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Digitized  by  the  Internet  Archive 

in  2007  with  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.archive.org/details/birdseyeviewofouOOdodgrich 


iSp  tl)e  ^ame  ^tttl)oi:* 


THE  CAMPAIGN  OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  With  Maps.  8to, 
fo.oo. 

RIDERS  OF  MANY  LANDS.  Profusely  illustrated  by  Remington,  and 
from  photographs  of  Oriental  subjects.  8vo,  $3.00. 

A  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL  V\^AR.  With  Maps  and  Illus- 
trations.  Students' Edition.    Crown  8vo,  j^i. 00,  «r/.    Postpaid. 

PATROCLUS  ANDPENELOPE:A  Chat  in  the  Saddle.  Popular 
Edition.  With  woodcuts  from  instantaneous  photographs.  Crown 
8vo,  half  roan,  $1.25. 

GREAT  CAPTAINS.    With  Maps,  etc.    8vo,  $2.00. 

Great  Captains  : 

ALEXANDER.  A  History  of  the  Origin  and  Growth  of  the  Art  of  War, 
from  the  Eariiest  Times  to  the  Battle  of  Ipsus,  b.  c.  301 ;  with  a  de- 
tailed account  of  the  Campaigns  of  the  Great  Macedonian.  With  237 
Charts,  Maps,  Plans  of  Battles  and  Tactical  Manoeuvres,  Cuts  of 
Armor,  Uniforms,  Siege  Devices,  and  Portraits.    2  vols.  8vo,  $5.00. 

HANNIBAL  A  History  of  the  Art  of  War  among  the  Carthaginians 
and  Romans,  down  to  the  Battle  of  Pydna,  168  b.  C  ;  with  a  detailed 
account  of  the  Second  Punic  War.  With  227  Charts,  Maps,  Plans  of 
Battles  and  Tactical  Manoeuvres,  Cuts  of  Armor,  Weapons,  and 
Uniforms.    2  vols.  8vo,  $5.00. 

C^SAR.  A  History  of  the  Art  ol  War  among  the  Romans,  down  to 
the  End  of  the  Roman  Empire  ;  with  a  detailed  account  of  the  Cam- 
paigns  of  Caius  Julius  Caesar.  With  258  Charts,  Maps,  Plans  of 
Battles  and  Tactical  Manoeuvres,  Cuts  of  Armor,  Weapons,  and 
Engines.    3  vols.  8vo,  $5.00. 

GUSTAVUS  ADOLPHUS.  A  History  of  the  Art  of  War  from  its 
revival  after  the  Middle  Ages  to  the  end  of  the  Spanish  Succession 
War,  with  a  detailed  account  of  the  Campaigns  of  the  great  Swede, 
and  the  most  famous  Campaigns  of  Turenne,  Cond^,  Eugene,  and 
Marlborough.  With  237  Charts,  Maps,  Plans  of  Battles  and  Tac- 
tical Manoeuvres,^  Cuts  of  Uniforms,  Arms,  and  Weapons,  a  vols. 
8vo,  $5.00.    Also  in  i  vol.  8vo,  $5.00. 

NAPOLEON.  A  History  of  the  Art  of  War,  with  many  Charts,  Maps, 
Plans  of  Battles  and  Tactical  Manoeuvres,  Portraits,  Cuts  of  Uni- 
forms, Arms,  and  Weapons. 

VOL.  I.  Includes  the  period  from  the  beginning  of  the  French 
Revolution  to  the  end  of  the  Eighteenth  Century,  with  a  detailed 
account  of  the  Wars  of  the  French  Revolution. 

VOL.  II.  Includes  the  period  from  the  beginning  of  the  Consulate 
to  the  end  of  the  Friedland  Campaign,  with  a  detailed  account  of 
the  Napoleonic  Wars. 

VOL.  III.  Includes  the  period  from  the  beginning  of  the  Peninsu- 
lar War  to  the  end  of  the  Russian  Campaign. 

VOL.  IV.  Includes  the  period  from  the  battle  of  Liitzen  through 
Napoleon's  last  campaign. 

4  vols.   8to,  each  $4.00  rut.    Carriage  extra. 


IN  PREPARATION: 
Uniform  in  style  with  the  above  volumes. 
FREDERICK    THE    GREAT. 
The  complete  series  (Alexander  to  Napoleon)  will  cover  the  History 
of  'lie  Art  of  War  from  the  earliest  times  down  to  1815. 

HOUGHTON    MIFFLIN    COMPANY 
Boston  and  Nbw  York. 


A  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW   OF 
OUR   CIVIL  WAR 


BY 

THEODORE  AYRAULT  DODGE 

BREVET   LIEUTENANT-COLONEL   UNITED   STATES   ARMY,   RETIRED    LIST;    AUTHOR  OF 

"the   CAMPAIGN   OF  CHANCELLORSVILLE,"    "  PATROCLUS   AND    PENELOPE " 

**  A  CHAT  IN  THE  SADDLE,"  "  GREAT  CAPTAINS  "  "  ALEXANDER" 

"HANNIBAL,"  *' C^SAR,"   "  GUSTAVUS   ADOLPHUS  " 

ETC.,  ETC. 


NEW  AND  REVISED  EDITION 


BOSTON  AND   NEW  YORK 
HOUGHTON  MIFFLIN  COMPANY 


Copyright,  1883, 
By  JAMES  R,  OSGOOD  &  CO. 

Copyright,  1897, 
By  THEODORE  A.  DODGE. 

All  rights  reserved. 


*    t  • 

c      *    • 


i" 


{dO 


•^^^ 


CONTENTS. 


F16I 
I5TR0DUCT0BT  LeTTEB Til 

I.  Thb  Casus  Belli 1 

II.  The  Opening  Situation   .        .        .     '  .        .        .        .5 

III.  The  Fibst  Clash  of  Abms 13 

rV.  Bull  Kun 16 

V.  The  Mighty  West  Moves 21 

YI.  The  Fibst  Confederate  Line  Bbokeh   .        .        .        .25 
VII.  New  Madbid  and  Island  No.  10     .        .        .        .        .29 

^  Tin.  The  Blockade 33 

IX.  Eablt  Outseibt  Operations 36 

X.  The  Advance  op  the  Westbbn  Abmies.  —  Shiloh        .    42 

XI.  McClellan  Moves  to  the  Peninsula     .        .        .        .49 

XII.  The  Peninsular  Campaign  inJbopardt.  —  Fair  Oaks  .    55 

XIII.  The  Seven  Days 62 

XIV.  Popti's  Campaign       .        .        .      • 69 

XV.  BuELL  AND  Bragg 82 

XVI.  luEA  AND  Corinth     . 89 

XVII.  Grant's  Failure  against  Vickbburg      .        .        .        .93 
XVIII.  Sherman's  Failure  against  Vicksbubo  .        .        .        .99 

XIX.  Lee's  First  Invasion.  —  Antietam 102 

XX.  Again  to  the  Rappahannock 108 

XXI.  The  Hobbob  of  Fbedebicksbubo 110 

XXII.  The  Soldieb  of  Nobth  and  South         .        •     '  .        .116 
XXIII    HosECBANS  AND  Bbagg.  —  Stone's  Riveb        •        •        .  122 

XXIV.  Chancellobsvillb 127 

XXV.  Lee's  Second  Invasion     ..•••••  132 
XXVI.  Gettysbubo 136 

227618 


VI  CONTENTS, 

PAOB 

XXVII.  Gbant  again  MorBS  on  Vicksburg  .        .        .        .  142 

XXVIII.  Grant  Turns  Pemberton's  Left       ....  145 

XXIX.  Grant  Drives  Pemberton  into  Vicksburg     .        .151 

XXX.  Siege  of  Vicksburg 166 

XXXI.  Banks  and  Port  Hudson 162 

XXXII.  Sparring  for  a  Hold.  —  Minb  Buk  .        •        ,        .  167 

XXXIII.  RosECRANS  Moves  upon  Bbaog 172 

XXXIV.  Chickamauga •        ,  179 

XXXV.  The  Battle  of  Chattanooga 184 

XXXVI.  Further  Outskirt  Operations 190 

XXXVII.  The  Wilderness 197 

0:XVTTI.  Spotsylvania 204 

XXXI X.  The  Minor  Armies 209 

>i  L.  Again  by  the  Flank.  —  Stalemate  .        .        .        .213 

^LLl.  More  Blood.  —  Cold  Harbor 217 

XLII.  Sherman  Looks  Toward  Atlanta    ....  223 

XLIII.  Sherman  Moves  on  Atlanta 227 

XLIV.  On  to  Marietta 231 

XLV.  Marietta 236 

XL VI.  Kenesaw 239 

XLVn.  Grant's  Change  of  Base 244 

XLVIII.  Petersburg. —The  Mine  Fiasco       ....  248 
XLIX.  Washington  in  Alarm  for  the  Last  Time     .        .  252 

L.  Atlanta 265 

LI.  A  Protracted  Siege 263 

LII.  Sheridan  in  the  Valley    .•••••  269 

LIII.  Hood  Takes  the  Offensive 279 

LIV.  Hood  Makes  for  Tennessee 282 

LV.  Sherman  Astonishes  Hood 286 

LVI.  Sherman's  Goal 291 

LVII.  Hood  Seeks  to  Crush  Schofield.  —  Franklin        .  293 

LVIII.  Hood  Broken  by  Thomas. — Nashville    ,        .        .  297 

LIX>  Sherman  Moves  Through  the  Carolinas        .        .  302 

LX    The  Final  Campaign 810 

LXT   A  Few  Stray  Items 820 

Glossary 827 

Index 839 


MAPS    AND    CHAKTS. 


PAGE 

1.  Bull  Run,  July  21,  1861 17 

2.  FoKTS  Henry  and  Donelson,  Feb.  6  and  16,  1862          .         .  27 

3.  New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10,  March,  1862       .        .         .30 

4.  Pea  Ridge,  March  5-8,  1862 31 

5.  Shiloh  (or  Pittsburg  Landing),  April  6  and  7,  1862           .         .  44 

6.  Williamsburg,  May  5,  1862 63 

7.  Fair  Oaks,  May  31,  June  1,  1862 69 

8.  Seven  Days,  June  26,  July  2, 1862 63 

9.  Pope's  Campaign  (1),  Aug.  24,  1862 71 

10.  Pope's  Campaign  (2),  Aug.  28,  A.M 76 

11.  Pope's  Campaign  (3),  Aug.  28,  6  P.M 76 

12.  Pope's  Campaign  (4),  Aug.  29,  Noon 77 

13.  Perryville,  Oct.  8,  1862 87 

14.  luKA,  Sept.  19,  1862 90 

16.   Corinth,  Oct.  8,  4,  1862 91 

16.  Memphis  to  Vicksburg,  1862,  1863 96 

17.  Antietam,  Sept.  16,  17,  1862 106 

18.  Fredericksburg,  Dec.  13,  1862         .        .        .        .        .        .  113 

19.  Stone's  River,  Dec.  31,  1862 123 

20.  Chancellorsville,  May  2,  1863 129 

21.  Chancellorsville,  May  3,  4,  5,  1863 130 

22.  Gettysburg,  July  1,  1863 136 

23.  Gettysburg,  July  2,  3,  4,  1863 138 

24.  Campaign  against  Vicksburg  in  1863 146 

25.  Mine  Run,  Nov.  26-30,  1863 170 

26.  RosECRANs'  Manceuvre,  Aug.  20-Sept.  17,  1863       .         .        .176 

27.  Chickamauga,  Sept.  19,  20,  1863 180 

28.  Chattanooga,  Nov.  23,  24,  25,  1863 186 

vii 


viii  MAPS  AND   CHARTS. 

PAGE 

29.  Wilderness,  May  5-6,  1864 201 

30.  Spotsylvania,  May  8-21,  1864 204 

31.  North  Anna,  May  23-26,  1864        ' 214 

32.  Cold  Harbor,  May  31,  June  12,  1864 219 

33.  Pickett's  Mills  and  New  Hope  Church,  May  25-27,  1863  .  232 

34.  Operations  about  Marietta,  June  14-28,  1864      .         .         .  237 

35.  Operations  about  Petersburg,  June,  1864,  to  April,  1865    .  249 

36.  Operations  about  Atlanta,  July  17-Sept.  2, 1864  .         .  257 

37.  Winchester  (or  Opequon),  Sept.  19,  1864        ....  272 

38.  Fisher's  Hill,  Sept.  22,  1864 273 

39.  Cedar  Creek,  Oct.  19,  1864 276 

40.  Franklin,  Nov.  30,  1864 296 

41.  Nashville,  Dec.  15,  16,  1864 298 


MAPS   SPECIALLY  PEEPARED  FOR   THIS   WOEK. 

1.  General  Map  op  the  Theatre  of  War     .        .  Front  Covers 

2.  Map  op  the  United  States  in  1860-61  (showing  the  States 

that  seceded  to  form  the  Confederate  States)  .        .        .        4-5 

3.  Map  op  the  Theatre  op  the  Western  Campaigns  .        .    24-25 

4.  Map  op  the  Theatre  op  the  Georgia  and  Carolina 

Campaigns 34-35 

5.  Map    op    the    Theatre    of    the    South-western    Cam- 

paigns         82-83 

6    Map  of  the  Thbatrb  of  the  Virginia  Campaigns  .  Back  Covert 


DEDIOATOET  LETTEE. 


To  Robert  Elkin  Neil  Dodge:  — 

My  dear  Neil, — Few  of  the  generation  to  which  you 
belong  will  ever  become  familiar  with  the  details  of  the 
gigantic  struggle  through  which  your  father's  generation 
fought.  But  every  young  American  should  know  its  out- 
lines. The  following  pages  are  what  I  long  ago  promised 
you,  when  you  should  be  of  an  age  to  take  an  interest  in  the 
subject.  They  are  too  few  to  make  any  pretence  to  being  a 
history  of  the  war ;  nor  have  they  anything  to  do  with  its 
political  aspect. 

A  soldier  can  discuss  calmly  victory  or  defeat.  Politics  do 
not  seem  to  be  treated  with  equal  good-temper.  Each  side 
in  our  great  Civil  War  believed  itself  in  the  right,  and  fought 
with  the  courage  so  engendere4.  You  need  not  busy  yourself 
with  the  asperities  of  the  political  field  of  twenty  years  ago. 
The  causes  which  brought  about  the  war  have  been  stated  in 
the  briefest  manner  only. 

The  principal  military  events  are  herein  grouped  in  such 
sequence  that  a  careful  reading,  with  the  maps  before  you,  will 
yield  you  a  fair  knowledge  of  what  modem  war  is,  and  what 
our  Civil  War  was.  Many  interesting  minor  operations  have 
been  barely  mentioned  ;  some  altogether  omitted.  All  impor- 
tant ones  have  due  space  allotted  to  them  as  even-handedly 
as  the  matter  and  the  general  purpose  of  the  work  will  allow. 
Many  of  the  manoeuvres  about  Petersburg  in  the  last  year  of 
the  war  were  on  a  scale  so  vast  that  they  rank  almost  as 
separate  campaigns.     But  although  they  called  for  endurance 


X  INTRODUCTORY  LETTER, 

and  skill  of  the  highest  order  and  for  enormous  sacrifices,  aa 
they  were  really  parts  of  one  great  whole,  less  space  has  in 
some  instances  been  devoted  to  these  than  to  other  lesser 
but  independent  conflicts.  The  skeleton  thus  presented,  can 
readily  be  clothed  from  the  standard  histories. 

To  know  this  subject  well  requires  the  diligent  study  of 
many  volumes.  I  have  tried  to  give  you  a  good  general  idea 
in  one. 

No  claim  to  originality  is  made  for  this  book.  The  facts, 
and  many  of  the  opinions,  have  been  gleaned  from  the  pages 
of  numerous  authors.  Their  patient  labors  have  made  the 
history  of  our  Civil  Strife  the  property  of  the  public ;  and  to 
all  of  them  my  thanks  are  due. 

The  maps  are  accurate  enough  for  the  purposes  of  the  book. 
To  convey  a  rapid  general  idea  of  the  various  battle-fields  is 
their  aim  rather  than  the  greater  exactness  which  may  be 
found  in  more  extended  works.  The  small  rectangles,  repre- 
senting troops,  indicate  general  position  only.  Too  great 
detail  has  been  purposely  avoided. 

The  few  technical  terms,  which  for  convenience  and  greater 
conciseness  have  been  used  in  the  book,  all  but  explain  them- 
selves. And  few,  indeed,  are  the  firesides  in  this  country 
which  have  not  at  least  one  member  who  can  interpret  the 
ordinary  manoeuvres  of  grand-tactics  or  strategy.  A  short 
glossary  is  appended. 

Though  but  twenty  years  have  elapsed  since  these  events 
were  enacted,  the  authorities  on  our  Civil  War  constantly 
disagree  as  to  numbers  and  localities;  frequently  even  as 
to  dates.  Errors  have  probably  crept  into  this  volume. 
But  they  will  be  found,  it  is  hoped,  neither  many  nor 
grave. 

The  intelligent  treatment  of   military  operations  necessi- 


INTRODUCTORY  LETTER.  XI 

tates  more  or  less  criticism.  That  which  has  here  been 
indulged  in  is  meant  to  be  temperate  as  well  as  honest.  It 
is  made  with  a  full  appreciation  of  the  unusual  difficulties 
which  beset  our  generals,  with  a  sincere  admiration  of  their 
qualities  and  services,  and  in  that  spirit  of  diflSdence  which 
should  become  a  soldier  who  bore  but  a  modest  part  in  the 
great  struggle  which  they  conducted  to  a  successful  issue. 

Our  Civil  War  was  full  of  dramatic  incident.  Every  war 
is.  But  the  narrow  limits  of  this  work  forbid  the  devotion  of 
any  space  to  what  others  have  sufficiently  painted.  My  aim 
has  been  to  give  the  layman  a  clear  idea  of  the  war  as  a  mili- 
tary whole,  paying  no  heed  to  individual  heroism  nor  dwelling 
upon  the  war  as  a  spectacle.  Regimental  histories  have 
already  done,  and  will  continue  to  do,  this.  Names  are  given 
only  to  elucidate  operations. 

While  holding  the  conviction  that  the  cause  of  the  North 
was  right,  I  yield  to  no  Southerner  in  my  admiration  of  the 
splendid  gallantry  of  our  old  enemy,  now  our  brother ;  and  I 
believe  that  no  one  will  accuse  me  of  intentional  partiality  in 
my  narration  of  events. 

I  need  not  ask  you,  my  dear  Neil,  to  study  these  pages, 
for  you  are  now  old  enough  to  desire  an  intelligent  knowledge 
of  our  great  war. 

Your  affectionate  father, 

THEODORE  AYRAULT  DODGE. 

BBOOKLms,  Mass.,  1888. 


PEEFACE. 


IN  correcting  the  figures  given  in  this  new  edition,  the  latest 
War  Department  publications,  the  invaluable  work  of  Colo- 
nel Fox,  and  other  well-known  sources  have  been  consulted.  It 
must  be  remembered  that  no  war  statistics  can  be  absolutely 
accurate.  Records  were  not  kept  in  the  same  manner  in  the 
Northern  and  Southern  armies;  many  have  been  lost;  some 
were  never  made.  Should  two  equally  competent  and  honest 
men  figure  up,  from  the  material  at  hand  and  by  the  same 
rules,  the  combatants  and  casualties  of  half-a-dozen  battles, 
they  would  vary  more  or  less.  Even  the  War  Department 
has,  from  time  to  time,  altered  the  figures  in  many  of  its 
tables.  But  reasonable  accuracy  can  be  attained;  and  the 
author  desires,  among  other  sources  of  information,  to  express 
his  peculiar  indebtedness  to  the  valuable  work  of  Col.  Thomas 
L.  Livermore,  whose  tables  of  forces  and  casualties  have  been 
laid  under  free  contribution.  Colonel  Livermore  has  figured  out 
the  numbers  for  the  Northern  and  Southern  armies  on  the  same 
basis.  His  studies  are  intended  to  enrich  the  archives  of  the 
Military  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts  ;  and  his  tabula- 
tion of  figures  of  the  Civil  War  is  singularly  accurate  and 
suggestive. 

The  facts  stated  have  been  diligently  compared  with  the 
OflScial  Records  of  the  Rebellion  by  Capt.  Edward  B.  Robins, 
for  many  years  Secretary  of  the  same  Society;  and,  owing  to 
his  valuable  labor,  for  which  my  earnest  thanks  are  due,  every 
such  fact  can  now  be  substantiated  from  the  record. 

The  author  alone  is  responsible  for  the  opinions  expressed. 

New  maps  have  been  prepared  from  the  Government  sur- 
veys and  charts.  These  have  equally  passed  under  the 
scrutiny  of  Captain  Robins.     They  are  all  north  and  south. 

The  author  hopes  that,  in  its  new  dress,  the  work  may  con- 
tinue to  give  the  same  satisfaction  which,  from  its  constant  sale 
in  a  more  expensive  form,  he  is  assured  that  it  has  so  far  done. 

Brookline,  October,  1896. 

ziu 


FOR  many  years  a  great  political  strife  had  been  grad* 
ually  undermining  the  ties  of  tradition  and  mutual 
interest  betwixt  North  and  South.  The  rival  sections  had 
Fought  side  by  side  in  conquering  our  independence  and  in 
maintaining  it.  ^Every  reason,  commercial  and  national, 
should  have  held  »e;  together.  The  slighter  differences  of 
opinion  had  been  mainly  about  tariff  protection  to  the 
Northern  manufacturers,  and  kindred  financial  subjects. 
Differences  like  these  could  scarcely  have  involved  serious 
results.  The  real  cause  of  the  growing  animosity  was 
associated  with  the  questions  attending  slavery. 

With  whatever  unanimity  servile  labor  may  now  be  con- 
demned as  a  social  and  commercial  mistake,  —  leaving  its 
moral  aspect  entirely  out  of  the  question,  — the  institution 
of  slavery,  in  the  decade  preceding  the  war,  was  asserted 
by  the  Southern  States  to  be  the  keystone  of  their  success 
m  the  same  measure  that  paid  labor  was  held  in  the  North 
10  have  built  up  the  wealth  of  its  manufacturing  communi- 
ties and  to  have  opened  the  wheat  fields  of  the  West. 
The  difference  in  climate  and  products  yielded  each  section 
abundant  sources  of  argument  for  its  own  peculiar  views. 


2  c    c  e  ..  ^BIRD'G'r^TJS  ^lEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR. 

But  the  matter  did  not  stop  at  discussion.  The  South, 
to  acquire  additional  political  power,  desired  to  extend  the 
institution  into  the  rapidly  growing  Territories  of  the 
Union;  the  North,  for  similar  reasons,  desired  to  have  it 
excluded  from  all  but  those  States  where  it  had  taken  such 
firm  root  that  it  could  not  be  extirpated  without  too  great 
upheaval.  There  was  of  course  in  each  section  a  minority 
of  very  bitter  opponents  and  favorers  of  slavery,  whose 
extreme  utterances  and  acts  bred  more  or  less  ill-feeling. 
But  the  general  question  was  confined  to  the  territorial 
extension  or  restriction  of  slave  labor. 

For  many  years  the  pro-slavery  men  North  and  South 
had  held  possession  of  the  reins  of  government.  But  the 
party  of  free  labor,  owing  to  immigration,  which  prefer- 
ably sought  the  Northern  and  Western  States,  was  thought 
to  be  on  the  point  of  dispossessing  them.  The  Republican 
party,  which  desired  to  restrict  slavery  to  the  limits  it  al- 
ready occupied,  existed  mostly  in  the  North.  The  Demo- 
crats of  the  South  wished  to  extend  slavery ;  their  political 
allies  in  the  Northern  States  aimed  to  prevent  rupture  by 
concessions  to  the  Southern  idea. 

In  1860  a  new  President  had  to  be  chosen.  The  Demo- 
5rats  North  and  South  outnumbered  the  Republicans.  If 
they  worked  together,  they  could  scarcely  fail  to  elect  their 
candidate.  But  the  Southern  Democrats  demanded  a  plat- 
form which  should  recognize  both  slavery  as  a  national 
institution,  and  the  right  of  secession.  This  latter  was  no 
new  doctrine.  Secession  had  been  threatened  before,  and 
the  abstract  right  of  a  State  to  rupture  its  relations  with 
the  Union  had  been  stoutly  maintained  and  denied  on  the 


THE  CASUS  BELLu  3 

one  and  the  other  side.  The  demands  of  the  Southern  wing 
led  to  a  breach  in  the  Democratic  party,  the  result  of  which 
was  that  four  presidential  candidates  came  into  the  field,  — 
two  Democrats,  Douglas  representing  the  North  and 
Breckenridge  the  South;  a  Whig,  Bell,  representing  the 
party  of  concession ;  and  a  Republican,  Lincoln. 

Out  of  nearly  4,700,000  votes,  Mr.  Lincoln  received 
1,900,000.  This  fell  short  of  an  actual  majority,  but  was 
much  more  than  any  other  candidate  received,  and  the 
usual  machinery  of  election  gave  the  Republican  candidate 
the  suffrages  of  the  electoral  college.  He  was  legally 
chosen  President. 

Still,  despite  their  defeat,  the  Democrats  would  retain  a 
majority  in  Congress,  and  could  assert  their  rights  in  am- 
ple measure.  But  this  power  was  not  ample  enough. 
The  ultra  men  among  the  Southern  leaders  determined 
upon  actual  secession  as  a  remedy,  hoping  to  retrieve 
by  threats  of  force  what  they  had  lost  by  their  political 
rupture  with  the  Northern  Democracy.  Many  opposed 
this  course.  But  in  vain.  The  passions  of  the  South- 
em  people  were  at  fever  heat.  Secession  measures  were 
at  once  put  in  play.  And  as  the  National  administra- 
tion, until  the  succeecung  March,  was  still  Democratic, 
the  South  reaped  many  advantages  from  the  weakness, 
and  in  some  instances  outright  dishonesty  of  United  States 
officials. 

Compromises  were  attempted.  But  matters  had  gone 
too  far.  Before  New  Year  of  1861  had  dawned.  South 
Carolina  had  set  up  as  an  independent  power.  The  other 
Southern  States  in  turn  passed  ordinances  of  secession,  a 


4  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR. 

Confederacy  was  formed,  and  North  and  South  were  openly 

arrayed  against  each  other. 

But  it  must  be  remembered  that  while  slavjBry  had  been 

at  the  root  of  the  trouble,  the  actual  casus  belli  was  the 

act  of  secession,  to  maintain  and  to  prevent  which  our  Civil 

War  was  really  waged.     As  the  struggle  grew  in  intensity, 

the  final  extirpation  of  slavery  became  an  element  in  the 

calculations  of  the  North,  and  even  a  means  of  encouraging 

its  people.     But  at  the  outset  the  contest  was  solely  a  War 

for  the  LTnioii.  \      ^,  ,      ^  .  „        ^       . 

^      <>^  ^^J^  ^tM^  tT^*^ 


n- 


r 


THE    OPENING  SITUATIOir: 


A  RTRD'S^YE  view  of  Our  CivU  War  shows  a 
-/TJl.  threefold  division  of  military  operations.  The 
mightier  conflicts  had  their  scene  in  the  States  bordering 
on  the  East  or  on  the  West  of  the  Alleghany  Mountains. 
Most  minor  hostilities  were  waged  on  the  outskirts  of  the 
Confederacy.  Many  of  the  latter  had  so  little,  if  any, 
bearing  upon  the  general  result,  that  they  may.  be  briefly 
dismissed  from  sight  without  affecting  an  intelligent  view  of 
the  whole.  Some  bore  a  weighty  share  in  our  eventual 
success. 

It  will  be  remembered  that,  in  a  general  way,  the  offen- 

fiive  was  )lf^,  tn6  defensive  the  Confederate  share  of  the 

>\ 
struggle.  But  as  the  best  defense  is  often  a  vigorous  at- 
tack, so  the  Confederates  waged  sometimes  an  offensive- 
defensive  warfare,  as  in  the  case  of  Lee's  incursions  across 
the  Potomac  in  1862  and  1863,  or  Bragg's  march  to  the 
Ohio  river  in  1862.  But  the  general  policy  pursued  by 
the  Confederates  was  formulated  by  Jefferson  Davis  when 
he  said  that  "all  we  ask  is  to  be  let  alone." 

In  the  East  the  two  rival  capitals  faced  each  other  at  no 

great  inten^al,  and  were  hungrily  fought  for  over  the  nar- 

6 


/6rlU'''lylimJ)'$-IfF^JIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1861. 

row  territory  lying  between  them.  Here,  too,  was  the 
great  Confederate  captain,  and  under  him  served  the  6Ute 
of  the  Southern  legions.  In  the  West  there  was  no  such 
topograph^l  limitation.  The  possession  of  the  Mississippi 
river  was  ^iwr  primary  objective,  both  as  a  base  for  opera- 
tions into  the  interior  and  to  cut  off  from  the  enemy  tlie 
supplies  he  gathered  from  beyond.  The  outskjrt  operations 
consisted  mostly  of  lodgments  on  the  coast,  which  were  not 
utilized  to  any  greater  extent  than  to  keep  the  blockade  of 
the  Southern  ports  intact. 

Munitions  of  war  were  the  prime  necessity  of  the  Seces- 
sionists. Within  the  boundaries  of  each  State  there  had  at 
various  times  been  granted  to  the  National  Government 
certain  small  tracts  of  land  for  forts,  arsenals,  and  navy- 
yards.  These  had  been  kept  more  or  less  liberally  sup- 
plied with  arms,  ammunition,  and  stores  of  all  kinds.  A 
large  part  of  this  material  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  seced- 
ing States.  It  was  claimed  that  the  act  of  secession 
revested  in  each  State  the  title  to  the  land  so  granted  to 
the  Government;  and,  wherever  possible,  the  claim  was 
made  good  by  taking  possession  of  this  national  property. 
In  some  iiistanqes  the  garrisons  of  the  forts  held  their  own, 
and  ^resetred  these  coigns  of  vantage  to  the  United  States. 

South  Carolina  had  been  the  most  prominent  State  in 
warlike  activity.  But  the  forts  in  Charleston  harbor  were 
still  in  possession  of  the  National  Government  and  under 
command  of  Major  Anderson.  Without  these  citadels 
the  new-bom  power  of  South  Carolina  would  be  unable  to 
control  the  entrance  to  its  only  seapoft.  After  the  act  of 
secession,  therefore,  negotiations,  were  opened  with  Preei- 


1861.]  THE  OPENING  SITUATION.  7 

dent  Buchanan  for  yielding  up  their  posses- 

eion.       Vacillating     though     he    was,    the 

President  could  not  consent  to   this.     He  prolonged   the 

discussion.    Anderson,  with  soldierly  decision,  cut  the  knot 

of  the  difficulty  by  abandoning  the  shore  fortresses  and 

transferrin":  his  small  force  of  one  hundred 

°  .        Dumber  26. 

and   twenty-eight  men  to  Fort  Sumter,  m 
the  centre  of  the  harbor,  prepared  to  hold  it  to  the  last. 
Months    elapsed    in    inaction.     Anderson's   commissariat 
beffan  to  fail.     Attempts  were  made  by  the 

°  r  .^  Jan.,  Aph,  1861. 

President  to  revictual  the  fort,  but  they  were 

unsuccessful. 

Finally   South   Carolina   struck  the   blow.     Always    a 

leader  in  the  South,  she  now  had  at  her  back  the  moral 

support  of  the   other  seceding   States.     After  summoning 

Fort  Sumter  to  surrender,  fire  was  opened 

.  April  12. 

upon  it  from  the  rehabilitated  United  States 

forts,  and  from  shore  batteries  erected  during  the  inter- 
regnum of  three  mouths.  A  bloodless  bombardment  of 
two  days  resulted  in  a  conflagration  which,  added  to  the  ex- 
haustion of  his  ammunition,  obliged  Anderson  to  capitulate. 
This  he  did,  and,  marching  out  with  all  the  honors  of  war, 
he  embarked  his  troops  for  the  North.     This  ^      ^ 

first  act  of  war  was,  however,  more  a  politi- 
cal than  a  military  combat. 

The  Northern  people  had  until  this  moment  disbelieved 
in  a  final  rupture.  But  their  eyes  were  now  opened,  and 
Fort  Sumter  was  the  signal  for  an  universal  uprising  to 
avenge  the  insult  to  the  National  flag.  President  Lincoln 
lit  once  issued  a  call  for  volunteers.     The  response  wa« 


8  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1861. 

unmistakable  in  its  intensity.  The  busy  merchant,  the 
plodding  farmer,  the  mechanic  and  the  professional  man, 
each  dropped  his  avocation  to  enter  the  ranks,  and,  as  if  by 
magic,  the  peaceful  North  became  one  vast  camp. 

In  the  South  preparations  were  much  further  advanced, 
but  recruitment  was  no  more  speedy.  Both  sides  donned 
their  armor  for  the  now  inevitable  fray. 

The  navy-yard  at  Norfolk  contained  much  material  of 

war  sadly  needed  at  the  South.     By  a  series  of  blunders 

this  valuable  possession  was  allowed  to  fall  into  the  hands 

of  the  new  Confederacy,  much  to  Soaa*  dis- 

April2d. 

comfiture   and   eventual  danger.      Harper's 
Ferry,  too,  an  arsenal  containing  the  most  necessary  ma- 
chinery for  producing  arms  and  ammunition 

Apnl  18. 

o^ned  by  the  United  States,  was  evacuated 
and  degtroyed  by  its  garrison. 

The  city  of  Washington  stood  in  no  little  peril.  A 
vigorous  raid  from  Virginia  could  readily  have  seized 
the  capital  at  any  time  during  the  first  month  of  hos- 
tilities. But  gradually  troops  from  the  North  arrived 
and  rescued  the  seat  of  government  from  danger.  In 
Baltimore  sentiment  was  strongly  for  secession.  The 
government  of  Maryland  was  on  the  point  of  leading  the 
State  in  the  wake  of  her  erring  sisters.  The  passage 
through  Baltimore  of  the  first  Northern  regiment  occasioned 
a  serious  riot,  and  the  regiments  that  followed  had  to  be 
transported  bj  way  of  Annapolis,  until  Bal- 
timore was  occupied  by  a  sufficient  force  to 
control  its  unruly  population^  K  A  ^  i 
All  these  events,  and  many  otner  minor  circumstances, 


1861.]  THE  OPENING  SITUATION.  9 

were  mere  incidents  to  the  opening  of  hostilities,  and  need 
but  a  casual  reference.  They  scarcely  belong  to  the  mili- 
tary history  of  the  war. 

The  new  belligerents  proposed  to  make  their  primary 
line  of  defense  along  the  Ohio  river  and  the  northern 
boundary  of  Maryland.  A  glance  at  the  map  shows  how 
large  is  the  territory  so  covered,  as  compared  with  the 
loyal  States,  and  queUs  our  wonder  at  the  opinion  which 
foreigners  at  first  held  as  to  the  probable  issue  of  our 
struggle,  although  the  census  of  1860  shows  nearly  two 
thirds  of  the  population  to  be  in  the  North. 

But  the  conditions  under  which  the  Southern  people 
lived  were  doubtless  such  as  to  enable  it  to  organize  an 
efficient  army  with  more  celerity.  And  this  fact  was  over- 
estimated abroad,  while  the  knowledge  of  where  resided 
the  siuews  of  war  was  naturally  more  limited  than  at 
present.  For  be  it  remembered  that,  thirty-five  years 
ago,  we  occupied  no  more  important  place  in  the  eyes  of 
even  intelligent  Europeans  than  do  at  present  the  South 
American  States  in  ours. 

There  lurked  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  Southern 
leaders  that  Maryland,  Kentucky,  and  Missouri  would  join 
the  Confederacy,  while  Virginia  was  considered  one  body 
indivisible.  But  they  were  destined  to  early  disappoint- 
ment, as  surely  as  to  eventual  miscarriage  of  the  bitterest 
kind.  In  the  seething  of  political  uncertainties,  Ken- 
tucky was  saved  to  the  Union.  Even  the  western  half 
of  Virginia  followed  her  water-courses  and  affiliated  with 
Ohio  rather  than  with  her  slave-holding  twin ;  while  the 
troubles  in  Baltimore   culminated   in  the  half-willing  re- 


10  BIRD'S-ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.        [1861 

demption  of  Maryland.  The  Potomac  thus  became  a 
Northern  barrier  instead  of  a  Southern  base.  The  Con- 
federates were  driven  to  substitute  for  it  the  Rappahan- 
nock, in  Virginia ;  while  west  of  the  AUeghanies,  as  tht' 
Ohio  river  remained  in  our  control,  they  were  forced  to 
adopt  an  irregular  line  across  the  State  of  Kentucky,  on 
which  to  make  their  first  defense. 

This  line  was,  however,  weak,  because  it  is  tapped  by 
the  Mississippi,  the  Cumberland,  and  the  Tennessee  riv- 
ers ;  and  these  became  at  once  available  to  our  armies  ae 
lines  of  operation  and  supply.  And  the  early  control  by 
us  of  both  banks  of  the  Ohio  river,  together  with  the  res- 
cue of  Missouri  from  secession  government 

AjirW  and  May.    ,        ^,    .  in  t 

by  Blau*  and  gallant  Lyon,  enabled  us  to 
keep  the  war  off  loyal  territory. 

Confederate  General  Pillow  had  ojcupied  New  Madrid  on 

^^         the  Mississippi.     The  intention  of  the  Con- 

federates  had  been  to  seize  upon  all  impor- 

«  Aiignwi.        ^^^^  points  about  the  mouth  of  the  Ohio 

river,  and  shortly  a  move  was  made  from  New  Madrid  to 

Columbus  by  fifteen  thousand  men,  under  Polk,  who  from 

thence  attempted  to  grasp  Paducah,  where  the  Tennessee 

empties  into  the  Ohio.     This  and  Cairo  were  two  points  of 

great  military  value. 

General  John  C.  Fremont  was  at  this  time  in  command 
in  the  West.  His  ancient  reputation,  beyond  his  abilities, 
at  least  in  regular  warfare,  had  placed  him  where  he  was. 
Under  orders  from  him.  Grant,  early  appointed  a  brigadier- 
SeptefrbcrS  general,  anticipated  Polk  by  seizing  Cairo, 
and  a  day  or  two  later  Paducah.     He  had  a 


1861.]  THE  OPENING   SITUATION.  11 

force  of  about  fourteen  thousand  men ;  Polk  some  ^yq 
thousand  more.  This  move  on  Grant's  part  checkmated 
the  Confederate  plans,  and  saved  this  important  strategic 
centre  to  the  Union. 

The  Confederates  were,  however,  reluctant  to  yield  up 
control  of  Kentucky,  and  were  equally  anxious  to  forestall 
our  use  of  the,  to  them,  all-important  rivers  above-named. ' 
They  speedily  fortified  Columbus,  New  Madrid,  and  Island 
No.  10  on  the  Mississippi,  erected  Fort  Henry  on  the  Ten^ 
nessee,  and  Fort  Donelson  on  the  Cumberland,  and  estab- 
lished a  strong  camp  of  observation  at  the  railroad  centre 
of  Bowling  Green  as  an  outpost  to  their  main  position  at 
Nashville,  while  ZoUicoffer  was  sent  through  Cumberland 
Gap  to  form  a  flying  right  wing.  This  was  the  first  Con- 
federate line  of  defense  in  the  West,  after  the  Ohio  river 
had  been  lost  beyond  hope  of  recovery. 

It  will  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  a  country  whose  sparse 
population  prevents  its  sustaining  large  armies,  and  where 
each  contestant  has  to  be  victualled  from  his  own  base, 
lines  of  operation  must  follow  navigable  rivers  or  railroads. 
These  will  always  be  observed  in  our  war  to  play  a  larger 
part  than  in  European  campaigns,  where  provisions  and 
forage  are  abundant  enough  for  an  army  to  live  upon  the 
country  through  which  it  is  operating,  and  roads  are  such 
as  to  allow  supplies  to  be  readUy  collected  and  trooi)8 
moved. 

Upon  our  side,  preparations  were  at  once  entered  into 
for  piercing  the  Confederate  line  in  Kentucky.  A  river 
flotilla  was  built.  It  consisted  of  Eads'  "  turtle  "  gun-boats, 
wnich  were  stem-wheelers  of  some  five  hundred  tons  bur- 


12  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR,        [1861. 

den,  light  draught,  and  with  hull  barely  a  foot  out  of 
water,  carrying  an  iron-plated  casemate  eight  feet  high 
armed  with  a  dozen  guns ;  of  remodelled  river  steamboats ; 
of  flat-boats  carrying  heavy  mortars  and  towed  by  tugs, 
and  of  a  motley  assortment  of  other  vessels. 

On  their  side,  the  Confederates  were  not  behind  us  in 
vigor,  though  they  lacked  our  mechanical  appliances,  and 
their  fleet  was  supplemented  with  several  cigar-shaped 
rams. 

While  in  the  West  weapons  are  being  wrought  for  con^ 
flict,  let  us  turn  to  the  £a8t. 


St 

THE  FIRST  CLASH  OP  ASMB-. 

H '('UTILITIES  were  initiated  in  the  East  by  General 
Geo.  B.  McClellan*8  campaign  in  West  Virginia. 
It  wa.f  essential  to  preserve  intact  the  new-bom  State  from 
the  aggression  of  her  ancient  partner,  and  to  organize  her 
forces.     A  movement   culminating   in   a  small  success  at 
Philippi   gave   a  happy  inspiration   to   ©ttr 
arms,  and  did  something  to  save  the  Balti- 
more  and   Ohio  Railroad  to  the  Federals.     To  recover 
possession  of  or  interrupt  this  great  highway,  of  impera- 
tive necessity  to  us,  was  the  cause  of  constant  Southern 
raids  thereafter.      Following  upon  Philippi,  early  in  the 
summer,  McClellan,  with  Rosecrans  as  his  second,  won  an 
easy  triumph  over  Garnett  and  Pegram  at         ^^^^^ 
the  battle  of  Rich  Mountain,  and  definitely 
rescued  West  Virginia  from  the  control   of  Confederate 
troops.       This   first  success,    though   obtained' by  simple 
means,  was  lauded  as  a  great  strategic  feat.     It  gave  both 
McClellan  and  Rosecrans   a  reputation   which   did  them 
eventual  injustice,  inasmuch  as  it  thrust  them  into  promi- 
nent positions  which  no  officer  in  the  country  was  equal  to 

without  the  experience  of  many  months  and  firequent  fail- 

IS  •   ^ 


14     .  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.        [1861 

ures.  The  nation  was  utterly  uneducated  in  war.  Gen- 
eral Winfield  Scott,  our  Commander-in-Chief,  whose  native 
ability  was  unquestioned,  had  outlived  his  powers.  Few 
of  our  officers  had  commanded  even  a  regiment.  Our 
only  recent  training  had  been  in  the  Mexican  War,  a 
distinctly  fine  campaign,  but  of  limited  scope.  The  work 
now  to  be  done  required  armies  such  as  none ,  since  Napo- 
leon had  seen  under  his  control.  Unlucky  they  who  were 
early  placed  in  high  command.  The  conditions  of  failure" 
were  strong  in  both  themselves  and  the  people  for  whom 
they  fought.  '  .y^/^  n\^  ' 

Inspired  by  McClellan's  success,  General  l^atterson,  ap- 
pointed to  command  Pennsylvania  forces,  projected  a'  plat 
for  recapturing  Harper's  Ferry,  now  held  by  General  Jos.  E. 
Johnston.  This  proved  easy^  of  accomplish- 
ment, for  Johnston  evacuated  the  place  as 
untenable,  destroyed  the  Works,  and  retired  upon  Win- 
chester. Not  far  away,  Patterson,  after  sundry  counter- 
marchings,  sat  down  before  his  opponent,  under  explicit 
instructions  from"^General  Scott  to  bring  him  to  battle,  or  in 
any  event  to  stand  athwart  his  path  and  prevent  his  rein- 
forcing the  main  body  of  the  enemy,  in  the  movement  now 
being  projected  tow.ard  Centreville. 

Encouraged  by  certain  logistic  successes  at  Annapolis 
and  Baltimore^  General  Butler,  who  had  been  translTerred  to 
Fprtress  Monroe,  managed  to  make  his  first 
military  fiasco  at  Big  Bethel.  This  affair, 
which  was  an  attempt  to  break  up  a  Confederate  camp  at 
that  place,  amounted  to  no  more  than  to  display  incom- 
petency in  conception  and  conduct.     But  it  greatly  elated 


1861.]  THE  FIRST  CLASH  OF  ARMS.  .    15 

the  South,  as  did  also  Schenck's  quasi-picnic  reconnoissance 

on  railroad  cars  to  Vienna,  Va.,  about  the 

June  17. 
same  time,  in  which  he  was   preceded  by 

neither  vanguard   nor   flankers,    and   was   surprised    and 

routed  by  k  party  of  the  enemy  who  concealed  themselves 

in  the  woods  for  the  purpose 


BULL    RUN. 

rwas  between  the  rival  capitals  that  public  opinion  first 
worried  our  army  into  serious  operations.  The  forces 
in  the  field  at  this  time  had  grown  to  unusual  proportions. 
On  the  Union  side  close  upon  two  hundred  thousand  men 
bore  arms ;  on  the  Confederate,  all  but  one  hundred 
thousand.  The  Union  fleet  consisted  of  sixty-nine  vessels, 
carrying  one  thousand  three  hundred  and  forty-six  guns. 
There  lay  along  the  Potomac  a  full  one  hundred  thousand 
men.  But  the  eager  champions  of  either  belligerent  were 
yet  far  from  being  soldiers. 

McDowell,  who  commanded  the  army  in 

the  field  in  front  of  Washington,  though  he 
had  little  confidence  in  the  discipline  of  his  troops,  was 
constrained  into  action  by  pressure  from  the  War  Depart- 
ment and  the  President,  who  in  their  turn  responded  only 
to  the  clamor  of  the  impatient  North.     He  accordingly  set 

a   column    of    about    thirty   thousand    men 

in  motion  against  the  Confederate  general, 
Beauregard,  who  withdrew  behind  Bull  Run  with  a  some- 
what inferior  force.  Each  was  determined  to  measure 
swords  with  his  ancient  comrade. 

16 


1861.] 


BULL  RUN. 


17 


When  the  armies  have  been  brought  into  tactical  contact, 

each  commander  plans  a  manoeuvre  by  which  to  turn  the 

other's  left.     The  Federals  are  earlier  in  the 

Julv21. 
execution  of  theirs,  crossing  Bull  Run  above 

the  Stone  Bridge,  and  come  very  near  to  crushing  the  Con- 


e  OF 


'io^ 


^"-'Tjioof 


>^(^«» 


CENTREV 


'e\ 


1 


5*  \v\'po'^o 


't^-^    \\ 


^< 


Bull  Run.    July  21,  1861. 

federate  left,  which  has  been  depleted  by  Beauregard  in 
order  to  strengthen  his  right ;  for  with  the  latter  wing  he 
proposes  to  cross  the  stream  at  Blackburn's  Ford  and 
Union  Mills,  and  to  fall  upon  McDowell's  left  at  Centre- 
ville.  A  small  force  of  the  enemy  has  gallantly  held  the 
Manassas    plateau   against    our   advance,    but  only   with 


18  BIRirS'ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.        [1861. 

grievous  loss.  It  is  here  that  Thomas  J.  Jackson  well 
earns  the  soubriquet  of  "  Stonewall "  by  his  solid  defense. 

Victory  seems  to  declare  for  McDowell.  It  is  almost 
within  his  grasp.  The  Southern  outlook  is  desperate. 
But  Beauregard  recalls  his  scattered  forces  from  the  right. 
The  plateau  is  secured.  The  conflict  is  again  renewed  and 
with  vigor.  The  raw  troops  on  both  sides  have  fought 
with  a  gallantry  premonitory  of  bloodier  contests.  Officers 
have  fallen  in  great  numbers.  Both  contestants  have  been 
quickly  exhausted,  and  on  either  side  there  is  wanting  but 
a  trifling  cause  to  incline  towards  victory  or  defeat. 

But  Patterson's  seniUty  works  our  ruin.  In  lieu  of 
barring  Johnston's  passage,  his  one  obvious  duty,  he  has 
left  an  open  road  for  this  wily  soldier  to  escape  him  in  the 
V^alley  and  to  march  to  the  assistance  of  Beauregard. 
Johnston,  with  a  portion  of  his  troops,  is  already  present. 
The  rest  are  coming  up  by  the  railroad. 

It  is  2.30  P.M.  The  dust  of  an  approaching  column  is 
Been  on  the  horizon.  Is  it  Patterson  ?  Or  is  it  Kirby  Smith, 
with  the  balance  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  ?  Beau- 
regard prepares  for  retreat,  for  he  fears  it  is  the  Federal 
column.  But  the  stars  and  bars  are  finally  descried.  The 
Confederate  hour  of  triumph  has  come.  The  arrival  on 
the  field  of  this  last  detachment  throws  eight  thousand  fresh 
troops  upon  the  Union  flank  and  rear,  and  turns  the  tide. 
llie  laurels  which  McDowell  should  have  added  to  his 
always  solid  reputation  are  lost  in  a  confused  retreat,  and 
this,-  before  the  vicinity  of  Washington  is  reached,  becomes 
utter  rout.  The  enemy  is,  however,  in  a  sunilar  strait, 
and  no  idea  of  pursuit  is  entertained.     The  losses,  twenty- 


1861.]  BULL  RUN.  19 

seven  hundred  on  ours  and  nearly  as  much  on  the  enemy's 
side,  show  that  the  field  has  been  neither  won  nor  lost 
without  stubborn  contest.  Patterson,  after  this  disgrace- 
ful lapse ^  retires  to  Harper's  Ferry,  where  he  is  super- 
seded by  Banks. 

After  Bull  Eun,  McClellan,  fresh  from  his  toe  quickly 
won  laurels  in  West  Virginia,  was  placed  in  supreme 
command,  and  sat  down  to  the  giant's  task  of  making  a 
mob  an  army.  The  South,  lulled  into  the  exultant  belief 
that  this  one  victory  would  suffice  to  close  the  war, 
really  eiirfered  worse  than  the  consequences  of  a  defeat  in 
allowing  self-applause  to  take  the  place  of  a  vigorous 
course  of  discipline.  Bull  Run  worked  benefit  to  the 
Union  in  as  great  measure  as  it  damaged  the  Confederate 
cause.  The  minds  of  all  in  the  Northern  States  were 
cemented  by  this  disaster  into  the  one  purpose  of  crushing 
out  the  heresy  of  secession. 

Generals  Rosecrans  and  R.  E.  Lee  lay 

August, 
facing   each   other   in  West  Virginia,  with 

some  ten  thousand  men  apiece.     There  are  but  three  roads 

across  the   Alleghanies    in   this    State.      One,    near  the 

Potomac,  the  Federals  had  kept;    one,  further  south,  at 

Great    Pass,    McClellan's    campaign    had    secured ;    the 

third,  by  way  of  Sewell's  Mountain,  was  still  open.     While 

Rosecrans  had  moved  south,  aorainst  Floyd, 

^      ,         .  ,  .      ,      ?  ".  September  10. 

at  (jrauley  river,  who  retired  after  a  combat 

at  Carnifex  Ferry,  Lee  sought  to  overcome  J.  J.  Reynolds' 

brigade,  which  alone  was  left  in  his  front  at 

Great  Pass.     But  his  method  showed  none      ®P  ™  ®^ 

of  the  wonderful  vigor  he  later  on  exhibited,  and,  after 


20  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR.         [1861. 

fairly  surrounding  Reynolds,  he  failed  to  attack  him,  and 
returned    to    make    head    against    Rosecrans.      He    thus 
enabled   Reynolds    to    assume    the    offensive    against    his 
lieutenant.     But  Reynolds'  attack  at  Green- 
brier   River   had   no   results.       Meanwhile 
Rosecrans,  though  with  a  weaker  force,  had  succeeded  in 
shutting  Lee    up    in   the    defiles    of   Sewell's    Mountain, 
but    lacked   numbers    sufficient  to  warrant   attack.      Lee 
was  recalled  to  other  duties.     After  a  couple 
of   minor    engagements  on  the  Greenbrier, 
New,  and  Gauley  Rivers,  which    had    small   importance, 
winter  put  an  end  to  operations  in  this  barren  region. 

This  disjointed  campaign  proved  of  value  in  that  it 
enabled  us  to  maintain  our  hold  on  the  new  State  of  West 
Virginia.  But  the  tools  of  war  were  in  raw  hands,  and 
the  operations  were  as  incomplete  as  the  country  was 
rugged,  and  the  means  of  transportation  difficult. 

We  must  now  turn  to  what  the  active  West  has 
accomplished. 


THE  MIGHTY  WEST  MOVfiS. 

r  I  IHE  operationa  in  Missouri   command  but  a  passing 
-L    notice,  as  all  trans-Mississippi  mancEUvres  bore  small 
relation   to   the   general   strategy  of  the  more   important 
fields.     Yet,  as  the  possession  of  any  part  of  that  State 
by  the  enemy  would  have  made  the  opening  qf;  the  Mis- 
sissippi river  a  much  more  onerous  task  fot'^-SfteJ  the  work 
t    of  rescuing  its  entire  territory  from  Confederate   control        9  < 
I    deserves  its  due  credit  among  the  efforts  of  the  war.      \f V^T* 
General   Lyon  had  assumed  control  of  affairs  in  Mis- 
souri, and  had  dispersed  the  forces  of  seced- 

^  .  .  June  17. 

ing  Governor  Jackson  at  BooneviUe,  while 

Sigel,  an  ancient  German  oflficer,  had  been  very  active  in 

raising  a  small  force  of  volunteers  in  the  lower  counties, 

and  had  crossed  swords  with  the  enemy  at 

•^  July  6. 

Carthage ;  but,  meeting  with  a  reverse,  he 

was  fain   to   retire  to  Springfield  under  the  aegis  of  hia 

chief.     The   effect   of  these   and   other   lesser   operations 

had   narrowed    the   control   of   the   Confederates    to   the 

south-west  comer  of  the  State,  whither  Lyon  had  pushed 

his    little    army.      It    was    not    long,    however,    before 

Lyon,     unsupported    by    his    superior,    Fremont,    found 


22  BIRD'S-ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.  [1861. 

that  the  advance  of  the  Confederates  Price 
and  McCulloch  upon  his  position  at  Spring- 
field with  a  large  force  was  seriously  compromising  his 
safety. 

To   rescue   himself    he   boldly   assailed    the   enemy   at 
Wilson's   Creek.     Sigel   was    sent   by   a    circuit    to    fall 

upon    the     enemy's    rear,    but     his    men, 
August  10. 

largely  three  months'  volunteers,  whose  time 
was  nearly  up,  fought  half-heartedly,  and  his  own  lack 
of  conduct  resulted  in  defeat.  Lyon  was  outnumbered 
two  to  one.  The  battle  fought  here  was  one  of  the 
most  stubborn  minor  contests  of  the  war.  The  Federals 
lost  the  field,  and  gallant  Lyon  his  life,  while  heading  a 
charge  to  retrieve  the  disasters  of  the  day.  The  little 
army  was  barely  rescued  from  destruction  by  a  summary 
retreat,  happily  without  pursuit,  to  Springfield,  under 
command  of  Major  Sturgis.  Out  of  six  thousand  men 
our  casualties  were  twelve  hundred.  The  enemy  lost  a 
less  number  out  of  twelve  thousand.  The  Southerners 
have  named  this  victory  "Oak  Hills." 

The  Confederates  were  soon  able  to  score  an  additional 

triumph   in  Missouri  by  the   capture   of   Lexington,    of 

which  place  Colonel  Mulligan  was  in  com- 

September  20. 

mand.  Price  advanced  from  Wilson's 
Creek.  With  some  three  thousand  men.  Mulligan  bravely 
held  the  town  against  Price  with  twenty  thousand,  until 
his  water  supply  was  cut  off,  when  he  surrendered 
what  remained  of  his  force.  The  enemy  had  thus  re- 
covered for  a  time  a  substantial  part  of  the  State. 
After    many    delays   Fremont    finally    took    the    field 


1861.]  THE  MIOHTY  WEST  MOVES.  23 

with   forty  thousand  men,  and  advanced  to   Springfield, 

the   Confederates   having   already  retired.     He   seems   to 

have  expected  to  fight  a  battle  here,  though  the  enen^y 

was   actually   some   sixty   miles   away;    but   on   the   eve 

of  this  hypothetical  combat   he  was  super- 
November  2. 
eeded  by  Hunter,  and  retired  to  St.  Louis. 

Fremont  undoubtedly  possessed  ability,  and  had  in 
former  days  exhibited  brilliant  qualities  in .  irregular  war- 
fare ;  but  his  conduct  in  the  Civil  War  lacked  every 
element  of  usefulness. 

Meanwhile,  in  July,  General  Pope  took  command  in 
Northern  Missouri,  which,  by  a  few  vigorous  blows  with 
sword  and  pen,  he  cleared  from  open  and  secret  rebels. 
He   later   rescued   the  region   between   the 

r\  t     ^        HIT'  •      .  n  ^  July-December. 

Usage   and  the   Missouri  rivers  from  Con- 
federate control.     He  was  building  for  himself  the  repu- 
tation which   soon  placed   him   in   command   beyond  his 
powers. 

All  these  stirring  events  in  Missouri  evinced  the 
greatest  activity;  but  their  only  effect  on  the  general 
struggle  lay  in  the  moral  weight  the  possession  of  this 
State  gave  to  our  arms. 

In  the  shifting  of  commanders,  so  constant  in  the 
first  years  of  the  war,  General  Halleck  early  became 
chief  player  on  the  chess-board  west  of  the  Appalachians, 
while    his    subordinates    accomplished,    in 

November. 

great  part,    the    results   attributed    to   his 
strategic  ability.     Halleck   was  a  most   scholarly  soldier. 
In  the   cabinet  none  was   more   astute.     But   his   action 
was   slow.     In   the   field  he   personally  brought   to   pass 


24  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1861. 

nothing.  Subsequently,  as  Commander-in-Chief  at  Wash- 
ington, his  peculiar  methods  more  than  once  induced 
disaster. 

General   Sherman    had   succeeded  Anderson    in  Ken- 
tucky.    General    Grant   began   to    display 
his  activity,  and  enabled  the  troops  under 
his  orders  to  learn  something  of  warfare,  in  an  expedition 
against   Belmont.     With   a  force    of  three 

November  1, 

thousand  men  he  moved  from  Cairo  against 
the  Confederate  camp  at  that  place,  and,  though  obligee 
after  a  day's  skirmishing  to  retire  with  a  loss  of  ^yi 
hundred  men,  he  nevertheless  broke  up  the  insurgents' 
stronghold.  The  Confederates  may  lay  such  claim  tt 
victory  as  the  possession  of  the  field  of  battle  alwayt 
gives.  No  permanent  gain  was  accomplished  by  Grsuitt 
Rnd  he  was  forced  to  retire  to  Cairo. 


VI. 

THE   FIRST   CONFEDERATE   LINE   BROKEN. 

AT  the  beginning  of  the  new  year  the  Union  armies 
were  five  hundred  and  seventy-six  j^^^^  i862. 
thousand  strong,  backed  by  a  fleet  of  two 
hundred  and  twelve  vessels.  McClellan  lay  quiet  upon 
the  Potomac  all  winter,  drilling,  organizing,  disciplining 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  In  his  front  was  Joe  Johns- 
ton, with  a  much  smaller  force,  pushing  forward  with 
equal  energy  the  schooling  of  his  soldiers. 

The  Western  generals  were  more  active.  Albert  Sid- 
ney Johnston,  perhaps  the  most  promising  Southern  offi- 
cer,was  in  command  in  the  West,  with  head-quarters  at 
Bowling  Green.  Buell  lay  in  Johnston's  November, 
front,  having  superseded  Sherman,  whose 
"crazy"  suggestion  that  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men  would  be  required  for  operations  on  the  Western  field 
had  lost  him  the  confidence  of  his  superiors.  There  was 
abundant  method  in  his  madness,  as  time    all   too    fully 

showed . 

In  Eastern  Kentucky  the  Confederate  Humphrey  Mar- 
shall had  been  creating  more  or  less  political  trouble,  and 
[general  Garfield  was  sent   against    him    with   some   two 

25 


26  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL    WAR.  [1862, 

thousand    men.     Marshall  somewhat    outnumbered    Gar- 
field ;  but  in  a  vigorous  January  campaign, 
January  10.  .        .  a     o 

culminating  at  Prestonburg,  Garfield  quite 

dispersed  his  forces,  and  drove  him  into  the  mountains. 

About  the  same  time,  Zollicoffer,  who  had  held  the 
extreme  right  of  the  Confederate  line  in  advance  of  Cum- 
berland Gap,  had  retired  from  his  post  and  joined  Crit- 
tenden near  Mill  Springs,  in  Central  Kentucky ;  and  to 
General  George  H.  Thomas  was  committed  the  duty  of 
disposing  of  them.  With  a  somewhat  superior  force 
Thomas  moved  upon  the  enemy,  and  in  a  sharp  engage- 
ment at  Logan's  Cross  Roads,  utterly  broke 

January  19. 

up  their  army.  Zollicoffer  was  killed.  This 
first  of  our  substantial  Western  victories  (called  "Fish- 
ing Creek"  by  the  enemy)  was  a  great  encouragement 
to  our  arms.  Our  loss  was  two  hundred  and  fifty,  to 
the  enemy's  ^\q  hundred.     Crittenden  withdrew  his  troops 

across    the     Cumberland,    abandoning    his 

January|20.  . 

artillery  and  trains.  Eastern  Kentucky 
was  thus  freed  from  the  Confederates. 

Halleck's  first  task  as  commander  of  the  Western  armies 
was  to  penetrate  the  Confederate  line  of  defense.  Tliis 
could  be  done  by  breaking  its  centre  or  by  turning  one  of 
its  flanks.  The  former  appeared  most  feasible  to  Grant 
and  Commodore  Foote,  who  commanded  the  naval  forces. 

Under  instructions  from  Halleck,  seven   of 

February. 

the  gun-boat  flotilla,  with  Grant's  seventeen 
thousand  men  in  reserve,  moved  up  the  Tennessee  river  to 
attack  Fort  Henry  and  essay  the  value  of  gun-boats  in  am- 
phibious warfare.     Grant  landed  below  the  fort,  and  Fo(»t« 


1862.]  FIRST  CONFEDERATE  LINE   BROKEN.  27 

then  opened  fire  upon  it.  Tilghman,  in  command,  fore- 
seeing its  capture,  was  shrewd  enough  to  send  off  the  bulk 
of  his^orce  to  Fort  Donelson.     He  himself 

February  6. 

made  a  mock  defense  with  a  handful  of  men, 

surrendering  the  fort  after  the  garrison  was  well  on  its  way. 

Without  the  twin  citadel  of  Donelson,  however.  Fort 
Henry  was  but  a  barren  triumph,  for  no  column  could  ad- 
vance up  the  Tennessee  river  while  this  garrison  threat- 
ened its  flank.  It  was  here  that  Grant  earned  his  first 
laurels  as  a  stanch  soldier,  by  compelling,  after  a  stubborn 
fight,  the  surrender  of  this  second  fortress  with  its  entire 
garrison. 

Every  effort  had  been  made  by  Johnston  to  hold  the 
place.  He  must  here  fight  for  the  possession  of  Nashville. 
Fort  Donelson   was    strongly  fortified    and    garrisoned. 


Forts  Henry  and  Donelson.    Feb.  6  and  16, 1862. 

Grant  moved  against  it  from  Fort  Henry  with  fifteen  thou- 
sand men,  six  thousand  less  than  the  enemy. 

The  ground  is  difficult ;  the  troops  are  green.    But  heavy 


28  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF   OUR  CIVIL   WAR.  [1862. 

reinforcements  and  the  fleet  come  to   Grant's  aid.     The 

fort  is  fully  invested,  under  great  difficulties  from  severity 

of  weather  and  the   inexperience   of  the   men*     Happily 

there  is   not   much   ability  in    the   defence.     Floyd,  the 

senior  officer,   determines  to  cut  his  way  out.     He  falls 

heavily    upon    Grant's   right,  held   by    McClernand    and 

backed  by  Wallace,  thinking  to  thrust  them  aside  from  the 

river  and  to  escape  over  the  road  so  won.     A   stubborn 

resistance   defeats   this   sortie,  though   but  narrowly.     A 

general  assault  is  ordered,  which  effects  a  lodgment  in  the 

works.     Divided  responsibilities  between  Floyd,  Buckner, 

and  Pillow  weaken  the  defense  so  as  to  oper- 
February  16. 

ate  a  surrender. 

Our  loss  was  two  thousand  eight  hundred.  The  Con- 
federates captured  were  nearly  fifteen  thousand  men. 

These  successes  broke  through  the  centre  of  the  Con- 
federate line,  established  with  so  much  pains,  and  compro- 
mised its  flanks.  Johnston  found  that  he  must  retire  to  a 
new  line.  This  lay  naturally  along  the  Memphis  and 
Charleston  Eailroad.  He  had  retreated  from  Bowling 
Green  on  receipt  of  the  news  of  the  fall  of 
Fort  Henry,  and  was  forced  thereby  to  cede 
to  Buell  possession  of  Nashville,  and  practically  of  Ken- 
tucky. The  advanced  flank  on  the  Mississippi  at  Colum- 
bus was  likewise  compromised,  and  with  the  bulk  of  the 
armament  was  withdrawn  to  Island  No.  10,  some  sixty 
miles  below  Cairo.  "We  could  congratulate  ourselves  upon 
a  very  substantial  gain. 


vn. 

NEW    MADRID    AND    ISLAND    NO.    10. 

THE  left  flank  of  the  Confederate  line,  thus  entrenched 
at  New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10,  is  still  too  far 
advanced  to  be  safely  held  more  than  a  short  time.  Pope 
receives  orders  to  reduce  the  place,  and  in 

^  March  3. 

less  than  two  weeks  puts  in  an  appearance 
at  New  Madrid.     He  has  some  twenty  thousand  men,  well 
equipped  and  officered.     The   enemy  is  under  command 
of  General  McCown,  later  replaced  by  General   Mackall, 
with  a  much  inferior  force. 

The  Mississippi  here  makes  one  of  its  gigantic  double 
loops.  Island  No.  10  lies  at  the  bottom  of  the  southerly 
loop,  and  New  Madrid  at  the  bottom  of  the  northerly. 
Across  the  isthmus  of  the  upper  loop  is  about  three  miles  ; 
across  the  lower,  four.  In  rear  of  Island  No.  10  on  the 
mainland  to  the  south  is  swampy  ground,  making  exit  pos- 
sible only  by  the  river,  by  New  Madrid,  or  by  a  single  road 
at  Tiptonville.  Pope's  first  effort  is  devoted  to  rendering 
New  Madrid  untenable,  by  effecting  a  lodgment  at  Point 
Pleasant  below  the  town,  and  by   erectino^ 

,  •     f  March  6. 

sieffe  batteries  near  New  Madrid  so  as  to  cut  it 

off  from  its  source  of  supply.     By  this  action  he  compels  its 


30 


BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR. 


[1862. 


March  14. 


surrender.      Commodore  Foote  now  comes 
upon  the  scene  from  above,  and  supplements 
Pope's  efforts,  by  attacking  the  defenses  of  Island  No.  10 


S   I1IUE.S 

New  Madrid  and  Island  No.  10.    March,  1862. 

with  his  heavy  guns.  The  river  is  exceptionally  high ; 
gun-boats  can  fire  across  country.  The  possession  of 
the  river  and  of  New  Madrid  has  left  the  enemy  only 
the  Tiptonville  road  to  escape  upon.  To  secure  this, 
Pope  must  procure  transports  to  get  his  men  across  the 
river.  The  transports  are  all  above  Island  No.  10  and 
cannot  be  run  past  the  batteries.  With  gigantic  labor  a 
canal  is  cut  across  the  isthmus,  through  heavily  wooded 
country,  from  a  point  opposite  New  Madrid  to  that  place, 


1862.] 


NEW  MADRID  AND  ISLAND  NO.   10. 


31 


April  1-8. 


and  the  transports  are  floated  through,  thus 

escaping  Island   No.    10.     Two    gun-boats 

run  the  batteries.     Pope  transfers  Paine's  division  to  the 

Tennessee  shore,  and  Foote  again  attacks  with  his  flotilla. 

Entirely  cut  off*  from  succor  or  retreat,  the  whole   force 

surrenders,  consisting  of  seven  thousand  men. 

Pope  received  hearty  congratulations  for  this  brilliant 
exploit,  which  had  lasted  but  thirty  days,  and  accomplished 
such  excellent  results. 

In  Missouri  General  Curtis  still  held  all  the  ground 
which  had  been  gained,  against  Price  and  Van  Dorn, 
defeated   the   insurgents,  and   drove   them   into   the  Bos- 


Pea  Ridge.    March  5-8,  1862. 

ton   Mountains    in   the  north-western   part  of  Arkansas. 
They     here     accumulated    a    motley    force    of    not    far 


32  BIRD'S  EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1863. 

from  thirty  thousand  men.     Curtis  had  but  eleven  thou- 
sand.    But  in  a  two  days'  conflict  at  Pea  Ridge  (Confed- 
erate   "  Elk    Horn ")    in  which  Van   Dom 
March  7-8.  ^ 

commanded  the  enemy,  Curtis  defeated  him 

with  a  loss  of  three  thousand  men.     Ours  was  much  less. 

Price,  before  the  commencement  of  the  battle,  had 
managed  to  get  into  Curtis'  rear,  and  stood  across  the 
post-road,  his  only  line  of  retreat.  This  obliged  Curtis 
to  change  front  to  rear.  The  first  day's  combat  was  dis- 
advantageous to  the  Federals ;  they  were  placed  where 
they  must  beat  the  enemy  or  surrender.  The  Confeder- 
ates had  met  with  heavy  losses,  and  on  the  second  day 
did  not  exhibit  the  discipline  of  the  first.  Sigel  was 
thrown  upon  their  flank,  and  after  brilliant  conduct  on  both 
sides,  Curtis  wrested  victory  from  a  desperate  strait. 

This  good  fortune  definitely  relieved  the  Federals  of  any 
anxiety  regarding  Missouri,  and  did  great  credit  to  Curtis' 
endurance  and  capacity. 

After  this  campaign  the  enemy  never  made  his  appear- 
ance in  force  in  that  State.  Curtis  shortly  undertook  a 
march  across  country  to  the  Mississippi 
river,  and  arrived  in  due  time  at  Helena, 
Ark. 

During  the  spring  and  summer  of  this  year  the  Depart- 
ment of  Missouri  was   under   command  of 

June  to  September. 

General  Schofield.  But  there  were  no 
larger  operations,  though  numerous  bodies  of  guerillas,  and 
some  organized  forces,  were  dispersed,  and  the  State  was 
brought  to  a  condition  of  greater  quiet  under  his  sensibla 
and  vigorous  administration. 


VIII. 

THE    BLOCKADE. 


\\T ITHIN  the  territory  of  the  Southern  Confederacy 
V  V  there  was  an  abundance  of  corn  and  cotton.  The 
former  sufficed  to  feed  the  people  and  the  armies.  The 
latter  was  useless  unless  it  could  be  marketed ;  for  there 
were  no  cotton  factories  in  the  South.  If  the  Confederacy 
could  sell  its  cotton  at  its  vastly  appreciated  price  in  the 
English  marts,  it  could  buy  materials  of  war  which  might 
help  it  indefinitely  to  prolong  the  contest.  Cost  was  the 
last  thing  thought  of  in  the  manufacturing  towns  abroad, 
which  must  have  the  raw  material,  or  starve ;  and  the 
exceptional  profit  to  be  made  in  this  traffic  induced 
numberless  vessels  to  ply  from  European  ports,  or 
from  Nassau,  Havana,  and  Bermuda,  to  the  Southern 
outlets,  laden  with  all  manner  of  goods,  from  Arm- 
strong guns  to  quinine,  which  they  could  exchange  for 
cotton. 

The  United  States  adopted  the  usual  military  means  of 
preventing  this  trade  by  employing  its  abundant  naval 
resources  to  blockade  the  Southern  ports ;  and  the  embargo 
was  more  or  less  effective  during  the  whole  war.     Still, 

many   merchantmen   did    manjvge   to  run   in  and   out   ol 

33 


34  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR. 

Southern  ports,  and  yet  other  vessels,  huiltjand  armed  in  the 

Confederacy  and  abroad,  preyed  upon%ffcr  'cbtninerce  under 

f^-^^^lett^^of  marque  from  the  Confederate  Government.     By 

uj:he   latter   these   cruisers   were  regarded   as  men-of-war. 

VJ^  '^•^^^  called  them  pirates,  because '.w^ denied  the  validity  of 


CV' 


their  commissions.  These  vessels  captured  all  merchant- 
men sailing  under  American,  cokirs,  and  sold  or  destroyed 
them  and  their  cargoes. ^^^^W6  kept  a  fleet  on  all  the  great 
highways  of  commerce  to  prevent  this  depredation,  JiuLj  Jj- 
only  partially  succeeded.  The  eventual^resvltjsiras  that  ©«r^'*^ 
merchant  marine  was  ruined.  In  1861' w^Siie^e  the  great 
ocean-carrieri  of  the  world;  by  1865  nearly  all  freight 
was  carried  in  English  bottoiH8^v.ijMx^  ,  (  fvtotv  ' 

Our  navy  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  was  in  Very  poor 
condition ;  but  with  the  greatest  vigor  it  was  at  oncfi 
taken  in  hand,  and  the  gaps  filled  temporarily,  until  more 
substantial  vessels  could  be  constructed.  Craft  of  all 
kinds  were  pressed  into  service;  even  ferry-boats  made 
up  into  effective  men-of-war.  A  converted  Fulton  ferry- 
boat captured  the  "Circassian"  off  Havana, — an  ex- 
ceedingly valuable  prize.  The  types  of  vessel  which  came 
mostly  into  use  were  converted  merchantmen,  sloops,  gun- 
boats, double-enders,  and  iron-clads. 

To   declare   the   Southern  ports  blockaded  was  a  bold 

step  with  the  limited  means  at  our  command.     The  recent 

Declaration  of  Paris  haxi  been  to  the   effect  that,  to  be 

binding,  a  blockade  must  be  a  substantial  danger  to  the 

passers   in  and  out.  Still,  with  our  national 

April  27, 1861.     ^,        .  .  , 

adaptiveness  to  circumstances,  we  managed, 
after  announcing  the  blockade  in  the  spring,  to  make  it 


;;harlestor  * 

Yt':^^Z4B^^ter  ^    GEOKGIA    AND 

THE 


a.Walkei/^  'v^o 

m^iC       >a:^TYBEE  ISLAND 


-^  Ossahaw  Sound 


^""S  ^        THEATRE  OF 

t. 

Iter 

IS 

V 


^ 


CAROX,INAS  CAMPAIGNS 


SCALE  OF  MILES 


V 


THE  BLOCKADE.  35 

de  facto  during  the  summer,  and  at  the  most  impoitant 
points  within  a  month. 

The  theory  of  the  United  States  was,  of  course,  that  the 
Southern  hostilities  were  an  insurrection,  and  not  a  war. 
jBut  the  enormous  extent  of  the  uprising  obliged  us  to 
construe  this  theory  very  liberally,  and  to  do  many  things 
on  a  war  scale.  The  position  was  often  inconsistent,  but 
was  fairly  well  maintained.  By  1864  we  were  blockading 
a  coast  three  thousand  miles  in  extent,  —  a  thing  utterly 
unprecedented. 

The  blockade  was  naturally  not  heard  as  much  of  as  the 
land  operations,  nor  had  it  the  same  effect  in  suppressing 
insurrection ;  but  it  necessitated  a  vast  amount  of  hard- 
ship and  danger.  Nor  must  its  services  be  under- 
rated. There  were  often  naval  fights  of  importance  with 
vessels  built  in  the  blockaded  ports  to  run  out  and  break 
up  the  embargo.     A  typical  combat  was  that  between  the 

Atlanta  and  Weehawken.     The  former' left 

o  1  1       ,        11     1     -..  n  June  17, 1863. 

bavannah  to   attack  the   blockadmg    fleet. 

Much  was  expected  from  her  efforts.  But  she  fell  foul 
of  the  Weehawken,  whose  heavy  ordnance  proved  quickly 
too  much  for  her.  In  fifteen  minutes,  and  with  but  ^\q 
shots  from  the  15-inch  guns,  she  was  disabled  and  capt- 
ured. 

It  must  not  be  forgotten  that  this  was  still  the  day  of 
the  old  naval  regime.  To-day  a  navy  cannot  be  created 
in  less  than  a  dozen  years  ;  then,  the  wooden  ship  was 
still  the  type  of  fighting  craft,  and  a  few  weeks  suflSced 
to  convert  a  merchantman  into  a  very  useful  man-of-war. 


IX. 

EARLY  OUTSKIRT  OPERATIONS. 

TBHE  briefest  mention  of  the  principal  outskirt  opera- 
tions must  suffice. 
Hatteras  Inlet  had  become  a  place  of  much  resort  for 
Confederate  cruisers  and  blockade  runners.     To  break  up 
this  rendezvous,  General  Butler,  whose  military  reputation 
was  then  still  reasonably  intact,  and  Commo- 

Aug.  28-29, 1861.  .  . 

dore  Stringham,  with  a  land  force  and  small 
fleet,  were  despatched  thither  from  Fort  Monroe.  After 
a  bombardment  of  two  days,  the  forts  protecting  the 
Inlet  were  captured  and  garrisoned  by  our  troops.  Be- 
yond this  nothing  was  undertaken. 

Fort  Pickens,  near  Pensacola,  had  at  the  outbreak  of 
the  war  been  preserved  to  the  Union,  and  was  held  by  a 
October  9,  small  forcc  of  troops.     Some  interchange  of 

November  22-23.    hostilities  took  place  at  this  point,  with  no 
result  beyond  giving  us  a  yet  firmer  foothold,  which  was 
not,  however,  utilized  to  push  operations  into  the  interior. 
In  this  same  month  fifteen  thousand  men,  under  com- 
October  and      mand  of  General  T.  W.  Sherman,  and  in  con- 
November,      voy  of  Admiral  Dupont,  were  sent  to  Port 

Royal,  S.C.     Fort  Walker,  on  Hilton  Head,  was  caor 
86 


1861-2.]  EARLY  OUTSKIRT   OPERATIONS.  37 

ured  by  the  fleet,  and  Beaufort,  S.C.,  abandoned  by  the 
enemy.  Sherman  fortified  Hilton  Head,  and  Dupont  took 
Tybee  Island  at  the  entrance  to  Savannah.  But  no  orders 
were  issued  for  following  up  these  successes,  and  whatever 
could  have  been  accomplished  •  was  forfeited.  General 
Parke  captured  Fort  Macon,  defending: 

April  26,  1862. 

Beaufort,    N.C.,    while    Reno    made   a 
barren  expedition  towards  the  rear  of  Norfolk. 

Early  in  the  new  year  Burnside  and  Goldsborough,  with 
twelve  thousand  men  and  a  fleet  of  light- 

.  January,  1862. 

draught  gun  boats,  set  sail  for  Pamlico  and 
Albemarle  Sounds,  N.C.,  with  a   purpose  similar  to  the 
Port  Royal   expedition.       General  Wise  commanded   the 
Confederates    at   this    point.       After   much   danger   from 
storms,  and  delay  from  the  difficulty  of  passage  into  the 
Sound,  Roanoke  Island  was  captured,   and   a   portion  of 
the  fleet  took  possession  of  Elizabeth  City.     February  and 
Later  New  Berne  was  taken  by  Foster,  as         March.  . 
well  as  the  town  of  Washington  near  by.       But  again  no 
sensible  demonstration  into  the  interior  was  attempted. 

About  the  same  time  Capt.  C.  H.  Davis  made  a  recon- 
noissance  of  Fort  Pulaski,  the  main  defense 

January,  1862. 

of  the  city  of  Savannah.     As  a  consequence, 
some  works  were  erected  on  adjacent  islands,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  isolating  Pulaski ;    and,  two  months  after,  Wright 
and  Dupont  visited  and  garrisoned  several 

^  *  March,  1862. 

points  on  the  coast  of  Florida. 

General  Hunter  succeeded  Sherman.       Gilmore  was  the 
engineer  officer  in  immediate  charge  of  the 

^  .  .  March,  1862. 

operations    against    Fort    Pulaski.       After 


r, 


88  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.      [1861-2. 

some  time  spent  in  preparation  he  sot  reatlv 

April  10-11, 1862.        ,        .     ,  .    ,         i        t  ^  rr.   ,        -r  ,       ; 

to  begm  ms  bombardment  irom  Tybee  Island, 
and  two  days  sufficed  to  reduce  the  place.  Thenceforth 
Savannah  was  isolated  from  the  outside  world. 

The  fight  between  the  Merrimac  and  the  Monitor  — 
the  first  combat  of  iron-clads  —  opened  a  new  era  in  naval 
warfare.  The  Merrimac  had  been  built  in  Norfolk.  She 
was  a  huge,  iron-plated,  casemated  hulk,  whose  armor  could 
resist  all  artillery  then  known.  She  was  probably  not 
seaworthy  enough  for  a  cruise ;  but  she  could  make  her- 
self mistress  of  the  Chesapeake  ;  she  would  have  prevented 
troops  from  landing  on  the  Peninsula ;  and  she  might  have 
approached  and  bombarded  Washington.  Great  apprehen- 
sion was  felt  about  her.  The  only  worthy  antagonist  of 
ihis  terrible  vessel  was  the  Monitor,  —  a  low-decked  craft 
with  a  turret,  "  a  raft  with  a  cheese-box  on  it,"  as  she  was 
laughingly  called, — which  was  building  at  the  same  time 
in  Brooklyn.  The  contest  was  as  much  a  race  between 
mechanics  at  the  start,  as  between  seamen  at  the  close. 
The  earliest  constructed  vessel  should  win  the  laurels. 
The  Merrimac  made  her  appearance  first.  Leaving  Nor- 
folk she  steamed  for  Newport  News,  near 

March  8,  1862. 

Fort  Monroe,  destroyed  the  United  States 
frigates  Cumberland  and  Congress,  and  forced  the  Min- 
nesota aground,  before  the  Monitor  came  up.  The  latter 
reached  the  scene  of  action  during  the  night.  Next  day  a 
gallant  struggle  ended  in  what  has  been  called  a  drawn 
battle  ;  but  the  Merrimac  put  back  into  Norfolk  disabled. 
She  had  been  "neutralized,"  and  the  class  of  iron-clads,  of 
whioh    the  Monitor  was  the  first,  became   the   type  from 


I8G1-2.]  EARLY  OUT  SKIRT  OPERATIONS.  39 

which  grew   a   large  fleet.     We   could   fairly   claim   the 
\ictory,  as  the   Monitor   had    nipped    the   career   of  the      ^ 
Merrimac  in  the  bud.  i|S>(2s^cJ1mAq^  <3^       •  -> 

The  blockade  at  New  Orleans  had  been  peculiaily  dif« 
licultto  keep  intact,  and  several  privateers,  as  well  as  many 
merchantmen,    had    been    able     to    break 

Oct.-Dec.,  1861. 

through.       Among    these    the     ram    Ma- 
nassas steamed  down  the  river,  and  made  a  sudden  diver- 
sion among  the  blockading  squadron ;   but  it  was    of  no 
great   duration,    and   quite   without  result. 

December. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  year  Ship  Island, 
near  New  Orleans,  had  been  occupied  by  Union  troops. 
General  Butler  had  charge   of  this  department,  but   had 
brought   nothing  to   a   head.      Admiral    Farragut,   with 
Porter  second  in  command,  reached  the  place 

^  February,  1862. 

in  the  early  spring  to  see   what   could   be 

done.     The  capture  of  New  Orleans  would  not  only  exert 

a  very  depressing   effect  upon  the  Confederates,  but  the 

city  would  also  serve   as   a   base   for   operations   up   the 

Mississippi,    in   connection    with    those    already    moving 

down. 

The  approaches  to  New  Orleans  by  the  main  channel 
were  held  by  two  strong  works.  Forts  Jackson  and  St. 
Philip,  and  the  river  was  patrolled  by  a  flotilla.  FaiTagut 
moored   his  mortar-boats   below  the   forts, 

April  18. 

back  of  a  bend  in  the  river,  and  for  six  days 
bombarded  Fort  Jackson  ;  but,  impatfent  to  secure  the  city, 
he  determined  to  try  the  experiment  of  running  his  fleet 
past  the  forts,  and  thus  to  isolate  them.     This  was  a  feat 
never  before  attempted  and  of  questionable  result.     But,  to 


40  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL    WAR.      [1861-3. 

the  utter  astonishment  of  the  Confederates,  it  was  success- 
fully accomplished,  and  the  next  day  Farra- 

April  25.  ^ 

gut  took  possession  of  New  Orleans,  evacu- 
ated by  General  LoveU  on  his  approach. 

Porter  shortly  afterwards  received  the  surrender  of  the 
forts, — it  is  claimed,  on  account  of  a  mutiny 

April  28.  .  ^ 

of  the  garrison  of  Fort  Jackson,  —  and  they 
were  duly  occupied.  Butler  then  took  possession  of  the 
city  with  his  troops. 

It  must  be  said  in  praise  of  Butler,  that  in  provost-mar- 
shal work,  such  as  he  was  called  upon  to  perform  in  New 
Orleans,  he  showed  remarkable  capacity.  The  city  was 
neyer  healthier  or  in  finer  condition  than  under  his  regime. 
There  was,  however,  just  complaint  against  him  in  matters 
connected  with  trade ;  nor  did  he  make  the  least  attempt 
to  mix  suavity  of  method  with  strength  of  action  in  his 
government  of  the  city. 

This  long  series  of  coast  operations,  none  of  which, 
except  Farragut's,  had  any  immediate  eflPect  upon  the  war, 
was  yet  not  without  its  uses.  It  was  essential  to  keep  up 
a  strict  blockade,  for,  by  the  law  of  nations,  none  but  an 
effective  one  is  a  blockade  at  all ;  and  it  was  a  sine  qua  non 
to  forestall  any  disposition  on  the  part  of  foreign  nations  to 
aid  the  enemy.  All  these  ends  were  subserved  to  a  con- 
siderable extent.  And  as  the  only  enlightened  military 
policy  is  to  concentrate  against  and  destroy  the  large  armies 
in  the  field,  it  is  perhaps  well  that  no  greater  numbers 
were  taken  from  the  all-important  work,  to  be  frittered 
away  on  minor  operations  on  the  coast.  Still  some  of  the 
expeditions  were  in   such  force  that   they  really  drained 


1861-2.]  EARLY  OUT  SKIRT  OPERATIONS.  41 

the   large  armies ;    and  it   seems  as   if  they   might  have 

amioyed  the  enemy  by  frequent  incursions  on  a  large  scale 

into  the  country,  thus  drawing  troops  from  the  armies  in 

front  of  those  of  their   comrades  who  were  fighting  the 

more  sanguinary  battles  of  the  war,  but  often  to  no  good 

purpose. 

I     In  the   early  part  of  1862   the   Confederate   general, 

Sibley,  undertook  a  campaign   against   the 

Febnuuy. 
Union   forces,  occupying  the  forts  in  New 

Mexico  under  command  of  Canby.  He  advanced  up  the 
Rio  Grande,  with  considerable  physical  labor,  but  met  with 
brilliant  success  in  several  combats  where  his  hardy  Texans 
proved  more  than  a  match  for  Canby *s  regulars.  The  con- 
duct of  the  regulars  did  on  this  occasion  no  justice  to  the 
splendid  record  they  made  for  themselves  during  the  war. 

But  Sibley's  triumphs  were  resultless.  He  found  that 
he  could  not  maintain  himself  in  that  territory,  and  he  was 
eventually  forced  to  abandon  it  to  the  Federal  forces  and 
make  a  disastrous  retreat. 


THE  ADVANCE  OF  THE  WESTERN  ARMIES.  — 
SHILOH. 

NO  sooner  had  untiring  Grant  ruptured  the  Confeder- 
ate line  at  Donelson,  than  he  proposed  to  ascend  the 
Tennessee  and  essay  to  break  their  new  defence  along  the 
Memphis  and  Charleston  Kailroad.  The  key  points  of  this 
line  were  Memphis  on  one  flank,  with  Fort  Pillow  up  the 
river  as  an  outpost ;  Chattanooga  on  the  other  flank,  and 
Corinth  as  a  centre.  While  McClellan  was  making  vast 
preparations  for  his  Peninsular  campaign,  Grant  quietly 
•  transported  his  army  to  Pittsburgh  Landing, 

March,  1862.  ;     ^  ,    xx  ,i     ,      .  i     , 

on  the  Tennessee,  and  Halleck  despatched 
Buell,  with  thirty-seven  thousand  men,  from  Nashville 
across  the  country  to  join  him.  General  Mitchel,  with  a 
division,  was  sent  out  as  a  flying  left  flank  to  seize  and 
hold  some  point  on  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad, 
where  the  Confederates  were  not  in  force.  This  railroad 
was  the  great  central  east  and  west  artery  of  the  Confed- 
eracy. South  of  it  all  railroad  transportation  had  to  go 
by  way  of  Mobile.  And  it  was  of  the  last  importance  to 
the  enemy. 

Mitchel,  with  great  celerity,  proceeded  upon  his  task, 

42 


1862.]  ADVANCE  OF  THE   WESTERN  ARMIES.  43 

captured  Huntsville,  and  despatched  parties 
along  the  road  east  and  west  to  hold  bridges  ^ 

and  destroy  material  of  war.  Alarmed  at  his  movements, 
Beauregard  sent  a  cavalry  detachment  to  operate  against 
him,  while  Halleck,  apparently  unable  to  handle  two 
simultaneous  problems,  afforded  him  no  support.  His 
position  was  precarious ;  but,  burning  the  bridge  at 
Decatur,  he  moved  eastward,  and  occupied  Bridgeport. 
With  proper  reinforcements  Mitchel  could  have  seized 
Chattanooga,  and  have  even  raided  on  Rome  and  Atlanta, 
and  there  destroyed  the  foundries  and  arsenals,  —  an  inter- 
ruption which  would  have  been  of  grave  consequence  to 
the  insurgents ;  but  his  operations  were  neglected  by 
Halleck,  as  of  secondary  importance. 

Beauregard,  who  held  a  species  of  second  command 
under  A.  S.  Johnston,  had  formed  certain  ambitious  plans 
for  an  advance  on  Cairo  and  St.  Louis.  Not  so  Johnston, 
whose  soldier's  wit  told  him  that  the  armies  in  the  field 
must  be  first  beaten  before  conquest  could  follow,  and  who 
preferred  to  make  solid  preparation  for  a  decisive  struggle 
near  Corinth. 

These  movements  lead  to  the  first  of  those  desperately 
contested  battles  in  which  Americans  have  shown  them- 
selves preeminent.  While  McClellan  is  laboriously  dig- 
ging his  way  into  Yorktown,  Johnston  ad- 

ApriL 
vances  from  Corinth,  purposing   a   aescent 

upon  Grant's  army  at  Pittsburgh  Landing,  before  the 
arrival  of  Buell.  Grant  has  under  his  command  forty- 
five  thousand  effectives.  Buell  is  yet  two  marches  dis- 
tant.    Johnston's  force  is   forty  thousand  men.     With  a 


44 


BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR. 


[1862. 


April  6. 


suddenness  we  had  in  those  early  days  not  learned  to 
guard  against,  Johnston  falls  upon  our 
army.  The  onslaught  bears  our  lines  back. 
We  have  been  taken  unawares.  The  troops  are  not 
well  in  hand.     Grant  is,  for  the  moment,  absent.     Wal- 


Shiloh  (OP  Pittsburg  Landing).    April  6  and  7,  1862. 


lace  is  at   Crump's    Landing,   with    seventy-five   hundred 
men,  useless  for  the  emergency. 


]  ADVANCE  OF  THE  WESTERN  ARMIES.  *c^ 

Johnston's  plan  i*  simple.  Attack  constantly  by  the 
right  and  drive  the  Federals  from  the  Landing  and  into 
the  angle  made  by  Snake  Creek  and  the  river.  Beaure- 
gard, Hardee,  Bragg,  his  lieutenants,  are  well  able  to 
second  him.  The  onset  is  full  of  fire.  Sherman,  on  our 
right,  struggles  manfully  to  hold  Shiloh  Church ;  but  it  is 
wrenched  from  his  grip.  Prentiss  is  surrounded  and 
captured.  The  left  is  almost  crushed.  Recognizing  the 
fterious  emergency,  Sherman,  with  McClernand  to  back 
him  up,  fights  desperately  to  hold  the  road  across  Snake 
Creek,  by  which  Wallace  can  join  them.  At  this  juncture 
Johnston  is  killed.  His  place  there  is  no  one  to  fi^l.  The 
Confederate  lines  begin  to  show  huge  gaps  from  casualties, 
and  yet  greater  ones  from  stragglers,  tempted  by  the  prizes 
in  the  abandoned  Federal  camps.  But  the  army,  still  in 
line,  strikes  lustily  for  its  goal  almost  won,  —  Pittsburgh 
Landing. 

Happily  for  us,  success  itself  has  disorganized  the 
enemy's  ranks.  A  number  of  heavy  guns  have  been 
massed  at  the  Landing.  The  ground  is  favorable.  The 
advance  brigade  of  Buell's  army  puts  in  an  appearance.  All 
is  not  yet  lost.  And  Beauregard,  who  succeeds  to  the 
command,  under  the  impression  that  Buell  is  still  distant, 
and  wishing  to  reform  his  troops  and  complete  the  victory 
on  the  morrow,  suspends  the  battle. 

But  the  situation  yet  is  critical.  Buell  is  near  at  hand, 
but  he  must  be  got  across  the  river  and  on  the  field. 
Sherman,  on  the  right,  is  in  much  disorder.  The  rest  of 
the  Union  Army  is  fairly  huddled  into  a  narrow  space 
n(:ar  the  Landing.     Our  fortunes  still  bear  a  questionable 


46  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [1862. 

aspect,  but  faint-heartedness  possesses  no  one.  Happily, 
transports  can  be  procured  for  Buell ;  and  by  early  dawn 
on  the  morrow  he  is  able  to  put  twenty-four  thousand  fresh 
soldiers  in  array  against  the  wearied  Confederates. 

The   second    day    dawns.       Beauregard 

A.pril  7. 

struggles  hard   to   keep   what   has   abeadj 

been  fairly  won ;  and  his  troops,  though  decimated,  second 
his  purpose  nobly.  At  one  moment,  though  greatly  out- 
numbered, he  succeeds  in  all  but  turning  the  Union  left 
by  the  same  tactics  which  won  so  much  on  yesterday. 
But  Buell's  men  have  profited  by  their  rigid  discipline. 
Their  ranks  are  adamant.  They  will  not  be  denied.  An 
order  for  a  general  advance  is  given.  Wallace  comes 
up  on  the  right.  Victory  shifts  to  the  stars  and  stripes. 
The  exhausted  Confederates  are  forced  in  confusion  from 
the  field. 

The  losses  at  Shiloh  were  thirteen  thousand  on  our  side, 
two  thousand  less  on  the  Confederate ;  but  this  does  not 
count  the  grievous  loss  by  the  death  of  Johnston.  With  a 
reputation  for  skill  which  experience  in  the  Black  Hawk 
and  Mexican  Wars,  and  the  expedition  to  Utah, 
had  fully  warranted,  he  was  deemed  by  the  South  the 
choicest  of  her  soldiers;  and  better  could  the  enemy 
have  spared  thousands  of  her  sons  than  this  one. 

Returning  to  Corinth,  unpursued  by  Grant,  Beauregard 

heavily  fortifies  the  place.     He  is  leisurely  followed  up  by 

Halleck,  who  has  assumed  personal  command  of  the  forces 

under   Grant,  Buell,  and  Pope,  the   latter 

May  1. 

having  joined   from  a  projected   attack   on 
Fort  Pillow.     Halleck  very  deliberately  opens  the  siege 


1862.]  ADVANCE  OF  THE  WESTERN  ARMIES.  47 

with  his  forces  recruited  up  to  one  hundred  thousand  men, 
while  Beauregard  numbers  fifty  thousand  effectives.  Op- 
erations would  have  sooner  culminated  had  Halleck  left 
their  direction  to  his  more  energetic  second  in  command, 
Grant. 

Corinth  was  naturally  strong,  and  easily  victualled. 
By  very  slow  degrees  the  several  divisions  worked  their 
way  nearer  the  town.  Beauregard  contested  every  inch, 
while  preparing  constantly  for  evacuation.  Finally  our 
troops  had  reached  a  position  from  which  aesault  was 
feasible.     But   Beauresrard,    who   had   har- 

°  May  30. 

bored  no  idea  of  permanent  defense,  aban- 
doned the  place  as  untenable. 

This  was  alleged  to  be  a  strategic  manoeuvre  on  his 
part;  but  in  what  manner  is  not  clear,  for,  beyond 
detaining  Halleck  some  weeks,  he  can  scarcely  claim  to 
have  accomplished  any  good  end  by  the  defense  of  Corinth, 
and  the  Confederacy  lost  with  Corinth  its  main  line  of 
communication  east  and  west.  Its  voluntary  evacuation 
seems  to  be  without  purpose.  A  stubborn  defense  might 
as  well  have  been  made  here  as  at  any  other  point ;  and 
to  yield  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Eailroad  without  a 
struggle  was  surely  a  lame  military  proceeding. 

The  natural  result  of  these  successes  fol- 

Janfi  6. 

lowed.     Fort  Pillow    was   evacuated,    and 

Memphis    surrendered   to  Davis  and  the  flotilla,  after   a 

smart  battle  with  the  Confederate  fleet.    The 

June  6. 

Mississippi   river   was    now   open   down   to 
Vicksburg. 

In  little  more  than  a  year  the  western  armies  had  accom- 


48  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.  1862. 

plished  a  task  to  which  they  could  point  with  just  pride. 
The  public  could  see  the  result  of  their  labors,  and  natu- 
rally yielded  to  them  the  palm.  In  the  East  apparently 
no  gain  had  been  made.  The  different  conditions  under 
which  each  army  worked  were  not  fully  considered.  Aj 
in  all  human  affairs,  the  victor  wore  the  crown. 


XI. 


McCLELLAN    MOVES    lO    THE    PENINSU1«A. 

OUR  attention  is  now  due  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
Since  McClellan  had  been  in  command  the  army 
had  grown  rapidly  in  discipline  and  efficiency.  As  an 
organizer  McClellan  was  in  his  element.  Few  have  ever 
done  more  substantial  work  than  he ;  and  well  did  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  testify  to  his  ability  in  its  subsequent 
campaigns.  Little  memorable  had  occurred  for  months, 
save  the  Ball's  Bluff  disaster  narrated  below.  The 
enemy  had  lain  encamped  at  Manassas  and  Centreville. 
Geary's  brigade  had  obtained  a  slight  success  at  Harper's 
Ferry.  Every  one  was  impatient  to  cross  swords  in  ear- 
nest. Seven  strong  divisions  garrisoned  the  fortifications  of 
Washington,  or  occupied  the  banks  of  the  Potomac  from 
Alexandria  up,  in  all  some  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
men. 

McClellan  has  seventy-five  thousand  effec- 

^  October  16, 1861. ; 

tives  who  can  be  spared  for  the  field.     He 
reconnoitres  with  his  right  wing  across  the  Potomac.     No 
enemy  is  found  north  of  Centreville.     Stone  is  ordered  to 
patrol  his  front,  to  ascertain  the  whereabouts  of  the  enemy 
and  develop  his  strength.     He  sends  a  regiment  across  the 

49 


50  BIRUS-ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR,     [1861-2 

river  at  Ball's  Bluff,  with  Baker's  brigade  in  support,  to 
capture  Leesburg.  But  with  singular  blindness  he  fails  to 
provide  a  sufficient  means  of  recrossing  in  an  emergency. 
The  river  is  high  and  the  current  strong.  The  advance 
regiment  feels  the  enemy  near  Leesburg  and  falls  back. 
Stone  insanely  crosses  more  men,  two  thou- 

October21.  .  "^ 

sand  in  all,  to  follow  up  what  he  deems  a 
success.  Without  means  of  retreat,  these  troops  are 
atta(3ked  by  the  enemy  in  force,  driven  back  to  the 
Potomac,  and,  before  they  can  cross  or  scatter,  are  crowded 
upon  the  narrow  banks  of  the  river,  below  a  bluff  on 
which  stand  the  Confederates.  After  a  gallant  attempt  at 
defense  barely  one-half  the  force  are  able  to  save  them- 
selves from  this  slaughter-pen,  —  a  success  which  greatly 
inspirited  the  South.  General  Stone  is  imprisoned  to 
appease  the  Northern  public. 

A  handsome  combat  and  victory  by  Ord, 

at  Dranesville,  a  few  weeks  later,  where 
about  an  equal  number  on  each  side  came  in  collision,  com- 
pensated partly  for  this  defeat. 

After  a  variety  of  plans  discussed,  and  manifold  delays  in 

arriving  at  one  satisfactory  to  the  President 

and  himself,  McCleUan  had  concluded  to 
transfer  his  forces  to  the  Peninsula  between  the  York  and 
James  rivers,  and  had  received  the  President's  sanction  to 
the  scheme.  No  sooner  was  this  decision  reached  than  Joe 
Johnston,  who  had  been  in  command  of  all  the  troops  in 
front  of  Washington  since  Bull  Kun,  evacuated  Manassas, 

and   anticipated    McCleUan   in   his   march. 

Secrecy  was  not  one  of  our  then  virtues. 


1862.J      MoCLELLAN  MOVES  TO    THE  PENINSULA,  51 

The  newspapers  were  able  to  publish  all  prospective  move- 
ments with  scandalous  accuracy;  and  what  these  were 
unable  to  learn,  secession  sympathizers  at  the  capital 
appeared  constantly  to  unearth  for  the  benefit  of  their 
Southern  friends. 

Stonewall  Jackson,  now  in  command  in 

1         01  Till  1  .  Januaiy,  1862. 

the    fehenandoah,    had    essayed    a    wmter 

campaign  against  our  General  Lander,  but  when  Manassas 
was  evacuated  he  fell  back  up  the  Valley.  General 
Shields  succeeded  Lander,  and,  desiring  to  engage  Jack- 
son, devised  a  plan  to  lure  him  back  by  a  simulated  retreat. 
Followed  up  by  Ashby's  cavalry,  a  stand  is  made  at  Kerns- 
town.  Jackson  arrives,  expecting  to  crush  a  small 
detachment.  Banks  is  absent.  Shields  has  been  wounded ; 
but  our  troops,  well  led  by  subordinates,  invite  attack,  and 

inflict  on  Jackson  a  smart  defeat,  with  a  loss 

March  23. 

of  five  hundred  men  on  each  side.     Jackson 
again   retires    up    the   Valley.       Even    the    Confederates 
admitted   that   this    eminent   soldier    had   for   once   been 
entrapped,  — a  thing  of  rare  occurrence. 

Vigor  half  equal  to  his  ability  should  months  ago  have 
enabled  McClellan  to  crush  his  enemy  at  Centreville ;  for, 
with  sixty  thousand  men,  Johnston  had  for  eight  months 
bidden  defiance  to  our  capital,  surrounded  with  one  hundred 
tnd  eighty  thousand  armed  men.  Such  vigor  should  have 
cleared  the  Potomac  of  the  impertinent  blockade.  It 
ahould  have  captured  Norfolk, — that  nest  of  Merrimacs 
ikud  gun-boats.  It  should  have  brought  him  to  the  very 
gates  of  Richmond.  Had  but  a  part  of  these  results  been 
^ecomplished,  MoClellan  would  have  enjoyed  the  full  cod 


52  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL   WAR.         [1863 

fidence  and  support  of  all  in  power.  But  now  other 
influences  were  beginning  to  work.  Fremont,  for  whom 
some  harmless  place  must  be  made,  was  put  in  command 
of  the  "  Mountain  Department,"  in  West  Virginia,  and 
furnished  with  an  army  to  confront  an  imaginary  enemy. 
Banks  kept  twenty  odd  thousand  men  to  defend  the  Valley 
against  Jackson's  eight  thousand  ;  and  the  President  wanted 
at  lowest  fifty  thousand  men  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of 
Washington,  heedless  of  the  fact  recognized  by  all  military 
minds  that  to  keep  the  enemy  busy  was  the  only  sure 
defense  of  the  capital. 

In  consequence  of  all  this  no  sooner  had  McClellan 
fairly  embarked  on  his  expedition  than  he  found  a  large 
part  of  his  available  force  taken  from  him.  He  had 
planned  a  "  rapid  movement,"  and  had  been  led  to  expect 
the  cooperation  of  the  navy  on  the  York  river,  as  well  as 
that  of  McDowell's  forty  thousand  men  on  the  Fredericks- 
burg route.     Both  these  were  to  fail  him. 

With    early   spring    McClellan    embarked    his    troops, 

transferred    them   to   the   vicinity   of    Fort 
March  and  i       t>      • 

Monroe,  and  began  to  move  up  the  Jr'enm- 

April. 

sula.  But  no  sooner  was  he  on  the  way 
than  his  progress  was  arrested  by  some  twelve  thousand 
men,  under  Magruder,  on  the  banks  of  the  Warwick  river. 
The  position  could  have  been  forced  without 
great  effort.  In  fact,  a  small  body  did  cross 
and  effect  a  lodgnjent  on  the  other  side,  and,  if  supported, 
couM  have  held  it.  But  the  conduct  of  affairs  was  weak, 
and  this  slight  check  enabled  the  enemy  to  arrest  the 
progiess   of  the   entire   Army  of  the   Potomac,  and   cul 


1862.]       McCLELLAN  MOVES   TO    THE  PENINSULA- 


55 


minated  in  the  defence  and  siege  of  Yorktown.  Indeed, 
McClellan  seems  to  have  anticipated  such  an  event,  for  he 
was  accompanied  by  siege  artillery,  which  in  a  "rapid 
movement  "  would  seem  superfluous. 

But,  being  checked,  he  sat  down  to  capture  Yorktown  by 
regular  investment,  all  of  which  was  done  with  scientific 
accuracy.  Still,  no  sooner  had  he  completed  his  parallels 
and  got  ready  to  bombard  the  place,  than  the 
enemy  evacuated  it.  They  had  detained  us 
a  precious  month.  Our  columns  followed  on  in  pursuit, 
McClellan  remaining  in  Yorktown,  busy  with  questions 
of  transportation. 


May  3. 


Williamsburg.    May  5,  1862. 

The  enemy  under  Longstreet  had  awaited  our  approach 
at  Williamsburg.  Hooker  first  attacked,  having  been 
brought  to  a  stand  by  a  work  known  as  Fort  Magruder, 
and  kept  up  a  heavy  pounding  all  the  fore- 
noon. Kearny  came  to  his  rescue  when 
Hooker's    men   were    all    but    spent.       Hancock    moved 


May  5. 


54  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.        [1862, 

around  the  enemy's  left,  seized  some  abandoned  redoubts, 
and  made  a  brilliant  diversion.     But  there  was  no  coopera- 
tion in  our  attack;  no  one  on  the  field  was  in  supreme 
command,  and  the  day  was  fruitlessly  spent  in  partial  blows. 
The  enemy  retreated  at  night.     Our  loss  was  two  thousand 
two  himdred  ;  theirs  some  six  hundred  less.    McCleUan  then 
leisurely  moved  up  the  Peninsula  on  the  east  side  of  the 
Chickahominy.     Franklin  moved  as  a  separate  body  up  the 
York  river,  intending  a  demonstration  from  White  House. 
None  was  made,  the  enemy  having  passed 
Ifay  7.        this  vicinity  in  his  retreat  before  the  Fed- 
ends  were  ready  to  attack. 


XIL 

THE    PENINSULAR    CAMPAIGN    IN   JEOPARDY.— 
FAIR    OAKS. 

WHILE  all  this  is  taking  place,  Jackson,  who  seems 
to  have  been  created  especially  to 
become  the  unknown  quantity  in  the  problem 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  again  begins,  with  twenty-five 
thousand  men,  his  restless  manoeuvring  in  the  Valley. 

A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  the  peculiar  relation  of 
the  Shenandoah  Valley  to  the  Virginia  campaigns.  Lying 
between  the  two  ranges  of  the  Alleghanies,  and  running 
down  in  a  north-easterly  direction  towards  the  Potomac, 
this  valley  not  only  afforded  the  enemy  a  hidden  and  secure 
means  of  marching  from  their  base  at  the  upper  end  down 
towards  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,  at  the  mere  expense 
of  watching  the  eastern  gaps  to  hold  in  check  detachments 
from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  but  led  their  column  for 
every  day's  march  closer  to  the  rear  of  Washington ; 
while  a  march  up  the  Valley,  on  the  contrary,  was  taking 
a  Federal  army  further  away  from  the  vicinity  of  Rich- 
mond. To  the  Confederates  the  Valley  was  a  sally-port 
which  we  must  be  constant  in  watching.  Its  strategic 
Value  to  the  Confederates  was  often  great ;   but  this  waa 

55 


56  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1862. 

not  all.  The  VaUey  was  also  the  granary  of  Viiginla ; 
for  no  portion  of  her  soil  yielded  such  abundant  harvests 
as  the  smiling  plains  along  the  Shenandoah.  No  wonder 
the  Confederates  clung  tenaciously  to  its  possession. 

As  usual  in  the  Valley,  our  forces  were  on  this  occasion, 
also,  scattered  about  in  detachments  wliich  could  not  sus- 
tain one  another.     Moving  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah 

sharply  upon  Milroy  and  Schenck,  Jackson 
May  8. 

inflicted    upon    them    near    the    town    of 

McDowell,  despite  four  hours'  resistance,  a  defeat  which 

forced  them  sharply  back.     He  then  turned  upon  Banks, 

who  prudently  and  promptly  retired.     Following  him  up, 

Jackson  fell  upon  one  of  his  detachments  at 

May  23. 

Front  Royal,  destroyed  it,  and  sent  Banks, 

May  25. 

'     after  a  stinging  defeat  at  Winchester,  whirl- 
ing back  to  the  Potomac. 

Bred  of  unreasoning  fears  for  the  safety  of  Washing- 
ton, action  was  immediately  taken  by  the  President, 
upon  receipt  of  the  news  of  Banks'  defeat,  to  deprive 
McClellan  of  the  assistance  of  McDowell,  against  the 
protest  of  both.  The  latter,  who  with  his  forty 
thousand  men  was  to  have  reinforced  McClellan's 
right  as  a  flying  wing,  and  would  have  added  moral 
strength  far  beyond  the  actual  assistance,  was  hurried  to 
the  Valley  to  assist  in  *' trapping  Jackson."  This  blow  to 
the  morale  of  the  army,  or  rather  of  its  commander,  weak- 
ened still  more  the  conduct  of  this  campaign. 
May  20. 

McClellan  had  reached  the  Chickahominy, 

and  crossed  with  his  left  wing.  He  had  been  building  all 
his  hopes  upon  McDowell's  aid  on  his  right. 


1862.]        PENINSULAR    CAMPAIGN  IN  JEOPARDY.  57 

Nor  was  McDowell's  march  to  the  Valley  of  any  avail. 
Jackson  was  the  last  man  to  be  trapped.  Fremont  moved 
upon  him  from  the  west ;  Shields  from  the  east.  But  the 
bold  raider,  determined  to  complete  the  scare  at  Washing- 
ton, which  was  so  rapidly  spoiling  the  prospects  of  the 
Peninsular  campaign,  made  a  diversion  on  Harper's  Ferry, 
paused  but  to  make  capture  of  abundant  stores,  and 
reached  Strasburg  in  advance  of  Fremont,  who  was  to  have 
closed  that  outlet  as  Shields  actually  did  the  one  at  Front 
Royal.  Jackson  amused  Fremont  by  a  few  demonstra- 
tions, while  he  got  his  columns  and  trains  beyond  reach, 
and  started  up  the  Valley.  Pursuit  was  made  ;  but  Jack- 
son's marching  capacity  was  beyond  theirs,  as  it  was 
beyond  that  of  any  other  soldier  during  the  war, 
and,  though  harassed  by  our  cavalry,  he  reached 
in  due  time  Port  Republic.  Here  he  was  antici- 
pated  by  Carroll's  brigade,    and   had  this 

June  7. 

officer  destroyed  the  bridge  across  the 
Shenandoah  at  that  point,  Jackson's  safety  would  have 
been  seriously  compromised.  But  in  war  no  man's  judg- 
ment is  infallible,  and  the  situation  at  other  points  is  rarely 
known.  The  bridge  was  left  standing.  This  mistake  ga^re 
Jackson  the  opportunity  to  drive  Carroll  away  and  occupy  it. 
Jackson  was  now  beyond  danger,  his  means  of  retreat 
being  assured.  But,  like  himself,  he  could  not  leave 
without  dealing  a  final  blow.  While  his  lieutenant, 
Ewell,    defeated  Fremont   at   Cross  Keys, 

June  8  and  9 

with  a  loss  of  seven  hundred  men,  Jackson 

crossed  the  Shenandoah  river  at  Port  Republic,  burned  the 

Dridge  behind  him,  and  attacked  Tyler  and  Carroll,  who 


58  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1862, 

had  a  bare  quarter  of  Jackson's  twelve  thousand  men. 
These  brigades  held  him.  in  check  many  hours,  but  were 
finally  driven  into  retreat. 

In  this  short  passage  of  arms  Jackson  had  lost  but  six 
hundi-ed  men,  and  had  kept  three  armies  playing  at  hide- 
and-seek,  the  presence  of  but  one  of  which  might  have 
turned  the  tide  of  victory  towards  the  banners  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  So  soon  as  the  enemy  had  left  the  Valley, 
Fremont,  Banks,  and  McDowell,  each  retraced  his  steps, 
disheartened  and  decimated   by  useless   countermarching. 

The  effect,  meanwhile,  of  this  brilliant  campaign  was  to 
sink  McClellan's  offensive  on  the  Peninsula  to  the  rank  of 
mere  self-protection ;  and  the  Battle  of  Fair  Oaks,  which 
occurred  at  this  time,  was  but  the  prelude  to  the  Seven 
Days'  Retreat. 

Following  the  thunderclap  of  McDowell's  detachment, 
McClellan  sent  Fitz  John  Porter  to  clear  away  a  Confed- 
erate force  threatening  his  right  at  Hanover  Court  House, 
under  command  of  Branch.     This  was  ac- 

May  27. 

complished  in  Porter's  usual  good  style ; 
the  road  to  our  forces  at  Fredericksburg  was  opened,  and 
some  bridges  over  the  Pamunky  and  South  Anna  rivers, 
by  which  the  enemy  could  approach  our  rear,  were 
destroyed. 

McClellan  had  thrown  Keyes'  corps  across  the  Chicka- 
hominy,  followed  by  Heintzelman's,  leaving  Sumner's, 
Franklin's,  and  Porter's  on  the  left  bank.  Unless  the 
means  of  crossing  the  river  were  reliable,  and  so  ample 
that  the  wings  could  have  mutual  support  in  any  emer- 
gency, this  was  a  dangerous  division  of  the  army.     The 


1862.]        PENINSULAR    CAMPAIGN  IN  JEOPARDY. 


59 


reports  showed  a   total  of  one  hundred  and  twenty-five 
thousand  men  and  two  hundred  and  eighty  guns. 

Johnston,  whose  forces  had  been  recruited  from  every 
section  of  the  Confederacy  to  help  him  meet  the  imminent 
danger  to  its  capital,  found  himself  in  command  of  about 
ninety  thousand  men.  For  the  defense  of  Richmond  this 
was  a  fair  match  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Johnston 
wisely  determined  to  take  summary  advantage  of  McClel- 
lan's  perilous  situation  astride  the  river,  and  to  attack  the 
isolated  left  wing.     He  had  just  received  information  that 


FRANKLIN  3     AND 
PORTE  f^'s     CO»<Pk 

On  This    SiOt 


Fair  Oaks.    May  31 -June  1,  1862. 

McDowell  had  been  arrested  in  his  movement  to  McClel- 
lan's  aid,  and  sent  to  the  Valley.  He  ordered  the  bulk  of 
his  force  to  fall  upon  Keyes  and  Heintzelman,  while  a 
small  body  watched  the  crossings  of  the  Chickahominy 
above  to  prevent  a  junction  by  the  other  three  corps.  Our 
left  wing  had  entrenched  at  Seven  Pines,  just  beyond  Fair 
Oaks,  and  had  daily  indulged  in  picket  skirmishing  with 
the  enemy. 


60  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [1862. 

In  pursuance  of  these  orders  Longstreet 
^^  '  and  EQll  fell  heavily  upon  Casey,  whose  divis- 
ion was  in  the  advance.  Huger  was  to  have  attacked  the 
left  flank  of  Casey,  by  a  circuit ;  but  his  progress  was  ar- 
rested at  streams  swollen  by  a  heavy  storm  of  the  previous 
day .  It  is  now  well  proven  that  Casey's  men  fought  stanchly ; 
but  they  were  overmatched  and  soon  driven  in ;  sad  con- 
fusion took  possession  of  their  ranks ;  destruction  seemed 
imminent ;  and  only  by  heavy  reinforcements  from  Heint- 
zelman  were  we  able  by  nightfall  to  reform  and  hold  a  line 
near  Savage  Station.  We  had  been  driven  back  more 
than  a  mile.  The  enemy  could  claim  a  brilliant  victory. 
Had  he  been  more  vigorous,  the  two  corps,  so  largely 
outnumbered,  might  have  been  driven  into  the  Chicka- 
hominy.  Happily,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  action,  McClel- 
lan  had  ordered  Sumner  across  the  river  to  sustain  the 
right  of  Keyes  and  Heintzelman,  and  the  brave  old 
sabreur,  after  many  difficulties  and  a  heavy  fight,  man- 
aged to  join  his  line  to  that  formed  of  the  reUcs  of  the  two 
defeated  corps,  and  held  Smith  in  check. 

The  following  morning  the  battle  was 
renewed.  Longstreet  soon  comprehended 
that  the  chance  of  completing  his  triumph  had  been  for- 
feited, and  did  not  attempt  much ;  the  Federals  not  only 
held  their  own,  but  drove  the  enemy  from  the  ground 
occupied  the  day  before.  Had  Franklin  and  Porter 
crossed  on  this  day,  a  vigorous  push  might  have  carried 
us  into  Richmond ;  but  a  rise  in  the  river  prevented 
their  so  doing.  Our  loss  had  been  five  thousand  out  of 
forty-five  thousand  engaged ;  the  enemy's  in  excess  of  six 


1862.]         PENINSULAR    CAMPAIGN  IN  JEOPARDY.  61 

thousand  out  of  an  equal  force ;  three  thousand  men  on 
each  side  was  the  loss  of  the  first  day.  General  Johnston 
was  wounded.  G.  W.  Smith,  who  had  commanded  the 
Confederate  left,  replaced  him. 

For  a  term  of  three  weeks'  bad  weather,  McClellan  new 
waited  for  the  again  promised  reinforcement  of  McDowell. 
During  this  period  great  excitement  was  created  by  a  bold 

cavalry  raid   of  Stuart's,   during  which  he 

-,  .    1  1  T  1  -,         ^"""^  13-15. 

rode  entirely  around  our  Imes,  and  escaped 

unharmed  after  doing  some  damage  to  our  supplies.  Mc- 
Clellan was  still  pressing  forward  his  lines  toward  Rich- 
mond inch  by  inch,  and  every  day  promising  himself  an 
assault  for  the  morrow.     And  the  last  heavy 

June  25. 
picket  fight  enabled  him  to  gain  ground  to 

within  four  miles  of  the  Confederate  capital.  To  the  un- 
initiated, success  seemed  already  within  our  grasp.  To 
those  in  a  situation  to  know,  the  outlook  appeared  fai 
from  promising. 


xm 

THE  SEVEN  DAYS. 

/^  ENERAL  Lee,  who  had  succeeded  wounded  John- 
\Ia  ston,  took  advantage  of  the  lull  following  Fair  Oaks, 
and  not  intending  to  afford  McClellan  breathing-time  to 
recover  from  the  weakness  engendered  of  McDowell's 
removal,  called  upon  Jackson  to  rejoin  him  from  the 
Valley ;  but  at  the  same  time  he  actually  sent  him  rein- 
forcements as  a  blind.  Troops  were  put  on  the  cars  in  full 
view  of  some  of  our  prisoners  in  Libby,  who  were  just 
ubout  to  be  exchanged,  and  these,  on  reaching  our  lines, 
spread  the  story  of  a  new  operation  by  Jackson  in  the 
Valley. 

The  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  lay  as  follows  : 
Porter,  north  of  the  river  at  Gaines'  Mill,  Franklin  joining 
him  on  the  south,  with  Sumner  on  his  left  as  far  as  Fair 
Oaks ;  then  Heintzelman,  on  to  White  Oak  Swamp,  and 
Keyes  in  reserve.  This  line  was  in  the  arc  of  a  circle, 
whose  centre  was  at  Bottom's  Bridge.  The  ^ve  corps 
numbered  some  one  hundred  thousand  men. 

Lee  had  the  divisions  of  Longstreet,  A.  P.  Hill,  Huger, 
Magruder,  and  D.  H.  Hill,  about  seventy  thousand,  not 
counting  Jackson,  who  was  to  join  with  twenty-five  thou- 

62 


1862.] 


THE  SEVEN  DAYS. 


63 


f1CCHANICs//ILL.e. 


Seven  Days.    June  26- July  2,  1862. 


sand  more.  Huger  and  Magruder  were  opposite  Sumner 
and  Heintzelman.  A.  P.  Hill  confronted  Franklin,  while 
Longstreet  and  D.  H.  Hill  lay  in  reserve.  Jackson, 
never  loth  to    be  afoot,   leaving  a  simple   rear-guard  at 


64  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR.       [1862. 

Harrisonburg,  to  keep  up  appearances  and  deceive  some 

sixty  or  seventy  thousand  men  who  were  watching  him,  put 

his  men  aboard  the  cars,  joined  the  Richmond 

June  26.  "^ 

forces,  and  marched  around  McClellan's  right 
at  Mechanics ville,  ready  to  further  Lee's  plan  of  crushing 
his  opponent's  flank. 

Meanwhile  A.  P.  Hill  fell  upon  our  right  at  Meadow 
Bridge.  JMcCall  made  a  stubborn  resistance,  inflicting 
grievous  loss  upon  the  enemy,  but  at  night  he  was  with- 
drawn to  Gaines'  Mill.  Next  day  McClellan  received  the 
enemy's  assault  at  the  latter  place.  The  blow  lit  on 
Porter,  whose  task  was  to  prevent  the  Confederates  from 
crossing  the  river.  Lee  was  manifestly  in  earnest.  He 
intended  no  child's  play.  Porter  was  reinforced  by 
Slocum's  division,  and  had  nearly  thirty  thousand  men, 
including  a  body  of  regulars.  Longstreet,  A.  P.  Hill, 
D.    H.    Hill,  and    Jackson   were   twice   as 

June  27. 

many.  Porter  had  the  advantage  of  posi- 
tion on  heights  in  front  of  Grapevine  Bridge ;  but  was 
isolated,  and  with  a  defile  in  his  rear,  —  a  critical 
situation  in  case  of  disaster.  The  enemy's  attacks 
were  furious  to  the  last  degree,  but  Porter's  line  was 
tempered  steel.  Not  until  nightfall  was  any 
breach  made  in  his  ranks ;  nor  could  the 
enemy  penetrate  the  one  they  made.  His  loss  was  seven 
tliousand  men;  Lee's,  seven  hundred  more.  Stancher 
defence  to  more  brilliant  assault  was  never  made. 

While  this  was  going  on  beyond  the  river,  Magruder 
hammered  away  at  the  force  south  of  the  Chickahominy,  to 
engage   McClellan's  attention,    and    prevent  his   sending 


1862.]  THE  SEVEN  DAYS.  •  65 

reinforcements  to  sore-pressed  Porter.  In  this  he  was 
successful.  Porter  withdrew  during  the  night  and  burned 
the  bridges. 

While  the  battle  of  Gaines'  Mill  was  in  progress 
McClellan  might  have  swung  his  left  into  Richmond, 
whose  defences  were  sparsely  held  while  the  bulk  of  Lee's 
army  was  in  action  north  of  the  Chickahominy ;  and  it 
was  for  this  object  that  gallant  Porter  believed  that  he  was 
fighting  his  single  corps  against  Lee's  army.  But,  still 
again,  McClellan  was  misled  by  his  secret-service  chief  as 
to  the  number  of  the  enemy,  as  he  had  been  often  before ; 
and  believing  that  he  had  one  hundred  thousand  men 
between  himself  and  the  Southern  capital  instead  of  Magru- 
der's  mere  handful,  he  sat  down  to  figure  out  the  itinerary 
of  the  predetermined  retreat  to  the  James  river,  in  lieu  of 
pushing  through  this  film  of  troops  and  into  Richmond. 

It  is  true  that  McClellan  always  contemplated  as  a 
possibility  a  change  of  base  to  the  James ;  but  he  surely 
never  dreamed  of  making  it  under  such  immense  pressure. 
Lee  had  based  all  his  estimates  upon  McClellan's  retreat- 
ing by  his  right  over  the  road  he  had  come.  But 
McClellan's  manoeuvre  was  by  his  left,  thus  frustrating  his 
opponent's  calculations  and  robbing  his  pursuit  of  two 
days'  initiative.  This  was  a  great,  but  very  natural,  error 
on  Lee's  part.  His  intuitions  were,  as  a  rule,  singularly 
near   the  truth. 

The  base  at  White  House  was  abandoned ;  supplies 
were  sent  round  to  the  James  by  transports,  and  aU 
unremovable  stores  were  burned.  Eight  days'  rations  and 
sk  large  drove  of  beeves  were  sent  on  ahead.     The  hospital 


66  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1862. 

at  Savage  Station  had  to  be  abandoned.  It  contained  some 
twenty-five  hundred  sick  and  wounded,  with  surgeons  and 
attendants,  who  had  not  yet  been  transported  to  White 
House.  The  enemy  behaved  with  humanity  to  these  men. 
Keyes  led  the  advance,  protecting  the  right  flank  of  the 
interminable    line    of  wagon-trains.       The 

June  28.  *  . 

first  day  passed  without  any  serious  action. 
To  the  enemy  it  was  a  wasted  day,  owing  to  Lee's  error. 
He  had  put  his  forces  still  further  down  the  left  bank  of 
the  Chickahominy  in  imaginary  pursuit. 

Porter   followed   Keyes.     Next  mominor 

June  29.  .       -^  ^ 

these  two  corps,  with  McCall  and  Slocum, 
stood  at  Glendale.  Huger  alone  was  in  their  front,  and 
throughout  the  day  no  shot  was  fired.     Huger  was  kept 

diverted  by  a  curtain  of  horse.     But  Lonsr- 

June  29.  ° 

street  and  Hill,  as  soon  as  Lee  had  dis- 
covered his  mistake,  retraced  their  steps  by  forced  marches, 
crossed  the  Chickahominy  by  New  Bridge  and  took  post 
in  rear  of  Huger ;  while  Jackson  still  remained  at  work, 
rebuilding  Grapevine  Bridge. 

Sumner  and  Smith,  of  Franklin's  Corps,  could  not 
escape  a  heavy  combat  with  Magruder  at  Allen's  Farm, 
and  another  at  Savage  Station.  They  must  fight  to  secure 
the  retreat.  Heintzelman,  who  was  on  Sumner's  left, 
extending  down  to  White  Oak  Swamp,  in  lieu  of  sus- 
taining them,  left  his  two  brother-officers  to  bear  the 
brunt  of  the  action,  and  began,  before  he  was  so 
ordered,  to  move  his  corps  through  the  swamp,  along 
a  second  road  which  had  been  happily  discovered 
by   Kearny.      As    good    luck   would    have    it,   Jackson 


1862.]  THE  SEVEN  DATS.  67 

had  not    reached    the     ground.      Rebuilding    Grapevine 

Bridge   was    an    all   day's  job.     At   night- 
June  29. 
fall,  Franklin  crossed  the  swamp,  and,  last 

of  all,  old  Sumner,  loth  to  leave. 

Lee's  cavalry  was  absent  at  White  House,  —  a  circum- 
stance which  saved  us  much  complication.  As  soon  as  the 
other  corps  began  to  arrive  at  Glendale,  Keyes  was  moved 
down  to  Turkey  Bend.  Porter  edged  to  the  left,  making 
room  for  the  third  corps.  Franklin  defended  White  Oak 
Bridge  against  Jackson.  Lee  now  hurled  Longstreet  and 
Hill,  with  Huger  and  Magruder  in  support,  down  the 
three  avenues  which  tapped  our  line,  massed  along  the 
Quaker  Road.  Foreseeing  the  imperative 
need  of  securing  Malvern  Hill,  McClellan 
moved  Porter  down  to  that  point. 

Our  line,  well  posted  at  Glendale  (Confederate 
"Frazier's  Farm"),  stoutly  resisted  the  attacks  of  the 
enemy,  which  fell  particularly  upon  McCall.  But  once 
during  the  day  was  a  break  effected  by  the  Confederates, 
and  Kearny  promptly  filled  the  gap.  Thus  Franklin  was 
holding  Jackson  at  bay  at  White  Oak  Swamp,  while 
Sumner  and  Heintzelman  repulsed  the  vigorous  onslaught 
of  Longstreet   and   HiU. 

At  night  all  the  corps  retreated  to  Malvern  Hill.     The 

seven  bloody  days  were  to  end  here.     Our 

July  1. 
troops  occupied   a  high  plateau,   and   were 

disposed  in  convex  order,  with  the  flanks  resting  on  the 
river.  We  were  warmly  sustained  by  the  fire  of  the  gun- 
boats in  our  rear,  whose  heavy  shell  passed  over  our  heads 
ind  exploded  far  beyond  in  the  enemy's  columns.     It  waa 


68  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR.         [18fi2. 

here  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  received  the  parting 
onsets  of  the  enemy.  These  were  delivered  in  an  isolated 
manner,  though  full  of  Southern  Uan,  But,  desperate  as 
were  these  assaults,  repeated  at  intervals  during  the  entire 
day,  and  hardy  as  was  the  courage  of  the  assailants,  no 
impression  could  be  made  upon  our  ranks.  Lee  retired, 
weary  and  in  confusion,  from  the  field.  The  Army  of 
the  Potomac   had   been   saved. 

During  the  seven  days*  operations  the  enemy,  who  had 
been  the  attacking  party,  lost  over  twenty  thousand  men. 
Our  loss  was  under  sixteen  thousand.  Brilliant  as  had 
been  tlie  conduct  of  the  Confederate  army,  its  performance 
fell  short  of  satisfying  the  Richmond  public,  which 
demanded  the  annihilation  or  capture  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  The  insatiability  of  nations  for  the  results  of 
military  skill  and  endurance  is  hard  to  be  explained. 
The  impossible  alone  appears  to  equal  the  anticipations  of 
laymen;  and,  were  the  impossible  accomplished,  more 
would  be  apt  to  be  demanded.  Even  old  soldiers,  famil- 
iar with  the  difficulties  which  hedge  about  all  military 
exploits,  will  often  join  in  this  unreasoning  clamor,  when 
not  themselves  engaged. 

In  this  retreat  McClellan  showed  undoubted  ability 
But  it  was  not  the  ability  which  accomplishes  result  . 
He  could  fight  for  existence,  and  fight  stanchly ;  but  not 
for  conquest.  And  when  Halleck,  wearing  the  laurels  of  his 
Western  lieutenants,  became  general-in-chief,  it  was  all 
over  with  the  Peninsular  campaign.  Lee  quickly  appreci- 
ated this  fact,  and  at  once  set  on  foot  a  new  campaign 
towards   the   old  battle-ground  of  Bull  Run. 


XIV. 

POPE'S  CAMPAIGN. 

THT!  Army  of  Virginia,  under  Pope,  is  now  to  bear  the 
bi  unt  of  Lee's  assault,  while  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac is  dismembered  and  sent  back  whence  it  came,  to  add  in 
driblets  to  Pope's  effective.  To  the  provoking  changeable- 
ness  of  the  President  and  his  advisers,  during  McClellan's 
campaign,  may  be  largely  ascribed  its  failure.  Who  does 
not  recognize  Mr.  Lincoln's  keen  perception  of  the  gen- 
eral bearing  politics  should  have  on  the  operations  in 
the  field,  as  well  as  his  military  obtuseness  ?  Harassed 
by  a  people  at  his  back  which  demanded  action,  he  was 
naturally  unable  to  preserve  his  confidence  in  a  general 
who  would  not  act.  And  before  McClellan  did  act,  the 
confidence  had  ebbed  away.  "General  McClellan  did  not 
give  to  the  will  of  the  President  and  the  demands  of  the 
people  that  weight  in  the  formation  of  his  plans  of  cam- 
paign to  which  they  were  entitled."     (Webb.) 

The  Western  armies  are  resting  on  their  laurels,  well, 
earned  by  the  recovery  of  Kentucky,  Tennessee,  Missouri, 
jind  so  material  a  part  of  the  Mississippi  river.     General 
Pcpe's  overestimated  if  brilliant  success  at  Island  No.  10 
has  persuaded  Halleck  to  call  him  to  the  command  of  the 


70  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   C.VIL   WAR. 

Virginia  forces.     A  new  army  is  created  for  him,  and  he 
is  unfortunate  enough  to  open  his  Eastern 

July  14.  ^ 

career  by  a  general  order  so  ill-judged  as  to 
rob  him  from  the  start  of  the  confidence  as  well  as  sympathy 
of  his  subordinates.  The  new  Army  of  Virginia  consists 
of  the  corps  of  McDowell,  Banks,  and  Sigel  —  the  latter 
having  been  Fremont's  —  which  are  all  assembled  from 
their  several  departments. 

McClellan  has  under  his  command  ninety  thousand  men. 

They  are  in  a  position  which  must  compel  Lee 

to  stay  in  Kichmond.    He  urges  the  capture  of 

Petersburg,  at  the  portals  of  which  two  years  later  so  much 

blood  will  be  spilled,  and  is   allowed  to  believe  that  his 

operations  are  to  be  continued  from  his  present  base.     But 

Halleck's  will  is  now  law,  and  Pope  is  his  favorite.     The 

sacrifices    and   labors   of  the   Army   of  the  Potomac  are 

abandoned,  and  the  troops  put  in  motion  for  Acquia  Creek. 

Gordonsville  is  the  key  to  the  southern  entrances  of  the 

Shenandoah  Valley.   Anticipating  a  new  march  by  Jackson 

towards   his  favorite   campaigning   ground, 

Pope   directs   his   scattered   forces    on    this 

town.     But  Jackson  gets  ahead  of  him.     Lee  has  been 

filling  up  his  attenuated  ranks  ;  he  has  got  together  eighty 

thousand  men.     He  sends  A.  P.  Hill  to  reinforce  Jackson. 

So    soon    as    Lee    ascertains    that   McClellan's    forces  are 

certainly  to  leave  the  James,  he  orders  Jackson  to  assail 

Pope's  van,  at  Culpeper,  without  further  delay.     Jackson 

advances  with  twenty-eight  thousand  men. 

August  9, 

Banks  meets  him  near  Cedar  Mountain 
(Confederate    "  Cedar    Kun ")    with   less    than    half   this 


1862.] 


POPE'S   CAMPAIGN. 


71 


force,  and,  attacking  without  discretion  but  with  much 
vigor,  he  almost  compasses  a  victory.  Jackson  retires 
across  the  Rapidan.  Our  losses  are  twenty-four  hundred, 
against  thirteen  hundred  of  the  enemy's. 

Lee  now  moves  Longstreet  to  the  new  field  of  operations, 
while  one-third  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  on  the  march 
to  sustain  Pope.     Overratino^  the  numerical 

•      .  P    -r  -r.  n  ^^  August  17-18. 

superiority   of   Lee,    Pope   follows    up    the 


•Pope's  Campaign.    (1.)    August  24,  1862. 


opening  boast  of  his  campaign  by  a  retreat  to  the  Rappa- 
hannock. Here,  under  Halleck's  orders,  he  is  committed 
to  the  very  hazardous  policy  of  protecting  two  divergent 


72  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1862 

lines  in  his  rear, — one  to  Washington,  whence  come  his 
supplies  ;  one  to  Acquia  Creek,  whence  are  to  come  his  re* 
inforcements  from  the  Armv  of  the  Potomac ;  and  he  is 
promised  immediate  and  large  accessions  of  troops.  If 
from  defeat,  or  for  good  tactical  or  strategic  reasons,  he  is 
constrained  to  abandon  the  position  so  taken  up,  it  need  not 
be  pointed  out  that  he  thus  uncovers  either  one  or  both  of 
these  lines.  Such  a  scheme  is  full  of  disadvantages  if  not 
positive  dangers.     It  is  rarely  permissible. 

Lee,  with  Jackson  on  the  left  and  Longstreet  on  the 

right,  advances  upon  him.     Seeing  no  chance 

of  forcing  the  river  to  advantage,  Lee  orders 

Jackson  far  around  the  Bull  Run  range  to  the  left,  to  fall 

upon  Pope's  flank  through  Thoroughfare  Gap. 

It  must  be  remembered  that  Halleck  was  keeping  both 
McClellan  and  Pope  ignorant  of  the  true  state  of  affairs, 
while  promising  the  latter  reinforcements  beyond  his  power 
to  send.  Pope  had  partially  divined  Lee's  tactics,  but 
believed  Jackson's  destination  to  be  the  Shenandoah  Valley, 
and  proposed  to  counter  this  manoeuvre  and  attack  Lee  by 
crossing  the  river  while  he  was  isolated  from  his  lieutenant. 
But  the  river  rose,  —  as  rivers  can  rise  only  in  V^irginia,  — 
August  22.  by  a  heavy  storm,  and  Pope  had  again  to 
August  23.  change  his  plan.  This  was  done  under  the 
excitement  of  a  swoop  by  Stuart  on  Catlett's  Station,  which 
carried  off  Pope's  head-quarter  papers,  spread  alarm  amcug 
the  whole  body  of  camp  followers,  and  set  the  War  Depart- 
ment in  a  panic. 

McDowell    had    arrived    at    Warrenton.      Porter    was 
marching  along  up  the  Rappahannock  from  Acquia  Creek, 


1862.]  POPE'S  CAMPAIGN.  73 

8igel  was  at  Waterloo ;    Banks  at  Sulphur 

Springs.    Heintzelman  sent  part  of  his  corps 

on  from  Alexandria.      The  men  were  already  leg-weary 

and  disheartened. 

Lee  meanwhile  had  given  his  troops  a  long  rest  while 
waiting  for  Jackson  to  complete  his  flank  march,  and  the 
rise  in  the  river  had  enforced  some  quiet  upon  Jackson  near 
Waterloo,  before   he   could   safely  get   his 

^    ^  August  25. 

corps  across. 

Pope  had  it  in  his  power  to  neutralize  Jackson's  march 
by  occupying  Thoroughfare  Gap.  But  again  he  was 
slower  than  the  Confederate  general.  Anticipating  a 
crossing  by  Lee,  as  the  waters  were  subsiding,  he  began 
a  new  movement  to  place  himself  on  the  Orange  and  Alex- 
andria Railroad  facing  westerly  to  protect  his  communi- 
cations with  Acquia  Creek.  While  thus  manoeuvring, 
new  advices  as  to  Jackson  being  on  the  march  reached  him 
and  almost  induced  him  to  make  another  attempt  on  Lee 
across  the  river.  But  his  forces  were  happily  too  much 
scattered  to  be  got  in  hand. 

Meanwhile  Jackson,  with  Stuart  protecting  his  right  and 
front,  after  a  march  of  fifty  miles  in  thirty-six  hours,  de- 
bouches from  Thoroughfare  Gap  and  descends  upon  Bristoe 
and  Manassas  Stations.  Here  are  Pope's  supplies  and 
munitions  of  war.  Jackson  makes  an  utter  wreck  of  them 
all.  Up  to  this  moment  Pope  has  appar- 
ently never  thought  of  Thoroughfare  Gap. 
His  consternation  is  complete,  while  Washington  is  at  the 
end  of  its  wits. 

Jackson  had  placed  himself  in  extreme  peril.     In  all  the 


74  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1862. 

campaigns  he  conducted  under  the  orders  of  Lee,  he  showed 
himself  peculiarly  fond  of  manoeuvres  which  can  not  but 
be  condemned  by  the  logic  of  warfare,  and  which  an 
opponent  who  was  his  equal  in  audacity  and  skill  could 
repeatedly  have  turned  to  his  all  but  destruction.  But  the 
celerity  of  Jackson's  manoeuvres,  and  the  fact  that  he  was 
never  pitted  against  any  antagonist  ready  to  take  summary 
advantage  of  his  breach  of  the  rules  of  strategy,  saved  him 
and  his  reputation  harmless.  His  genius  was  as  eccentric 
as  he  himself  was  daring ;  his  soldierly  qualities  were  of  the 
highest,  and  brilliant  success  stamped  him  the  ablest  lieuten- 
ant of  the  war.  And  after  all  must  not  the  strictest  methods 
of  strategy  subordinate  themselves  to  the  one  rule  of  doing 
the  most  apt  thing  at  the  proper  moment  ?  This  Stonewall 
Jackson  invariably  did. 

But  if  Jackson  was  in  danger,  so  was  Pope  cut  off  from 
his  base.  Halleck,  aghast,  was  utterly  ignorant  as  to  what 
force  was  in  Pope's  rear.  Franklin  had  arrived  at  Alexan- 
dria and  a  brigade  was  sent  out  to  Bull  Run  to  reconnoitre. 
Here  these  troops  were  waylaid  by  Jackson  and  fell  back  to 
Centre ville,  spreading  consternation  on  every  side. 

This  flank  march  accomplished  in  his  usual  splendid  style, 
Jackson  occupies  the   old  Bull  Run    battle 

August  27. 

ground  and   gives  his   men   an    ample   rest 

while  he  awaits  the  arrival  of  his  chief.     His  corps  is  in  the 

highest  spirits,  and  each  man's  haversack  is  filled  with  rare 

good  provender.     Pope  hurries  hither  and  yon  in  the  hope 

of  striking  the,  to  him,  invisible  foe.     The  two  armies  are 

about  to  close  and  wrestle  over  the  familiar  ground. 

Pope  has  had  good  reason  to  rely  on  Halleck  to  pro- 


1862.] 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN. 


lb 


tect  his  right  and  rear.  The  capture  of  Manassas  unde- 
ceives him.  But  he  can  now  make  Jackson  pay  dearly  for 
his  venture  by  striking  him  before  his  chief  comes  up  to 
his  aid ;  for  Longstreet  has  set  out  to  march  towards  him  by 
the  same  long  circuit.  But  he  goes  to  work  in  the  wrong 
way.  Pope  should  evidently  plant  himself  between  Jack- 
son and  Thoroughfare  Gap.  This  is  the  one  thing  needful 
to  be  done,  and  Gainesville  is  the  strategic  key  of  the  op- 


Pope's  Campaign.    (2.)    August  28,  A.M. 


eration.     McDowell  appreciates  the  fact  and  does  occupy 
both  Gainesville  and  Haymarket.     He   then   proposes  to 
demonstrate  on  Jackson  and  develop  his  position.     All  this 
is  well  to  the  purpose  and  shows  foresight  and  activity. 
Longstreet  is  thus  cut  off  from  Jackson.     The  Army  of 


76 


BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL   WAR, 


[1862. 


Northern  Virginia  is  actually  in  bad  case» 
ugus      .      p^pg  Qjj]y  needs  to  advance  his  left  to  com- 
pass absolute  success.     But  a  strange  infatuation  makes  him 
again  conceive  a  fear  for  his  right  flank  and  robs  him  of  the 
power  of  gauging  his  advantage.     He  withdraws  McDow- 


Pope's  Campaign.    (3.)    August  28,  6  P.M. 


ell  with  other  troops  from  Gainesville  to  the  vicinity  of 
Manassas.  Exhausted,  confused,  and  dispirited,  this  new 
and  puzzling  march  is  made  by  the  divisions  concerned. 
Only  Ricketts  remains  at  the  key-point,  McDowell  having 
left  him  to  observe  Thoroughfare  Gap. 

Jackson  could  ask  no  better  treatment.  He  has  taken 
position  from  Sudley  Springs  to  Groveton,  and  utilizing 
a  new  railroad  grade  as  defence,  he  sends  Hill  towards  Cen- 


1862.] 


POPE'S  CAMPAIGN. 


11 


August  28. 


treville  as  a  ruse  to  draw  Pope  away.     Ricketts  is  driven 

from  Thoroughfare  Gap  at  the  same  moment 

he  is  recalled.     King,  of  McDowelFs  corps, 

has  a  sharp  battle  with  Jackson's  right,  but  retires  at  night. 

The  Federals  have  lost  all  they  possessed  the  day  before, 

Jackson  and  Lee  can  now  shake  hands,  while 

August  29. 

Pope  scarcely  knows  what  has  become  of  all 
his  troops. 

Having  blundered  away  his  advantage,  the  thing  for  Pope 
to  do  now  is  to  take  position  north  of  Bull  Run  and  receive 


Pope's  Campaign.    (4.)    August  29,  Noon. 


the  enemy  on  strong  ground,  where  he  can  be  securely 
joined  by  the  balance  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  and  can 
rest  and  victual  his  men.     But  he  now,  at  this  late  hour, 


78  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL   WAR.      .   [1862. 

endeavors  to  reoccupy  Gainesville,  so  as  to  separate  Lee  and 
Jackson.  Heintzelman  and  Reno  are  to  pass  the  stone 
bridge.  McDowell  and  Porter  are  to  go  to  Gainesville. 
Sigel  and  Reynolds  will  be  the  centre.  All  this  is  too  late. 
Pope  is  already  tactically  defeated. 

Sigel  arrives  and  attacks  Jackson's  riffhfc, 

August  29.  °  .  .  ° 

Starke  holds  him  off;  reinforcements  come 
up,  but  the  combat  is  not  heavy.  Longstreet  puts  in  his 
appearance.  Groveton  becomes  the  centre  of  the  Confed- 
erate line,  while  Longstreet  works  gradually  around  our  left. 

McDowell  and  Porter  are  barred  from  the  road  Pope  has 
ordered  them  to  pursue.  Porter  faces  Longstreet  astride 
the  railroad.  McDowell  gets  his  corps  together  and 
marches  towards  the  booming  of  the  guns  at  Groveton. 
Pope  still  hugs  the  delusion  that  Longstreet  is  far  away,  and 
that  McDowell  and  Porter  can  turn  Jackson's  right.  As- 
suming that  they  have  actually  got  at  this  work.  Hooker 
and  Kearny  are  thrown  upon  Jackson's  railroad  defences, 
but  repulsed  by  Hill  and  Early.  Pope  again  sends  an  order 
to  Porter  to  attack  Jackson's  right,  and  again  assuming 
that  he  has  received  and  acted  on  it,  once  more  hurls  Kearny 
and  Reno  on  the  embankment.  These  divisions  capture  it, 
but  being  without  reserves,  must  fall  back  with  useless 
slaughter.  McDowell  appears  at  Groveton  and  attacks, 
but  he  falls  foul  of  Longstreet's  veterans  and  can  make  no 
impression.  Porter  remains  inactive.  He  might  create  a 
diversion  in  Pope's  favor  by  attack,  but  the  operation  is  deli- 
cate. His  orders  are  nullified  by  the  facts  which  Pope  ig- 
nores. 

While  our  troops  have  had  the  advantage  of  the  fighting 


1862.]  POPE'S  CAMPAIGN.  79 

on  this  day,  they  are  now  out  of  rations  and 

should  be  withdrawn.  But  Pope  determines  to         ^^^ 

fight  again  on  the  morrow,  with  the  fifty  odd  thousand  men 

left  him.  He  strengthens  his  right  wing  by  de- 

^  °  .  August  30. 

pie  ting  his  left,  and  attacks  at  noon.  Porter  is 
brought  to  the  centre  and  launched  upon  the  enemy.  His 
gallantry,  which  no  one  has  ever  questioned,  can  effect 
nothing.  Lee  assumes  the  oflPensive.  Despite  hard  blows 
the  Unionists  are  forced  back  all  along  the  line.  Had  not 
a  successful  stand  been  made  by  a  hurriedly  assembled  force 
massed  on  the  Henry  House  Hill,  the  disaster  would  have 
been  fatal  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Pope  retires  to  Centreville.  August  30. 

Here  Jackson  again  outflanks  him.  By  a  August  31. 
march  around  his  right  to  Chantilly,  he  is  nearer  Fair- 
fax than  Pope.  A  still  more  hurried  retreat  towards 
Alexandria  follows.  Pope  is  barely  saved  from  this  new 
destruction  by  the  successful  head  made  against  Jackson  at 
the  battle  of  Chantilly  by  the  divisions  of  Kearny  (in 
making  which  this  jpreux  chevalier's  life 
is  lost)  and  Reno. 

During  this  campaign  we  lost  fourteen  out  of  eighty 
thousand  men  ;  the  enemy  nine  out  of  fifty-four  thousand. 

Thus,  despite  the  gallantry  of  the  troops,  the  Federals 
have  been  sent  whirling  back  towards  the  capital,  having 
fought  half-a-dozen  battles  to  no  purpose  whatsoever.  Lee 
can  not  further  follow  Pope.  He  must  also  revictual  his 
army,  and  give  his  gallant  men  time  for  recuperation. 

Pope  should  not  be  held  alone  to  blame  for  the  issue  of 
this  campaign.     He  was  brave,  light-hearted  under  adver- 


80  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [1862. 

sity,  and  sanguine.  That  he  was  unable  to  cope  with  Lee's 
steady  purpose  and  Jackson's  splendid  marching  capacity 
must  not  rob  him  of  what  he  fauly  deserves.  He  was 
utterly  outgeneralled ;  he  never  knew  where  his  enemy 
was ;  he  fought  to  no  purpose.  But  when  he  did  fight,  it 
was  with  a  will  beyond  his  discretion ;  and  he  would  have 
cheerfully  marched  out  again  to  meet  his  late  antagonists  so 
soon  as  he  had  reached  the  protection  of  the  defences  of 
Washington.  It  was  Halleck's  secretiveness,  and  his 
illusory  promises  of  reinforcements,  dangerous  because  he 
kept  the  actual  facts  both  from  Pope  and  McClellan  so  that 
neither  could  sustain  the  other,  that  were  the  actual  causes 
of  failure;  while  Pope's  lack  of  power  to  divine  Lee's 
manoeuvres  and  his  exhausting  energy  in  parrying  the 
thrusts  he  vainly  imagined  to  be  aimed  at  him,  were  im- 
mediately at  fault.  But  from  Cedar  Mountain  to  Chantilly, 
the  conduct  of  our  troops  stands  out  in  brilliant  relief  from 
the  tactics  of  their  commander ;  while  we  cannot  sufficiently 
wonder  at  the  courage,  patience,  and  muscular  legs  of  the 
Southern  veterans.     Mere  words  cannot  do  them  justice. 

Pope  attributed  his  overthrow  to  the  failure  of  Fitz  John 
Porter  to  obey  orders  to  attack  Longstreet  on  August  29. 
Facts  now  well  known  exonerate  this  officer,  and  his 
splendid  service  whenever  called  upon  has  deserved  better 
of  the  nation.  That  Porter  should  have  more  definitely 
developed,  by  a  reconnoissance  in  force,  the  fact,  which  he 
knew  by  scouts,  of  Longstreet's  presence  in  his  front,  or 
perhaps  have  attacked  him  as  a  diversion,  is  almost  the  only 
criticism  that  can  be  honestly  and  intelligently  brought 
home  to  him  by  his  opponents.     And,  confronting  as  he 


1862.]  POPE'S  CAMPAIGN.  81 

did,  half  of  Lee's  army,  unknown  to  Pope,  sucli  a  course 
might  have  proved  highly  disastrous.  What  other  citizen, 
during  our  entire  history,  ever  suffered  for  so  slight  an 
error  ?  Moreover  every  corps  commander  in  the  army  was 
at  that  time  in  utter  daze  at  the  eccentric  tactical  combina- 
tions of  Pope ;  while  the  t*tK»ps  were  exhausted,  hungry, 
and  without  confidence  in  their  chief. 


BUELL    AND    BRAGG. 

AGAIN"  to  return  to  the  "West,  where  we  left  the  Union 
Army  to  recruit  from  the  fatigues  of  their  successes 
against  Beauregard.  After  the  fall  of  Corinth  the  Confed- 
erates dispersed  their  forces  over  a  considerable  area.  As 
Halleck  made  no  effort  to  follow  up  his  advantages  by  a 
forward  movement,  this  necessitated  a  similar  disposition 
on  his  part. 

It  is  altogether  probable  that,  starting  from  Corinth,  a 
column  of  ten  thousand  or  fifteen  thousand  men  could  have 
captured  Vicksburg.  But  enterprise  in  the  field  was  not  one 
of  Halleck's  virtues,  and  the  enemy  was  able  to  erect  defences 
both  there  and  at  Port  Hudson  which  checked  our  opera- 
tions for  at  least  a  year. 

When  summer  opened  Halleck  stood  at 

June,  1862. 

the  head  of  one  hundred  and  seventy-five 
thousand  men,  of  which  one  hundred  and  ten  thousand 
were  carried  on  his  Morning  Report  as  ''for  duty."  In 
addition  to  this  Mitchel  was  at  Huntsville  on  the  Memphis 
and  Charleston  Railroad  with  seven  thousand ;  Morgan  at 
Cumberland  Gap  with  nine  thousand;  and  Curtis  with 
ten  thousand  more  was,  after  the  battle  of  Pea  Ridge,  ap- 

82 


TBaiOwin  88 


Shicl\lsbor<x?'^ 


THEATRE  OF 

SOUTHWESTERIS^ 

CAMPAIGNS 

SCALE  OF  MILES 


75  100 


Mouths  of  the 


Greenwich  /5%I^^  Mississippi  River 


1862.]  BUELL  AND  BRAGG,  83 

proaching  the  Mississippi  river.  Our  forces  were  much 
elated  by  recent  victories,  which  had  a  correspondingly 
depressing  effect  upon  the  enemy.  With  this  force  at  his 
command,  it  seems  as  if  Halleck  might  have  marched  at 
Jwill  to  Mobile  and  neutralized  the  entire  belt  of  country 
(for  a  hundred  miles  east  of  the  Mississippi. 
I  Beauregard  was  south  of  Corinth  with  one  hundred  and 
twelve  thousand  men,  fifty-three  thousand  "for  duty,"  and 
in  addition  eleven  thousand  in  East  Tennessee,  with  head- 
quarters in  Knoxville,  and  ten  thousand  in  Jackson  and 
Vicksburg.  The  Arkansas  forces  had  been  ordered  to 
Corinth  against  the  protest  of  the  governor  of  that  state. 

There  were  two  roads  open  to  Halleck  by  which  to 
pierce  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy ;  one  down  the  great 
river,  one  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta  and  beyond.  He 
had  the  numerical  ability  to  control  both,  and  each  being 
a  highway  to  the  North,  it  behooved  him  to  protect  both. 
The  Memphis  and  Charleston  Railroad  was  in  his  hands. 
His  army  was  strong  enough  to  divide  and  yet  hold  the 
keys  to  each  of  these  strategic  routes.  The  bulk  of  his 
force  was  still  disposable  for  whichever  route  he  might 
choose  to  advance  upon. 

But  Halleck  was  feeble  in  movement.  Buell  could  well 
have  been  despatched  towards  Chattanooga  to  secure  what 
Mitchel  had  already  seized.  This  would  have  left  Halleck 
plenty  of  force  with  which  to  attack  Beauregard.  But 
Halleck's  whole  scheme  is  formulated  in  his  own  words : 
"  I  think  the  enemy  will  continue  his  retreat,  which  is  all 

I  desire." 


84  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF   OUR    CIVIL    WAR.         [1862. 

forces  disjointedly  strung  out,  was  losing  precious  time  in 
repairs  on  the  railroad  and  in  contemplating  his  past  tri- 
umphs, Bragg  sent  his  thirty-five  thousand  men  by  rail  via 

Mobile  to  Chattanoos^a.     This  foresiofht  pro- 
July  21-30.  ^  . 

longed  the  Western  contest  indefinitely,  and 

enabled  Bragg  to  control   events  until  Grant,  more  than  a 

year  later,    had   freed   the    Mississippi   and    could   devote 

his  active  energies  to  the  interior. 

The  cards    are  again    shuffled,   during  which   operation 

every  one  is  without  definite  instructions  ;    there  is  no  one 

head,   and  the  Western  armies  are  practically  put  on  the 

defensive.      Pope  is  transferred  to  Vir ovinia, 

June  26-27.  5      .  . 

and  Rosecrans  is  given  the  Army  of  the  Mis- 
sissippi ;  Buell  retains  the  Army  of  the  Ohio  ;  Halleck's 
questionable  strategy  in  the  field  is  rewarded  by  the  supreme 

control  of  the  Union  forces  in  the  War  De- 

July  16-17. 

partment — work  for  which  he  is  better  fitted. 
To  Grant's  lot  falls  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi  in  addition 
to  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  forty-two  thousand  effec- 
tives, with  which  to  keep  open  his  communications  with 
Buell  and  guard  the  railroad  from  Memphis  to  Decatur. 
While  Grant  and  Sherman  devote  their  energies  to  the  line 
of  the  Mississippi,  Buell  is  ordered  to  regain  East  Tennes- 
see, where  the  loyal  population  is  in  extreme  suffering. 

Mitchel's  capture  of  Huntsville  and  of  some  hundred 
miles  of  the  Memphis  and  Charleston  Kailroad,  which  he 
had  held,  together  with  all  territory  north  of  the  Ten- 
nessee River,  had  been  full  of  possibilities.  Had  he  but 
received  the  authority,  he  might  readily  have  anticipated 
Bragg   in    taking   possession    of   Chattanooga,    and    have 


1862.]  BUELL  AND   BRAGG.  85 

saved   much   subsequent   blood    and   treasure.     For    this 
town  is  the  key  to  that  entire  strategic  field. 

Buell  desired  to  establish  his  base  of  supplies  at  Nash- 
ville and  to  make  an  immediate  advance  upon  Chattanooga 

from   thence.     Halleck   insisted  on  his  ad- 

JiinelSto  Ang.  1, 
vanciug  along  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 

Kailroad   and  putting  it  in  thorough  repair  as  he  went. 

This  he  did  ;  but  it  was  the  delay  so  caused  which  enabled 

Bragg  to  seize  the  coveted  prize,  and  A.  S.  Johnston  had 

well  fiUed  the  place  vdth  stores  when  he  had  found  himself 

obliged  to  abandon  Nashville  months  before. 

Buell  had  barely  reached  a  position  in  which  he  could 
confront  Bragg,  when  the  Confederate  partisans  Forrest 
and  Morgan  began  their  equally  brilliant  and  troublesome 
raids  against  his  communications.  These  Buell  was  unable 
to  meet  for  entire  lack  of  horse.  But  he  took  up  a  line 
calculated  to  protect  Nashville  as  well  as  to  threaten  Bragg, 
who  lay  in  advance  of  the  Tennessee. 

Buell  supposed  that  Bragg  would  attempt  to  turn  his 
right  in  order  to  obtain  possession  of  Nashville.  He  there- 
fore concentrated  the  bulk  of  his  force  at 

August. 
Murfreesborough.  Thomas,  then  command- 
ing a  wing  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  whose  military  intui- 
tions were  as  keen  as  his  judgment  was  reliable,  and  who  was 
always  the  safest  adviser  either  Buell,  Rosecrans  or  Sherman 
ever  had,  was  shrewd  enough  to  recognize  Bragg's  cross- 
ing of  the  Tennessee  river  as  a  threat  to  invade  Kentucky. 
Not  so  Buell,  to  his  sorrow. 

By  a  sudden  movement,  Bragg  steals  a  march  around 
Buell's  left  through  the  Sequatchie  Valley       August  28. 


86  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1862. 

and  marches  straight  toward  Louisville, 
^^^^  '  while  Kirby  Smith  turns  Cumberland  Gap, 
defeats  Nelson  at  Richmond  and  makes  for  Cincinnati. 
This  is  all  in  pursuance  of  the  plan  of  A.  S.  Johnston, 
which  he  had  purposed  to  put  iato  execution,  when,  as  he 
confidently  believed,  he  should  have  beaten  our  army  at 
Shiloh. 

Thoroughly  alarmed,  as  is  also  the  country,  Buell  at 

once  swings  his  left  in  pursuit  of  Bragg,  while  he  endeavors 

to  retain  his  grasp  on  Nashville  with  his  right.     Bragg  has 

the  shorter  line  and  the  start.      But  he  is 

Sept.  14-17. 

delayed   a   day   or   two    by  the   capture  of 

Munfordville,    and    by   scattering    his    forces    instead   of 

pushing  home.     This  is  a  serious  fault  on  Bragg's  part. 

He   fairly   holds  success  in  his  hand,  but  forfeits   it   by 

this  delay.     After  some  rapid  marching  and  manoeuvring, 

Buell  enters  Louisville  just  ahead  of  his  opponent. 

The  authorities  in  Washington  have  lost  all  confidence 

in   Buell.     He  is  summarily  relieved  from 
September  29.  -,         t  n^^  •        n 

command  and  Thomas  appomted  to  succeed 

him.      But  this   magnanimous  soldier,  though   far    from 

always  agreeing  with  the  methods  of  his  chief,  declines  the 

proffered  honor,  and,  at  his  earnest  solicitation,  Buell   is 

reinstated.     The  Army  of  the  Ohio  marches  out  to  meet 

Bragg,  with  Thomas  second  in  command. 

Bragg  expects  to  defend  the  line  of  the  Kentucky  and 

Duok  rivers,  but  divides  his  forces,  leaving  Kirby  Smith 

near    Frankfort.      Buell    makes    a    demonstration    upon 

Bragg's    communications.      After   some   cautious   feeling, 

Buell    comes    upon  Hardee   with   only  sixteen   thousand 


1862.] 


BUELL  AND  BRAGG. 


87 


TMOMAS     AND 

tdiTTCNOEi*   wem 

NOT    eN&ACCO 


men,  at  Perry- 
ville,  where,  had 
he  at  once  at- 
tacked he  could 
have  punished 
Bragg  severely 
for  this  division. 
But,  owing  to 
lack  of  water, 
one-half  of  Buell's 
army  is  distant 
from  the  field, 
and  he  in  turn 
pays  the  penalty 
of  lack  of  con- 
centration.    Polk 

joins  Hardee  and  they  both  fall  heavily  upon  McCook, 
who  holds  BuelFs  left,  and  bear  him  back. 
But  they  cannot  break  the  Union  centre ; 
and  after  a  stubborn  conflict  Bragg  retires,  leaving 
to  our  forces  the  field.  Our  right  has  not  been  en- 
gaged. The  loss  is  :  Buell,  forty-two  hundred ;  Bragg 
thirty-four  hundred ;  a  fifth  of  the  men  actually  en- 
gaged. On  being  followed  up,  Bragg  re- 
treats through  Cumberland  Gap,  and  leaves 
Kentucky  and  Tennessee  once  more  in  our  possession. 
His  retreat  ends  only  at  Chattanooga. 

What  Bragg  expected  to  obtain  in  Kentucky  was  a  vast 
accession  of  recruits  and  horses,  as  did  Lee  in  Maryland. 
Both  fell  short  of  their  calculations,  though  Bragg  carried 
off  a  goodly  train  of  supplies.     Forgetful  of  what  he  had 


Peppyville.    October  8,  1862. 


October  8. 


October  13. 


88  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         flSGk 

really  done,  the  South  was  bitter  in  its  criticism  of  Bragg'a 
failure  to  hold  Eastern  Tennessee  and  Kentucky.  But  his 
campaign  had  really  placed  him  in  a  position  in  Buell's 
front  far  superior  to  the  one  he  had  occupied  before  he 
marched  for  the  Ohio,  morally  and  materially.  And  it 
was  beyond  reason  to  anticipate  his  holding  any  consider- 
able part  of  these  States  in  permanency. 

Halleck  now  insists  that  Buell  shall  undertake  a  cam- 
paign in  East  Tennessee,  still  occupied  by  the  enemy.    But 
Buell  alleges  the  utter  impossibility  of  subsisting  his  troops 
BO  far  from  the  railroad,    and  again  concentrates  at  Nash- 
ville.    Here  he  is  relieved  and  Gen.  Rose- 
October  so.  ..11  1 
crans  is  appomted  to  the  command. 

During  this  campaign  every  one  lost  confidence  in  Buell 
except  his  stanch  lieutenant,  Thomas,  who,  though  he 
could  have  had  the  command,  allowed  his  sense  of  justice 
as  well  as  his  very  singular  distrust  of  the  great  powers  he 
possessed  to  stand  in  his  own  light.  Thomas  desired  nothing 
less  than  to  have  an  independent  charge.  A  rare  union 
indeed  of  abihty  and  modesty. 

Buell  was  a  thorough  soldier  and  a  fine  disciplinarian. 
The  effectiveness  of  the  divisions  he  had  led  was  due  to 
his  care  and  skill  in  organization  in  as  full  measure  as  that 
of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  to  McClellan.  More  than 
one  soldier  of  our  war  acquired  fame  and  achieved  success 
on  a  basis  less  sound  than  his.  But  he  had  served  in  the 
bureau  more  than  with  troops,  and  the  marshal's  baton  was 
bestowed  upon  him  too  early.  Had  he  possessed  the 
experience  of  moderate  field  command  before  he  worked 
in  so  large  a  sphere,  he  might  have  compassed  final  success 
of  much  more  enduring  character. 


XVI. 

lUKA  AND   CORINTH. 

WHEN  Bragg  had  confronted  Buell  in  Tennessee  with 
the  purpose  of  operating  towards  the  Ohio,  as  just 
narrated,  it  became  necessary  for  him  to  adopt  measures  to 
prevent  Rosecrans  or  Grant  from  detaching  reinforcements 
to,  or  indeed  from  making  a  junction  in  force  with,  their  as- 
sociate. He  therefore  sent  orders  to  Price,  whom  he  had 
left  south  of  Corinth,  to  advance  upon  the  Federals  and  di- 
vert their  attention.  Price,  deeming  himself  too  weak  to 
cope  single-handed  with  the  Army  of  the  Mississippi,  re- 
quested Van  Dom  to  lend  his  assistance  to  the  enterprise. 

Grant  is  meanwhile  anticipating  that  the  enemy  will 
make  an  attack  upon  Corinth,  where  the  bulk  of  our  force 
is  stationed,  while  we  have  heavy  detachments  at  Memphis 
and  Bolivar.  But  Rosecrans'  cavalry  discovers  Price's  van- 
guard in  luka.     Well  aware  that  Van  Dom 

September  15. 

is  at  least  four  marches  distant.  Grant   de- 
termines to  crush  Price  singly,  and  feels  that  he  has  nu- 
merical  strength  enough  to  divide  his  forces.     He  sends 
Rosecrans  to  make  an  attack  upon  Price  along  roads  reach- 
ing luka  from  the   south,  while  another  column  from  the 

north  shall  intercept  him  and  if  possible  drive  him  back 

89 


90 


BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR. 


[1862. 


^September  19. 


^ORD  (.NOT   eNC■a^) 


luka.    September  19,  1862. 


upon  the  Tennessee  river.       Grant  accompanies  the  latter 
body  under  command  of  Ord. 

Bad  roads  and  worse  maps  of  the  country- 
delay  Kosecrans.     And  when  he  finally  does 

attack,  it  is  in  so 
^  disjointed   a  way 
that  only  a   por- 
tion of  his  force 
can    engage    the 
enemy.    Rose- 
crans'  task   is  to 
seize    both  roads 
running    south 
from  luka ;    but 
he  manages  only 
to  reach  one.    On 
the  other  Price   escapes    unharmed.     The   loss    on   either 
side  is  not  far  from  eight  hundred  men. 

Grant  has,  all  told,  some  forty-eight  thou- 
sand men,  seven  thousand  being  under  Sher- 
man at  Memphis,  twelve  thousand  under  Ord  at  Bolivar, 
twenty-three  thousand  under  Rosecrans  at  Corinth,  and 
six  thousand  at  head-quarters  at  Jackson. 

Price  and  Van  Dorn  in  due  time  join  their  forces,  twenty- 
two  thousand  men,  at  Ripley,  the  latter  as 
senior  taking  command.  He  is  wise  enough 
U  see  that  a  successful  attack  upon  isolated  Corinth  will 
thrust  Grant  back,  as  Bragg  has  served  Buell,  and  neutralize 
all  his  victories .  Full  of  his  purpose  Van  Dorn  with  his  wonted 
energy  moves  upon  Corinth  and  marshals  his  army  on  the 


October  1. 


September  2» 


1862.  ;j 


lUKA  AND   CORINTH. 


91 


north-west  of  the  town.  His  position  sev- 
ers Rosecrans'  force  from  Grant's.  Van  ^P^°^  ^^ 
Dorn's  plan  is  to  feint  upon  Rosecrans'  left,  thereby  drawing 
troops  from  his  right,  and  then  to  throw  Price  upon  the 
depleted  wing  and  crush  it.  He  attacks.  At  an  early 
stage  of  the  battle  a  gap  is  opened  in  Rosecrans'  line.  Into 
this  breach  Van  Dorn  is  not  slow  to  press.  Our  left  and 
centre  is  borne  back,  but  the  risrht  remainino^ 

*  °         Octobers. 

mtact,  wheels  and  threatens  Van  Dorn's  ex- 
posed flanks.     Darkness  brings  the  combat  to  a  close. 

The  forces  of  each  are  about  equal.     The  night  is  spent 
in  reforming  the  troops  for  the  morrow.     Van  Dorn  pur- 


Copinth.    Oetobep  3-4,  1862. 


poses  to  assault  at  dawn,  but  is  belated  by  subordinates. 
When,  however,  he  does  attack,  it  is  with  characteristic 
vigor.     Part  of  his  troops  actually  enter  the  city,  and  for 


92  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1862. 

about  an  hour  cannot  be  ejected.     But  Rosecrans  holds  his 
own  ;  Van  Dorn  finds  that  he  cannot  worst  him,  and,  fear- 
ing an  attack  upon  his  rear,  determines  on  retreat.     This 
he  skilfully  effects,  under   cover  of  renewed 

October  4. 

attack. 

Rosecrans  makes  no  motion  to  follow.  In  falling  back 
Van  Dorn  runs  across  Ord  at  the  fords  of  the  Hatchie  river, 
and  had  Rosecrans  been  at  his  heels.  Van  Dorn  might  have 
been  badly  used  up.  But  by  ably  manoeuvring  his  rear- 
guard. Van  Dorn  manages  to  elude  Ord,  crosses  the 
Hatchie  a  trifle  to  the  east  and  escapes. 

The  Confederate  loss  and  ours  were  not  far  from  two 
thousand  ^ye  hundred  each.  We  took  two  thousand 
prisoners. 

Shortly  after,  Van  Dorn  was  displaced  by  Pemberton, 

while   Rosecrans  was   promoted   to   Buell's 

command.     It  is  not  saying  much  to  assert 

that  had  Van  Dorn  remained  in  command  of  the  Vicks- 

burg  forces,  Grant's  task  would  have  proved  a  harder  one 

than  with  Pemberton  in  his  front. 


s 


xvn 

GRANT'S  FAILURE  AGAINST  VICKSBURG. 

OON  after  Farragut  had  passed  into  New  Orleans,  he 
moved  up  the  river  to  Baton  Rouge  and 

KT       ,  X  .  .,      T  May  8, 1862. 

Natchez.    In  connection  with  this  movement 
a  land  force  had  made  its  way  to  Vicksburg,  under  com- 
mand of  General  Williams,  hoping  to  capture  the  place  by 
a.  coup  de  main;   but  its  batteries,  during 
the  weeks  just  elapsed,  had  been  completed, 
and  General  M.  L.  Smith  made  show  of  so  good  a  defense 
that  Wniiams  deemed  it  unwise  to  attack.     Farragut  having 
run  the  batteries,  then  incomplete,  both  up  and  down  river, 
returned  to  New  O-leans.      The  next  month  the  importance 
of  the  new  fortress  was  the  occasion  of  putting 

June 

Van  Dom  in  command. 

Subsequently    Admiral  Porter    was    or- 

June  25. 

dered  up    the     river     by    Farragut,     and 

WiUiams  began  to  dig  the  afterwards  famous  canal,  which 

its  projectors  imagined  would  make  Vicksburg  an  inland 

town  by  diverting  the  current  of  the  Missis- 

Bippi.     At  this  time  h  arragut  agam  ran  the 

batteries  with  his  fleet  up  river,  at  a  loss  of  some  sixty  men, 

satisfying  himself  that  he  could  at  any  time  perform  this  feat. 

93 


94  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [186a 

But  he  was  by  no   means  strong  enough  to  successfully 
engage  the  forts  without  cooperation  of  a  land  force. 

The  ram  Arkansas  had  been  building  in  the  Yazoo  river, 
above  Vicksburg.  Farragut  had  hoped  for  a  chance  to 
destroy  the  vessel ;  but  the  ram  eluded  his  watchfulness, 
and  sought  refuge  under  the  Vicksburg  guns,  much  to  Far- 
ragut'g  disgust.  He  again  ran  down  past  the  batteries,  in- 
tending to  destroy  the  ram,    but  vainly.      Later  he  was 

ordered  back  to  New  Orleans  ;  Williams  re- 
July  26. 

turned  to  Baton  Eouge,  and  Admiral  Davis 

moved  up  the  river,  leaving  Vicksburg  mistress   of  the 
situation. 

This  invited  Van  Dorn  to  make  a  raid  from  Vicks- 
burg on  Baton  Rouge,  which  he  entrusted  to  Brecken- 
ridge.      A   stubborn  resistance  succeeded  in   holding  the 

city,  though  Williams  was  killed  in  the  de- 
August  5. 

fense.  But  Breckenridge  actually  accom- 
plished his  purpose  by  securing  an  available  point  for 
another  fortress  below  the  mouth  of  the  Red  river,  to  wit. 
Port  Hudson.  Baton  Rouge  was,  in  consequence,  shortly 
abandoned  by  us,  as  at  the  time  comparatively  of  no  value. 
While  Rosecrans  was  planning  a  campaign  against  Chat- 
tanooga, Grant,  in  immediate  command  of  the  Thirteenth 
Army  Corps,  as  it  was  now  called,  suggested  the  capture  of 
Vicksburg  to  the  general-in-chief.  There  was  a  force  of 
not  far  from  fifty  thousand  men  in  this  vicinity.  With 
Halleck's  half-approval  Grant  made  a  forward  move ;  but  was 

no  sooner  under  way  than  he  stopped  and  de- 
November  2.  .  . 
cided  to  wait  tor  some  twenty  thousand  rein- 
forcements promised  him.     Hereupon  HaUeck  placed  all 


1862.]      GRANT'S  FAILURE  AGAINST  VICKSBURG.  95 

the  forces  in  the  Department  under  his  orders,  and  told 
him  "to  fight  the  enemy  where  he  pleased." 

r^  ^     nn  i  i  ^^^    ^  November  11. 

(jrrants  iitty-seven   thousand   men  still   lay 

substantially  as  they  had,  with  Pemberton  in  their  front. 

A  threatened  complication  of  serious  nature  arose  in  a 
half  promise  extorted  from  Mr.  Lincoln  and  the  Secretary 
of  War  by  General  McClemand,  that  the  latter  should  have 
a  separate  command  to  operate  down  the  Mississippi; 
and  while  Grant  and  Halleck  were  planning  one  thing, 
Secretary  Stanton  and  McClemand  were  secretly  confer- 
ring about  another.     These  cross-purposes  were,  however, 

for  the  time  being,  arrested  by  Grant's  mov- 

°  ^  Nov.  26-27. 

ing  on  Holly  Springs,  Sherman  at  the  same 

time  starting  from  Memphis,  and  Hovey  crossing  from 
Helena  to  threaten  Grenada  on  Pemberton's  flank  and  rear. 
Some  skirmishing  was  had  with  the  enemy's  outposts,  but 
without  results.  Pemberton  had  established  his  head-quar- 
ters at  Jackson,  Miss.,  with  Van  Dorn  out  as  vanguard  at 
Holly  Springs.  All  told,  he  had  some  forty  thousand  men 
under  his  command. 

Grant's  line  of  operations  was  long  and  weak ;  he  could 
get  no  locomotives  nor  cars  so  as  to  utilize  the  railroad,  nor 
did  support,  moral  or  material,  reach  him  from  Halleck. 
He  had  desired  to  bring  Pemberton  to  battle,  but  the  latter 
retired  behind  the  Tallahatchie.  And,  lest  McClemand 
bhould  actually  receive  the  command  of  the  Mississippi  ven- 
ture, while  he  himself  was  left  to  fight  on  the  overland  route 
lingle  nanded.  Grant  devised  a  new  plan.  This  contem- 
plated that  Sherman  should  take  the  bulk  of  the  forces  at 
Memphis,  at  once  descend  the  river  in  transports,  and,  in 


P6 


BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR. 


[1862. 


connection  with  Admiral  Porter,  assail  the  works  at  Vicks- 
burg,  while  he  himself  would  push  the  enemy  down  the  line 
of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  and  if  they  retired  to 
that  fortress,  endeavor  to  enter  the  city  with  them. 


/  Vpurdv 


Memphis  to  Vieksburg.    1862-63. 


This  double  attack  was  certainly  not  strategically  sound. 
None  of  the  attendant  circumstances  warranted  such  a  divi- 
sion of  forces.  But,  at  that  stage  of  the  war,  it  was  not 
deemed  possible  to  subsist  an  army  very  far  from  its  base, 


1862.]      GRANT'S  FAILURE  AGAINST  VICKSBURG.  97 

nor  at  all  upon  the  country.  And  McClernand  was  so  very 
uncertain  and  disturbing  a  factor  in  Grant's  calculations 
that  the  latter  deemed  any  action  preferable  to  delay. 

McClernand  meanwhile  had  received  the  sole  command 
of  the  river  expedition.  But,  as  it  fell  out,  Sherman  got 
under  way  before  the  news  could  reach  him.  About  the 
same  time  Joe  Johnston  was  put  in  command  of  all  Con- 
federate forces  between  the  AUeghanies  and  the  Mississippi 
river. 

While  Sherman  and  Porter  are  moving  down  the  river, 
with  thirty  thousand  men  and  sixty  guns,  beside  the 
flotilla  of  eight  gun-boats,  Grant  pushes  forward  to  Oxford, 
while  Pemberton  retires  to  the  line  of  the  Yallabusha  at 
the  town  of  Grenada.  Grant's  line  of  operations  is  pro- 
tected at  various  points  along  the  railroad  by  strong 
detachments.  Van  Dorn,  now  commanding  a  cavalry 
division,  and  Forrest,  the  noted  Confederate  raider,  join 
forces  to  operate  against  Grant's  communi- 

^  ^  December,  1862. 

cations,  and  during  the  last  ten  days  of  the 

year,  while  Forrest  demonstrates  against  Jackson,  Tenn., 

Van  Dorn  attacks,  and  with  scarcely  any  opposition  from 

its  negligent   commander,    captures   Holly   Springs,   with 

large   stores   of    food,    arms,    and    ammunition.     Several 

important  bridges   in  Grant's  rear  are  at  the  same  time 

destroyed. 

The  whole  scene  is  suddenly  changed.     Grant's  advance 

IS  made  impossible,  for  starvation  stares  him  in  the  face. 

Bo  is  obliged  to  fall  back  to  reestablish  his  base,  while 

Pemberton  in  his  turn  retires  to  defend  Vicksburg  from 

Sherman  and  Porter.     This  raid  has  not  only  destroyed 


98  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF   OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1862. 

Grant's  supplies,  but  also  his  ability  to  accumulate  more 
for  the  moment.  A  courier  is  at  once  despatched  to 
Sherman  to  notify  him  of  this  disaster,  but  does  not 
overtake  him  with  the  news.  Grant  is  ordered  by  Halleck 
to  follow  Sherman  down  the  river.  This  he  proceeds  to 
do  by  way  of  Memphis. 

It  took  all  Grant's  patience  to  bear  up  under  this  utter 
failure  of  his  campaign,  and  especially  to  brook  the 
appointment  of  McClernand.  But  his  zeal  and  activity 
never  flagged.  Grant  possessed  the  rare  power  of  stand- 
ing firm  under  the  hardest  conditions  of  disappointment  or 
defeat. 


XVIII. 

SHERMAN'S  FAILURE  AGAINST  VICKSBURG. 

MEANWHILE    Sherman,  convoyed  by  Porter  and 
his  fleet  on  some  sixty  transports,  had  reached  the 

mouth   of  the  Yazoo  river.     Next  day  he     ^       ^    „- 

•'  December  2o. 

moved  up  stream  to  effect  a  landing,  expect- 
ing that  Grant  was  near  at  hand  or  else  was  holding  the 
enemy  on  the   Yallabusha.     Halleck   had   also   promised 
Banks'  cooperation  from  New  Orleans ;  but  fortunately  no 
immediate  reliance  was  placed  upon  this  promise. 

A  line  of  bluffs  runs  for  many  hundred  miles  along  the 
east  bank  of  the  Mississippi  river.  From  Vicksburg 
north  these  bluffs  leave  the  river  to  join  it  again  at  Mem- 
phis i  The  land  between  the  river  and  the  bluffs  is  low, 
much  cut  up  by  bayous,  and  like  to  an  impenetrable  morass. 
Its  waters  all  flow  into  the  Yazoo.  Some  fifteen  miles 
above  Vicksburg,  where  the  bluff  abuts  on  the  Yazoo, 
Haines  Bluff,  as  it  is  there  called,  is  some  two  hundred 
feet  high,  and  all  but  inaccessible.  The  ground  in  front  is 
of  the  same  low  character,  and  is  diversified  by  the  presence 
of  several  small  lakes  connected  by  Chickasaw  Bayou. 

There  were  no  maps  of  the  ground  in  Sherman's  posses- 
sion.    It  was  terra  incognita.     And  it  was  equally  un- 
"^  99 


100  BIRUS-ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1862L 

known  to  him  that  strong  works  had  been  erected  all  along 
the  bluffs,  the  few  approaches  to  which  were  specially 
defended.  Sherman  had  hoped  to  get  in  rear  of  Vicksburg 
by  this  route ;  to  cut  the  railroad  and  to  isolate  Pemberton, 
whom  he  imagined  at  the  moment  to  be  confronting  Grant. 
Our  success  depended  entirely  on  a  surprise.  But  Pember- 
ton was  actually  in  Vicksburg  and  fully  aware  of  Sherman's 
every  move.  We  were  already  checkmated,  but  did  not 
know  it. 

Sherman  has  with  him  four  good  divisions, 

December  28.  .  .       , 

He  makes  a  reconnoissance,  to  ascertam  the 
best  point  of  attack.  It  is  thought  that  a  lodgment  can 
be  effected  on  the  bluff. 

Two  well-pushed  attacks  are  made.    Some 

December  29.  ,     i   ,.  i    • 

of  the  enemy  s  defences  come  near  to  bemg 
tajsen.  But  after  an  all-day  struggle  to  get  a  suitable  force 
across  the  open  and  up  the  perpendicular  bluffs  from  which 
the  resistance  of  the  enemy  is  steadily  maintained,  and  with 
absurd  ease,  our  troops  fall  back  with  a  loss  of  nearly  two 
thousand  men.  The  Confederate  casualties  are  nominal. 
Sherman  then  makes  an  attempt  further  up  and  nearer  the 
Yazoo,  but  as  Porter  can  not  cooperate  with  the  flotilla  he 
is  unable  to  accomplish  material  results. 

This  disheartening  failure  was  not  caused  by  want  of 
ccurageous  effort  or  intelligent  action.  Even  had  Sherman 
taken  the  bluffs,  as  he  thinks  might  have  been  done,  it  is 
ioubtful  if  he  could  have  held  them. 

Grant's  subsequent  success  goes  far  to  show  that  a  cam- 
paign overland  with  all  forces  in  one  body  would  have  come 
much  nearer  to  compass  the  end  than  these  two  isolated 


1863.]   SHERMAN'S  FAILURE  AGAJ^^STItiC^ESZ'V^^'      ^01 

attempts  by  land  and  water.  A  division  of  forces  requires 
a  background  of  good  luck.  It  can  not  face  bad  fortune  or 
accidents. 

McClemand  now  joined  the  army  on  the  Yazoo  and 
jissumed  command  under  his  general  orders 

Janaaiy  4, 1863. 

to  that  effect. 

An  attack  on  Arkansas  Post  had  already  been  planned 
by  Sherman  and  Porter,  and  McClemand  as  commanding 
officer  having  assented,  they  now  proceeded  to  put  it  into 
effect.  Fort  Hindman,  as  the  Confederates  called  it,  lay 
some  distance  up  the  Arkansas  river,  and  was  a  constant 
threat  to  the  rear  of  any  force  operating  against  Vicksburg. 
It  was  at  this  time  garrisoned  by  some  seven  thousand  men, 
under  command  of  General  Churchill. 

The  troops  embark  and  in  a  few  days  reach  the  scene  of 
action.  A  landing  is  effected  below,  and  next 

January  11. 

day  the  heavy  guns  of  the  fleet,  after  a  few 
hours'  bombardment,  silence  the  artillery  in  the  fort.  An 
assault  is  in  contemplation  when  (as  it  is  afterwards  claimed 
by  the  enemy,  under  a  mistake)  white  flags  are  raised  along 
the  parapet,  and  the  fort  is  surrendered  with  nearly  five 
thousand  prisoners.     Our  loss  was  about  one  thousand. 

This  very  brilliant  and  cheap  success  was  in  the  nature 
of  a  compensation  for  the  grievous  failure  at  Chickasaw 
Bayou.  McClernand  arrogated  its  accomplishment  to  him- 
self, and  proceeded  to  project  a  visionary  movement  into 
the  heart  of  Arkansas.  But  this  expedition  was  nipped  in 
the  bud  by  Grant,  who  under  authority  from  Halleck 
ordered  the  forces  back  to  the  Mississippi.  McClernand 
sullenly  obeyed. 


XIX. 

LEE'S  FIRST  INVASION.  —  ANTIETAM. 

LEAVING  Grant  to  profit  by  his  failure,  and  to  study 
up  a  new  means  of  compassing  the  reduction  of 
Vicksburg,  we  will  see  what  is  doing  in  Virginia. 

The  natural  sequence  of  Pope's  reverse  was  an  incursion 
by  Lee  across  the  Potomac.  Active  Bragg  had  just 
marched  around  Buell's  left  flank  and  made  his  way  into 
Kentucky.  The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  had  utterly 
worsted  both  McClellan  and  Pope.  Confederate  prestige 
was  high.  In  Southern  eyes  "  My  Maryland  "  was  groan- 
ing under  the  tyrant's  heel.  And  were  there  not  corn,  and 
horses,  and  shoes,  as  well  as  perhaps  recruits,  to  be  had  in 
exchange  for  liberation  ? 

No  sooner  then  had  the  disjecta  membra  of  the  short- 
lived Army  of  Virginia  been  gathered  within  the  defences 
of  Washington,  than  McClellan,  informally  reinstated  by 
unspoken  verdict  of  army  and  people  alike,  found  it  neces- 
sary to  move  up  the  left  bank  of  the  Potomac  to  encounter 
the  divisions  which  a  few  weeks  since  he  had  fought  within 
the  suburbs  of  their  own  capital. 

Rather  than  march  on  Baltimore,  Lee  had  chosen  a  cam- 
paign in  the  mountainous  region  of  Maryland.     D.  H.  Hill 

102 


1862.]  LEE'S  FIRST  INVASION.  103 

was  the  first  to  cross  the  Potomac,  and  within  three  days 
the  whole  Confederate  Army  was  put  over,  and  occupied 
the  line  of  the  Monocacy. 

The  disenchantment  of  the  Marylanders  at  the  ragged- 
ness  of  the  Southern  chivalry  was  only  equalled  by  the 
mortification  of  these  gallant  soldiers  at  their  lukewarm 
reception,  and  Lee's  campaign  from  the  start  wore  the 
signs  of  failure.  Harper's  Ferry  barred  his  communication 
up  the  Valley  with  a  garrison  of  eleven  thousand  men,  and 
oflfered  a  tempting  bait  as  well.  With  reckless  contempt 
of  his  foe,  Lee  once  again  divided  his  forces,  sending 
Jackson  back  across  the  river  to  capture  this  position. 

Harper's  Ferry,  with  Lee  in  Maryland,  was  worse  than 
useless  to  the  Federals.  It  was  a  mere  key  to  gates 
already  broken  down.  Lee,  of  course,  expected  to  see 
it  evacuated.  But  to  Halleck's  soul  this  position  was 
always  dear.  To  lose  it  was  to  endanger  the  republic ; 
he  ordered  it  held  at  any  sacrifice. 

Meanwhile  McClellan  was  moving  from  Washington 
into  Maryland  by  his  right,  reorganizing  the  crestfallen 
but  still  resolute  Army  of  the  Potomac  as  he  went.  The 
troops  had  received  the  return  of  "Little  Mac"  as  a 
harbinger  of  success,  though  it  was  a  bitter  task  to  follow 
the  enemy  into  loyal  territory. 

McClellan    occupied    Frederick,    moving 

...  .  September  12. 

With  more  than  nis  usual  caution  on  account 
of   Halleck's   absurd  fears   that    he   would    uncover    the 
capital.     Here  unexampled  good  luck  put  into  his   pos- 
eession  a  copy  of  Lee's  order  of  march  to    „        ^    ,.. 

^•^  September  13. 

his    division   commanders.     To   secure   the 


104  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1862. 

fruit  of  this  good  chance  he  had  but  to  extend  his  hand. 
An  immediate  march  through  the  then  undefended  South 
Mountain  passes  would  have  enabled  him  to  crush  Long- 
etreet,  separated  from  Jackson  by  the  broad  Potomac. 
But  McClellan  was  incapable  of  moving  rapidly.  He 
loitered  till  the  enemy  occupied  and  he  had  to  force 
these  passes,  at  equal  sacrifice  of  men  and  opportunity. 

Reno  fiinds  Hill  in  force  in  Turner's  Gap.     Reinforced 
by  Hooker,  a  heavy  fight  enables  them  to  gain  a  domi- 
nating  foothold.       Hill    retires.       On    the 

September  14. 

same    day   Franklin    forces    Cobb    out   of 

Crampton's    Gap.       These    two    actions,    known    as    the 

Battle  of  South  Mountain,  cost  us  eighteen  hundred  men. 

The  enemy's  loss  was  much  larger,  for  we  captured  some 

twelve  hundred  prisoners. 

Meanwhile   Jackson  has   cooped    up    eleven   thousand 

Federals   in   the    cul   de    sac   at    Harper's    Ferry.     The 

heights   on  both   sides   of  the   river   are   occupied.     The 

bombardment  begins.     But  within  an  hour  Colonel  Mdes, 

the  commander,  who  could  have  cut  his  way  out,  as  did 

his  cavalry,    surrenders.     His  death,  by  almost  the  last 

shot  fired,  ill  atones    for  this  weakness.      Jackson,  with 

a  part  of  his   force,  at  once  starts  to  reioin 

September  16.         .  .         . 

his  chief  in  Maryland.  The  rest  follows 
after  completing  the  detads  of  the  capitulation. 

McClellan's  inertia  had  thus  permitted  Lee  to  capture 
eleven  thousand  men  and  to  reunite  his  separated  corps. 
The  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  now  takes  up  at  Sharps- 
burg  a  strong  defensive  position,  covered  by  the  Antietam. 

Lee   had   over   fifty    thousand   muskets,    every   one   of 


LEE'S  FIRST  INVASION. 


105 


which  was  as  usual  put  to  use.  McClellan  had  eighty-seven 
thousand,  but  he  not  only  failed  to  deceive  Lee  as  to  his 
tactical  dispositions,  but  managed  to  use  barely  two-thirds 
his  men,  while  his  successive  instead  of  massed  attacks 
enabled  Lee  to  fight  what  English  roughs  would   call   a 


Antietam.    September  16  and  17,  1862. 


'*one  down  t'other  come  on"  sort  of  battle.  Wherever 
engaged,  the  Confederates  were  equal  to  the  Federals  in 
number. 

The  main  attack  is  by  the  Federal  right.     Hooker  crosses 
the  Antietam,  and  opens  the  battle  by  a  sharp  assault  on 


106  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR.       [1862. 

Lee's  left.      Next  morning  the  attack  is  re- 
Sept.  16  and  17.  ,    ,        .  n  i       x     i  -r^      i 

newed,  but  is  stopped  by  »Jackson  at  Dunker 

Church.     All  day  the  tide  ebbs  and  flows  over  this  ground. 

Meade  and  Sumner  and  Mansfield  fight  their  men  to  the 

best  advantage,  though  in  isolated  columns.     The  lack  of 

single  purpose   is   manifest.     Lee  heavily   reinforces  this 

wing. 

But  hard  fighting  across  the  Antietam  is  neutralized  by 
Burnside's  sluggish  movement  on  the  left  flank.  Ordered 
to  cross  at  7  A.M.,  he  barely  works  out  his  task,  against 
feeble  opposition,  by  3  P.M.,  when  our  ex- 
hausted right  has  ceased  to  struggle,  and  the 
balance  of  Jackson's  corps  comes  upon  the  field  from  the 
Harper's  Ferry  triumph.  Both  combatants  need  rest,  and 
Lee  next  day  withdraws  from  a  tactically  drawn  battle  and 
a  strategic  defeat. 

Our  loss  in  this  battle  of  Antietam  (Confederate  "  Sharps- 
burg  ")  was  twelve  thousand  ^nq  hundred ;  Lee's  over  ten 
thousand.  Except  Shiloh,  no  such  sanguinary  struggle  had 
stained  the  sod  of  the  civilized  New  World. 

McClellan's  pursuit  was  feebler  than  his  critics  deem  it 
should  have  been.  But  he  had  under  him  many  raw  troops, 
and  his  best  were  the  men  who  had  been  disheartened 
by  the  Richmond  failure  and  Manassas  ;  who  scarcely  nowt 
felt  the  elation  of  victory,  and  were  exhausted  by  labors 
Buch  as  critics  oftener  impeach  than  perform. 

Lee  crossed  into  Virginia  without  losin&c  a 

Sept.  18-19.  °  ° 

man. 
The  Confederates  had,  during  the  summer  of  1862,  as- 
sumed a  bold  oflfensive  aU  along  the  line,  at  Corinth,  into 


1862. J  LEE'S  FIRST  INVASION.  107 

Kentucky  and  into  Maryland.     Each  campaign  terminated 
in  disaster  about   the   same  time ;  by  Lee's 

September  17. 

withdrawal  from  Antietam ;  by  Van  Dorn's       ,     ,     , 

•^  October  4. 

defeat  at  Corinth ;  by  Bragg's  check  at  Per-       October  8. 

ryville.     After  this  date,  a  strong  offensive, 

with  any  chance  of  success,  was  never  undertaken  by  the 

enemy. 


XX. 

AGAIN  TO  THE  RAPPAHANNOCK. 

THE  elation  of  the  North  was  equalled  by  the  bitter 
disappointment  of  the  South  at  the  failure  of  the 
Maryland  campaign.     McClellan  moved  to  Harper's  Ferry, 
but  did  not  attempt  to  cross  the  army.     As  a  shadow  of 
the  great  struggle,  Stuart  made  a  sudden  raid  into  Mary- 
land and  Pennsylvania  with  a  couple  of  reffi- 
Oct.  9-12.  -^  r  & 

ments  of  horse.     He   penetrated  as   far  as 

Chambersburg,  remounted  his  troopers  and  retired  again 
across  the  river,  making  the  entire  circuit  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac.  Our  cavalry  was  unable  to  foUow  or 
cope  with  him,  though  great  efforts  were  made  to  head  him 
off.  For  some  weeks,  McClellan  paused  to  rest  and  reor- 
ganize. 

The  Potomac  having  risen  so  as  to  be  in  the  nature  of  a 
protection  to  Maryland,  McClellan  began  to  cross  the  army, 

intendinoj  to  move  down  the  eastern  slope  of 
October  26. 

the  Blue  Ridge  until  he  struck  the  Manassas 
Gap  Railroad,  where  he  would  be  in  direct  communication 
with  Washington,  and  successively  to  occupy  all  the  de- 
bouches of  the  mountains.     Lee  retired  up  the  valley  on 
108 


1862.]  AGAIN  TO   THE  RAPPAHANNOCK,  109 

the  western  side  of  the  range.     Beyond  a  successful  cav- 

ahy   combat  by  Pleasonton  against  Stuart 

..      .  .,  November  5. 

in  the  valley,  no  blood  was  spilt. 

Six  weeks  after  the  close  of  the  Maryland 

November  6. 

campaign  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  con- 
centrated near  Warrenton.     McCleUan  was  ready  to  move 
upon  Culpeper.     There  was  good  ground  for  thinking  the 
prospect  brighter  than  ever  before,  when  suddenly  he  was 
relieved,  and  Burnside  appointed  to  command. 

McClellan  "  was  an  excellent  strategist,  and  in  many 
respects  an  excellent  soldier.  He  did  not  use  his  own 
troops  with  sufficient  promptness,  thoroughness  and  vigor 
to  achieve  great  and  decisive  results,  but  he  was  oftenei 
successful  than  unsuccessful  with  them,  and  he  so  conducted 
affairs,  that  they  never  suffered  heavily  without  inflicting 

heavy   loss    upon    their    adversaries There   are 

strong  grounds  for  believing  that  he  was  the  best  com- 
mander the  Army  of  the  Potomac  ever  had.  .  .  .  While 
the  Confederacy  was  young,  and  fresh,  and  rich,  and  its 
armies  were  numerous,  McClellan  fought  a  good,  wary, 
damaging,  respectable  fight  against  it.  .  .  .  Not  to  men- 
tion such  lamentable  failures  as  Fredericksburg  and  Chan- 
cel] orsville,  it  is  easy  to  believe  that  with  him  in  command, 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  would  never  have  seen  such 
dark  days  as  those  of  the  Wilderness  and  Cold  Harbor." 
(Palfrey.) 


XXI. 

THE   HORROR  OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 

FROM  McClellan's  hyper-caution,  a  quality  from  which 
he  seemed  to  be  gradually  weaning  himself,  to 
Burnside's  utter  recklessness,  is  a  disheartening  step. 
McClellan  had  followed  up  Lee  rather  charily,  but  his 
position  and  plans  were  good. 

Longstreet  was  but  one  day's  march  in  our  front.  A 
sudden  attack  in  force  might  have  proven  fatal  to  him,  for 
Jackson  was  in  the  valley,  beyond  supporting  distance. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  numbered  one  hundred  and 
twenty-two  thousand  men.  McClellan  had  purposed  to 
cross  the  Rappahannock,  drive  the  enemy  to  GordonsvUle, 
and  then,  by  a  sudden  movement  to  the  east,  anticipate 
him  in  a  march  on  Richmond  by  way  of  Bowling  Green. 
Later  events  proved  the  soundness  of  McClellan's  method. 

It  is  dangerous  to  shift  commanders  on  the  eve  of  battle, 

and  our  cavalry  had  already  engaged  the  Confederates' ;  it 

is  more  dangerous  to  change  the  plans  of  troops  moving 

in  the  vicinity  of  the  enemy.     But  as  if  impelled  to   do 

some  new  thing,  for  no  reason  dictated  a  change  of  the 

movement  already  in  course  of  execution  (which  was,  by 

the  way,  the  first  of  McCleUan's  ever  approved  by  Hal- 
110 


1862.]  THE  HORROR    OF  FREDERICKSBURG.  Ill 

leek) ,  the  new  commander  of  the  Army  of 
the  Potomac  determined  upon  a  flank  move- 
ment by  his  left  on  the  north  of  the  river  towards  Fred- 
ericksburg. 

To  be  sure,  the  lines  of  operation  and  supply  by  way  of 
Acquia  Creek  were  shorter,  but  this  was  the  only  advan- 
tage, and  McClellan's  plan  embraced  this  factor  when  he 
should  march  eastward.  Bumside  was  on  the  wrong  side 
of  the  Eappahannock,  and  was  widening  the  one  great 
obstacle  in  his  path  for  every  mile  of  distance.  Only  by 
movements  equally  wary  and  rapid,  as  well  as  by  sure 
means  of  crossing  the  river,  could  Burnside's  manoeuvre 
possibly  succeed.  In  this  last  element  he  counted  on  Hal- 
leck,  and,  of  course,  failed.  The  promised  pontoons  did 
not,  and  could  scarcely  have  been  expected  to  come. 

Arrived  at  Fredericksburg,  Burnside  still 

*='  November  16-18. 

might  have  crossed  by  the  fords,  for  the  water 
was  low.  And  once  in  possession  of  the  heights  beyond  the 
city,  he  could  afford  to  wait.  But  slower  than  even  his  pre- 
decessor, Bumside  sat  down  at  Falmouth,  on  the  north 
side  of  the  river,  while  Lee,  having  learned  of  his  move- 
ment, by  forced  marches  concentrated  his  army  on  the 
opposite  bank,  and  prepared  to  erect  impregnable  defences 
in  his  front. 

Bumside  had  reorganized  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  into 
three  Grand  Divisions,  the  Centre  Grand  Division  under 
Hooker,  and  the  Right  and  Left  under  Sumner  and  Frank- 
lin respectively.  These  were  in  their  system  of  responsi- 
bility practically  separate  armies,  and  robbed  the  whole 
body  of  elastic  force  and  mobility. 


112  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR. 

Before  Bumside  got  ready  to  take  any  active  steps, 
Marye's  Heights,  back  of  Fredericksburg,  had  been 
crowned  by  a  triple  line  of  works,  and  Lee  had  brought 
together  seventy-four  thousand  troops  to  man  them.  Two 
canals  and  a  stone  wall  in  front  of  the  left,  as  well  as  open, 
sloping  ground  on  both  flanks,  served  to  retain  an  attack- 
ing party  for  a  long  period  under  fire.  To  assault  these 
works  in  front  was  simple  madness.  To  turn  them  below 
necessitated  the  crossing  of  a  wide  and  now  swollen  river, 
in  the  face  of  a  powerful  enemy  in  his  immediate  front,  an 
operation  always  attended  with  the  greatest  risk,  and  con- 
sidered one  of  the  most  delicate  in  war.  To  turn  them  above 
was  practicable,  but  it  was  a  confessed  return  to  McClellan's 
plan.     Bumside  chose  the  first. 

Preparations  for  crossing  were  begun.  The 
December  10.  /.     i  i  ■•    . 

better  part  of  three  days  was  consumed  m 

throwing  the  bridges  and  putting  over  the  two  Grand  Di- 
visions of  Franklin  and  Sumner,  all  of  which  was  accom- 
plished under  fire. 

But  Lee  was  by  no  means  unwilling  to  meet  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  after  this  fashion.  Such  another  happy 
prospect  for  him  was  not  apt  soon  again  to  occur.  He  did 
not  dispute  the  crossing  in  force. 

Bumside's  one  chance  in  an  hundred  lay  in  a  concen- 
trated assault  sharply  pushed  home  before  the  enemy  could 
oppose  an  equal  force.  But  in  lieu  of  one  well-sustained 
attack  or  of  two  quite  simultaneous,  Burnside  frittered 
away  this  single  chance  by  putting  in  Franklin  on  the 
left  and  Sumner  on  the  right,  without  concerted  ac- 
tion.    Nearly  one  hundred  thousand  men  were  in  line. 


1862.] 


THE  HORROR    OF  FREDERICKSBURG. 


113 


Our  artillery  opens   the   affair   and,  as   always,  proves 
superior  to  the  enemy's.     From  Franklin's 

^  -^  December  13. 

front  Reynolds  assaults  with  a  well-massed 


Frederieksburg.    Deeembep  13,  1862. 


column.     Meade,    who  is    in    the  lead,  drives   in    A.   P. 
Hill,  but  being  unsupported,  Doubleday  and  Gibbon  having 


114  BIRUS'ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.        [1862» 

been  delayed,  is  hurled  back  by  Early,  whose  advance  ia 
in  turn  balked  by  Birney's  division. 

In  Sumner's  front  French  is  arrested  at  the  stone  wall. 
Hancock  comes  up  and  makes  a  manful  struggle  to  pass  it. 
Both  attacks  are  easily  repulsed.  Hunt  with  his  artillery 
on  the  north  side  essays  to  silence  the  guns  on  Marye's 
heights.  It  is  too  distant  for  his  field  ordnance.  Hooker 
is  ordered  across.  Under  protest,  and  yet  Hooker  lacked 
not  stomach  for  a  fight,  he  obeys  the  useless  order,  and 
leads  his  men  into  the  slaughter-pen.  Humphreys  again 
assaults  the  stone  wall  with  all  the  gallantry  and  coolness 
which  distinguish  him.  All  is  in  vain.  Even  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  cannot  do  the  impossible.  The  defeated 
troops  are  huddled  into  Fredericksburg,  and  gradually 
withdrawn  across  the  river. 

Burnside  was  insane  enough  to  wish  to  repeat  the  assault 
next  day.  But  the  counsels  of  his  officers  prevailed  on  him 
to  desist. 

No  such  useless  slaughter,  with  the  exception,  perhaps, 
of  Cold  Harbor,  occurred  during  our  war,  and  thirteen 
thousand  men  paid  the  penalty.  The  enemy's  loss  was  but 
two  in  five  of  ours.  He  had  exulted  in  a  fiery  holiday. 
Well  were  his  paeans  sung  !  He  had  been  obliged  to  put 
in  but  a  few  divisions. 

Lee  was  taken  to  task  for  not  advancing  from  his  defences, 
and  completing  the  destruction  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
But  he  believed  that  the  attack  would  be  renewed,  for  he 
did  not  know  how  heavy  our  losses  had  been,  and  was  un- 
willing to  risk  the  advantage  of  position  which  had  already 
gained  him  so  much.     The  Southern  public  was  quite  as 


1862.]  THE  HORROR   OR  FREDERICKSBURa,  115 

unreasonably  critical  of  military  events  as  our  own,  and 
Lee's  splendid  achievements  were  scarcely  ever  appreciated 
at  a  fraction  of  their  true  value.  In  view  of  the  diflficulty 
to-day,  with  all  the  facts  before  us,  of  withholding  from 
General  Lee  our  sincere  homage  as  the  great  soldier  of  our 
Civil  "War,  of  the  difficulty  we  meet  in  passing  any  criticism 
upon  his  conduct  as  a  soldier,  it  seems  strange  that,  during 
the  war,  when  it  was  he,  whose  unfailing  equipoise  and 
sturdy  courage  prolonged  the  life  of  the  Confederacy  from 
month  to  month,  many  of  his  fellow-citizens  should  have 
been  bitterly  arrayed  against  him.  And  yet  this  was  the 
case.  A  dispassionate  judgment  places  Robert  E.  Lee 
on  the  level  of  such  captains  as  Turenne,  Eugene,  Marl- 
borough, Wellington,  and  Moltke. 


XXIL 

THE  SOLDIER  OF  NORTH  AND  SOUTH. 

**  rTlHERE  can  be  no  doubt  about  the  proposition  that 
-L  ji^eater  results  were  habitually  achieved  by  a 
certain  iminb.er  of  thousands  or  tens  of  thousands  of  Lee's 
army  than  by  an  equal  number  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 
The  reason  for  this  is  not  to  be  found  in  any  difference  in 
patriotic  zeal  in  the  two  armies.  The  first  reason  probably 
was  that  the  different  modes  of  life  at  the  South  and  at  the 
North  made  the  Southern  soldiers  more  fond  of  fighting 
than  the  Northern  men.  Not  to  mention  the  intense  and 
more  passionate  character  of  the  Southerner  as  compared 
with  that  of  the  Northerner,  the  comparatively  lawless  (not 
to  speak  invidiously)  life  at  the  South,  where  the  popula- 
tion was  scattered  and  the  gun  came  ready  to  the  hand, 
made  the  Southern  man  an  apter  soldier  than  the  peaceful, 
prosperous,  steady-going  recruit  from  the  North.  The 
Southerners  showed  that  they  felt  the  gaudium  certaminis. 
With  the  Northerners  it  was  different.  They  were  ready 
to  obey  orders,  they  were  ready  to  do  the  work  to  which 
they  had  set  their  hands,  they  were  ready  to  die  in  their 
tracks  if  need  be,  but  they  did  not  go  to  battle  as  to  a 
feast.     They  did  not  like  fighting.     Sheridan,   Hancock, 


1862.]         THE  SOLDIER   OF  NORTH  AND  SOUTH.  117 

Humphreys,  Kearny,  Custer,  Barlow,  and  suet  as  they, 
were  exceptions  ;  but  the  rule  was  otherwise."  (Palfrey.) 

Other  reasons  are  alleged.  The  Confederate  soldier  was 
as  a  rule  ill  fed  and  clothed,  worse  shod  and  rarely  had 
luxuries.  And  as  a  field  won  meant  to  him  these  sadly 
needed  shoes  and  clothing  and  blankets  and  rations  as  well 
as  arms  and  ammunition, — not  indeed  to  mention  money 
and  other  valuables, — this  motive  may  fairly  be  said  to  have 
weighed  also  as  an  incentive  to  the  fight.  The  very  rags  and 
starvation  of  the  Southerner  made  him  the  better  fighter  and 
the  quicker  marcher.  "'I  can  whip  any  army  that  is  fol- 
lowed by  a  flock  of  cattle,'  said  Jackson,  and  it  was  a  preg- 
nant saying.  "  (Ibid.)  The  Federal  was  embarrassed  by 
his  riches,  and  the  difficulty  of  transporting  all  he  had.  The 
Confederate  was  always  in  light  marching  order,  and  all  too 
often  captured  his  rations  on  the  field. 

General  Palfrey  has  struck  the  key-note  of  this  inter- 
esting discussion.  But  there  are  still  other  reasons.  The 
marked  degrees  of  the  Southern  social  scale  as  readily  assigned 
to  the  enlisted  man  his  musket  as  to  the  officer  his  side-arms. 
Wherever  a  regiment  was  raised,  the  men  who  had  always 
been  leaders  at  home  were  with  rare  exceptions  chosen 
leaders  for  the  field  ;  they  were  uniformly  the  best  men  for 
the  places,  and  the  habit  of  command  and  obedience  was 
instinctive.  It  must  not  be  forgotten,  moreover,  that  the 
early  conscription  laws  kept  under  the  Confederate  colors 
the  hardened  men,  making  discipline  more  a  matter  of  course 
than  in  our  ranks  where  the  individual  soldiers  were  con- 
Btantly  changing. 

That   he   accomplished   more   is    true.     But    that    the 


118  BIRD'S-ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1862. 

Southerner  was  a  better  soldier  cannot  be  claimed.  Even 
Friedrich's  regiments  at  Leuthen  showed  devotion  no 
greater  than  our  own  battalions  at  Marye's  Heights ;  and 
desperate  as  was  the  Prussians'  task  as  they  marched  in 
parade  order  upon  the  Austrians'  left  flank,  had  they  not 
Vater  Fritz  to  lead  them,  and  the  pregnant  threats  of 
Friedrich  the  King  to  keep  them  to  their  work  ?  While 
every  soldier  in  the  ranks  on  that  fatal  thirteenth  of 
December  could  see  the  hopeless  nature  of  his  struggle, 
and  was  far  indeed  from  fighting  for  king  and  fatherland. 
In  this  most  famous  of  Friedrich's  victories  he,  the  attack- 
ing party,  lost  six  thousand  two  hundred  men  out  of 
thirty  thousand,  all  of  whom  were  actually,  and  at  the 
crisis  simultaneously,  engaged.  At  Fredericksburg,  with- 
out incentive,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  laid  at  the  foot  of 
the  heights  ten  thousand  nine  hundred  dead  and  wounded, 
out  of  not  much  more  than  sixty  thousand  men  actually  in 
the  assault.  Hancock  lost  two  thousand  and  twenty-nine 
out  of  forty-eight  hundred  and  thirty-four. 

Not  that  the  presumption  is  attempted  of  comparing  the 
two  battles  as  such,  Leuthen  is  the  most  splendid  piece 
of  grand-tactics  of  the  last  century,  perhaps  of  modern 
times  ;  Fredericksburg  was  a  tactical  blunder  of  the  purest 
water.  But  Leuthen  is  often  cited  to  show  the  grand  fidel- 
ity of  the  Prussian  infantry  ;  in  this  respect  the  comparison 
is  not  odious. 

Nor  is  it  hard  to  parallel  Fredericksburg  more  than  once 
during  our  war.  What  shall  be  said  of  Grant's  "  hammer- 
ing "  campaign  of  1864,  in  which  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac from  May  5  to  June  10  lost  little  short  of  sixty  thou- 


1862.]         THE  SOLDIER    OF  NORTH  AND   SOUTH.  119 

sand  men,  killed  and  wounded,  in  front  of  Lee's  intrenched 
lines,  out  of  a  total  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand 
under  arms  ?  Or  of  the  thirteen  thousand  out  of  forty-three 
thousand  at  Stone's  River?  Or  of  Chickaraauga's  sixteen 
thousand  out  of  sixty-two  thousand  men  on  the  field  ?  Or  of 
Porter's  loss  of  seven  thousand  out  of  twenty-nine  thousand 
at  Gaines'  Mill?  Or  of  Sherman's  loss  of  thirty  thousand 
men  out  of  one  hundred  thousand  in  his  four  months'  cam- 
paign from  Dalton  to  Atlanta?  Shall  further  comparison 
be  made?  That  the  elation  of  the  battle-field  engendered 
of  a  sunny  climate  can  be  offset  by  the  sturdier  virtues  of 
the  patient  North  is  the  constant  verdict  of  history. 

Moreover,  in  Virginia,  it  was  leadership  which  accom- 
plished such  results  with  so  feeble  resources.  Look  at 
other  battle-fields,  and,  man  for  man,  where  commanders 
were  of  equal  weight,  what  diflference  can  be  traced  ?  The 
arithmetical  value  of  the  Southron  as  compared  with  the 
Yankee,  which  used  to  be  so  constantly  roUed  as  a  sweet 
morsel  under  the  tongue  by  our  ancient  foemen,  can  to-day, 
I  ween,  be  dismissed  with  a  friendly  shake  of  the  hand  as 
we  shoulder  our  crutch  for  the  rising  generation,  and  show 
how  fields  were  won. 

It  is  a  noteworthy  fact  that  a  list  of  the  fifty  most  severe 
battles  during  the  Civil  War  shows  ten  drawn  and  twenty 
victories  to  each  side.  At  the  point  of  fighting  contact,  in 
these  fifty  battles,  the  forces  were  within  two  per  cent,  of 
being  equal. 

In  thirty-four  battles  the  Union  forces  remained  in  pos- 
session of  the  field,  and  buried  the  enemy's  dead ;  th** 
Confederates  did  the  like  in  twenty-nine.     In  eleven  assaults 


120  BIRD'S-EYE    riEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR.         [1862. 

by  large  forces,  the  Union  troops  won ;  in  eleven  the  Con- 
federates drove  them  back ;  in  eight  the  Federals  repulsed 
such  assaults. 

The  strongest  reason  for  the  acknowledged  truth  that 
the  Southerner  accomplished  more  with  less  means  than  we 
did  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  was  fighting  for  the  preservation 
of  his  own  soil.  It  needs  not  history  to  teach  us  what  this 
incentive  can  accomplish.  Every  brave  man  carries  it  in 
the  deepest  recesses  of  his  heart,  and  reads  his  willing  duty 
in  the  eyes  of  the  wife,  the  child,  the  mother,  or  the  sweet- 
heart, to  preserve  whose  sacred  right  to  a  peaceful  home 
his  life  stands  alw^C^^  ready  sacrifice. 

The  North',  thaiik  God,  was  never  called  upon  for  the 
effort,  the  self-denial  of  the  South.  That  it  is  capable  of 
yielding  it  when  so  called  needs  not  to  be  asserted.  And 
there  is  suflficient  to  be  proud  of  in  American  manhood  not 
to  draw  lines  of  politics  or  climate  in  comparing  either  the 
intelligence  or  the  hardihood  of  the  men  who  marched 
and  fought  through  our  Civil  War  beside  or  against  each 
other. 

To  attempt  to  give  the  American  his  proper  place  among 
the  soldiers  of  other  nations,  ancient  or  modern,  is  an 
inquiry  demanding  a  volume  by  itself.  But  the  stanchness 
of  the  American  in  battle  may  be  measured  to  a  fair  extent 
by  a  few  statistics.  Courage  is  only  one  of  the  necessary 
virtues  of  the  soldier ;  but  it  is  an  important  one,  and,  if 
we  take  the  average  number  of  killed  and  wounded  in  the 
prominent  battles  of  the  past  century  and  a  half,  we  arrive 
at  a  conclusidn  reasonably  secure. 

Frederick  and  Napoleon  are  the  two  captains  of  modern 


1862.]         THE  SOLDIER    OF  NORTH  AND   SOUTH.  121 

times  who  have  fought  their  men  au  fond.     Their  lo88e& 
are  the  heaviest;  but  ours  follow  hard  upon. 

The  following  percentages  of  men  killed  and  wounded 
comprise  the  most  noted  battles  since  1745.  Only  those 
whose  full  statistics  are  wanting  are  omitted  :  — 

Up  to  "Waterloo,  the  French,  in  nine  battles   (Napoleon's) , 

lost  in  killed  and  wounded  of  the  number  engaged      .        .  22.38  per  cent. 

Since,  in  nine  battles 8.86  " 

tip  to  Waterloo,  the  Prussians,  in  eight  battles  (mostly  Fred- 
erick's), lost            18.42  " 

At  Koniggratz  they  lost 3.86  " 

Up  to  Waterloo,  the  Austrians,  in  seven  battles,  lost       .        .  11.17  " 

Since,  in  two  battles 8.56  " 

The  Germans,  since  1745,  in  eight  battles         ....  11.53  " 

The  English,  in  four  battles      .        .        .        .        .        .        .  10.36  .  " 

During  our  Civil  War,  the  Union  forces  lost  in  fourteen  pitched 
battles,  in  which,  numbers  and  casualties  are  well  ascer- 
tained        14.48  " 

The  Confederate  forces,  in  twelve,  ditto           ....  18  " 

Of  very  severe  losses  in  small  bodies,  perhaps  the  most  often 

quoted  is  that  of  the  Light  Brigade  at  Balaclava,  viz.           .        36. 7  per  cent. 

At  Metz  the  Gardeschiitzen  battalion  lost        ....        46.1  " 

At  Mars  La  Tour,  the  Sixteenth  Infantry  (Westphalian)  lost,        49.4  " 
During  our  Civil  War,  there  were  lost,  in  some  one  action  by 

one  Union  regiment,  out  of  the  men  taken  into  action     .        82  ** 

By  three  Union  regiments    .        .        between  70  per  cent,  and  80  *< 

By  seventeen  Union  regiments,                "        60       **            *'  70  ** 

By  forty-one        "             "            .              "        50       "            "  60  " 
These  numbers  are  all  taken  from  the  muster  rolls  on  file  in  the  War  Depart- 
ment, where  each  man  is  accounted  for  by  name. 

The  severest  loss  in  the  Civil  "War  was  by  a  Confederate  regi- 
ment at  Gettysburg,  720  out  of  800  men     ....  90  per  cent. 

Another  lost  in  one  battle 82       " 

Three          "            "                ...    between  60  per  cent,  and  70       " 
Nine            "            "                ..."        50        "  "  fiO       " 

Twenty-nine  lost  in  one  battle over  50       *' 

Longstreet's    Division   lost    at    Gaines'    Mill  and   Glendale 

4,438  out  of  8,831  men over  50  per  cent. 

Several  divisions  lost  in  some  one  action  .        .        .        .       "    40       ** 

It  thus  appears  that  in  ability  to  stand  heavy  pounding, 
since  Napoleon's  Waterloo  campaign,  the  American  has 
shown  himself  preeminent.  Of  course  there  are  other 
factors  in  the  problem.  But  these  figures  may  surely  be 
looked  upon  with  pride  —  even  if  no  absolute  conclusion 
can  be  drawn  from  them. 


XXIIL 

ROSECRANS  AND   BRAGG.  —  STONE'S  RIVER. 

EOSECRANS   was   called  to   the    command   of  the 
Department   of  the   Cumberland  in   the   place  of 
Buell,  as  already  stated.    The  forces  operat- 

October  30, 1862.    ... 

ing  on  this  line  were  hereafter. to  "be  known 
as  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland.  The  name  of  Army  of  the 
Ohio  was  to  be  borne  by  the  troops  in  the  East  Tennessee 
Valley. 

Much  was  expected  of  Rosecrans.  His  many  friends 
claimed  for  him  up  to  this  date  the  only  record  of  uniform 
success.  His  brilliant,  if  somewhat  erratic,  method  was 
thought  to  embody  the  soldierly  instinct,  not  so  apparent  in 
more  quiet  natures. 

Rosecrans  made  many  changes.  He  gave  the  command 
of  his  right  wing  to  McCook ;  of  his  left  to  Crittenden ;  of 
his  centre  to  sturdy  Thomas.  The  position  of  the  army 
about  Nashville  was  not  modified. 

Towards   the   middle   of  November,  Bragg,  somewhat 

reinforced,  advanced  to  Murfreesborough  and  laid  distant 

siege  to  Nashville.     Beyond  this   movement,  except  for 

some   minor   operations,  —  another  notable 

raid  of  J.  H.  Morgan  among  them, — there 

l^ae  no  attempt  to  cross  swords  for  two  months. 
122 


1862.] 


R08ECRANS  AND  BRAGG. 


123 


December  26. 


Braxton  Bragg's  rank  as  a  soldier  is  hard  to  gauge.  He 
was  put  and  kept  in  place  by  the  personal  favor  of  President 
Davis.  Not  lacking  audacity  or  military  skill,  he  was 
uniformly  beaten,  and,  like  all  unsuccessful  generals,  he 
received  no  credit  for  what  he  did  accomplish.  It  is  easy 
to  forgive  errors  to  the  eventually  successful ;  hard  to  allow 
any  credit  for  even  good  work  which  comes  to  nothing. 

Rosecrans'  objective  was  of  course  Chattanooga,  as  had 
been  Buell's.  But  he  must  first  clear  the  enemy  from  his 
front.  In  the  last  days  of  the  year,  in  three 
columns,  he  advanced  upon  Bragg's  posi- 
tion. Not  intending  active  operations,  Bragg  had  already 
put  his  army 
into  winter- 
quarters  over 
a  considerable 
area ;  but  no 
sooner  aware  of 
Rosecrans'  in- 
tentions, than 
he  concentrated 
.his  troops 
across  the  lat- 
ter's  path. 

After  some 
outpost  skir- 
mishing, the 
armies  con- 
fronted  each  S*^^®'s  River.    Deeember  31,  1862. 

other  north   of  Murfreesborough,    intent   upon  a   prompt 


124  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1862. 

struggle  for  mastery.  The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was 
in  a  position  facing  substantially  south-east.  Stone's  River, 
the  turnpike,  and  the  railroad,  aU  near  together,  ran  north- 
westerly from  the  town  at  right  angles  to  the  position  of 
Rosecrans  and  near  his  left  flank.  The  river  was  fordable 
in  places.     The  country  was  alternate  woods  and  clearing. 

Rosecrans'  plan  of  battle  was  to  throw  Crittenden  across 
Stone's  River  upon  Bragg's  right  in  force,  while  McCook 
should  hold  our  right  where  it  lay.  Upon  his  strict  per- 
formance of  this  duty  depended  success,  and  McCook 
protested  his  ability  to  hold  his  lines  at  least  three  hours 
against  any  odds.  Curiously  enough,  Bragg  contemplated 
precisely  the  same  field  tactics,  to  wit :  to  crush  our  right. 
Under  these  conditions,  other  things  being  equal,  whoever 
moved  first  upon  his  enemy  with  sufficient  vigor  would  win 
the  day.  Rosecrans  ordered  the  men  to  breakfast  and  the 
movement  to  begin  at  7  A.M.  Bragg  ordered  the  attack 
to  begin  at  daylight. 

There  was  some  carelessness  in  the  disposition  of  the 

troops  on  McCook's  wing,  which  Rosecrans  should  have 

personally   known    and  rectified.      He  placed   too  much 

rehance   on   this  officer's  assertion  that   he 
December  31.  n  i    n  i  . 

could  hold  his  own. 

Bragg's  left,  under  Hardee,  overlapped  our  right.     His 

onset  was  made  with  true  Southern  4lan,  and  immediately 

thrust  back  McCook,  whose  resistance  ill   bore   out  his 

boast.     Scarcely  had  Rosecrans  crossed  Stone's  River  and 

launched  Crittenden's  columns  upon  Breckenridge  than  he 

was  forced  to  recall  them  to  the  assistance  of  his  already 

routed  right  wing.     There  was  no  let  up  to  the  Confederate 


1863.]  ROSECRANS  AND  BRAQG.  125 

attack.  Hardee  was  in  his  element.  Every  success  was 
quickly  followed  up,  and  McCook  was  driven  in  confusion 
upon  the  centre.     The  situation  was  grave. 

But  Thomas  was  of  other  stuif.  He  was  not  to  be  90 
easUy  disposed  of.  Forming  his  own  divisions  along  the 
turnpike  at  right  angles  to  our  first  line,  he  fought  with  his 
never  flagging  coolness  and  determination.  Rosecrans* 
feverish  activity  served  to  reanimate  the  troops.  Sheridan's 
division  reflected  the  mettle  of  its  commander.  Young, 
and  as  yet  unused  to  large  commands,  he  seconded  Thomas 
with  the  instinct  of  the  soldier  glowing  in  every  fibre.  Our 
lines  struggled  through  the  rest  of  the  day  against  almost 
certain  defeat.  The  success  of  the  Confederates  elated 
them,  but  in  no  sort  demoralized  the  Federals.  The  fight- 
ing on  either  side  was  desperate. 

Night  fell.  All  we  could  claim  was  that  we  had  not 
been  driven  from  the  field.  A  council  of  war  was  held. 
Neither  Rosecrans  nor  Thomas  would  consider  the  question 
of  retreat.  A  fresh  conflict  was  settled  for  the  morrow, 
the  first  day  of  the  new  year. 

But  Bragg's  success  had  bred  more  disorganization  than 
our  defeat.  He  was  in  no  condition  to  attack.  His  men 
and  officers  had  exhausted  themselves  in  the  splendid  eflbrts 
which  had  so  nearly  destroyed  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 
New  Year's  passed  without  a  demonstration  on  either  side. 
Next  day,  Bragg  essayed  an  attack  on  Rosecrans'  left,  but 
was  thrown  back-.     Unable  to  force  defeat 

1  11  1  T  1  .  1     -r^      1,    January  2,  1863. 

upon  the   stubborn    battalions  which  Buell 

had  drilled,  he  withdrew  into  Murfreesborough,  with  a  loss 

of  ten  out  of  thirty-eight  thousand  men  against  thirteen  out 


126  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        C1863. 

of  forty-three  thousand  on  our  side.  Bragg  could  show 
as  trophiee  some  twenty-eight  guns. 

Both  parties  laid  claim  to  victory.  But  Bragg  retreated 
from  Murfreesborough  as  a  consequence  of  this  battle,  and  it 
was  occupied  by  our  troops. 

Bragg  was  apt  to  throw  blame  upon  his  subordinates  for 
his  own  shortcomings.  On  this  occasion  he  gave  as  the 
cause  of  his  failure  that  Breckenridge  did  not  promptly 
obey  orders  in  reinforcing  Hardee  when  sore  pressed. 
But  as  the  usual  test  of  a  general  is  success,  or  at  least 
results,  small  attention  can  be  given  to  the  easUy  invented 
explanations  of  failure.  Under  equal  conditions  none  but 
the  victor  may  wear  the  laurel.  Against  overwhelming 
odds  alone  can  defeat  add  honor  to  the  soldier's  name. 


XXIV. 

CHANCELLORSVILLE. 

THE  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  never  so  demoralized 
as  after  the  horror  of  December  13th,  at  Fredericks- 
burg. Succeeding  this  battle  a  fine  spell  of  weather 
invited  a  renewal  of  aggressive  movements.  But  Bum- 
side  allowed  the  favorable  time  to  pass.  Just  as  the 
elements  ceased  to  be  propitious  he  began  a  manoeuvre 
—  it  was  on  McClellan's  plan — to  turn  Lee's  left.  But 
Virginia  roads  and  rivers  are  treacherous.  One  day's 
down-pour   of  rain   sufficed  to  destroy  the 

^  -^  January  20  to  24 

possibility  of  success,  and  the  farcical  ending 
of  the  so-called  Mud  March  gave  the  enthusiasm  of  the 
army   its   coup   de  grace.      A   new  commander   became 
essential,    and    Hooker  was    promoted    from   his    Grand 
Division,  —  Franklin  and  Sumner  being  overslaughed. 

At  this   time,    so   lax   had    been   its   discipline,    some 
eighty-five   thousand  officers  and  men   ap- 

,  ,  11         o     1  *  January  26,  1863. 

peared  on  the  rolls    of  the    Army    of    the 

Potomac  as  absent  without  leave.     But  "Fighting  Joe" 

grasped  the  reins  with  firmness  and  in  organization  gave 

proof  of  great  skill.     A  rare   favorite   among  the  men, 

and   with  solid  record,    it   was   only   those   who   judged 

127 


128  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR.        [1863. 

with  exceptional  insight  and  long  knowledge  of  the  man 
who  mistrusted  the  result.  And  even  their  apprehensions 
were  in  part  allayed  by  Hooker's  steadiness. 

By  the  beginning  of  April  the  recuperative  power  of 
the  stanch  old  army  had  again  made  it  equal  to  any 
effort.  It  lay  in  its  cantonments  about  Falmouth,  while 
Lee  watched  it  from  his  ever  strengthening  heights 
back  of  Fredericksburg,  with  confidence  bred  of  the 
knowledge  that  under  him  served  sixty  thousand  of  the 
!iardiest  troops  which  ever  laughed  at  hunger,  cold,  or 
danger. 

Hooker  initiated  the  Chancellorsville  campaign  by  a 
cavalry  raid  on  Lee's  communications  intended  to  move 
about  his  left  and  far  to  his  rear;  but  sheer  blundering 
robbed  this  diversion  of  any  good  results.  He  followed 
up  this  raid  by  a  feint  under  Sedgwick  below  Fredericks- 
burg, while  he  himself  so  cleverly  stole  a  march  on  Lee  by 
the  upper  Rappahannock,  that  within  four 

April  30. 

days  he  had  massed  forty  thousand  men  on 
the  enemy's  left  flank  at  Chancellorsville,  before  the  latter 
had  begun  to  divine  his  purpose. 

But  here  Hooker  paused.  Indecision  seized  his  mind. 
He  frittered  away  a  precious  day,  and  when  he  finally 
advanced  on  Lee,  the  latter  had  recovered  himself  and  was 
prepared  to  meet  him.  After  barely  feeling  his  adver- 
sary, "  Fighting  Joe  "  retired  into  the  Wilderness  to  invite 
attack,  while  Lee,  with  half  his  force  but  thrice  his  nerve, 
sharply  followed  him  up.  The  terrain  to  which  the  Army 
ftf  the  Potomac  had  been  thus  withdrawn  was  well  named. 
It  was  one  vast   entanglement  of  second   growth   timber 


1863.] 


CHANCELLORS  VILLE. 


129 


and   chapparal,    to    the   last   degree  unfitted   for  the  ma- 
noeuvres of  an  army. 

With  his  wonted  rashness,  but  relying  on  his  adver- 
sary's vacillation,  Lee  divided  his  army  and  sent  Jackson 
around  Hooker's  rio^ht  to  take  him  in  reverse  and  cut  him 
off  from  United  States  Ford,  while  his  own  constant  feints 
on  the  centre  should  cover  the  move.  Meanwhile  Hooker 
weakened  his  right  by   blind  demonstrations  in  his  front, 


Chaneellopsville.    May  2,  1863. 

and  enabled  Jackson  to  complete  his  manoeuvre  and  to 
crush  at  a  blow  the  Eleventh  corps,  which  held  that  flank, 
and  to  throw  the  army  into  utter  confusion. 
In  this  moment  of  his  greatest  triumph  Jack- 
son fell  at  the  hand  of  his  own  men. 

On  the  morrow,  by  dint  of  massed  blows,  with  "  Jack- 
son "  for  a  watchword,  upon  Hooker's  lines,  where  but  one 
man  in  three  was  put  under  fire,  Lee  fairly  drove  our  army 


May  2. 


130  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR.  [1863. 

into  a  corner,  from  whence  its  dazed  commander,  with 
eighty  thousand  men,  cried  aloud  for  succor  to  Sedgwick's 
one  corps  fifteen  miles  away,  still  fronting  the  defenses  at 


palmoutm 


Chaneellopsville.    May  3,  4,  5,  1863. 

Fredericksburg.     Under  quite  impossible  orders  this  gal- 
lant soldier  captured  Marye's  Heights,  where 

May  3. 

Burnside  had  lost  thirteen  thousand  men, 
and  advanced  towards  his  chief.  But  Lee,  trusting  to 
Hooker's  panic  to  keep  him  bottled  up,  turned  upon  Sedg- 
May  4.  wick,  drove  him  across  the  river  after  an  all 
M^y5-  day's  fight,  and  again  confronted  Hooker, 
who,  dizzy  and  nerveless,  sought  safety  in  retreat  to  his 
old  camps. 

This  ten  days'  passage  at  arms  was  glorious  to  the  Con- 
federate soldier's  valor  and  to  his  leader's  skill,  while  we 
lost  all  save  honor.  With  an  effective  only  half  as  great, 
Lee    had     actually    outnumbered     Hooker    whenever    he 


1863.]  CHANCELLORSVILLE.  131 

had  struck  him.     While  a  fraction  of  our  forces  were  beinor 

o 

decimated,  the  rest  were  held  by  Hooker  in  the  leash  at 
places  where  they  were  uselessly  fretting  to  join  their 
brothers  in  the  fray. 

It  is  true  that  Hooker  was  accidentally  disabled  May  3  ; 
but  rather  than  turn  over  the  command  to  his  second, 
Couch,  he  chose  to  retain  the  responsibility. 

Of  this  splendid  campaign  every  American  may  make  his 
boast.  Every  Northerner  must  keenly  deplore  it.  Our 
losses  were  seventeen  thousand  out  of  one  hundred  and 
five  thousand  engaged,  and  the  enemy's  thirteen  thousand 
out  of  sixty-one  thousand. 

Jackson's  reputation  as  a  soldier  is  national.  It  is 
almost  supererogatory  to  add  anything  to  what  has  been 
narrated  about  this  remarkable  man.  Untried  in  large 
command,  his  powers  as  a  captain  can  only  be  judged  from 
his  successes  in  the  VaUey.  But  as  a  lieutenant  he  was  far 
beyond  any  oflficer  who  fought  on  either  side  during  our 
Civil  War. 

Hooker  and  Hooker's  partisans  have  endeavored  to  shift 
the  responsibility  of  this  defeat  on  Howard,  for  allowing 
his  corps  to  be  surprised  on  the  right ;  and  on  Sedgwick, 
for  not  fighting  an  impossible  battle  and  making  an  impos- 
sible march  in  the  middle  of  the  ni^ht.  But  neither  can  be 
so  saddled.  Hooker  himself  must  bear  the  load,  however 
heavy,  and  however  weU  he  has  otherwise  deserved  our 
admiration.  And  this  may  be  said  with  sincere  apprecia- 
tion of  Hooker's  services  as  a  corps  commander,  and  of  his 
splendid  gallantry  on  many  a  hard-fought  afield. 


XXV. 

LEE'S   SECOND  INVASION. 

NOW  supervenes  another  rest  in  the  thrice-reoccupied 
Falmouth  camps,  while  Lee  plans  with  questionable 
political  or  strategic  foresight  a  second  raid  into  the  North- 
em  States.  Still  grasping  with  his  right  the  old  defenses 
at  Fredericksburg,  he  covertly  advances  his  left,  under 
Ewell,  to  Culpeper,  and  thence  into  the  Shenandoah 
Valley. 

Hooker  became  aware  of  an  impending  movement,  and 

threw  his  entire  force  of  cavalry  across  the  Rappahannock  on 

a  forced  reconnoissance.     At  Beverly  Ford 

June  9. 

a  smart  combat  with  Stuart,  the  loss  on 
our  side  being  some  eight  hundred  men,  on  theirs  half  as 
many,  revealed  Lee's  intentions. 

Ewell,  followed  warily  by  the  centre,  pushed  rapidly  on 
down  the  Valley. 

At  one  moment  the  line  of  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  stretched  from  Fredericks- 
burg to  Winchester,  —  a  distance  of  one  hundred  miles. 
This  was  a  very  dangerous  extension,  and  Hooker  sug- 
gested to  his  timid  chief  in  Washington  the  obvious  pro- 
priety of  lecalling  Lee  from  his  now  evident  objective  by 
18S 


1863.]  LEE'S  SECOND  INVASION.  133 

crushing  his  right  wing,  thus  seriously  compromised  at 
Fredericksburg.  But  he  was  forbidden  this  safest  of  opera- 
tions, for  Mr.  Lincoln's  idea  of  fighting  a  divided  army 
was  that  of  "  an  ox  jumped  half  over  a  fence  and  liable  to 
be  torn  by  dogs  front  and  rear,  without  a  fair  chance  to 
gore  one  way  or  to  kick  the  other,"  while  Halleck's  one 
notion  of  defending  Washington  was  by  the  presence  of 
the  entire  army  between  it  and  the  enemy. 

Thus  Hooker  was  chained  to  the  hackneyed  strategy 
of  moving  by  his  right  towards  the  Potomac,  while  Ewell 
trapped   Milroy  at   Winchester   and   captured   some   four 

thousand     prisoners     and    much    material. 

^  .  Jane  13-15. 

From  here  Ewell  marched  boldly  into  Penn- 
sylvania, where  his  cavalry  levied  heavy  contributions  in 
stock  and  grain  on  the  terrified  farmers. 

So  soon  as  Lee  saw  Hooker  fairly  started  in  pursuit  of 
Ewell,  he  let  go  of  Fredericksburg,  and  urged  Longstreet 
and  Hill  to  their  utmost  speed  to  rejoin  him.  Halleck  had 
got  the  Union  forces  parcelled  out  in  wretched  driblets  all 
over  the  map  from  West  Virginia  to  the  Peninsula,  and 
could  still  not  rise  beyond  his  one  idea  of  preserving 
Harper's  Ferry.  Within  his  restrictions  Hooker's  march 
had  been  conducted  with  logistic  skill  and  discretion.  He 
was  simply  hand-tied,  while  the  enemy  was  free  to  ravage 
Pennsylvania.  However  fretted  by  E well's  presence  in  the 
loyal  States,  Hooker  could  not  cross  the  Potomac  imtil  he 
knew  that  none  of  Lee's  three  corps  was  left  in  Virginia. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  put  over  a  day  after 
the  Confederates    and  was    concentrated    at 

June  25-27. 

Frederick,  from  which  point  Hooker  could 


134  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [1863. 

debouch  on  Lee's  rear  through  South  Mountain,  or  else 
move  upon  him  on  the  line  of  the  Susquehannah.  For 
intelligent  concentration  Halleck  had  substituted  pitiful 
fault-finding,  all  of  which  had  resulted  in  the  enemy's 
reaching  the  vicinity  of  Harrisburg  without  opposition 
worthy  the  name.  And  unable  to  control  events  within 
his  own  reach,  Hooker  requested  on  the  eve  of  engagement 
to  be  relieved.  This  was  an  act  scarcely  to  be  condoned, 
but  for  its  happy  outcome. 

Few  words  sum  up  Hooker's  military  standing.  As  a 
corps  commander,  or  with  orders  to  obey,  unless  jealousy 
warped  his  powers,  he  was  unsurpassed  in  bravery,  devo- 
tion and  skill.  For  the  burden  of  supreme  command  he 
had  neither  mental  calibre  nor  equipoise.  Self-sufficiency 
stood  in  lieu  of  self-reliance. 

Into  Hooker's  place  quietly  stepped  business-like  Meade, 

and  unhampered  by  Halleck,  whose  favorite 
June  28.  r  j 

he  was,  continued  to  follow  up  the  invaders. 
Ewell  was  at  York  and  Carlisle  and  might  cross  the  Sus- 
quehannah and  capture  the  capital  of  the  State.  Meade, 
therefore,  moved  northward  from  Frederick,  intent  upon 
loosening  Lee's  grip  on  that  river.  This  he  effected,  and 
Longstreet  and  Hill  were  ordered,  not  towards  Harris- 
burg, but  through  the  South  Mountain  passes.  For  Lee, 
60  soon  as  he  knew  of  Meade's  direction,  became  fearful  for 
Ids  communications.  And  he  was  moreover  troubled  by 
{hQ  naked  defense  of  Kichmond,  which  prize  could  have 
been  secured  by  a  vigorous  attack  by  General  Dix  from 
Fort  Monroe  with  more  ease  than  at  any  time  during  the 
war,  had  the  attempt  been  made.     Lee,  therefore,  deter* 


1863.]  LEE'S  SECOND  INVASIOIT.  135 

mined  to  draw  back  and  make  a  diversion  east  of  the  South 
Mountain  range  to  engage  Meade's  attention. 

Lee's  plan  of  invasion  had  been  thwarted ;  but  his  army 
must  be  defeated. 

Having  divined  the  purpose  of  his  adversary,  Meade 
selected  the  general  line  of  Pipe  Creek  for  his  defense,  and 
threw  his  left  wing,  preceded  by  cavalry,  forward  to 
Gettysburg  as  a  mask.  Lee  also  aimed  to  secure  thia 
point,  for  it  controlled  the  roads  towards  the  Potomac. 
The  encounter  was  near  at  hand. 


XXYL 


GETTYSBURa. 


THE  First  and  Eleventh  corps  met  the  van  of  Lee's 
Army  under  A.   P.  Hill,  on  the   north  of  the  now 

historic  town.     A  severe  en^a^ement  ensued, 
July  1.  ,  ^  .       . 

in  which  doughty  Reynolds  lost  his  life,  and 
the  Federals,  after  Ewell  came  upon  the  field,  were  driven 


Gettysburg.    July  1,  1863. 

back  through  the  town,  with  heavy  loss,  but  unpursued. 
Hill  and  Ewell  waited  for  Longstreet. 


136 


1863.]  GETTYSBURG,  137 

This  check  to  the  enemy's  advance  led  to  results  worth 
aU  the  sacrifice. 

Few  conflicts  of  modem  times  have  become  so  familiar, 
in  art  and  story,  as  the  battle  of  Gettysburg.  Only  its 
chief  features  need  be  recalled.  South  of  the  quiet  little 
town,  covering  the  road  to  Baltimore,  lies  a  chain  of  hil- 
locks and  bluffs  shaped  like  a  fish-hook.  At  the  barb  rises 
Gulp's  Hill,  along  the  back  what  is  known  as  Gemetery 
Hill,  and  the  shank,  running  north  and  south,  is  formed 
by  a  hilly  slope  terminating  in  a  rocky,  wooded  peak,  called 
Round  Top,  having  Little  Round  Top  as  a  spur.  For 
Hancock  and  Howard  alike  has  been  claimed  the  credit 
of  selecting  this  ever  memorable  position.  Perchance 
Reynolds'  keen  eye  gauged  its  value  as  he  hurried  through 
the  town  to  stem  the  approaching  tide.  On  this  eligible 
ground  the  retreating  Unionists  were  rallied,  and  speedily 
reinforced,  while  Meade,  at  Hancock's  suggestion,  brought 
the  army  forward  from  Pipe  Greek  to  secure  it. 

Meanwhile  Lee  cautiously  advanced  his  own  troops,  and 
forgetting  that  he  had  promised  his  corps  commanders  that 
he  would  not  in  this  campaign  assume  a  tactical  offensive, 
resolved  to  give  battle.  Longstreet's  preference  was  to 
seize  the  Emmetsburg  road  beyond  the  Union  left,  and 
manoeuvre  Meade  out  of  his  position  by  compromising  his 
communications  with  Washington.  But  there  lurked  in 
the  healthy  body  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  a 
poisonous  contempt  of  its  adversary.  This  was  the  natural 
outcome  of  Manassas,  Fredericksburg,  and  Ghancellors- 
ville.  Lee  was  morally  unable  to  decline  battle.  He 
could  not  imperil  the  high-strung  confidence  of  his  men. 


138 


BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW   OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR. 


[186a 


As  the  second  day  dawned  he  must,  however, 

have    watched   with   throbbing    anxiety  the 

Federal  line  rapidly  throwing  up  defences  on  just  such  a 


Gettysburg:.    July  2,  3,  4,  1863. 


formidable  crest  as  himself  had  held  at  Marye's  Heights, 
For  Lee  gauged  better  than  his  men  the  fighting  qualities 
of  his  foe. 


1863.]  QETTTSBURG.  139 

His  general  line  lay  along  Seminary  Ridge,  parallel  to 
Cemetery  Hill,  and  about  a  mile  distant,  with  his  left 
thrown  round  and  through  the  town  to  a  point  opposite 
Gulp's,  in  order  Longstreet,  Hill,  Ewell.  He  was  thus 
formed  in  concave  order  of  battle,  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  having  been  thrown  by  the  lay  of  the  land  into 
substantially  the  convex  order. 

By  noon  Lee  had  perfected  his  plans,  and  Longstreet 
opened  an  attack  on  a  weak  salient  thrown  out  by  Sickles 
^om  the  general  line  of  our  left  towards  the  Emmetsburg 
road  The  possession  of  Round  Top  would  take  the 
Federal  line  in  reverse,  and  Sickles'  position,  an  outward 
^ngle,  could  be  enfiladed  in  both  directions,  and  if  lost 
would  seriously  compromise  this  point.  Longstreet  was 
not  slow  to  clutch  at  the  advantage  thus  offered.  But  the 
foresight  of  Warren,  after  a  desperate  struggle,  secured 
Round  Top ;  and  though  Longstreet  wrested  from  Sickles 
his  saHent,  he  secured  only  an  apparent  benefit  not  com- 
mensurate with  his  loss. 

On  the  Union  extreme  right,  Ewell  had  meanwhile 
gained  a  foothold  on  Gulp's  Hill,  and,  as  night  fell,  Lee 
was  justified  in  feehng  that  the  morrow  would  enable  him 
to  carry  the  entire  ridge.  For  he  believed  that  he  had 
3ffected  a  breach  in  both  flanks  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac.  Lideed  at  the  close  of  the  second  day  the  gravity 
Df  the  situation  induced  Meade  to  call  a  council  of  his  corns 
commanders.  It  was  determined  to  abide  the  result  at 
that  spot.  Oflficers  and  men  were  in  good  spirits  and 
equal  to  any  work. 

Lee  was  tactically  in  error  as  to  Longstreet's  supposed 


140  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1863. 

success   on  the   left.     It  had  in  reality  rectified  Sickles' 

position.     Our  real  line  was  undisturbed.     And  Meade  at 

daylight  attacked  Ewell  in  force,  and  after  a 

July  3.  ^    ^ 

hard  tussle  wrenched  from  him  the  ground 
commanding  Gulp's.  Thus  Lee  had  failed  to  effect  a  per- 
manent lodgment  on  our  either  flank,  and  we  had  thrown 
up  strong  field  works  to  defend  them.  There  was  no 
resource  for  him  but  to  break  our  centre. 

He  accordingly  massed  nearly  one  hundred  and  fifty 
guns  along  Seminary  Ridge,  and  at  1  P.M.  opened 
fire.  Owing  to  the  limited  space  for  the  batteries,  barely 
eighty  guns  from  our  side  could  answer  this  spirited  chal- 
lOKige.  For  two  hours  lasted  the  fiery  duel,  when  Lee 
laonched  Pickett,  "the  Ney  of  the  rebel  army,"  with  a 
coIuTcin  of  thirteen  thousand  men,  to  drive  a  wedge  into 
the  Cv'ntre  of  the  Union  line.  A  column  charged  with  so 
despera  ie  a  duty  —  the  forlornest  of  forlorn  hopes  —  should 
contain  none  but  picked  troops.  Pettigrew's  division  in 
the  assaulting  column  was  unable  to  hold  its  own.  And 
though  Pickett's  Virginians  actually  ruptured  Hancock's 
line  and  a  few  of  the  men  penetrated  some  fifty  yards 
beyond,  he  met  an  array  in  front  and  flank  which  rolled 
him  back  with  fearful  loss.  Lee's  last  chance  of  success 
was  wrecked. 

The  instinct  of  a  great  commander  might  have  seized 
this  moment  for  an  advance  in  force  upon  tho  broken 
enemy.  But  Meade  cautiously  held  what  he  had  already 
won,  rather  than  gain  more  at  greater  risk. 

Beaten  but  not  dismayed,  Lee  spent  all 
the  morrow  and  until  after  daylight  next  day 


1863.J  GETTYSBURG.  141 

preparing  for  retreat,  and  yet  in  a  mood  to  invite  attack. 
And  he  would  have  met  it  stoutly.  But  Meade  was 
content.  He  would  adventure  nothing.  He  had  won  the 
credit  of  defeating  his  enemy;  he  lost  the  chance  of 
destroying  him.  He  may  be  justified  in  this  ;  but  not  in 
failing  to  follow  up  Lee's  deliberate  retreat  with  greater 
vigor.  It  must  however  be  admitted  that  in  almost  ail 
campaigns,  a  similar  criticism  maybe  passed, — after  the 
event.  There  is  always  a  term  to  the  endurance  and  ac- 
tivity of  armies  and  their  commanders. 

In  this  most  stubborn  battle  of  modern  days  we  lost 
twenty-three  thousand  out  of  ninety-three  thousand  en- 
gaged ;  the  Confederates  twenty-two  thousand  five  hundred 
out  of  eighty  thousand  men,  beside  fifty-four  hundred 
prisoners.  The  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  twenty-two 
and  a  half  per  cent. ,  is  unexampled  in  so  large  a  force. 

Lee  retreated  by  way  of  Williamsport,  undisturbed  save 
at  a  distance,  and  after  some  days  was  followed  across  the 
Potomac  by  Meade. 


XXVIL 

GRANT  AGAIN  MOVES  ON  VICKSBURG. 

"TTTTHLE   the  old  year  closed  with  the    tragedy  of 

Y  V     Fredericksburg   and  the    drawn   battle    of  Mur- 

freesborouffh,    the   new  year   opened  with 

1862andl863.  ^  x  •       i 

Grant's  second  advance  on  Vicksburg,  and 
with  General  Banks  creating  a  base  for  operations  at 
New  Orleans. 

Grant  was  now  in  sole  command  of  the  forces  operating 
down  the  Mississippi.  His  army  consisted  of  the  Thirteenth 
corps  under  McClemand,  the  Fifteenth  under  Sherman, 
the  Sixteenth  under  Hurlbut,  and  the  Seventeenth  under 
McPherson,  a  body  comprising  the  veterans  of  the  West. 
We  have  seen  how  his  overland  march  on  Vicksburg  was 
cut  short  by  severed  communications,  and  neutralized  Sher- 
man's efforts  at  Chickasaw  Bayou.  This  only  served  how- 
frver  tc  whet  his  determination  to  capture  the  place,  which, 
and  Port  Hudson  below,  were  the  only  serious  obstacles 
to  the  free  navigation  of  the  great  river.  But  they  were 
serious  indeed. 

Hurlbut  was  detached  to  watch  the  Memphis  and  Charles- 
ton Railroad  while  Sherman  and  McClernand   moved  to 

Toung's  Point,  and  McPherson  was  ordered  soon  to  follow. 
142 


1863.]        GRANT  AGAIN  MOVES  ON  VICKSBURG.  143 

From  here  Grant  would  have  preferred  to  work  around  the 
city  by  the  north,  but  the  Yazoo  lowlands  were  quite  under 
water,  and  all  reconnoissances  pointed  to  grave  diflficidties 
in  the  way  of  such  an  operation. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  Vicksburg  is  situated  at  the 
bight  of  a  great  loop  made  by  the  Mississippi.  Across  the 
loop,  at  its  narrowest  point,  does  not  much  exceed  a  mile. 
Before  reaching  the  ground  Grant  had  given  orders  to  con- 
struct  another   canal    across   this   loop,   as 

.  February. 

Williams  had  done  a  year  before,  but  when, 
towards  early  spring,  he  arrived  and  (McClernand  protest- 
ing) assumed  command,  he  discovered  the  uselessness  of 
such  an  attempt.  Work  on  the  canal,  however,  was  kept 
up  by  the  troops  for  six  weeks,  when  a  heavy  freshet  washed 
away  the  embankments  and  utterly  destroyed 

•  T     .      .  1111  .  March?. 

it.     It  IS  improbable  that  as  a  water-way  it 
could  ever  have  been  utilized,  for  it  was  not  in  such  a  loca- 
tion as  to  allow  the  current  of  the  river  to  flow  freely 
into  it. 

During  this  period  the  monotony  of  the  canal  work  was 
enlivened  by  various  naval  exploits  on  the  river.  Admiral 
Porter,  who  commanded  the  fleet  cooperating  with  Grant, 
sent  several  of  his  vessels  down  past  the  Vicksburg  batteries. 
Among  these  was  prominent  the  feat  of  Colonel  Ellet, 
already  noted  for  much  excellent  work  with  the  flotilla.  In 
the  Queen  of  the  West  he  ran  below  the  town,  attacked 
and  all  but  destroyed  the  rebel  ram.  City  of  Vicksburg. 
Being  unable  to  return  he  proceeded  down  the  river,  and 
after  numerous  adventures,  joined  the  forces  under  Banks. 

Grant's  task  was  one  full  of  contingencies.     Strangely 


144  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1863. 

enough,  he  seems  to  have  had  no  settled  plan  at  this  time. 
But  he  set  on  foot  various  projects  for  weakening  the  ap- 
proaches to  Vicksburg,  or  for  opening  a  water-course  around 
so  as  to  isolate  it.  He  dug  a  canal  from  the  Mississippi  to 
Providence  Lake,  hoping  to  make  a^  practicable  channel 
through  the  Tensas,  Black,  Red  and  Atchafalaya  rivers  to 
a  point  below  Port  Hudson.  He  opened  another  channel 
from  the  river  to  Moon  Lake,  purposing  to  run  light- 
draught  boats  down  the  Tallahatchie  and  Yazoo.  For  not 
only  was  there  a  shipyard  at  Yazoo  city,  where  some  ves- 
sels were  building,  but  it  was  a  considerable  depot  of 
stores. 

The  latter  route,  if  practicable,  not  only  afforded  an 
opportunity  of  destroying  this  depot,  but  would  also  enable 
Grant  to  take  Haines'  Bluff  in  reverse,  and  capture  the  hills 
which  are  the  key  to  Vicksburg.  A  demonstration  by  land 
forces  as  well  as  the  navy  was  made  in  connection  with  this 

scheme.     But  all  these  attempts,  which  con- 
March  and  April.  ,-,/..,, 
sumed  over  two  months,  resulted  fruitlessly. 

The  enemj  was  able  to  check  each  movement  in  its  turn 


XXYIIL 

GRANT  TURNS  PEMBERTON'S  LEFT. 

P EMBERTON  had  at  Vicksburg  some  twenty-two  thou- 
sand men,  stationed  from  Haines'  BluiF  above,  to 
Grand  Gulf  below  ;  at  Grenada,  eleven  thousand ;  at  Jack- 
son, Miss.,  five  thousand.  Johnston,  though  in  supreme 
command  of  the  forces  west  of  the  AUeghanies,  was  person- 
ally at  Chattanooga,  deeming  that  field  of  most  importance 
to  the  fortunes  of  the  Confederacy ;  and  Van  Dorn,  with 
his  cavalry,  had  likewise  joined  Bragg. 

Having  fruitlessly  attempted  all  methods  of  approach  to 
Vicksburg  from  the  north  and  west,  Grant  now  deter- 
mined to  place  his  army  below  the  fortress  and  to  turn 
Pemberton's  left.  His  position  was  a  trying  one.  The  fickle 
public  was  all  but  ready  to  tire  of  him  also,  as  it  had  on 
less  pretext  of  so  many  of  his  brother  soldiers.  Since  Don- 
elson,  he  had  fought  only  the  battle  of  Shiloh,  —  a  most 
questionable  triumph.  luka  and  Corinth  had  been  quite 
forgotten,  or  such  credit  as  a  minor  victory  yields  had  been 
ascribed  to  Rosecrans.  For  a  year  Grant  had  been  floun- 
dering about  with  no  substantial  success  to  show.  Some- 
thing was  demanded  of  him. 

Grant  must  look  the  matter  squarely  in  the  face.    Assault 

145 


146 


BTRUS-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR, 


[1863. 


promised  ill-success  from  any  point,  while  involving  the 
certainty  of  heavy  losses.     To  go  back  and  try  the  really 


M 
o 


.5     S 


most  feasible  route,  along  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad, 
seemed  like  failure  acknowledged,  and  would  therefore  be 


1863.]  GRANT  TURNS  PEMBERTON'S  LEFT.  147 

politically  ruinous,  though  strategically  sound.  To  turn 
Pemberton's  left  was  a  desperate  undertaking.  Its  only 
merit  lay  in  that  it  showed  no  sign  of  turning  back,  for, 
while  to  do  the  unexpected  is  a  sound  maxim  of  war,  this 
plan  in  no  sense  partook  of  the  nature  of  a  surprise.  Sup- 
plies must  come  by  a  most  circuitous  route,  liable  to  fatal 
interruption,  and  the  fleet  must.runtheVicks burg  batteries. 
Choice  was  difficult.  But  with  his  usual  disregard  of  obsta- 
cles Grant  adopted  the  latter  plan.  He  could  face  a  difficult 
problem  rather  than  a  simple  one.  His  courage  grew  with 
opposit  ion.  He  could  assume  any  risk.  In  this  case  it  proved 
a  virtue  ;  but  not  so  a  year  later,  in  Virginia.  This  type 
of  courage  often  lacks  the  tempering  element  of  caution. 

Part  of  Sherman's  corps  was  sent  up  the  river  to  make 
a  diversion   which   might  take   Haines'   Bluff  in  reverse. 

This   was  ably  done,  as  was  all  work  this 

•^  '  March  14-27. 

ffeneral  had    in    hand.      McClernand    was       ,,    ,  „^ 

^  March  29. 

ordered  to  New  Carthage,  below  Yicksburg. 
Communication  with  Milliken's  Bend,  from  which  place 
Grant  drew  his  supplies,  was  kept  up  by  flat-boats  along 
the  innumerable  bayous,  and  a  haul  overland  of  some 
twenty-five  miles.  The  transports  and  gun-boats  needed 
for  operations  below  were  safely  run  past  the  batteries. 

Towards  the  end  of  the  month,  after  infinite  trouble  with 
the  roads,  Grant  joined  McClernand  at  New  Carthage  and 
from  there  marched  to  a  point  opposite  Grand 

^    in  .1  1        ..^T.  1    1  April  24,  1863. 

Gulf,  twenty  miles  south  of  Vicksburg,  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Big  Black.    Grand  Gulf  had  been  fortified, 
though  not  with  the  strength  of  Haines'  Bluff,  for  Pember- 
ton  was  vastly  more  concerned  for  his  right  than  his  left 


148  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [1863. 

flank,  and,  having  no  cavalry,  was  much  in  the  dark  as  to 
the  plans  of  his  opponent. 

But  the  passage  of  the  fleet  revealed  Grant's  purpose, 
and  reinforcements  which  had  been  ordered  to  Bragg,  on 
the  supposition  that  Grant  would  not  soon  attack,  were  at 
once  recalled. 

As  a  means  of  diverting  attention  from  his  movements, 
and  to  disturb  the  enemy's  line  of  supplies  from  the  east, 
Grierson  had  been  despatched  on  a  raid  from  Lagrange  south- 
ward, with  a  cavalry  brigade  of  one  thousand  seven  hundred 
men.  This  enterprising  officer,  starting  in  light  order,  made 
his  way  along  roads  some  twenty  miles  east 

April  17. 

of  the  Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad,  detailing 
parties  right  and  left  to  destroy  tracks  and  telegraph,  stores 
and  munitions  of  war,  and  by  his  clever  devices  kept  the 
enemy  utterly  in  the  dark  as  to  his  direction  and  purposes. 
He  finally  turned  up  at  Baton  Rouge,  having 
marched  six  hundred  miles  in  sixteen  days, 
and  having  created  vast  confusion,  of  no  little  assistance 
to  Grant  in  safely  crossing  the  Mississippi. 

The  presence  of  the  Federals  opposite  Grand  Gulf,  as  well 
as  on  his  right,  made  a  problem  which  Pemberton  was  not 
soldier  enough  to  solve.  Though  he  seems  to  have  known 
all  about  Grant's  manoeuvre,  he  was  incapable  of  action 
that  met  the  conditions  confronting  him. 

The  fortifications  of  Grand  Gulf  were  incomplete,  but 
Porter  could  not  destroy  the  works  from  his  gun-boats. 
Unable  to  get  over,  owing  to  their  fire,  Grant  dropped 
down  a  few  miles  further  to  Bruinsburg,  where  by  crossing 
he  could  take  Grand  Gulf  in  reverse. 


1863.]  GRANT  TURNS  PEMBERTON'S  LEFT.  149 


First  McClernand  with  eighteen  thousand 


/ 


o 


April  30. 


men    is    ferried   over   and   marches  towards 

Port  Gibson.     Pemberton  promptly  puts  in  an  appearance 

and  arrests  his  advance  four  miles  this  side 

May  1. 

of  the   place.     Without   waiting    for    Mc- 

Pherson,   who  is  coming  up,   McClernand  attacks.      We 

have  already  .twenty-four  thousand  men  on  the  field,  the 

Confederates  but  eight  thousand  five  hundred.     But  they 

make   none  the  less  a  stubborn  defense.     The  ground  is 

very   broken    and    difficult    for   the    troops.      Despite   his 

numbers,   McClernand   makes    small  headway   for  hours, 

when    McPherson    arrives    and   the    Confederate   right   is 

turned.     Thus  thrust  back,  the  enemy  retires  beyond  and 

bums  the  bridges  over  Bayou  Pierre.     The  loss  on  each 

side  is  not  far  from  eight  hundred. 

Next  day  our  forces  enter  Port  Gibson, 

May  2. 

and  repair  and  rebuild  the  bridges   burned 

by  Pemberton.     The  enemy  is  now  obliged   to   evacuate 

Grand  Gulf,  which  Porter  speedily  occupies. 

Sherman  had  been  left  behind  as  rear  guard.  While  Mc- 
Clernand and  McPherson  were  marching  on  Port  Gibson, 

he  had  been  making  a  still  more  noisy  dem- 

May  1. 
onstration  at  Haines'  Bluff.     Pemberton  was 

thus  kept  from  sending  reinforcements  from  the  city. 

Matters  were  now  much  facilitated  by  all-water  com- 
uiunication  with  the  base  of  supplies.  This  had  been 
laboriously  opened  by  the  engineers  from  Milliken's  Bend 
to  New  Carthage  and  thence  to  Grand  Gulf. 

Grant  had  at  the  beginning  of  his  campaign  been  led  to 
believe  that  Banks  would  before  now  be  in  position  to 


150  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [1863. 

cooperate  with  him  from  below.  But  Banks  was  delayed 
by  operations  at  Port  Hudson ;  and  Grant,  seeing  that  to 
wait  would  only  allow  the  enemy  to  accumulate  as  much  in 
reinforcements  as  Banks'  presence  would  afford  to  himself, 
concluded  t©  push  matters  to  an  issue. 


XXIX. 

GRANT  DRIVES  PEMBERTON  INTO  VICKSBURG. 

P EMBERTON  had  now  got  out  seventeen  thousand 
men  to  thwart  Grant's  further  progress.  But  he 
found  himself  compelled  to  place  the  Big  Black  between 
his  army  and  the  Federals.  Meanwhile  McPherson  and 
McClernand  went  into  bivouac  to  wait  for  Sherman. 

Grant  was  once  more  on  dry  ground,  and  had 
actually  turned  Pemberton's  left.  But  this  was  only  a 
beginning.  He  must  strike  hard  and  fast  to  secure  the 
fruits  of  his  bold  manoeuvre.  Numbers  were  practically 
equal,  but  the  local  advantages  were  all  on  the  Confederate 
side.  They  were  within  their  own  territory,  near  their 
supplies,  on  the  defensive.  Grant  was  obliged  to  get  his 
supplies  over  seventy  miles  of  treacherous  country.  But 
on  the  other  hand  Grant  had  a  navy  at  his  back,  and  above 
all  good  lieutenants,  while  Pemberton's  military  ability 
never  proved  equal  to  heavy  strain. 

Giant  now  advanced  from   Hawkinson's 

Mav  7. 

Ferry  along  the  Big  Black,  keeping  to  the 
east  of  the  river  and  cutting  loose  from  his  base  at  Grand 
Gulf.     He  supplied  the  troops  with  five  days'  rations,  trust- 
ing to  reestablish  himself  within  no  great  time  on  a  new 

161 


152  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1863. 

base  by  defeating  the  enemy.  Until  then  he  must  sustain 
himself  largely  on  the  country,  which  could  furnish  him 
beeves  and  some  com. 

The  enemy  was  posted  at  Jackson  as  well  as  Vicksburg, 
and  Grant  calculated  to  thrust  himself  between  the  two 
bodies  of  the  enemy  at  these  places.  McPherson  com- 
manded the  right  wing,  Sherman,  who  had  come  up,  the 
centre,  McClernand  the  left.  The  advance  was  more  or 
less  irregular  according  to  the  opposition  encountered  and 
the  roads  pursued.     McPherson  pushed  for 

.       May  12.  ^  ^ 

Raymond,  and  after  a  smart  combat,  in  which 
we  lost  four  hundred  men,  took  possession  of  the  place. 

Grant  now  made  up  his  mind  to  secure  the  town  of 
Jackson  before  the  enemy  could  erect  defences  about  it. 
This  would  give  him  a  point  from  which  to  threaten  the 
rear  of  Vicksburg  and  to  protect  his  own. 

It  was  learned  about  this  time  that  Joe  Johnston  was  on 
his  way  with  reinforcements  to  assume  personal  command. 
He  could  not  be  allowed  possession  of  Jackson.  Grant 
promptly  moved  Sherman  and  McPherson  on  that  point 
while  Pemberton  was  concentrated  at  Edwards'  Depot, 
expecting  him  to  attack  there. 

Jackson  was  readily  captured  with  a  loss  of  three  hun- 
dred men,  and  Johnston,  thus  forestalled. 

May  14. 

was  obliged  on  his  arrival  to  move  round  by 
the  north  to  seek  to  join  forces  with  Pemberton. 

Johnston,  who  was  really  in  supreme  command,  had  per- 
emptorily ordered  Pemberton  to  come  out  of  Vicksburg 
and  attack  Grant's  flank  at  Clinton.  But  Pemberton  did 
not  seem  to  feel  that  Johnston  held  over  him  exactly  the 


1863.]       PEMBERTON  DRIVEN  INTO    VICKSBURG.         153 

authority  of  a  commanding-officer,  and  considered  it  the 
best  policy  to  hold  on  to  Vicksburg,  not  seeing,  as  John> 
eton  did,  that  to  beat  Grant  was  the  only  means  to  retain 
possession  of  it.  But  a  few  days  later,  and  too  late,  ho 
made  up  his  mind  to  attack  as  suggested.  Strangely 
enough  he  conceived  the  plan  of  moving  away  from  John- 
ston, to  demonstrate  against  Grant's  rear.  Here  then  we 
have  the  spectacle  of  two  armies,  of  equal  resources,  one 
solid  and  compact,  the  other  split  into  several  detachments, 
in  Vicksburg,  under  Johnston,  and  under  Pemberton.  No 
military  problem  has  ever  been  more  often  solved.  With- 
out serious  blunder  or  mishap  the  concentrated  army  must 
win. 

Pemberton,  soon  made  aware  of  his  mistake,  endeavored 
to  retrace  his  steps.     But  Grant  was  already  upon  him. 

The  enemy  takes  up  position  at  Champi- 
on's Hill  (Confederate  "Baker's  Creek"),  ^^^  ^^' 
between  Vicksburg  and  Jackson.  Grant  moves  upon  him 
along  the  three  roads  from  Raymond  and  Bolton.  The 
divisions  of  Hovey,  Logan,  and  Crocker  assault  his  left 
posted  on  the  hill.  Pemberton  brings  forces  from  his  right 
to  sustain  this  key  position,  but  forgets  that  a  vigorous 
movement  along  the  two  Raymond  roads  could  brush  away 
this  depleted  wing  and  seize  the  fords  over  Baker's  Creek 
in  his  rear.  The  battle  wavers  over  the  hill-slopes  all  day, 
with  alternate  success.  Meanwhile  McClemand,  on  our 
left,  in  lieu  of  pushing  through  Loring's  division  and  thus 
helping  Grant  surround  the  enemy,  wastes  the  day  in  mere 
skirmishing,  with  a  loss  of  barely  one  hundred  and  fifty  men. 
Towards    night    Pemberton    is     driven    from    the    hill. 


154  hiRD'S-ETE   VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1863. 

Had  the  victory  on  the  right  been  less  complete,  he  might 
not  have  retired,  and  could  still  perhaps  have  been  cooped 
lip.  But  to  be  driven  back  upon  the  fords  before  McCler- 
nand  has  seized  them  is  his  one  element  of  safety. 

Our  loss  was  two  thousand  four  hundred.  The  Con- 
federates lost  an  equal  number  in  prisoners  alone,  fourteen 
hundred  killed  and  wounded,  and  twenty-four  guns. 

Pemberton  escaped  in  confusion  beyond  the  Big  Black, 
where,  at  all  the  principal  passages,  he  had  already  con- 
structed  bridge-heads.  Grant  in  pursuit  arrived  at  some 
of  the  crossings  as  soon  as  Pemberton,  but  th^  latter 
secured  the  railroad  bridge. 

Loring's  division  had  been  entirely  cut  off  from  Pember* 
ton  at  Champion's  Hill,  and  after  some  days  joined  John- 
ston by  a  circuitous  march.  Pemberton  had  charged  Loring 
with  the  duty  of  defending  the  railroad  bridge-head  in  case 
of  need,  and  in  the  perplexities  of  retreat,  Loring  being 
absent,  there  was  some  confusion  in  supplying  his  place. 

Sherman  moved  up  to  Bridgeport  to  turn 

May  17. 

the  enemy's  new  left,  and  effected  a  crossing 

there.  Everything  was  at  sixes  and  sevens  in  the  Confed- 
erate army.  Pemberton's  defences  at  the  railroad  bridge 
were  maladroitly  placed  nearly  a  mile  in  advance  of  the 
crossing,  without  supports,  and  with  an  opea  plain  behind 
the  works.  For  troops  to  pass  this  plain  under  fire  would 
prove  certain  destruction.  The  soldiers  were  well  aware  of 
the  fact  and  made  but  a  sorry  resistance, 
finally  dwindling  away  with  an  unnecessarily 
heavy  loss,  our  own  being  but  three  hundred.  They 
burned  the  railroad  bridoje  behind  them 


1863.]      PEMBERTON  DRIVEN  INTO   VICKSBURO.  155 

Twenty-four  hours  were  consumed  in  rebuilding  the 
bridges.  During  this  time,  Pemberton  had  fallen  back 
within  his  Vicksburg  defences.  Here  he  reassembled  barely 
twenty  thousand  men  of  the  force  he  had  led  out. 

Thus  in  two  weeks,  Grant  had  driven  his  antagonist  into 
Vicksburg,  with  a  loss  of  over  five  thousand  men,  not 
counting  Loring's  division  ;  had  prevented  the  enemy  from 
reuniting  his  forces,  and  held  the  key  of  the  situation. 
And  this  on  five  days'  rations.     A  splendid  record  ! 

Pemberton  found  that  he  must  abandon  the  bluffs  north 
of  the  city.     These  Sherman  occupied,  thus 

....  May  19. 

reaching  once  more  the  Yazoo  river,  but  this 
time  on  the  bluffs,  and  not  at  the  foot  of  them.  Pember- 
ton had  notified  Johnston  that  he  could  not  continue  to 
hold  these  bluffs.  Johnston  replied  that  in  that  event  he 
had  much  better  leave  Vicksburg  to  its  fate,  —  for  Walnut 
Hills  was  the  key  to  the  city,  —  and  join  forces  with  him. 
But  Pemberton  was  already  cooped  up.  Vicksburg  had 
been  invested. 

On  the  same  day  Sherman  gained  the  ridge  beyond  Fort 
Hill,  and  rested  his  right  on  the  Mississippi.  On  his  left 
stretched  McPherson's  line.  Beyond  him  McClemand. 
The  city  was  now  besieged  from  the  east,  after  the  Feder- 
als had  made  its  complete  circuit  by  the  west  and  south. 

Altogether  it  has  been  a  strange  military  manoeuvre, 
which  success  will  justify ;  failure  utterly  condemn.  But 
it  has  exhibited  on  Grant's  part  exceptional  self-reliance 
and  knowledge  of  his  opponent. 


XXX. 

SIEGE  OF  VICKSBURGT. 

THE  logistic  situation  was  now  simplified  by  a  change 
of  Grant's  base  to  the  Yazoo.  And,  about  these 
days,  Porter  found  that  time  was  ripe  for  an  expedition 
up  to  Yazoo  City,  where  he  finally  got  at  and  destroyed 
the  stores  and  the  vessels  building  and  being  armed  for 
river  warfare,  as  well  as  the  means  of  replacing  them. 

No  sooner  had  the  city  been  invested  than,  relying  upon 
the  demoraHzation  of  the  Confederate  troops,  Grant  deter- 
mined upon  an  immediate  assault.     Preparations  were  yet 

far  from  complete,  and  to  Sherman's  sharp 
May  19. 

alone  fell  any  severe  fighting.     McClernand 

and  McPherson  had  not  yet  moved  near  enough  to  cooper- 
ate efficiently  with  him.  And  though  these  generals  were 
enabled  to  seize  an  advanced  position,  the  works  proved 
everywhere  too  strong  to  be  carried. 

The  troops  in  Vicksburg  were  hardened  veterans,  who 
had  acquired  the  peculiar  instinct  of  the  soldier.  In  the 
recent  confficts  in  the  field  they  had  felt  the  want  of  that 
strong  leadership  without  which  the  lives  of  the  men  are 
always  at  stake,  and  had  behaved  accordingly.    But  arrived 

behind  good  defences,  where  each  man's  intelligence  and 
156 


1863.]  SIEGE  OF   VICKSBURO.  157 

experience  under  fire  came  into  play,  they  fought  with  their 
accustomed  nerve,  and  no  impression  could  be  made  upon 
them.     Our  loss  was  nearly  a  thousand  men. 

Grant's  success,  like  not  a  few  of  Napoleon's,  tad 
been  aided  by  his  opponent's  incapacity.  Had  Lee  and 
Jackson  been  in  his  front,  his  triumph  would  have  been 
earned  at  the  expense  of  much  harder  blows,  if  at  all. 
Later  on  in  Virginia,  with  only  half  Grant's  effective 
strength,  Lee  was  able  to  hold  him  at  bay  for  a  full  year, 
despite  courage  which  laid  in  front  of  Lee's  field-works  as 
many  dead  and  wounded  Federals  as  the  entire  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  had  under  the  colors. 

The  assault  has  failed,  but  Grant  is  not  made  of  stuff 
to  recognize  defeat.  A  second  assault  is  ordered.  He 
feels  confident  that  the  works  can  be  carried.  The  troops 
are  eager  for  it,  and  are  unwilling  to  settle  down  to  the 
spade,  until  they  have  again  tried  the  bayonet.  Johnston 
may  do  something  which  will  oblige  Grant  to  raise  the 
siege.  The  investment  is  not  yet  quite  complete  on  the 
south.  Every  reason  seems  to  demand  prompt  action, 
and   Grant's  tendency  is  always  towards  hard  blows. 

Two  or  three  brigades  form  the  storming  party  from  each 
corps  front,  backed  up  by  substantially  the  entire  force. 
The  first  rush  fails,  though  individual  soldiers  reach  the 
parapet  and  plant  their  colors  upon  it.  The 
men  are  withdrawn.  At  this  moment  Grant 
receives  a  misleading  message  from  McClernand  to  the 
effect  that  he  has  made  a  lodgment  in  the  works  in  his 
front,  and  asking  Sherman's  and  McPherson's  help  by  a 
renewed  effort.     McClernand  has  really  only  got  posses- 


158  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [186a 

Bion  of  an  outwork,  which  he  can  not  retain.  But  Grant, 
supposing  him  to  know  what  he  asserts,  orders  the  men  in 
again  with  the  hope  of  sustaining  him.  This  second 
assault  adds  to  the  loss  of  life  to  no  effect.  Our  casualties 
have  been  over  three  thousand ;  the  enemy's  barely  five 
hundred.     But  the  failure  has  caused  no  loss  of  morale. 

Grant  found  himself  driven  to  regular  siege  operations. 
The  topography  of  Vicksburg  is  singularly  cut  up.  The 
country  is  full  of  ravines.  The  Confederate  line  lay  along 
ridges  surrounding  the  town.  The  fortifications  were  skil- 
fully constructed  and  well  armed  and  manned.  Everything 
indicated  that  starvation  alone  would  reduce  the  town. 
Our  engineers  got  speedily  to  work  and  some  twelve  miles 
of  trenches  and  nearly  an  hundred  batteries  were  in  due 
time  constructed. 

Within  the  city  Pemberton  was  soon  obliged  to  econo- 
mize victuals,  and  then  cut  down  to  half  and  quarter  rations. 
The  firing  from  our  lines  and  the  fleet  was  continuous. 
Many  thousand  shot  and  shell  were  daily  thrown  into  the 
city.  In  Vicksburg  ammunition  had  necessarily  to  be 
more  sparingly  used. 

Johnston  now  took  the  field,  and  Grant, 
May  26. 

obliged  to  hold  the  lines  of  the  Big  Black 
and  the  Yazoo  for  the  safety  of  his  rear  and  flank,  detailed 
Blair  with  six  brigades  to  operate  against  him. 

Reinforcements  began  to  arrive  from  Memphis,  and  from 
Burnside  and  Schofield,  and  swelled  our  force  to  seventy 
thousand  men  and  two  hundred  and  fifty  guns.  This 
enabled  Grant  to  complete  the  investment  at  all  points. 

With  every  day  Johnston's  chance  of  successful  diversion 


1863.]  SIEGE  OF  YTCKSBURO.  159 

was  disappearing.  He  had  thirty-one  thousand  men  "  for 
duty,"  but  he  made  no  active  attempt  to  aid  Pemberton, 
despite  constant  pressure  from  Richmond,  and  appeals  from 
his  comrades  within  the  walls  of  Vicksburg. 

A  momentary  scare  was  created  at  this  time  by  an 
expedition  from  Arkansas  against  our  base 

June  6  to  8. 

of    supplies   at   Milliken's   Bend.      But  no 
result  of  value  was  accomplished  by  the  enemy. 

McClemand  had  never  been  satisfied  with  his  loss  of 
command  on  the  Mississippi,  and  at  times  gave  cause  for 
serious  complaint  by  his  erratic  conduct.  At  last,  on  the 
occurrence  of  an  act  of  actual  insubordination,  Grant  sum- 
marily relieved  him,  and  appointed  Ord  to  his  place. 

One  of  the  forts  on  the  north-east  front  had  been  mined, 
and,  hoping  for  a  practicable   breach,  was 
blown   up.     But   the   enemy  s   countermine 
weakened  the    explosion    and  their  loss    was   not   severe. 
Our  subsequent  assault  was  met  with  the  usual  stubborn 
courage  and  shared  the  same  failure  as  the  others. 

Mining  operations  were  vigorously  carried  on.  Counter- 
mining by  the  enemy  was  almost  uniformly  unsuccessful. 
Starvation  was  fast  approaching.  The  end  must  speedily  come 
unless  Johnston  could  accomplish  something  substantial. 

Towards  the  end  of  June,  Johnston  did  get  ready  to 
attack.  He  was  lying  in  the  vicinity  of  Canton  and 
Jackson.  Grant  sent  Sherman  with  twenty-four  thousand 
men  to  watch  his  movements,  with  instructions  to  attack  him 
at  once  if  the  next  assault  on  Vicksburg,  which  he  set  for 
July  6,  should  eventuate  in  success.  But  Johnston  attempted 
nothing  which  proved  helpful  towards  raising   the   siege. 


160  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR.         [1863. 

The  garrison  by  the  end  of  June  was  much  reduced  by  lack 
of  victuals. 

In  May,  Johnston  urged  evacuation  so  as  to  save  the 
army  ;  in  June  he  promised  aid  and  suggested  a  sortie.  But 
the  men  were  in  no  condition  to  cut  their  way  through  well- 
fed  troops.  They  had  in  fact  circulated  a  petition  for  surren- 
der. Mutiny  was  feared.  All  Pemberton's  officers  advised 
capitulation,  and  Johnston  finally  notified  Pemberton  that 
he  saw  no  chance  to  afford  him  relief.     There 

July  4. 

being  no  alternative,  Pemberton,  after  some 
interchange  of  letters  with  Grant,  surrendered  with  thirty- 
seven  thousand  men  as  prisoners  of  war. 

His  total  loss  during  this  campaign  was  thus  above  fifty 
thousand.  Ours,  in  the  movement  from  Port  Gibson  on, 
some  eight  thousand  men. 

Sherman's  force    was  at    once    increased    to    forty-nine 

thousand  men.     He  crossed  the  Big  Black  and  marched  on 

Johnston,  who  retired  into  Jackson.     Here 

Sherman  sat  down  before  him  and  destroyed 

the  railroads  north  and  south  of  the  town. 

Owing  to  Grant  having  laid  waste  the  entire  country 
around  Vicksburg  for  fifty  miles,  as  a  means  of  self-protec- 
tion, Johnston  was  unable  long  to  maintain  himself.  No 
provision  had  been  made  for  a  siege.  Johnston  indulged 
hopes  that  Sherman  would  assault ;  but  finding  him  disin- 
clined to  do   so,  he   quietly  slipped   away 

July  16. 

towards  the  east,  and  Grant  withdrew  Sher- 
man from  pursuit.  The  loss  of  each  in  this  subsidiary  cam* 
paign  had  been  about  one  thousand  men. 

Johnston's   conduct    during  these    hostilities   was    not 


1863.]  8IE0E  OF   VICKSBURG.  161 

marked  with  vigor.  He  arrived  at  Jackson,  as  he  tele- 
graphed the  Richmond  authorities,  "  too  late "  to  retrieve 
the  campaign  ;  but  it  was  quite  within  his  power  to  join  his 
forces  to  Pemberton's,  or  failing  this,  to  make  a  stout  effort 
to  raise  the  siege. 

Johnston,  with  all  his  ability,  was  never  distinguished  as  a 
fighter.  His  tendency  was  dilatory  rather  than  active,  the 
very  reverse  of  Grant's.  He  was  never  quite  ready  to  at- 
tack. Compare  this  inactivity  with  any  of  the  campaigns 
of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  At  Chancellorsville 
Lee  had  but  about  two  men  to  %.yq  of  Hooker's.  Por  all 
that,  his  very  audacity  gained  him  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
successes  of  the  war.  Here  Johnston  had  all  but  the  same 
force  as  Grant ;  yet  he  made  no  active  attempt  whatever 
to  solve  the  problem.  To  be  sure,  Pemberton's  obstinate 
hold  on  Vicksburg  did  not  coincide  with  Johnston's  views ; 
but  it  was  consistent  with  the  Confederate  programme.  And 
Pemberton's  feeling  that  Johnston  had  no  more  than  a  right 
to  advise  as  to  his  movements,  and  not  to  give  him  orders, 
resulted  in  a  disastrous  lack  of  cooperation.  None  the  less 
Johnston  owed  more  assistance  to  the  troops  within  the 
walls  than  he  rendered ;  and  he  had  it  in  his  power  very 
seriously  to  hamper  Grant's  operations. 

Grant  had  won  the  great  success  of  the  war.  And  he 
received  his  well-earned  reward  in  the  plaudits  of  the 
people. 

Thus  ends  the  drama  of  Vicksburg,  fit  companion  for  the 
glorious  victory  at  Gettysburg  I  Both  triumphs  occurred 
on  our  national  holiday. 


XXXI. 

BANKS  AND  PORT  HUDSON. 

VERY  early  in  the  war  it  was  determined  to  ope  a 
some  of  the  ports  on  the  Gulf  to  serve  as  bases  for 
operations  extending  into  the  interior.  New  Orleans  was 
the  most  important  of  these,  and  its  possession  was  of 
gi'eat  use  in  wresting  the  control  of  the  Mississippi  rive^* 
from  the  enemy.  It  was  expected  that  Mobile  would 
shortly  after  fall  into  our  possession,  and  sundry  efforts 
were  made  to  capture  it.  But  until  near  the  close  of  the 
war  we  did  not  enter  the  city. 

Mobile  was  the  point  of  next  military  importance  to 
New  Orleans.  From  here  an  advance  on  the  line  of  the 
Mobile  and  Ohio  Railroad  could  have  been  made  by  a 
strong  force  towards  the  armies  operating  from  the  Ten- 
nessee river.  The  capture  or  destruction  of  the  railroad 
centre  at  Meridian  from  this  base  would  have  seriously  af- 
fected the  ability  of  the  enemy  to  detain  our  forces  at 
Vicksburg ;  or  indeed  an  advance  in  force  towards  Mont- 
gomery would  more  than  once  have  weakened  the  conduct 
of  the  Confederate  campaigns  in  Tennessee  and  Kentucky. 
And  as  after  we  had  broken  the  Memphis  and  Charleston 

Railroad  there  was  no  all-rail  route  east  and  west  except 
162 


1863.]  BANKS  AND  PORT  HUDSON,  163 

via  Mobile,  the  importance  of  a  lodgment  here  is 
apparent. 

But  up  to  this  date,  none  of  the  operations  on  the  Gulf- 
coast,  excepting  notably  those  of  the  navy  under  Farragut, 
liad  been  conducted  with  such  vigor  as  to  accomplish  re- 
sults. The  utmost  that  was  done  was  to  obtain  a  foot- 
hold at  sundry  points,  which  was  made  useful  only  to 
prevent  supplies  from  entering  the  enemy's  territory  from 
abroad,  and  the  shipment  of  cotton  in  return.  All  this 
was  of  course  helpful  to  the  Union  cause,  but  it  was 
negative  helpfulness  only. 

Towards  the  close  of  1862  Banks  had  sailed  from  New 
York  with  an  army  of  twenty  thousand  men,  and  had 
relieved  Butler  at  New  Orleans.  Some  results  were  ex- 
pected from  his  activity.     He  had  at  once 

^  .  \  Dec.  14-17. 

despatched  Grover  with  ten  thousand  men 
to  Baton  Rouge.  Banks  had,  including  the  troops  already 
at  this  station,  a  total  effective  of  thirty  thousand ;  the 
whole  force  being  consolidated  into  the  Nineteenth  army 
corps.  But  after  he  had  made  details  from  his  troops  for 
necessary  garrisons,  only  fifteen  thousand  remained  with 
which  to  operate  against  Port  Hudson,  which  was  hia 
immediate  objective.  This  force  being  deemed  insufficient 
for  direct  attack.  Banks  formed  a  plan  to  cut  off  supplies 
from  the  place  by  tapping  the  Red  river,  down  which  the 
bulk  of  them  was  received. 

The  Confederates  held  Brashear  City,  and  various 
points  alonff  the  Atchafalaya  river,  to  Alex- 

,  .  rr,  1.  .  Jan.-Feb.,  1863. 

andria.     Two   expeditions   were   sent    out, 

on-B  under  Woitzel  to  move  up  Bayou  Teche   and  one 


164  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1863. 

under    Emorj    up    the    Atchafalaja.      Both     came    to 
naught. 

Banks    himself   then    moved    to    Baton 

March. 

Eouge,  and  Grover,  with  twelve   thousand 
men,    started   for   Port   Hudson.       He   was   to   create   a 
diversion  while  Farragut  could  run  the  Port  Hudson  bat- 
teries, so  as  to  be  able  to  patrol  the  river  above  and  inter- 
cept supplies.     Farraffut  made  the  attempt 

March  14.  .  i  •  ^ 

with  seven  ships.  Owing  to  various  mis- 
haps only  two  contrived  to  pass  above,  while  the  rest, 
barring  the  Mississippi,  which  was  blown  up,  were  dis- 
abled Jiiul  fell  below.  Still  with  these  two,  Farragut  was 
able  to  blockade  the  Red  river. 

Banks  projected  a  new  expedition  along  the  Atchafalaja. 
This  time  he  was  more  successful.     The  army  moved  by 
the  railroad  west  to  Brashear  City.     Three 
days  later  Fort  Bisland  was  taken.     In  an- 
other week  we   occupied  Opelousas,  and  later,  with  Ad- 
miral Porter's  cooperation,  captured   Alex- 
andria, at  a  loss  all  told  of  not  exceeding 
six  hundred  men. 

Halleck  found  fault  with  Banks  for  pushing  his  Red 
River  schemes  in  lieu  of  cooperating  with  Grant  in  the 
reduction  of  Vickaburg.  But  Banks  was  in  the  right. 
General  Taylor  was  not  far  from  New  Orleans  in  some 
force,  and  had  not  Banks  taken  measures  to  keep  him  at  a 
distance  as  well  as  to  garrison  this  city  with  sufficient 
troops,  it  might  easily  have  fallen  into  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  This,  even  temporarily,  for  of  course  it  could 
have  been  recaptured,  would  have  been  a   sad   blow  to 


1863.]  BANKS  AND  PORT  HUDSON,  165 

Federal  prestige.  As  it  was,  no  sooner  had  Banks  left 
the  vicinity  of  New  Orleans  than  Taylor  appeared  upon 
the  ground  and  blockaded  the  river  below  Port  Hudson 
for  quite  a  period.  Not  until  the  fall  of  that  place  was 
Banks  enabled  to  get  rid  of  him. 

The  correspondence  between  Banks  and  Grant  during 
this  campaign  was  conducted  by  couriers  up  and  down  the 
river.  It  proved  very  misleading,  for  the  intervals  be- 
tween despatches  were  considerable.  Each  at  one  time 
had  reasonable  ground  to  expect  that  the  other  would  sup- 
plement iiis  efforts  in  his  own  special  task  ;  and  each  con- 
tinued to  count  upon  the  other  after  the  changed  conditions 
had  made  cooperation  impossible. 

Banks  finally  concentrated  at  Port  Hud-  23 

son,  bringing  from  the  Red  River  country 
the  divisions  of  Grover,  Emory,  and  Weitzel,  and  passing 
around  the  city  by  the  north,  while  Augur  and  T.  W. 
Sherman  moved  up  from  Baton  Rouge.  The  works 
were  strong  and  ably  defended.  Gardner  had  recently 
been  in  command  of  some  seventeen  thousand  men,  but 
Pemberton,  in  whose  department  he  was,  had  withdrawn 
reinforcements  and  left  him  only  four  thousand  effectives. 
Indeed,  at  the  moment  Banks  completed  his  investment, 
Johnston  had  ordered  Gardner  to  evacuate  the  place,  in- 
tending that  he  should  reinforce  his  own  command  at 
Jackson. 

No    sooner   on    the    ground   than    Banks 

May  27.   ^ 

orders  an  assault  all  along  the  line.     But, 

despite   good  conduct,  failure  results.      The   loss    is  two 

thousand  men. 


166  BIRD8-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1803. 

A   second  assault  has  no  better  fortune. 

But  the  issue  in  gaining  an  advanced  line 

may  have  heen  worth  the  further  loss  of  eighteen  hundred 

men.     The  investment  is  continued,  and  the  monotony  of 

regular  siege  operations  is  the  order  of  the  day. 

In  this  condition  matters  remain  for  a  month.     News  of 

he  surrender  of  Yicksburg  comes  to  hand,  and  Gardner 

capitulates,  on  similar  terms,  with  a  large 

number  of  prisoners. 

The   loss   ^  y   sickness   had   been   enormous,   exceeding 

vastly   the   casualties  of    the  siege.      The   army  left    to 

General   Banks   after  the  surrender   mustered   barely  one 

third  "for  duty"  which   had   appeared  on   the   rolls   two 

months  before. 

Just  prior  to  the  surrender  of  Port  Hudson,  Confeder- 
ate General  Holmes,  with  nine  thousand  troops,  arrived 
before  Helena,  Ark.,  held  by  Prentiss  with  half  the  num- 
ber.    Holmes   trusted  to   capture  the  ffar- 

July  4.  . 

rison    and  to   erect    a   new   citadel  there. 

But  his  project  came  to  naught,  with  a  loss  of  nearly  two 

thousand  men. 

Very  shortly  after  this  event  the  steamer 

Imperial  from   St.    Louis  arrived   at  New 

Orleans,  with  a  load  of  freight.     The  Great  River  could  be 

said  to  be  fairly  emancipated  from  its  bonds. 

During  the  remainder  of  the  war  only  partisan  hostilities 

nrere  waged  upon  the  Mississippi. 


XXXII. 

SPARRING  FOR  A  HOLD.  — MINE  RUN. 

LEE  retired  from  his  defeat  at  Gettysburg,  by  way  of 
the  Shenandoah  Valley.     Meade  crossed  the  Poto 
mac  and  marched  along  the  route  followed 

July  17-18. 

by  McClellan  in  1862,  east  of  the  Blue 
Ridge.  The  pursuit  was  begun  late,  but  once  afoot  it  was 
expeditious  enough  to  have  enabled  Meade  to  strike  Lee's 
flank  by  debouching  through  Manassas  Gap.  This  he  at- 
tempted to  do,  but,  owing  to  the  delay  of  French's  corps, 
the  opportunity  was  lost.  Lee  retired  to  Culpeper. 
Meade  advanced  to  the  line  of  the  Rappahannock. 

Not  anticipating  any  immediate  demonstration  by  Meade, 
Lee  sent  Longstreet  to  help  out  Bragg,  who  apparently  was 
overmatched  by  Rosecrans  in  Tennessee.  Meade,  however, 
was  preparing  for  an  active  campaign,  and  shortly  put  the 
army  across  the  Rappahannock.  But  the  battle  of  Chicka- 
mauga,  in  which  Bragg  turned  the  tables  on  Rosecrans, 
alarmed  the  War  Department,  and  Hooker  with  the  Elev- 
enth and  Twelfth  corps  was  taken  from  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  and  hurried  out  to  Chattanooga.  Meade  was 
thus  reduced  to  the  strict  defensive. 

Overestimating  Meade's  depletion,  Lee  resolved  to  try 

167 


168  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1863. 

on  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  a  manoeuvre  similar  to  the  one 

practised  on  Pope  the  year  before,  and  to  seize  the  Orange 

and  Alexandria  Railroad    in  its  rear.     He 

October  9.  ,         .  ,        , 

accordingly  put  across  the  river  by  the  up- 
per fords.     So  soon  as  Meade  fully  learned 
October  11.        ^  .  '' 

this  fact,  he  in  turn  withdrew   across   the 

Rappahannock. 

In  lieu  of  retreat,  by  a  bold  stroke  Meade  might  have 
fallen  upon  Lee's  rear,  and  thus  have  caught  him  in  the 
execution  of  his  manosuvre,  —  a  moment  always  critical, 
because  the  troops  are  not  so  well  in  hand.  But  Meade 
was  a  sound  rather  than  a  bold  soldier;  he  deemed  it 
best  to  retire.  Upon  which,  and  not  until  then,  Lee 
forged  rapidly  ahead,  feeling  safe  for  his  own  communi- 
cations.    He  had  won  a  point. 

Meade  assumed  that  Lee  had  abandoned  his  purpose  and 
was  still  at  Culpeper.  Anxious  to  bring  him  to  a  general 
engagement  if  he  could  force  it  upon  favorable  ground,  the 
Army  of  the  Potomac  was  again  put  across  the  Rappahan- 
nock. But  no  sooner  over  than  the  appearance  of  Stuart 
on  his  right  laid  bare  the  facts,  and  he  promptly  retraced 
his  steps. 

Now  follows  a  race  for  the  possession  of  the  Orange  and 
Alexandria  Railroad.  Lee  aims  for  Bristoe  Station.  He 
has  the  longer  road,  but  also  the  clearer  purpose.  Meade, 
not  understanding  his  intention,  must  divine  if  he  would 
anticipate  it. 

Warren  acts  as  rear  guard.  Meade  reaches  and  passes 
Bristoe  en  route  to  Centreville.  Warren  arrives  there 
only  to  find  himself  alone  in  presence  of  Lee's  entire  force. 


1863.]  SPARRING  FOR  A  HOLD.  169 

As  the  boldest  is  often  the  best  means  of  extricating  one's 
Belf  from  peril,  he  smartly  attacks  Hill,  who  is  in  his  im- 
mediate front.     A  brilliant  combat   results 

.  October  14. 

in  Warren's   favor.     Under  cover   of    this 
demonstration  he  retires  in  safety  to  join  the  army. 

Meade  is  now  too  strongly  posted  at  Centreville  for  Lee 
to  push  him  further.  The  Confederate  chieftain's  efforts 
have  been  foiled.  But  throwing  out  a  curtain  of  troops 
along  Bull  Run  he  destroys  the  railroad  south  from  that 
point  and  leisurely  retires.     Meade  follows, 

.  1  -r»       1  .  1       -r.  October  18. 

repairing  as  he  goes.      Keachmg  the  Eap- 

pahannock,  he  crosses,  after  being  obliged  to  force  the  pas- 
sage.   Lee  at  once  puts  the  Rapidan  between 

November  7. 

himself  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

This  unsatisfactory  manoeuvring  served  to  demonstrate 
that  if  Meade  was  not  always  ready  to  take  advantage  of 
Lee's  openings,  neither  could  Lee  make  him  lose  his  head, 
as  he  had  done  Pope. 

The  country  still  demanded  action.  Meade  appreciated 
the  fact  and  sought  opportunity  again  to  try  conclusions 
with  Lee.  The  latter  had  put  his  troops  into  cantonments 
for  the  winter  over  a  considerable  area  of  country.  A 
number  of  the  lower  fords  of  the  Rapidan  were  left 
open,  but  Lee  had  defended  his  right  flank  by  a  line  of 
intrenchments  facing  Mine  Run,  at  right  angles  to  that 
river. 

Meade  deems  it  possible  to  turn  this  position,  and 
seriously  cripple  Lee  in  detail  by  a  sudden  blow  before  he 
can  call  in  his  scattered  forces.  Time  and  distance  are 
'iarefuUy  computed.     The  Army  of  the  Potomac  is  to  cut 


170 


BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL   WAR, 


[1853. 


loose    from    its  base    with    ten  days'   rations   for  a    flying 
campaign.     The  several  corps  are  simultaneously  to  cross 

at   the    various 
^^'  fords.     The 

strict  execution 
of  marching 
orders  seems  to 
promise  suc- 
cess. But  suc- 
cess can  be 
compassed  by 
nothing  short 
of    minute    ac- 


Mine  Run.    November  26-30,  1863. 


curacy. 
It    is 


never 


well  to  risk  too  much  upon  mathematical  compliance 
with  the  order  of  march.  In  an  ancient  country, 
where  turnpikes  and  bridges  provide  easy  marching, 
such  calculations  may  be  made.  On  such  terrain  as 
was  covered  by  our  campaigns,  abundant  leeway  was 
always  essential.  Here,  however,  the  estimates  appear 
liberal,  and  the  movement  is  simple. 

But*  again   French   is    at   fault.      He   is 

November  26. 

three  hours  late.  And  the  pontoon  train 
has  been  prepared  without  accurately  estimating  the  depth 
of  the  stream.  From  the  start  ill-luck  attends  a  well- 
conceived  plan. 

Lee  catches  the  alarm,  and  hastily  concentrates.  Meade 
gets  into  position  two  days  later  than  he 
calculated  to  do.     The  army  is  not   ready 


I8tt».]  SPARRING  FOR  A  HOLD,  171 

for  attack  till  the  fourth  day.     Lee  has  made  his  position 
impregnable. 

Recognizing  failure,  Meade  ruefully  withdraws.  Each 
army  resumes  its  old  location^  and  the  troops  go  into 
winter  quarters. 


XXXIII. 

ROSECRANS  MOVES  UPON  BRAGG. 

"T~nOR  full   six  months   the  Army  of  the   Cumberland 

JL      lay    quietly    in    and    near    Murfreesborough,    still 

facing  Bragg.     None  but  minor  operations 

anuaiy  were  undertaken.     An  occasional  raid  was 

July,  lobo, 

made  by  the  cavalry  of  either  combatant. 
The  Union  horse,  under  Stanley,  had  begun  to  give  a 
better  account  of  itself  than  heretofore. 

Among  other  such  operations  was  one  by  Forrest  and 

Wheeler  against  Fort  Donelson  in  which 
Feb.  3.  .    . 

these  brilliant  troopers  came  nigh  to  snatch- 
ing a  marked  success,  but  as  the  event  turned,  suffered 
defeat.  And  the  most  remarkable  cavalry  raid  of  the 
war  was  undertaken  during  the  early  summer  of  this  year 
by  J.  H.  Morgan,  the  Confederate  partisan.  With  some 
three  to  four  thousand  mounted  men  this  officer  ranged  at 
large  through  the  States  of  Kentucky,  Indiana,  and  Ohio, 

for  about  a  month,  destroying  and  capturing 
July  26        property  wholesale.    He  was  finally  corralled 

and   taken   prisoner  with  his   whole   force. 

The  consternation  of  the  districts  through  which  he  rode 

was  beyond  anything  which  occurred  in  the  North,  except 

during  the  Gettysburg  campaign. 
172 


1863.]  ROSELRANS  MOVES   UPON  BRAGG.  173 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  was  in  good  condition  to 
take  the  field.  Halleck  had  been  urging  Rosecrans  to  open 
the  campaign.  The  latter  in  turn  advised  that  "two  great 
and  decisive  battles  should  not  be  risked  at  the  same  time," 
meaning  by  Grant's  army  on  the  Mississippi  and  by  his 
own.  This  was  scarcely  a  fair  interpretation  of  a  maxim 
often  applicable  to  the  operations  of  a  single  body  of 
troops. 

Grant  was  particularly  anxious  to  have  Rosecjans  attack 
Bragg  so  as  to  prevent  his  detaching  reinforcements  to 
Vicksburg.  Rosecrans,  however,  insisted  that  the  sounder 
policy  was  merely  to  threaten  Bragg.  He  was  positive 
that  this  course  would  retain  him  in  force  in  his  own  front. 
Bragg  pursued  the  same  policy.  Each  appeared  to  dread 
the  struggle  which  sooner  or  later  must  come. 

Towards  midsummer  Rosecrans  was  finally 
constramed  to  move  upon  the  enemy.  He 
had  seventy  thousand  men  ;  Bragg  lay  at  Shelbyville  with 
some  forty-seven  thousand.  Rosecrans  feinted  with  his 
right  against  Bragg's  position,  in  front  of  which  some  con- 
siderable skirmishing  was  done,  to  enable  Thomas,  whose 
route  lay  through  Hoover's  Gap,  to  move  upon  Manchester 
and  thus  turn  Bragg's  right.  On  Thomas'  arrival  at  Man- 
chester, after  tedious  marching  over  heavy  roads,  Bragg, 
who  had  been  watching  his  front  and  had  forgotten  his 
flanks,  was  obliged  hurriedly  to  retire  from  his  well-fortified 
works    at   Shelbyville.     Hereupon   Thomas 

11  -.   T-*  ,       .    1  .  June  28. 

again  marched  around  rJragg  s  right,  cutting 

his  communications  at  Decherd,  and  the  Con- 
June  30. 
federate  found  that  it  would  be  prudent  to 


174  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL  WAR.         [1863. 

evacuate  TuUahoma,  which  had   been  his   depot  of  eup- 
pHes,  and  move  his  head-quarters  to  Chat> 

July  7. 

tanooga. 

The  casualties  in  this  short  campaign,  in  which  Rose- 
crans  fairly  manoeuvred  Bragg  out  of  positions  which  might 
have  cost  great  loss  by  direct  assault,  were  not  much  over 
fi^^e  hundred  men.  The  operation  had  been  skilfully 
conducted  and  reflects  credit  upon  the  commanding  general^ 
as  weU  as  upon  Thomas,  whose  pertinent  advice  and  stanch 
methods  always  figured  as  an  important  factor  in  the 
success  of  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

Durmg  the  summer  Burnside,  with  the  forces  which  were 
now  called  the  Army  of  the  Ohio,  had  advanced  from  Ken- 
tucky across  the  mountains  into  the  Valley 

August.  n    T^  m  -r*        1 

of  East  Tennessee.     Buckner  was  m  com- 
mand of  this  Valley,  but  retired  towards  Bragg  on  the 
approach  of  Burnside,  who  thereupon   oc- 

September  2.  ... 

cupied  Knoxvule.  He  was  now  m  position 
to  afford  protection  to  the  left  of  the  forces  operating 
against  Chattanooga,  and  his  position  cut  Lee  off"  from  his 
easiest  route  to  the  Western  armies. 

Rosecrans  had  before  him  the  task  of  flanking  Bragg  out 
of  Chattanooga.  A  glance  at  the  map  will  show  the  im- 
possibility of  taking  the  city  from  the  front  short  of  a  pro- 
tracted siege.  An  attempt  to  turn  Bragg's  right  would 
necessitate  a  long  and  tedious  march  away  from  our  railroad 
communications,  and  through  a  country  beset  with  diffi- 
culties. He  would  have  to  move  some  seventy-five  miles 
up  the  Tennessee  river  before  he  could  cross.  This  was, 
however,  the  way  Bragg  expected  the  attack,  on  account  of 


1863.] 


ROSECRANS  MOVES   JIPOIT  BRAGG. 


175 


Burnslde's  presence  at  Knoxville.     And  it  was  on  cogent 

grounds  that  he  assumed  that  Rosecrans  would  attempt  to  join 

those  forces  to  his  own  before  attacking  him  in  his  stronghold. 
But  Rosecrans  was  planning  a  different  manoeuvre.     He 

guessed  that  Bragg  would  count  on  his  moving  by  his  left, 

and  knew  that  _^     ,, 

to     do     what  y^r^r 

your      enemy 

does  not  ex- 
pect is  to  half 

accomplish 

your  purpose. 

He    proposed 

to  himself  to 
cross  the  Ten- 
nessee west  of 
Chattanooga, 
pass  the  moun- 
tain ranges 
below  the  city, 
and  take 
Bragg  in  re- 
verse from  an  unexpected  quarter. 

This  was  no  easy  problem.  He  had  before  him  a  wide 
river  and  several  parallel  ranges  of  rugged  mountains 
traversed  only  by  the  roughest  of  roads.  He  was  provided 
with  poor  transportation.  Yet  he  must  calculate  on  forag- 
ing his  beasts,  and  feeding  his  men  for  at  least  three  weeks, 
and  must  provide  ammunition  for  several  encounters,  if  not 
one  or  more  pitched  battles. 


Rosecrans'  Manoeuvpe.  Aug.  20-Sep,  1 7,  '63. 


176  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR.  [1863. 

Still  this  seemed  to  him,  all  things  considered,  the  prefer- 
able route.  He  accordingly  sent  Crittenden 
with  the  left  wing  up  the  Sequatchie  Valley 
to  make  a  demonstration  on  Bragg's  right,  to  confirm  the 
latter  in  his  theory  that  this  was  the  real  point  of  attack, 
while  himself  with  Thomas  and  McCook  made  ready  to  march 
towards  the  most  available  crossing-places  of  the  Tennessee 
near  Bridgeport.  He  was  about  to  place  himself  in  the 
enemy's  country,  with  insecure  means  of  retreat  in  case  of 
disaster,  insufficient  supplies,  and  a  treacherous  knowledge 
of  the  terrain;  while  the  conditions  prescribed  a  march  in 
several  columns.     A  bold  but  hardly  a  prudent  scheme. 

Bragg  had  just  been  reinforced  from  Mississippi,  and 

expected  Longstreet  from  Virginia.     He  was  quite  intent 

on  watching  Crittenden's  movement  toward  his  right. 

Rosecrans  was  unopposed  in  crossing  the 
September  4. 

Tennessee,  and  m  putting  Thomas  and  Mc- 
Cook over  the  Raccoon  range  into  Lookout  Valley.  There 
being  but  three  practicable  wagon  roads,  he  ordered  Thomas 
by  way  of  Trenton  over  Lookout  Mountain  and  Missionary 
Ridge  into  McLemore's  Cove,  while  McCook  moved  byway 
of  Valley  Head  into  the  open  country  beyond  Lookout 
Mountain,   and  south  of  Chattanooga. 

This  eccentric  route  separated  McCook  by  nearly  three 
days'  march  from  Thomas.  Crittenden,  meanwhile,  had 
returned  and  had  followed  Thomas  across  the  river. 

On  reaching  Alpine,  McCook  threw  out  a  reconnoitring 
party,  but  without  encountering  the  enemy 

September  10.      .  i     n  >r   i->(      i      n^i 

m  force,  io  reach  McCook,  ihomas  must 
pass  through  one  of  the  gaps  in  Pigeon   Mountain.     In 


1863.]  ROSECRANS  MOVES   UPON  BRAOO.  177 

attempting  Dug  Gap  his  van  was  attacked,  and  he  drew 
back,  as  he  must  force  the  defile  in  order  to  advance,  — 
always   a  delicate  operation,  —  and  was  in 

''  ^  September  11. 

the  dark  as  to  McCook's  whereabouts. 

So  soon  as  Thomas  and  McCook  had  reached  Lookout 
Valley,  Bragg  had  seen  the  necessity  of  evacuating  Chatta- 
nooga. Hereupon  Crittenden  moved  up  the  river,  took 
possession  of  the  town,  and  advanced  twelve  miles  south  to 
Gordon's  Mills.  But  the  situation  was  scarcely  bettered. 
Rosecrans'  army  was  still  divided  into  three  parts,  each 
separated  from  the  others  by  a  serious  distance  in  the 
presence  of  the  enemy. 

From  Chattanooga  Bragg  had  moved  to  LaFayette  from 
whence  he  at  once  sent  out  detachments  to  hold  the 
Pigeon  Mountain  Gaps.  It  was  one  of  these  which 
Thomas'  head  of  column  had  encountered. 

Rosecrans'  position  was  perilous  in  the  extreme ;  Bragg 
was  afterwards  severely  blamed  by  many  for  not  taking 
summary  advantage  of  it.  But  the  game  of  war  is  not 
based  on  mathematical  exactness.  What  appears  feasible 
on  paper  is  often  far  from  practicable  in  the  field.  Nor 
are  all  good  soldiers  great  strategists.  The  heavy  work  of 
the  world  has  to  be  done  by  the  average  abilities.  And 
even  brilliant  genius  does  not  always  compass  the  most 
useful  ends.     Li  medio  tutissimus. 

The  lack  of  maps  and  his  unfamiliarity  with  the  country 
was  Rosecrans'  only  excuse  for  having  placed  himself  in 
Buch  jeopardy.     He  had  got  his  right  wing 

°     September  14. 

separated  from  his  centre  by  three  marches, 

and  these  through  a  long  and  dangerous  defile.     His  left 


178  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1863. 

was  equally  distant  from  the  centre.  Thomas  could  not 
go  to  either  wing  without  endangering  the  other.  He 
must  wait  for  each  of  them  to  rally  upon  him.  If  Bragg 
could  but  overwhelm  Thomas  singly,  he  could  at  once 
turn  upon  Crittenden  with  good  assurance  of  crushing  him, 
and  still  have  ample  time  to  retrace  his  steps  and  to  cut 
McCook  off  from  retreat  across  the  river. 

To  have  done  this  would  have  stamped  Bragg  as  the 
equal  of  Lee.  And  while  McCook  or  Crittenden  would 
have  stood  a  sorry  chance  against  Bragg  single-handed,  it 
is  much  easier  to  talk  of  crushing  Thomas  than  it  ever 
proved  to  do  it.  If  Bragg  had  undertaken  this  operation, 
so  obvious  to  his  critics,  he  might  have  fallen  far  short  of 
its  performance.  Though  indeed  it  was  the  thing  to  attempt, 
for  any  action  would  have  compromised  Rosecrans  still  fur- 
ther. But  Bragg  did  not  act,  and  Rosecrans  escaped  from 
his  peril. 

By  a  long  and  arduous  march,  McCook  joined  Thomas, 

and  Crittenden  soon  after  came  within  hail. 

Bragg   must  now  fight   the   Army   of    the 

Cumberland  as^one  body. 

The  position  of  Rosecrans  lies  facing  Chick- 
September  18.  r^       ^     n  •        •  i 

amauga  Creek  from  a  point  m  advance  or 
Rossville  Gap  in  Missionary  Ridge,  through  which  passes 
the  road  to  Chattanooga,  southerly  past  Gordon's  Mill  tow- 
ards Dug  Gap.  He  has  finally  manoeuvred  himself  in  front 
of  the  captured  city.  But  he  must  fight  for  its  preserva- 
tion.    And  Bragg  proposes  to  make  him  fight  au  fond. 


xxxiy. 

CHICKAMAUGA. 

LONGSTREET  is  now  approaching  the  field.  Bragg 
marshals  his  forces  on  the  east  bank  of  Chickamauga 
Creek.  His  purpose  is  to  cross  on  the  morrow,  crush  our 
left,  seize  the  Rossville  road,  and  thus  cut  us  off  from  both 
retreat  and  Chattanooga.  But  Thomas  has  anticipated  this 
probability  and  firmly  covers  Rossville.  Rosecrans  awaits 
attack. 

Braojor  crosses  Chickamauga  Creek  a  day 

r        .  ,    ,  .    n..  rJ^^  September  19. 

later  than  intended,  and  falls  upon  Thomas, 
whom  circumstances  have  placed  in  control  of  the  left  of 
the  army.  The  fighting  is  stubborn,  and  during  the  day 
Thomas  is  somewhat  thrust  back ;  but  by  nightfall  he  re- 
gains his  old  position.  Bragg's  tactics  have  now  become 
quite  intelligible  to  him,  and  he  re-forms  during  the  night 
in  such  wise  as  to  protect  more  securely  the  Rossville  road, 
the  enemy's  evident  goal. 

Next  day  Polk  commands  on  the  enemy's  right,  Long- 
street  on  the  left.      In  the  forenoon  Polk 

mi  1  -1  •  September  20. 

forces  the  fighting.     Thomas  exhibits  a  stay- 
ing quality  of  the  highest  order,  and  though  repeatedly  thrust 
hfSLck,  shows  no  symptom  of  weakening.      Towards  midday 

179 


180 


BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR. 


[186a 


a  serious  breach  is  made  in  our  line  on  the  right  of  the 
centre,  by  the  removal  of  Wood's  division,  through  mis- 
taken orders.     Into  this  cleft  quickly  pours  a  stream  of 


«OSSVILUt 


Chickamauga.    September  19-20,  1863. 


Southern  regiments.  The  right  under  McCook  is  isolated, 
taken  in  reverse  and,  as  at  Murfreesborough,  speedily  hud- 
dled into  shapeless  masses. 

'  The    absence  of  the  instinct  of  command  is  apparent. 
Thomas'   flank   is    completely   turned.       The   fate   of  the 


1863.]  CHICKAMAUGA.  181 

battle  hangs  by  a  hair.     No  aid  can  now  come  from  the 
right.     Thomas  re-forms  by  a  retrograde  movement  upon 
Horse  Shoe  Ridge.     Granger's  divisions  advance   oppor- 
tunely from  Rossville  Gap,  which  Longstreet  might  have 
seized,  thus  forces  the  latter  back,  and  occupies  a  ridge 
on   Thomas'  right.     Ammunition    is   getting   low.     Cold 
steel  is  used.     The  enemy  is  unremitting  in  his  blows  : 
his  onslaught  is  redolent  of  success.     As  at  Stone's  River, 
everything  seems  lost.     The  entire  right  of  the  army,  with 
Rosecrans  and  his  staff,  is  driven  from  the  field  in  utter 
rout.     But,  unknown  even  to  the  commanding  general, 
Thomas,  the  Rock  of  Chickamauga,  stands  there  at  bay, 
surrounded,  facing  two  to  one.     Heedless  of  the  wreck  of 
one-half  the  army,  he  knows  not  how  to  yield.     No  more 
splendid  spectacle  appears  in  the  annals  of  war  than  this 
heroic  stand  of  Thomas  in  the  midst  of  a  routed  army, 
and  in  the  face  of  an  enemy  the  power  of  whose  blows  is 
doubled  by  the  exultation  of  victory.     Slowly  riding  up 
and  down  the  lines,  with  unruffled  countenance  and  cheery 
word,  it  is  his  own  invincible  soul  which  inspires  his  men 
for  the  work  they  have  to  do.     It  is  on  his  courage  that 
every  soldier  leans. 

Rosecrans'  frantic  efforts  to  rally  the  right  are  wasted. 
The  rout  is  complete,  disgraceful.  The  panic-stricken  regi- 
ments pour  by,  heedless  of  entreaty  or  command.  Reaching 
Rossville,  in  the  belief  that  Thomas  too  has  been  routed, 
Rosecrans  sends  Garfield,  his  chief  of  staff,  to  hunt 
him  up  and  bid  him  to  protect  the  rear  with  whatever 
force  he  can  collect.  He  himself  rides  back  to  Chatta- 
nooga,   thinking   there   to    rally   and   re-form   his    troops 


182  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [1863. 

to  meet  the  pursuing  foe.     Unhappy  day  for  Rosecrans' 
fame  I 

Night  supervened.  Bragg  had  torn  his  columns  into  use- 
less shreds  by  dashing  them  against  immovable  Thomas. 
Nor  was  he  able  to  follow  Thomas  up,  when,  with  broken 
but  undaunted  ranks,  this  silent  hero  led  back  his  men  to 
Rossville.  Here  he  re-formed  at  his  leisure.  And  before 
morning  he  was  joined,  after  a  weary  circuit  over  the  hills, 
by  Sheridan,  who  had  been  cut  off  in  Rosecrans'  disordered 
retreat,  but  who  had  kept  his  troops  together,  and  was  still 
in  condition  and  temper  to  do  efficient  service. 

Next  day  Brasjff  could  do  no  more  than 
Sept.2L  ^  J  SB 

observe  our   movements    with   nis   cavalry, 

Sept.  22.  .  .  "^ 

and  thirty-six  hours  later,  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  was  concentrated  at  Chattanooga,  and  in  fair 
shape  for  service. 

Rosecrans  had  been  badly  worsted  on  the  field  of  battle. 
Chickamauga  was  one  of  the  direst  mishaps  of  the  war. 
But  the  result  of  the  campaign  was  that  he  had  manoeuvred 
Bragg  out  of  his  key-position,  and  Thomas'  stanch  de- 
fense had  so  weakened  him  that  he  could  not,  for  some  time 
at  least,  undertake  the  offensive.  On  the  other  hand,  Bragg 
bad  practically  got  Rosecrans  cooped  up  in  Chattanooga. 
Honors  were  easy  between  them. 

Rosecrans  ascribed  his  unfortunate  division  of  forces  to. 
the  failure  of  his  subordinates  to  obey  orders.  Both  Mc- 
Cook  and  Crittenden  were  relieved  from  command  till  a 
Court  of  Inquiry  could  make  disposition  of  their  cases. 

In  this  bloody  battle,  the  Army  of  the  Cumberland  lost 
sixteen  thousand  out  of  sixty-two  thousand  men   on  the 


1863.]  CHICKAMAUOA.  183 

field,  thirty-six  guns  and  much  material.  Bragg's  loss 
was  over  eighteen  thousand  out  of  a  considerably  larger 
effective. 

There  is  no  doubt  much  difference  of  opinion  as  to  Rose- 
crans'  ability.  He  also  belongs  to  that  large  number  of 
excellent  generals  upon  whom  Fortune  did  not  smile. 
Without  being  a  great  soldier,  he  possessed  many  of  the 
qualities  of  one.  He  was  tried  in  the  balance  and  found 
wanting.  But  was  the  balance  itself  true  ?  "  It  was  inev- 
itable that  the  first  leaders  should  be  sacrificed  to  the  na- 
tion's ignorance  of  war."  At  that  time  our  public  would 
not  exhibit  the  patience  which  became  necessary  in  after 
days  if  success  was  to  be  enticed,  to  our  banners. 

The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  in  Chattanooga  was  really 
in  a  state  of  siege.  The  Confederate  Army  held  the  south 
bank  of  the  Tennessee,  and  from  the  end  of  the  railroad 
which  supplied  our  troops,  at  Bridgeport,  around  the  long 
bend  here  made  by  the  river,  was  a  haul  of  sixty  miles. 
This  distance  was  over  roads  axle-deep  in  mud,  and  daily 
liable  to  interruption  by  cavalry  raids.  Rations  began 
speedily  to  fall  short.     The  situation  was  grave. 

Under  these  circumstances,  the  arrival  of  Hooker  with 
fifteen  thousand  men  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was 
by  no  means  an  unmixed  gain  ;  but  Rosecrans  soon  found 
use  for  his  corps  in  an  operation  designed  to  open  commu  • 
nications  across  the  loop  of  the  river,  via  Brown's  Fciry. 


T 


XXXV. 

THE    BATTLE    OF    CHATTANOOGA. 

HE  Departments  of  the  Ohio   and  the  Cumberland 
were  now  merged  into  the  Military  Division  of  the 
Mississippi    under   Grant.     Rosecrans    was 

Oct  16-20. 

relieved  and  Thomas  became  commander  of 
the  Army  of  the  Cumberland. 

The   advantage  of  opening  the  Brown's 

October  27.       ^  ,  .7.  -,        .  ,        , 

Ferry  road   was     manifest,    and  with    the 

cooperation   of  Hooker,  the  left  bank  of  the  Tennessee 

opposite  Bridgeport  was  seized  by  a  coup  de  main,  and 

his   command,    consisting   of   the  Eleventh   and  Twelfth 

corps,  was  posted  on  the  spot. 

The  enemy  had  been  unable  to  interrupt  the  movement, 

though  made  under  his  very  eyes;   but  loth  to  have  the 

city  so  easily  revictualled,  Lono^street  got 
Oct.  2a-29.  \        ,.    -^  ^  .1    ,  TT     1        . 

together  his  troops  and  assailed  Jblooker  in 

force.     He  must  be  driven  from  his  ground,  or  starvation 

in  Chattanooga  would  no  longer  be  the  Confederates'  ally. 

A  short  and  sharp  action  at  Wauhatchie  ensued ;  Hooker 

Irove  Longstreet  back;   the  road  was   finished,  and  the 

siege  of  Chattanooga  was  raised. 

Bragg  now  despatched  Longstreet  into  East  Tennessee 
184 


1863.J  BATTLE  OF  CHATTANOOGA.  185 

to  dispose  of  Burnside,  who  was  still  in  the  vicinity  of 
Knoxville,  where  he  was  a  constant  threat  to  Bragg's  right. 
Grant  ordered  Sherman  to  join  him  at  Chattanooga  with 
the  Fifteenth  army  corps.  The  other  three  corps  of  the 
Wmy  which  captured  Vicksburg  remained  on  the  Missis- 
Jsippi.  While  his  enemy's  forces  were  depleted  was  the  time 
for  Grant  to  push  home  with  his  sixty  thousand  men. 

How  to  drive  Bragg's  army  from  our  front  was  the  im- 
mediate problem  before  him,  and  Grant's  restless  activity 
would  not  allow  him  to  sit  down  and  wait. 

Bragg's  right  lay  substantially  along  Missionary  Ridge, 
its  advance  strongly  entrenched  at  Tunnel  Hill ;  his  centre 
across  Chattanooga  Valley;  his  left  holding  the  supposed 
inaccessible  heights  of  Lookout  Mountain.  In  whichever 
direction  the  eye  was  cast  formidable  defenses  had  to  be 
pierced,  and  these  were  manned  by  forty  thousand  muskets. 

The  battles  of  Chattanooga,  Lookout  Mountain,  and 
Missionary  Ridge,  which  shortly  came  about,  may  be  con- 
sidered as  parts  of  one  single  engagement,  having  for  object 
to  drive  Bragg  from  the  position  he  had  chosen.  The  plan 
of  action  was  as  follows :  Sherman  was  to  move  up  the 
river  on  the  north  side  with  four  divisions,  cross  near  the 
mouth  of  Chickamauga  Creek,  under  cover  of  artillery,  on 
a  pontoon-bridge  to  be  thrown  for  the  purpose,  attack  and 
capture  the  north  end  of  Mission  Ridge,  and  advance  along 
it.  Thomas  was  to  concentrate  in  Chattanooga  Valley  and 
feel  the  enemy  strongly  to  hold  him  there  in  force ;  while 
Hooker's  share  was  to  patrol  Lookout  Valley  and  make  a 
diversion  to  assist  Sherman.  For  on  the  latter  Grant  sup- 
posed the  main  task  was  to  fall  and  desired  that  it  should. 


186 


BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL   WAR. 


[1863. 


Knowing  Sherman's  method  better  than  that  of  his 
newer  lieutenants,  Grant  felt  that  he  could  rely  on  the 
work  being  done  as  it  should  be  if   entrusted  to  him. 


t»»*^ 


SSEC 


iJ 


'z  c 


i<'-L 


%■■  3i*.-K:  ^ 


ilS"' 


r  ^ 


J 


Chattanooga.    November  23,  24,  26,  1863. 


November  24. 


Some  delay  occurred  in  Sherman's  crossing,  but  two  days 
later  than  ordered  he  put  over  his  command 
and  drove  the  enemy  from  the  north  end  of 
the  ridge.  The  entire  range  had  been  supposed  to  be  con- 
tinuous ;  but  Sherman  found  a  deep  gap  which  must  be 


1863.]  BATTLE  OF  CHATTANOOGA.  187 

passed  before  he  could  arrive  at  Tunnel  Hill,  and  his  pur- 
pose was  summarily  arrested  by  this  unexpected  physical 
obstacle,  of  which  the  enemy  had  taken  full  advantage  for 
defense. 

Meanwhile  Thomas  makes  a  reconnoissance  in  force  in 
the  Valley,  which  develops  the  enemy  in  his  front,  and  suc- 
ceeds in  advancing  his  line  some  distance,  while  Hooker 
pushes  round  the  end  of  Lookout  Mountain 

*■  November  24. 

and  fights  his   eccentric  Battle   above  the 
Clouds,  driving  the  enemy  from  every  position.     Next  day 
Hooker  operates  towards  Rossville  on  Bragg's  left,  while 
Sherman  makes  another  heavy  onslaught  on  the  enemy  in 
his  front.     Beinff  met  with  stubborn  oppo-    ^        ,     „^ 

°  ^^  November  25. 

sition  from  Hardee's  troops,  Thomas  is  or- 
dered to   attack   seriously   all  along   the  defenses   in  his 
front. 

This  attack  is  meant  by  Grant  to  be  merely  in  the  na^ 
ture  of  a  diversion  to  lighten  Sherman's  task.  But  the 
Army  of  the  Cumberland,  eager  to  show  that  lack  of  stom- 
ach did  not  lose  the  fight  of  Chickamauga,  as  well  as  jeal- 
ous of  the  glory  to  be  won,  assails  the  field-works  at  the 
foot  of  Mission  Ridge  and  captures  them  at  the  point  of 
the  bayonet.  Breckenridge  is  quite  unable  to  hold  head 
against  them.  After  which  triumph,  the  troops,  emulating 
each  other's  ardor,  and  without  orders,  press  gallantly  on 
up  the  ridge  in  full  view  of  both  armies,  with  deafening 
cheers,  heedless  of  the  deadly  fire  belched  into  their  very 
faces,  and  overrun  the  works  at  the  summit  like  a  torrent, 
capturing  thirty-five  guns  and  prisoners  wholesale.  It  has 
all  been  the  work  of  an   hour,  and  so  completely  has  it 


188  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1863 

flanked  the  line  opposing  Sherman,  that  he  is  at  once  re- 
lieved of  opposition. 

In  this  triple  action  Sherman's  loss  was  fifteen  hundred ; 
Thomas'  nearly  four  thousand ;  Hooker's  not  great.  Bragg, 
thus  worsted  at  every  point,  found  it  necessary  to  withdraw 
to  Ringgold  with  a  loss  of  sixty-six  hundred  men. 

Granger,  with  fifteen  thousand  men,  was  now  sent  to 

Burnside's  assistance.    Longstreet  was  besieging  the  Army 

of  the  Ohio  in  Knoxville,  and  had  made  a  very  heavy 

assault  on  the  place.     Alarming  reports  com- 

November29.  n  ^  •  n 

mg  from  thence,  especially  as  to  the  want 
of  provisions,  Sherman  was  also  despatched  to  his  aid.  But 
as  Longstreet  retired  towards  Virginia  on  his  approach, 
Sherman  shortly  returned  to  Chattanooga.  He  had  not 
found  Burnside  in  so  great  a  strait  as  reported. 

During  the  succeeding  winter  months  minor  operations 
alone  were  undertaken. 

Early   next   year  Schofield  succeeded  to 

February,  1864. 

the  command  of  the  Army  of  the  Ohio. 
Transportation  being  difficult,  the  troops  had  sufiered  bit- 
terly from  lack  of  victuals  during  the  winter.  As  spring 
approached  Longstreet  was  withdrawn  to  the  more  im- 
portant field  of  operations  in  Virginia,  and  Schofield  became 
free  to  join  Sherman. 

That  beau  sabreur,  Forrest,  about  these 

March,  1864. 

days  made  another  of  his  chronic  raids, 
notorious  on  account  of  the  Massacre  at  Fort  Pillow.  The 
furthest  point  reached  by  him  was  Paducah,  where  a  stub- 
born resistance  rendered  threats  and  attacks  alike  vain. 
On  the  return  march,  he  visited  Fort  Pillow,  garrisoned  by 


1863.]  BATTLE  OF  CHATTANOOGA.  189 

Liegro  troops.  Here  he  at  first  met  a  stout  rebuff;  but 
during  a  subsequent  parley  for  surrender  of  the  garrison  on 
honorable  terms,  the  Confederates  advanced  their  lines  while 
hostilities  had  ceased,  and,  thus  surrounded, 

^       o  .      -,         •,  IT.       April  12, 1804. 

the  fort  was  surprised  and  captured,  it  is 
not  probable  that  Forrest  personally  had  anything  to  do 
with  the  events  which  followed.  But  his  troops,  maddened 
by  the  sight  of  their  ancient  slaves  in  arms,  began  butcher- 
ing wholesale  after  surrender  had  been  made.  It  is  a  black 
page  in  the  story  of  the  war,  and  one  to  be  quickly  turned. 


XXXVI. 

FURTHER  OUTSKIRT  OPERATIONS. 

NO  more  than  a  bare  mention  can  be  made  of  a  few 
of  the  numerous  small  expeditions  which  were  under- 
taken on  the  outskirts  of  the  Confederacy. 

For  about  a  year  from  the   beginning  of  the  war,  the 
town   of  Norfolk  was  held   by  the  enemy.     But   shortly 

after  the  fiffht  of  the  Merrimac  and  Monitor 
May-Oct.,  1862.  •      .  f ,  .   ,  .        .  W        r 

it  agam  tell  mto  our  hands,  completmg  for 

U3  the  possession  of  the  mouth  of  the  Chesapeake. 

After  the  capture  of  Fort  Sumter  the  enemy  held  un- 
disputed possession  of  Charleston  for  a  twelvemonth.     It 
was  then  deemed  advisable  in  Washington  to  make  some 
attempt  to  recover  possession   of  this   politically,   if  not 
strategically,  important  city.     Admiral  Dupont  and  Gen- 
eral Hunter  first   tried   their   hand   at   the 
work,  but  made  no  headway ;  and  Hunter 
was  relieved    by   Mitchel.      The   latter   soon    after   died, 
and    Hunter    resumed     command     of    the 
"^"Triir^     Department  of  the  South.      Three  months 
thereafter  Hunter  made  a  further   attempt 
apon  the  city,  which  again  had  no  result,  and  Gilraore 
superseded    him   so   far   as    the   operations 

against  Charleston  were  concerned. 
190 


1862-3.]  FURTHER    OUTSKIRT  OPERATIONS.  191 

Durinor   the  next   month,  Gilmore  made 

°  .  July  10. 

a  lodgment,  with  Dahlgren's  assistance,  on 

Morris  Island  in  Charleston  Harbor,  and  Fort  Wagner  —  a 

strong  work  there  situated  —  was  attacked. 

Failure  followed  two  assaults  with  a  loss  of 

some  eighteen  hundred  men.     Fort  Sumter  was  demolished 

bv  the  fire  of  the  fleet,  and  thouojh  a  naval 

Aug.  23-Sept.  9. 

assault  on   it  failed,   the  enemy  evacuated 

Morris  Island.      Further  operations  were  then  suspended, 

and  the  city  of  Charleston  remained  in  the  possession  of 

the  enemy  until  Sherman  marched  through  the  Carolinas 

nearly  two  years  later. 

General  Foster  made  a  raid  from  his  base 

Dec.  11-20,  1862. 

at  New  Berne  on  Goldsborough,  N.C.,  but 
accomplished  no  result  which  proved  to  be  of  permanent 
value. 

A  minor  campaign  between  Generals  Blunt  and  Hind- 
man  in  Missouri  took  place  at  the  close  of 

^  December,  1862. 

the  second  year.  Blunt  had  marched  some 
seven  thousand  Union  troops  from  Missouri  into  Arkansas, 
driving  the  Confederate  horseman  Marmaduke  before  him. 
Hindman,  who  was  in  general  command,  deeming  it 
essential  to  arrest  his  progress,  advanced  and  confronted 
Blunt,  whom  a  body  under  Herron  was  on  the  way  to  rein- 
force. Hindman  was  held  in  check  for  two  days.  The 
Confederate  then  feinted  on  the  Union  front,  stole  by  its 
left  and  attacked  Herron  at  Prairie  Grove  ;  but  being  held 
up  for  three  hours,  Blunt  reached  his  rear,  and  the  two,  in 
a  sharp  action,  in  which  over  one  thousand 

December?. 

men  were   lost    by  each  combatant,   forced 


192  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR.      [1863-4. 

Hindman  to  permanently  withdraw  south  of,  the  Arkansas 
river. 
September,  1863.       Steele  occupies  Little  Rock,  Arkansas. 

An  expedition  from  New  Orleans  against 

September.  ,  ^   ^  ° 

Sabine  Pass,  Louisiana,  fails. 

Blunt  and  Cabell  indulo^e  in  a  skirmishing 

September.  .        ,  °  ^ 

campaign  in  Arkansas. 

The   guerilla  Quantrell   assails  Lawrence,  Kansas,  but 

is  driven  off  after  creating  great  confusion 

August  21.  °    ° 

among  the  settlers. 

Banks  sends  out  an  expedition  which  takes 

November  6, 

Brownsville,  at  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande. 

Gilmore  despatches  Seymour  and  six  thousand  men  to 

Jacksonville,  Florida.      From    here  an  advance   is  made 

into  the  country,  and  at  Olustee  an  enffasre- 

Feb.  20,  1864.  .  , 

ment  with  the  enemy  results  disastrously 
for  our  arms,  with  a  loss  of  one-quarter  the  effective  force. 
But  Jacksonville  is  held.  • 

Galveston  had  early  been  occupied  by  the 

October,  1862.      tt    •         ^  i     .    n/r  i  ■•    . 

Union  torces ;    but  Magruder  recaptured  it 
somewhat  later,  and  it  was  thenceforth  held 
by  the  Confederates. 

An  attempt  to  release  our   prisoners  at  Libby  Prison, 

Richmond,  was  made    by   the  cavalry  gen- 

'  eral,  Kilpatrick.       But  this  operation,  made 

noteworthy    at   the   time    by   the   death   of 

Colonel  Dahlgren,  fell  short  of  success. 

The  Red  River  expedition  deserves  perhaps  a  larger 
treatment.  But  as  it  had  no  influence  upon  the  great 
strategic  fields,  a  passing  notice  must  suffice. 


1864.]  FURTHER   OUTSKIRT  OPERATIONS.  193 

As  the  third  year  began  General  Banks  conceived  the 
idea   that  the  trade  of  Western   Louisiana 

1864. 

could  be  opened  by  the  medium  of  the  Eed 
river,  and  projected  an  expedition  to  take  possession  of  the 
country  adjacent  to  its  course.  This  river  is  open  for  navi- 
gation by  larger  vessels,  only  during  the  high  water  of 
March  and  April.  Porter  was  to  command  the  fleet  of 
twenty  of  the  finest  vessels  on  the  Mississippi,  and  Sherman 
was  persuaded  to  lend  some  of  his  troops  for  the  purpose. 
A.  J.  Smith  was  to  start  from  Vicksburg  with  ten  thousand 
men,  while  Banks  would  proceed  up  river  from  New 
Orleans,  with  Franklin's  division.  Steele  from  Little 
Rock  was  to  operate  towards  Shreveport  to  join  the  main 
army. 

Kirby  Smith  was  in  command  of  the  enemy's  forces  in 
Shreveport ;  Taylor  led  an  army  in  the  field. 

The  fleet  started  up  the  Red  River  in  company  with  the 
transports  carrying  A.   J.  Smith's  column. 

March  14. 

Fort  De  Kussy  was  captured,  the  enemy  re- 
tiring before  our  troops,  and  Alexandria  and       March  16. 
Natchitoches  fell  into  our  hands  as  the  joint         April  2. 
force  advanced.     Banks  put  in  an  appearance 
a  week  later.     There  was  more  or  less  skirmishing  with 
the  enemy's  horse  and  outposts  along  the  entire  route  ;  and 
near  Mansfield,  at  Sabine  Cross-Roads,  the  vanguard  met 
the  enemy  in  force.     Sufficient  care  had  not 

''  April  8. 

been  taken  to  keep  the  several  bodies  con- 
centrated.    Taylor  fell  smartly  on  Franklin,  defeated  and 
drove  him  back  with  a  loss  of  three  thousand  out  of  eight 
thousand  engaged.     Emory  stopped  the  Confederates,  but 


194  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR.       [1864. 

we  fell  back  on  our  supports.  At  Pleasant  Hill,  A.  J. 
Smith  made  a  stand  for  the  possession  of  what  had  been  so 
far  gained,  but  despite  stanch  fighting  the 
result  could  not  be  changed.  An  immedi- 
ate retreat  was  made,  without  waiting  to  bury  the  dead. 
The  casualties  now  numbered  about  four  thousand  men. 
The  situation  was  threatening. 

>,.j  A    n  The  fleet  meanwhile  had  reached  Grand 

Mid-Apru. 

Ecore.     High  water  was  coming  to  an  end, 
and  Porter  was  obliged  to  return  down  river, 
to  Alexandria.     Here  it  was  found  that  most  of  the  vessels 
were  of  too  heavy  draught  to  pass  the  falls  below  the  town ; 
and  the  loss  of  most  of  them  would  have  been  certain,  but 
for   a  dam  and   water-way  ably  constructed   by   Colonel 
Bailey,  an  engineer  remarkably  fertile  in  ex- 
pedients.    By  means  of  this  device  the  fleet 
was  safely  floated  over. 

On  the   retreat,    Alexandria   was   burned  by  accident, 
traceable  to  no  particular  cause,  though,  nat- 
urally enough,  laid  by  the  Confederates  to 
our  spirit  of  revenge. 

The  failure  of  this  expedition  came  near  to  fatally  com- 
promising the  force  of  General  Steele,  who  had  begun  his 
march  down  from  Little  Rock,  and  to  whom  no  word  of  our 
disaster  could  be  conveyed.  But  with  good  luck  his  small 
army  was  eventually  withdrawn  in  safety,  though  with  the 
loss  of  much  material. 

The  harbor  of  Mobile  was  protected  by  three  works, 
Forts  Gaines,  Morgan,  and  Powell.  It  was  determined  to 
make  a  joint  land  and  naval  attack  upon  them,  to  break  up 


1864-5.]  FURTHER    OUT  SKIRT  OPERATIONS.  195 

the  illicit  commerce  of  the  city  and,  if  possible,  to  reduce 
the  place.  Farragut's  fleet  was  increased  by  the  addition 
of  some  monitors,  and  he  rendezvoused  in  the  harbor  with 
Gordon  Granger,  selected  by  Canby  to  command  the  land 
forces  for  this  purpose.     Farragut  proposed 

n  '       ^       .  \        n  August  5. 

to  employ  his  old  tactics  of  isolating  the  forts 
by  running  by  them  in  column.  This  was  done, — the 
gallant  Admiral  in  command  of  the  flag-ship  Hartford, — 
with  the  loss  of  only  one  vessel.  The  Confederate  ram 
Tennessee  made  a  brave  resistance,  but  was  captured. 
Fort  Gaines  surrendered  to  Granger ;  Fort 

Augusts,  23. 

Powell  was   abandoned ;  and  Fort  Morgan 
surrendered  later.     But  the  city  itself,  though  cut  off*  from 
the    outside    world,    maintained   itself    against    Granger's 
efforts,  and  was  not  reduced  till  the  close  of 

T       1  T         1  r.      ,  April  11,  1865. 

the   war.      it  then  surrendered  to    Canby. 

Price  makes  an  extensive  raid  into  Missouri  and  pene- 
trates to  within  less  than  one  hundred  miles 
of  St.  Louis.     Curtis  defeats  him  and  drives     ^^^!™'^\!!! 

October,  1864. 

him  from  the  State. 

A  noteworthy  combat  between  the  Confederate  cruiser 
Alabama  and  the  United  States  ship  Kearsarge  occurred  off* 
Cherbourg,    France.       Amonor    the   vessels 

.^  ®  .  June  19. 

depredating  on  our  commerce  three  English- 
built  cruisers  had  been  preeminent,  the  Alabama,  Florida, 
and  Georgia.     The  two  last  were  captured  respectively  in 
'  Bahia  Harbor  and  at  sea. 

The  Alabama,  under  command  of  Captain  Semmes,  had 
been  sought  by  the  Kearsarge,  Captain  Winslow,  and 
sailed   out   of  Cherbourg   to   accept   her   challenge.     The 


196  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [1864. 

tonii;»ge  and  crews  of  each  were  about  equal.  The  arma- 
ment of  each  was  what  the  English  and  we  considered 
the  best  for  war  vessels  of  that  size.  They  were  typical 
craft.  The  Alabama  was  an  English  vessel,  mounting 
English  guns  and  carrying  an  English  crew ;  the  Kearsage 
an  American  vessel,  with  American  guns,  and  out  of  one 
hundred  and  sixty  officers  and  men  all  but  eleven  were 
American-bom  citizens.  Both  were  wooden  vessels,  but 
the  Kearsarge  hung  her  chain  cables  over  the  sides  to  protect 
her  engines. 

It  was  a  fair  fight,  but  of  short  duration.  The  fire  of 
the  Kearsage  was  the  more  deliberate  and  proved  very 
destructive.  The  Alabama  surrendered  within  an  hour  in 
A  sinking  condition.  Semmes  was  picked  up  in  the  water 
by  an  English  vessel,  and  escaped  capture.  The  loss  of 
the  Alabama  was  about  forty  men.  On  the  Kearsarge, 
which  was  but  slightly  injured  by  her  opponent's  fire,  only 
three  men  were  wounded. 


XXXVIL 

THE  WILDERNESS. 

FOR  three  long  years  the  operations  of  our  armies  had 
been  conducted  without  united  effort.  The  campaigns 
of  the  East  and  West,  though  nominally  directed  by 
HaUeck,  had  really  been  of  so  isolated  a  character  that  the 
enemy  could  at  need  detach  troops  from  Virginia  to  Ten- 
nessee, or  the  reverse,  according  as  the  tide  might  turn  on 
each  strategic  field.  The  nation  had  now  learned  that  war 
could  not  be  carried  on  by  political  methods  alone ;  that 
the  South  must  be  exhausted  before  peace  could  be  won ; 
that  systematic  warfare  was  the  least  costly  means  of  bring- 
ing this  to  pass ;  and  that  the  unhampered  work  of  one 
man,  in  whom  the  confidence  of  all  could  be  centred,  was 
essential  to  a  successful  issue. 

The  choice  of  the  nation  fell  naturally  upon  General 
Grant.      He   was  commissioned  Lieutenant 

«  ,  ^     ,         n    .  ^      March  9,  1864. 

General  and  placed  m   supreme  command. 

Grant  gave  over  the  control  of  events  in  the  West  to 
Sherman.  For  himself  he  reserved  the  special  field  of 
Virginia.  He  knew  that  he  left  in  Sherman's  hands  a  well- 
tempered  weapon  with  which  to  fight. 

Grant's  own  success  on  other  fields  not  unnaturally  led  him 

197 


198  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL   WAR.         [1864:. 

fco  believe  that  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  never  been 
fought  au  fond;  he  imagined  that  Lee  and  the  Army  of 
Northern  Virginia  could  be  beaten  by  the  same  means  as 
Pemberton  and  Bragg,  and  he  set  himself  the  task  to  make 
the  rugged  old  army  do  that  vrhich  he  thought  it  never  yet 
had  done.  Moreover  Grant  at  this  time  openly  gave  his 
preference  to  hard  blow^s  over  manoeuvring.  "  Continuous 
hammering  "  vp^as  his  motto.  His  belief  seems  to  have  been 
that  the  use  of  skilful  tactics  exhibits  vreakness.  Other 
and  greater  soldiers  have  sometimes  for  a  vrhile  been  sub- 
ject to  this  delusion.  He  v^as  to  discover  his  error  in  hia 
first  cLish  of  arms,  and  to  recognize  the  fact  that  he  haj 
never  yet  faced  a  captain  such  as  was  the  man  who  through 
so  many  campaigns  had  borne  the  proud  banner  of  the 
South  on  the  Old  Dominion  soil,  nor  yet  had  led  stouter 
hearts  against  more  valiant  foes. 

Grant's  objective  was  Lee's  army.  So  long  as  Lee  held 
to  the  defense  of  Richmond,  this  city  was  the  goal.  But 
to  destroy  Lee's  army  was  the  work  cut  out.  "  On  to 
Eichmond  "  was  an  empty  phrase. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  lay  in  and  about  Culpeper ; 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia  around  Orange.  A  move- 
ment by  our  right  possessed  the  manifest  advantage  of  more 
open  ground,  and  the  yet  greater  disadvantage  of  grad- 
ually lengthening  our  lines  of  communication  and  supply. 
A  movement  by  our  left  gave  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
lines  of  operation  easy  to  keep  open,  because  the  base 
could  be  constantly  shifted  to  points  on  the  coast  in  rear  of 
the  operations  actually  going  on,  but  it  carried  the  army 
through  a  country  essentially  unfitted  for  manoeuvring. 


1864.]       ^  THE   WILDERNESS.  199 

Grant  had  in  theory  favored  moving  on  Richmond  from 
the  James  river.  The  overland  route  he  deemed  too  cost- 
ly in  time  and  men.  But  he  eventually  adopted  a  plan 
savoring  of  both.  Only  his  great  numerical  superiority 
could  excuse  his  dividing  his  forces.  Concentric  operations 
are  always  weak,  because  the  several  detachments  are  liable 
to  be  separately  overwhelmed. 

The  plan  was  this.  Grant,  with  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac under  Meade,  and  the  Ninth  corps  under  Bumside,  was 
to  take  the  overland  route  on  the  east  of  Richmond.  Butler, 
with  thirty  thousand  men  (the  Army  of  the  James) ,  was  to 
move  up  James  River.  Sigel,  who  was  near  the  Potomac  at 
the  mouth  of  the  Valley,  and  Crook,  who  was  in  the  Ka- 
nawha region,  were  to  operate  from  the  debouches  of  the 
Shenandoah. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  had  had  five  corps.  These 
were  now  consolidated  into  three,  perhaps  unwisely.  For 
the  new  ones  became  too  bulky  for  the  difficult  country 
through  which  they  were  to  operate,  and  the  esprit  de  corps 
of  the  ancient  organizations  was  destroyed  by  their  dis- 
bandment  and  merger  into  the  new. 

There  were  now  Hancock's  Second  Corps,  Warren's 
Fifth,  Sedgwick's  Sixth,  and  Sheridan's  Cavalry  Corps. 
These,  with  the  Ninth,  numbered  one  hundred  and  twenty- 
two  thousand  men  "  for  duty  equipped  "  and  over  three  hun- 
dred guns.     Head-quarters  were  at  Culpeper  Court  House. 

Lee  confronted  this  splendid  army  with  the  corps  of 
Longstreet,  Hill,  and  Ewell,  not  far  from  seventy  thousand 
men  and  over  two  hundred  guns.  He  was  ready  for  the 
fray.     But  he  must  have  anxiously  watched  for  the  first 


200  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.  ^      [1864. 

fii^ii  of  the  movement  of  his  new  opponent,  whose  set  pur- 
pooc'  he  knew  as  well  as  the  strength  of  the  army  he  led. 

Grant  purposed  to  turn  Lee's  right.  No  time  was  lost. 
Marching  orders  were  issued.  The  army  was  perfect  in 
discipline,  equipment,  and  material.  One 
day  sufficed  to  put  the  hundred  thousand 
oien  across  the  Rapidan.  Warren  led,  Sedgwick  followed 
ever  Germanna  Ford ;  Hancock  crossed  at  Ely's,  further 
cast.     Burnside  was  to  remain  in  camp  for  a  day  later. 

Giant's  route  was  through  the  Wilderness,  due  south. 
This  was  the  same  dense  forest  where  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  just  one  year  before,  had  been  so  nearly  wrecked. 
Lee  made  no  effort  to  dispute  Grant's  crossing,  but  pur- 
posed to  strike  him  while  traversing  these  dreary  woods. 
From  Orange  towards  the  route  pursued  by  Grant  were 
two  parallel  roads,  known  as  the  Plank  road  and  the  Turn- 
pike, which  cut  the  north  and  south  roads  used  by  us  at 
right  angles  to  our  line  of  march. 

Meeting  with  no  opposition  in  crossing  the  river.  Grant 

believed  that  Lee  had  retreated  to  more  favorable  ground. 

He  had  no  idea  of  fighting  here,  in  the  forest  which  had 

proved  so  nearly  fatal  to  Hooker.     On  the 

May  4-5.  -i.  i  /.     i       -r»      • 

night  succeedmg  the  passage  of  the  Kapi- 
dan  both  armies  camped  near  by  each  other,  Grant  un- 
suspicious of  the  close  presence  of  the  enemy,  and  far  from 
assured  that  Lee  would    accept   battle  when   his  position 

was   turned.      But   orders   were   issued   to 

May  5. 

attack,  and  next  day  Ewell  is  met  by 
Warren,  who  is  moving  by  the  flank  through  the  wood 
roads.       Grant   and   Meade,  at   Old  Wilderness  Tavern, 


1864.] 


THE   WILDERNESS. 


201 


suppose  this  to 
be  the  affair 
ofa  simple  rear 
guard.  At 
this  moment, 
had  Ewell 
been  vigor- 
ously pushed 
by  Warren, 
he  might  have 
been  badly 
used  up,  for 
he  was  unsup- 
ported. But 
as  the  resist- 
ance to  Ewell 


was 


propor- 
tioned only  to 
Grant's  idea  of 
his    strength, 


before    Sedg-  "^ 
wick       could 


Wilderness.    May  5-6,  1864. 


come    up    on 

Warren's  right,  Ewell  had  inflicted  a  loss  of  three  thousand 
men  upon  the  Fifth  corps.  Still  Warren  clung  tenaciously 
to  ground  in  advance  of  Old  Wilderness  Tavern. 

Grant's  eyes  begin  to  open,  but,  with  his  usual  determi- 
nation, he  is  ready  to  accept  the  gage  of  battle  here. 
Sedgwick  is  ordered  to  join  on  to  Warren's  right.  Han- 
cock, away  off  at  Chancellorsville,  with  his  head  of  column 


202  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.  [1864 

at  Todd's  Tavern,  is  hurried  up  along  the  Brock  road.  On 
his  arrival  he  promptly  moves  out  the  plank  road,  south  of 
Warren,  and  attacks  Hill.  Both  the  Warren-Ewell  and 
Hancock-Hill  combats  are  isolated.  No  tactical  connection 
exists  between  them.  In  fact  grand- tactics  are  impossible 
on  this  ground.     Night  closes  the  engagement. 

Both  Grant  and  Lee  determine  to  attack  on  the  morrow. 
Burnside  is  ordered  up  to  take  place  between  Warren  and 
Hancock.  Lee  awaits  the  arrival  of  Longstreet,  whom  he 
will  place  opposite  Hancock's  right. 

The  Wilderness  is  covered  by  a  scrub  growth  of  small 
trees  and  underbrush,  so  dense  that  one  can  see  but  a  few 
hundred  feet  in  the  clearest  places.  Cavalry  can  not  leave 
the  roads,  which  are  few  and  poor.  Artillery  is  useless, 
except  occasionally  where  a  section  may  fire  down  a  road. 
There  are  next  to  no  clearings.  Manoeuvring  is  impossible. 
Bodies  of  troops  have  to  march  by  the  compass.  Success 
or  failure  can  only  be  guessed  from  the  advance  or  recession 
of  the  infantry  fire.  In  this  blind  place,  familiar  enough 
to  Lee,  but  quite  unknown  to  Grant,  the  two  old  enemies 
are  again  to  grapple. 

Grant  orders  an  attack  along  the  whole  line  at  5  A.M. 
Lee  determines,  so  soon  as  Longstreet  shall  have  ar- 
rived, to  turn  Grant's  left  and  throw  him  back  upon  the 
river.  To  divert  attention  from  Longstreet's  absence,  he 
strongly  feels  our  right. 

Hancock  falls  upon  Hill  at  five,  and  drives  him  over  a 
mile  down  the  plank  road.  Confusion  among  the  troops  is 
natural  in  these  woods.  Hancock  stops  to  rearrange  the 
ranks.     He  has  been  cautioned  to  beware  lest  Longstreet 


1864.]  THE    WILDERNESS.  203- 

fall  upon  his  left  along  the  Brock  road,  for  Grant  considers 
it  probable  that  Lee  may  use  this  approach.  Part  of  the 
Second  corps  has  thus  been  kept  there,  the  presence  of  which 
in  the  advance  might  have  insm-ed  a  larger  success  against 
Hill.  While  thus  pausing,  Longstreet  comes  upon  the 
field.  The  suddenness  of  his  assault  takes  Hancock 
unawares,  and  drives  him  back  to  his  old  lines  on  fhe  Brock 
road.  Here  he  rallies.  Longstreet  is  wounded.  The 
violence  of  the  attack  subsides. 

Later  in  the  afternoon,  Lee  again  attacks  Hancock. 
Aided  by  afire  in  the  woods,  which  the  wind  blows  into  our 
faces,  he  drives  our  line  in  some  distance,  but  once  more 
we  rally  and  retake  the  ground  so  lost.  Night  again 
supervenes.  Nothing  has  been  decided.  Grant's  loss  of 
eighteen  thousand  men  should  make  him  rate  his  own  new 
army  and  his  adversary's  skill  at  a  higher  value  than  he 
did  two  days  ago.  Lee's  loss  is  probably  less  by  several 
thousand  men. 

Beyond  a  cavalry  fight  by  Sheridan  against  Stuart  there 

are  no  further  operations  on  this  ground.     Both  armies  are 

exhausted.     Neither  has  gained  aught  but  added  respect  foi 

the  other's  mettle. 

NoTB.  — Anderson  succeeded  Longstreet.  But,  for  conrenieuce,  thii 
Corps  is  still  referred  to  by  the  name  of  Its  old  commander. 


SPOTSYLVANIA. 


/^  RANT,  having  found  that  Lee  is  able  to  check  any 
VJ^  direct  advance  upon  his  lines,  concludes  to  resort  to 
manoeuvring,  and  attempts  to  oust  the  Army  of  Northern 


Spotsylvania.    May  8-21,  1864. 


Virginia  from  its  position  by  a  flank  movement.  It  is 
painfully  apparent  that  no  gain  can  be  made  by  continuous 
hammering  here.    He  orders  his  trains  to  Chancellorsville, 

204 


1864.]  SPOTSYLVANIA.  205 

and  heads  the  left  of  his  array  for  Spot-eylvania  Court- 
House.  Warren  is  to  lead  and  march  by  the  Brock  road 
upon  that  place  ;  Hancock  to  follow  ;  Sedgwick  and  Burn- 
side  to  march  on  roads  leading  in  the  same  direction  from 
Chancellors  ville. 

Warren's  advance  was  unfortunately  delayed  by  a  block- 
ade of  the  roads  and  by  some  opposition  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry.  The  trains  of  so  large  an  army  can  not  be  speedily 
or  quietly  moved.  Lee  soon  became  aware  that  Grant  was 
about  to  shift  his  ground  and  divined  that  it  would  be 
either  towards  Spotsylvania  or  Fredericksburg.  Longstreet 
was  ordered  to  protect  Spotsylvania. 

By  a  lucky  accident  for  him  Longstreet  started  so  as  to 

reach  the  place  before  Warren.     A  summary  attack  might 

have  brushed  him  away.     But  our  troops  were  weary  and 

by  no   means    in    high   spirits.     So   Warren   waited  for 

Sedgwick.     Before  the  latter's  arrival,    night  had  fallen. 

Hancock  had  been  kept  back   some   hours 

May  8. 

by  Meade,  lest  Lee  should  attack  our  rear, 
which  Meade  thought  not  unlikely.     As  a  consequence  of 
all  these  mishaps,  Lee  had  managed  to  plant  himself  athwart 
Grant's  path. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  files  into  line  in  front  of  Lee's 
position,  —  in  order  from  the  right,  Hancock,  Warren, 
Sederwick,  Burnside.     One  of  the  first  mis- 

.  .  May  9. 

fortunes  on  this  fatal  ground  is  the  death  of 

gallant  Sedgwick.      Wright  succeeds  to  the  command  of 

the  Sixth  corps. 

Hancock  is  ordered  to  make  a  demonstration  south 
of  the  Po,  but  is  withdrawn  without  accomplishing  any 


206  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR.        [1864. 

result.    The  loss  is  severe.     Although  probably  too  late  to 

turn  the  enemy's  left,  the  manoRuvre,  having  been  begun, 

should   have  been  pushed  home.     Towards 

May  10.  .  ^ 

evening  two  assaults  are  made  on  a  position 
in  WaiTen's  front.  It  can  not  be  carried,  even  at  a  loss  of 
five  or  six  thousand  men.  Further  on  the  left  Upton  does 
manage  to  effect  a  lodgment.  But  unsupported  he  can 
not  hold  it. 

Up  to  this  moment  Grant's  hard  blows  have  punished 
only  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Lee  is  neither  Pemberton 
nor  Bragg.  Grant  has  met  his  match  in  all  but  material 
resources. 

Among   Grant's   qualities  is  wonderful  staying  power. 

Up  to  a  certain  point  this  is  one  of  the  highest  virtues  of  a 

soldier.    But  it  can  be  pushed  too  far.    Grant  is  altogether 

too  blind  to  the  advantages  of  combining  manoeuvring  with 

direct  assault.     He  can   not   believe   that   Lee   has   even 

greater  endurance  than  himself;  that  the  Army  of  Northern 

Virginia  can  longer  resist  his  masses.     He  has  yet  to  learn 

how  tough  is  the  grain  of  that  \ronderful  body  of  men. 

An  attack  in  force  upon  the  centre  is  or- 
May  12. 

dered.      Hancock,  in  two  lines  of  columns 

of  regiments,  at  early  dawn,  assaults  the  Confederate  posi- 
tion, where  the  first  line  is  thrown  out  in  a  salient.  The 
troops  rush  over  the  intrenchments  with  a  cheer,  capturing 
four  thousand  prisoners  and  many  guns.  But  the  second 
line  still  remains.  It  too  must  be  taken.  The  elated  men, 
without  pausing  to  re-form,  push  forward,  intent  upon  the 
fruits  of  victory.  But  our  loose-strung  lines  are  met  by  the 
enemy  with  serried  ranks,  and  break  against  their  wall  of 


I864.]|  SPOTSYLVANIA.  207 

Bteel.  A  countercliarge  hurls  us  back  to  the  salient. 
With  extreme  difficulty  these  works  are  held,  the  Sixth 
corps  sustaining  Hancock's  right. 

Grant,  who  by  this  stubborn  defense  has  got  the  impres- 
sion that  Lee  has  weakened  his  right  and  left  to  sustain  his 
centre,  orders  an  immediate  attack  by  Warren  and  Bum- 
side.  Though  stoutly  made,  each  fails  with  grievous  loss. 
Lee  determines  to  recapture  the  salient  at  any  sacrifice* 
Five  distinct  assaults  are  made  during  the  day.  The 
defences  arc  taken  and  retaken  again  and  again.  The 
breastworks  are  alternately  crowned  by  the  rival  flags. 
For  twenty  hours  the  tide  has  surged  doubtfully  to  and 
fro.     Our  loss  this  day  has  been  eighty-five  hundred  men. 

Grant  might  readily  flank  the  enemy  out  of  his  position. 
But  he  can  not  give  up  the  contest.  He  will  not  yield  to 
Lee.  He  knows  him  to  be  vastly  his  inferior  in  men,  and 
will  not  believe  that  he  can  not  be  crushed  by  weight  alone. 
For  a  week  after  he  makes  partial  attacks  at  all  points, 
shifting  divisions  from  place  to  place  along  the  line,  seek- 
ing a  weak  point  in  the  harness  of  the  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  through  which  to  thrust  his  weapon.  Lee  meets 
his  every  onset.     No  impression  can  be  made. 

The  assailant  labors  under  the  disadvantage  of  attacking 
intrenchments.  To  oflPset  this  he  is  able  secretly  to  mass 
his  men  and  attack  a  single  point,  while  his  enemy  must 
keep  all  portions  of  his  line  equally  manned  until  he  divines 
»\rhere  the  blow  is  to  fall.  To  attack  without  studying  your 
opponent's  position  is  to  throw  away  this  manifest  advan- 
tage, to  refuse  to  add  skill  to  mere  strength  of  arm. 

In  this  short  campaign  of  little  over  two  weeks,  Grant  has 


208  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1864. 

lost  thirty-six  thousand  men  in  casualties,  nearly  one  in 
three  of  his  *'  for  duty  "  force.  He  has  accomplished  nothing 
which  manoeuvring  could  not  have  compassed,  unless  he  has 
weakened  the  morale  of  his  antagonist  more  than  he  has 
his  own.  This  he  has  not  done.  The  Army  of  Northern 
Virginia  is  elated  at  its  successful  defense.  The  Army  cf 
the  Potomac  is  disheartened  at  its  losses  with  so  little  tan- 
gible result. 

But  for  all  that,  the  courage  and  sense  of  duty  of  our 
brave  old  army  are  unshaken.  It  knows  that  the  hopes  of 
the  nation  are  in  its  keeping,  and  not  a  weak  heart  beats  in 
its  ranks. 

Courage  is  a  common  virtue  in  the  soldier.  That  com- 
bination of  physical  and  moral  courage  which  enables  a 
general  to  inflict  and  unflinchingly  to  resist  heavy  blows  is 
the  rarest  and  best.  But  this  courage  must  be  tempered 
with  skill  to  be  of  the  greatest  use,  and  skill  implies  a  dis- 
creet use  of  power.  Though  it  was  Falstaff  hiding  behind 
his  shield  at  the  battle  of  Shrewsbury  who  exclaimed  that 
the  better  part  of  valor  is  discretion,  yet  there  is,  for  the 
commanding  general  of  a  great  army,  a  far  deeper  meaning 
in  these  pregnant  words. 

Failing  to  make  any  impression  by  hard 
blows,  Grant  again  issues  orders  to  move  by 
the  left  —  straight  on  Kichmond. 


XXXIX. 

THE  MINOR  ARMIES. 


DURING  all  this  heavy  fighting,  the  like  of  which  has 
not  been  seen  since  Borodino,  the  minor  armies  were 
cooperating  towards  the  general  goal. 

Sheridan,  with  the  cavalry  corps,  started 

.  May  9. 

on  a  raid  around  to  the  west  of  Richmond. 
At  intervals  he  measured  swords  with  Stuart,  with  uniform 
success,  for  he  largely  outnumbered  him.  Finally  after 
much  destruction  of  roads,  bridges,  and  material  of  war,  he 
turned  up  on  the  James  river,  where  Butler's  army  lay, 
and  from  thence  rejoined  the  Army  of  the 

''  '^  May  25. 

Potomac. 

Butler,  with  his  new  command,  moved  to 

May  4. 

City  Point  and  Bermuda  Hundred,  and  in- 
trenched. His  instructions  were  vague.  When  Grant, 
in  his  overland  march,  should  reach  the  vicinity  of  Rich- 
mond, Butler  was  to  cooperate  from  this  point  and 
move  so  as  to  lean  with  his  left  upon  the  James  beyond 
the  city.  This  plan  appears  weak  because  Butler's  rear 
would  thus  be  quite  at  the  mercy  of  Beauregard,  who 
was  certain  to  approach  from  North  Carolina,  as  Gilmore 
had  been  withdrawn  from  there  to  join  the  Army  of  the 

209 


210  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL   WAR.         [1864. 

James.  Without  the  possession  of  Petersburg  and  the 
line  of  the  Appomattox,  there  was  no  safety  whatever  in 
Butler's  position. 

But  the  capture  of  Petersburg  was,  strangely  enough,  no 
part  of  Grant's  plan    at  this  time.     He  perhaps  thought 
that  Lee  could  be  annihilated  before  the  vicinity  of  this  city 
was  reached.     And  before  Butler  himself  saw  the  necessity 
of  so  protecting  his   rear,  Beauregard  had 
reached  the  place  and  Butler's   demonstra- 
tions against  it  became  useless. 
May  13. 

Butler    now    moves   toward    Richmond. 

The  enemy's  line  extends  from  the  river  at 

May  16. 

Drury's  Bluff  westerly.  We  purpose  to 
attack.  But  Beauregard  is  again  too  quick.  He  plans  to 
break  Butler's  right  and  seize  his  communications.  The 
attack  falls  heavily  on  the  centre,  but  meets  with  no  suc- 
cess. A  dense  fog  prevents  intended  combinations  on  both 
sides.  A  diversion  from  Petersburg  against  the  Army  of  the 
James  fails.  But  Butler  is  none  the  less  compelled  to 
withdraw,  for  his  position  is  compromised. 

He  has  in  this  battle  of  Drury's  Bluffs  lost  four  thousand 
men  to  Beauregard's  three  thousand.  He  retires  to  Ber- 
muda Hundred.  Here,  as  Grant  expresses  it,  he  is  "bottled 
up,"  and  the  greater  part  of  his  force  is  ordered  to  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  while  the  rest  remains  to  hold  a  footing  on 
the  James. 

The  other  force  co5perating  with  the  Army  of  the  Poto- 
mac from  the  Valley,  consisting  of  Crook's  Kanawha  Army 
and  Sigel's  troops,  were  under  command  of  the  latter.  The 
work  cut  out  for  this  command  was  to  destroy  the  railroad:^ 


1864.]  THE  MINOR  ARMIES.  211 

in  the  Valley  so  as  to  cut  Lee  from  his  communications 

with  the  West  by  way  of  the  East  Tennessee  Kailroad  and 

from  his  source  of  supplies  in  the  Shenandoah.     Sigel  lay 

along  the  Potomac ;     Crook  in  the  Kanawha  region. 

Tlie  latter  was  the  first  to  get  to  work,  and  debouching 

into  the  Valley   he   and   Averell  did  some 

.      .  .  May. 

excellent  work  in  demolishing  the  railroads. 

Sigel  moved  southward  about  the  same  time,  but  sud- 
denly brought  up    against  Breckenridge   at 

May  15. 

New  Market.     Here  he  suffered  a  sharp  de- 
feat, and  retired  to  the  line  of  Cedar  Creek, 

May  26. 

where  he  was  superseded  by  Hunter. 

This  general  again  moves  up  the  Valley, 

Jane  5. 

and  runs  across  Imboden  at  Piedmont.     In 
a  smart  combat  he  defeats  the  enemy,  capt- 

.  ^  June  8. 

uring  one  thousand  five  hundred  prisoners, 

and  occupies  Staunton.     Crook  and  Averell  now  join  him, 

making;  his  effective  some  eighteen  thousand 

°  ^  .  June  12. 

men.     Four  days  later  Jbe  reaches  Lexing- 
ton, and  should  have  at  once  advanced  to  Lynchburg.    Bu< 
delays  supervene  and  when  he   does   leave 

•^  .  June  16. 

Buchanan  to  march  towards  this  key  of  the 
Valley,  he  finds  that  he  is  too  late. 

Lee  can  by  no  means  afford  to  lose  Lynchburg.  Breck- 
enridge occupies  its  defences  in  force,  and  Early  is  hurriec' 
from  Cold  Harbor  to  strike  the  Valley  in  Hunter*s  real 
witli  Jackson's  old  corps. 

But   first   Early    throws    his   troops   into    Lynchburg. 

Hunter  assaults,    but  is  thrust  back,    and 

June  18. 

retires,  followed  by  Early,  who  is  so  placed 


212  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR,        [1864. 

as  to  be  able  readily  to  out  off  Hunter's  line  of  retreat  down 

the  Valley.     Hunter,  who  is  entirely   out   of  provisions, 

determines  to  retire  by  way  of  the  Kanawha,  where  Crook 

has  left  a  supply-camp  at  Meadow  Bridge.   But  on  reaching 

the  place  he  finds  that  a  skilful  guerilla-raid  has  destroyed 

the  depot.     Luckily,    a  train  of  supplies  reaches  him  at 

Gauley  River.     From  here  Hunter  moves 
June  27. 

around  the  mountains  to  the  upper  Potomac. 

The  march  is  full  of  difficulties. 

Sheridan  had  been  sent  out  from  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
to  work  in  unison  with  Hunter,  but  he  could  not  success- 
fully co[>e  with  Early,  and  he  returned  to  White  House, 
after  considerable  interchange  of  hostilities  with  the  enemy 
and  a  loss  of  not  far  from  one  thousand  men. 

The  cooperation  of  the  Valley  forces  with  Grant's  main 
army  had  thus  been  summarily  cut  short,  in  part  by  ill  luck 
and  in  part  by  Lee's  clever  dispositioiis. 


XL. 

AGAIN  BY  THE  FLANK.  —  STALEMATE. 

GEANT'S  flank  operations  were  uniformly  well  con- 
ducted. They  exhibited  skill  in  conception  and  exe- 
cution, and  commanded  success  which  his  favorite  method  of 
hammering  as  uniformly  failed  to  compass  when  his  opponent 
was  his  equal.  The  orders  after  Spotsylvania  were  for 
Hancock  to  withdraw  from  the  riffht,    and, 

May  20. 

marching  behind  the  other  corps,  to  push 
towards  Bowling  Green.  Lee  was  not  slow  to  divine  the 
movement,  but  was  too  weak  to  attack  during  its  prosecution. 
To  meet  the  threatened  danger,  however,  he  started 
Longstreet  on  the  parallel  turnpike  in  the  same  general 
direction.  When  Warren  followed  Hancock,  Ewell  fol- 
lowed  Longstreet;   Wright    and   Bumside 

May  21. 

brought  up   the   rear,   Hill  followed   suit. 
As  a  result,  the  roads  being  somewhat  shorter   for   Lee, 
when  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  reached  the  North  Anna,  it 
descried  the   Army    of   Northern   Virginia 

1  .  1  .         .,  May  23. 

drawn  up  to  welcome  it  on  the  opposite  side. 

Our  left  column  under  Hancock  strikes  the  North  Anna 
near  the  railroad  crossing;  Warren,  with  the  right,  at 
Jericlio  Ford.     The  latter  finds  his  passage  undisputed  and 

213 


214 


BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL    WAR. 


[1864. 


crosses  some  troops  at  once.  On  the  other  side  he  has  a 
sharp  exchange  with  the  enemy,  the  result  of  which  is  to 
capture  one  thousand  prisoners.  Hancock  finds  that  the 
enemy  occupies  a  bridge-head  and  some  strong  field-works, 
formerly  erected,  on  the  other  side.  He 
forces  the  passage  at  considerable  loss,  and 
puts  his  corps  across. 


May  24. 


North  Anna.    May  23-26,  1864. 


Lee's  position  is  masterly.  His  centre  is  thrown  forward 
and  holds  the  river.  The  wings  form  an  obtuse  angle,  with 
their  flanks  well  supported  on  diflScult  natural  obstacles. 
Burnside  attempts  to  force  a  crossing  at  the  centre  but  quite 
without  success.  Hancock  is  across  on  the  left.  So  is 
Warren  on  the  right.  But  each  is  separated  from  the  centre 
by  the  river,  and  from  the  other  wing  by  Lee's  army.  A 
more  complete  stalemate  can  not  be  imagined.  There 
is  not  even  a  chance  to  hammer,  unless  Lee  should  now 


1864.]  AGAIN  BY  THE  FLANK.  215 

assume  this  role.     But  Lee  is  wise  enough  to  refrain.     Ho 
is  better  suited  with  Grant's  pursuing  this  policy. 
The  Army  of  the    Potomac  must  again 

.  May  26. 

withdraw.    At  night,  speedily  but  cautiously, 

the  Second  corps  acting  as  rear  guard,  the  operation  is  carried 

out.    A  wide  easterly  circuit  is  made  to  strike  the  Pamunkey . 

While  the  army  was  at  Spotsylvania,  its  base  had  been 
at  Fredericksburg.  On  moving  to  the  North  Anna,  the 
base  was  transferred  to  Port  Royal.  It  will  now  be  estab- 
lished at  White  House,  on  the  York  river. 

No  time  is  lost.  The  order  of  march  is  systematically 
carried  out.     The  entire  army  reaches  Han- 

May  27. 
overtown  next  day  and  crosses  the  Pamun- 
key.    But  Lee  is  again  on  hand,  facing  north-easterly  and 
covering  the  line  of  the  Chickahominy. 

Grant  develops  his  position  by  reconnoissances.  From 
Hanovertown  there  are  direct  roads  leading  to  Richmond. 
These  Lee  defends  with  his  entire  force.  It  is  evident  that 
only  a  hard  struggle,  or  the  cleverest  tactics,  will  dislodge 
him.     His  position  can  not  well  be  broken, 

^  May  28. 

and  Grant  again  moves  across  Tolopotomoy 
Creek  and  towards  Cold  Harbor. 

Lee  does  the  same,  and  his  interior  lines  enable  him  to 
excel  the  speed  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Lee  is  of  course  glad  to  have  Grant  bear  the  brunt  of  at- 
tack. Grant  has  been  steadily  playing  this  part.  But  an 
effort  can  be  made  so  to  manoeuvre  as  to  make  Lee  attack. 
Opportunities  are  not  wanting.  To  match  Lee  in  skilful 
movements,  if  we  can  not  break  him  down  by  fighting,  is 
indeed  an  honor  worth  the  seeking. 


216  BIRD'8-ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [1864. 

The  two  armies  are  on  the  old  ground.  Gaines'  Mill  is 
close  by.  Singularly  enough,  each  army  occupies  the 
position  its  opponent  held  at  the  beginning  of  the  Seven 
Days.  But  we  are  now  the  assailants.  Two  years  ago  it 
was  Lee  who  forced  the  fighting.  He  had  not  then  to  hus- 
•y  band  his  means  so  stingily.  Now  he  can  afford  to  fight 
;  only  when  pushed,  or  when  the  advantage  is  manifebtly 
hii. 


XLI. 

MORE  BLOOD.— COLD  HARBOR. 

SHERIDAN  with  Ms  cavalry  has  seized  Cold  Harbor,  a 
centre  of  roads  of  great  value.  The  Sixth  corps  is 
despatched  from  the  right  to  this  point  with  orders  to  hold 
it.  Meanwhile  General  Smith,  with  sixteen  thousand  men 
from  Butler's  force,  has  arrived  and  is  ordered  to  cooperate 
with  Wright.  Lee  has  divined  the  manoeuvre  and  has 
moved  Longstreet  to  the  same  cross-roads.  Wright  and 
Smith  are  forced  to  drive  him  out  of  a  commanding  position 
beyond  Cold  Harbor  at  a  loss  of  two  thousand  men  before 
they  can  secure  the  place.  But  the  roads  are  held.  Han- 
cock moves  to  the  left  of  the  Sixth  corps  ;  Warren  remains 
on  the  right,  with  Burnside  in  support.  Sheridan  protects 
the  lower  fords  of  the  Chickahominy,  and  the  roads 
towards  White  House. 

Grant  is  impelled  to  try  one  more  blow.  His  faith  is 
yet  strong  that  he  can  break  Lee's  lines  by  sheer  mo- 
mentum. This  might  still  be  possible  if  he  would  call  to 
his  aid  the  resources  of  grand-tactics.  He  ought  to  seek 
the  key  of  his  enemy's  position  and  mass  his  assault  there. 
But,  unlike  the  Army  of  the  Potomac,  he  has  not  learned 
the  wonderful  vitality  of  Lee  and  his  veterans.     Orders 

217 


218  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL    WAR.         [18&4. 

are  once  more  issued  to  attack  along  the 
whole  line  at  4.30  A.M.  on  the  morrow. 

The  want  of  definite  plan  is  painfully  apparent.  Skilful 
manoeuvring  might  more  than  once  have  placed  Lee  where 
he  would  have  to  be  the  assaulting  party  or  forfeit  his  stake. 
Kew  Bridge  over  the  Chickahominy  could  have  been  seized 
at  this  very  time  with  this  result. 

Grant  in  his  despatches  stated  that  Lee  would  not  come 
out  of  his  intrenchments  to  fight.  But  Grant  had  never 
tried  the  proper  means  to  make  him  do  so.  In  lieu  of 
moving  upon  Lee's  communications  and  thus  compelling 
him  to  leave  his  works  for  the  open,  Grant  had  constantly 
hurled  his  men  against  field-works  which  he  should  have 
learned,  by  the  experience  he  had  recently  been  through, 
that  he  could  not  take.  Grant's  method  was  just  what  Lee 
preferred.  He  was  right  in  not  coming  out  of  his  intrench- 
ments to  fight. 

Moreover  an  "  assault  all  along  the  line "  was  useless. 
To  obtain  advantages  from  the  great  loss  of  life  which 
was  inevitable,  the  dominating  point  of  the  line  should  have 
been  developed  and  the  assault  massed  there.  No  reserves 
were  apparently  ready  to  follow  up  any  advantages  which 
might  be  gained.  The  extreme  care  in  arranging  details 
which  should  have  been  exercised  was  not  to  be  seen.  No 
picked  troops  were  selected  for  the  heaviest  work.  The 
orders  were  only  for  "  an  assault  all  along  the  line."  The 
rank  and  file  did  not  even  know  Cold  Harbor  was  to  be  a 
battle.  The  old  method  of  selecting  your  point  of  attack, 
picking  your  troops,  and  properly  supporting  them,  is  by  no 
means  obsolete.   But  Grant  did  not  deem  its  use  advisable. 


1864.] 


MORE  BLOOD. 


219 


Within  a  few 
moments  of  the 
appointed  time 
this  general  assault 
takes  place.  Out 
of  the  grey  dawn,  ' 
eighty  thousand 
men  rush  forward 
upon  the  enemy  in 
his  intrenched 

lines,  meet  a 
bloody  repulse, 
and  retire  to  cover 
themselves  with 
such  works  as  they 
can  most  speedily 
erect  to  hold  the 
advanced  ground 
which  some  of 
them  have  gained. 
The  assault  has 
failed  in  a  brief  ten  Cold  Harbor.  May  31 -June  12, 1864. 
minutes.     All  the 

fighting  is  over  in  less  than  an  hour.  Six  thousand  men 
have  fallen.  The  enemy  has  lost  but  a  tithe  of  this  num- 
ber. 

It  would  have  been  proper  on  this  day  for  Grant  to  ask 
a  truce  to  bury  the  dead  and  care  for  the  wounded  who 
lay  between  the  lines. 

It  was  not  pleasant  to  acknowledge  defeat ;  but  it  was 


220  BIRD'S-MYJH  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1864. 

the  part  of  humanity.  And  no  great  military  necessity 
called  for  the  continuance  of  the  battle  for  the  succeeding 
four  days.  But  during  all  this  time  the  wounded  lay  upon 
the  field.     Many  perished  from  hunger  and  exposure. 

Grant  at  first  proposed  to  himself  to  take  the  position  by 
regular  siege  approaches.  But  he  soon  abandoned  this  idea 
and  reverted  to  the  old  plan  of  a  transfer  of  the  Army  to  the 
James. 

The  object  of  Grant^s  overland  campaign  was  to  capture 
or  to  destroy  Lee's  army.  He  had  done  neither.  But  he 
had  lost  sixty  thousand  men  in  ^\q  vreeks  without  inflicting 
corresponding  loss  upon  the  enemy.  The  Second  corps 
alone  had  lost  four  hundred  men  a  day,  from  the  time  of 
leaving  the  Rappahannock.  The  full  significance  of  this  is 
apparent  when  the  force  of  each  army  at  the  inception  of 
the  campaign  is  called  to  mind.  Grant  had  numbered  one 
hundred  and  twenty-two  thousand  men  ;  Lee  some  seventy 
thousand.  This  fearful  loss  was  the  result  of  assaults  in 
mass  undertaken  without  the  aid  of  that  skill  which  Grant 
knew  well  how  to  employ,  though  he  neglected  to  do  so. 
Whenever  Grant  resorted  to  manoeuvring,  he  succeeded 
measurably.  Whenever  he  attacked  all  along  the  line,  he 
failed  utterly.  "  Turenne,"  says  Napoleon  of  the  campaign 
of  1655,  "constantly  observed  the  two  maxims:  first, 
Never  attack  a  position  in  front  when  you  can  obtain 
it  by  turning  it;  second,  Avoid  doing  what  the  enemy 
wishes,  and  that  simply  because  he  does  wish  it.  Shun 
the  field  of  battle  which  he  has  reconnoitred  and  studied  and 
more  particularly  that  in  which  he  has  fortified  and  in- 
trenched himself." 


18641}  MORE  BLOOD.  221 

The  theory  has  been  advanced  that  there  had  to  be  about 
BO  much  hammering,  about  so  much  loss  of  life,  and  con- 
sumption of  energy  and  material,  before  we  could  hope  to 
end  the  war ;  that  so  long  as  the  South  had  any  men  or 
means,  the  struggle  would  continue.  There  is  a  ground- 
work of  truth  in  this.  The  Confederacy  was  practically 
exhausted  before  it  yielded. 

But  the  corollary  is  likewise  true.  If  the  South  would 
certainly  succumb  when  exhausted,  it  behooved  us,  on 
merely  humanitarian  grounds,  to  fight  on  conditions  so 
nearly  equal  as  to  inflict  the  same  loss  upon  the  enemy  as 
we  ourselves  must  suffer.  This  had  not  been  done.  And 
the  student  of  this  final  campaign  in  Virginia  looks  in  vain 
for  the  master-stroke  by  which  our  forces,  numbering  two 
to  one  of  the  enemy,  could  compel  the  surrender  of  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  without  losses  to  us  greater  in 
number  than  the  total  effective  of  that  gallant  body.  Lee 
undoubtedly  was  fighting  at  a  great  advantage,  on  interior 
lines,  in  his  own  State,  on  the  defense.  But  how  was  he 
overmatched  in  force ! 

Criticism  can  not  depreciate  the  really  great  qualities  or 
eminent  services  of  General  Grant.  His  task  was  one  to 
tax  a  Bonaparte.  That  he  was  unable  to  put  an  end  to 
the  struggle  by  means  less  costly  in  lives  and  material,  if 
not  indeed  by  some  brilliant  feat  of  arms,  can  not  detract 
from  the  praise  actually  his  due  for  determined,  unflinching 
courage.  It  rather  adds  to  the  laurels  of  Lee.  It  cannot 
be  asserted  that  any  other  Northern  general  could  here 
have  accomplished  more  against  the  genius  of  this  soldier. 
And  it  was  Grant  who,  in  the  face  of  the  gravest  diflScul- 


222  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1864. 

ties,  political  and  military,  was  able  to  hold  the  confidence 
of  the  nation  and  to  prevent  that  party  at  the  North,  which 
was  clamoring  for  peace,  from  wrecking  our  success  now 
all  but  won.  But  his  truest  admirers,  indeed  he  himself, 
admit  Cold  Harbor  to  have  been  a  grievous  mistake.  And 
all  who  appreciate  at  its  solid  worth  Grant's  ability  as  a 
leader,  regret  that,  in  this  great  struggle  with  Lee,  he 
should  have  failed  to  employ  the  fiill  resources  he  so  abun- 
dantly possessed. 


XLIL 

SHERMAN  LOOKS  TOWARDS  ATLANTA. 

WE  have  seen  three  parallel  columns,  west  of  the 
Alleghanies,  slowly  working  their  way  southward 
from  the  Ohio  river  into  the  heart  of  the  Confederacy. 
The  Army  of  the  Tennessee  had  hugged  the  Mississippi. 
The  Army  of  the  Cumberland  had  advanced  with  varied 
success  and  failure  along  the  railroad  from  Louisville  to 
Nashville  and  thence  to  Chattanooga,  branching  off  for  a 
while  to  Shiloh  and  Corinth,  where  its  identity  was  merged, 
for  the  moment,  in  the  great  body  there  manoeuvring 
under  Halleck.  The  Army  of  the  Ohio  had  left  Eastern 
Kentucky  by  way  of  Cumberland  Gap,  and  had  long  had 
its  head-quarters  atKnoxville.  In  the  winter  of  1863-4 
these  armies  were  commanded  respectively  by  Sherman, 
Thomas  and  Schofield,  under  the  supreme  control  of 
Grant. 

When,  towards  the  end  of  1861,  the  Department  of  the 
Ohio  was  first  created  and  Buell  was  placed  in  command, 
his  forces  had  been  known  as  the  Army  of  the  Ohio. 
A  year  later  the  Department  of  the  Cumberland  was 
created  for  Rosecrans,  and  Buell's  old  army,  now  ad- 
vanced to  Nashville,  became    the  Army  of  the  Cumber- 

223 


224  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1864. 

land.  Later  still,  the  Department  of  the  Ohio  was 
narrowed  to  Eastern  Kentucky  and  Eastern  Tennessee,  and 
the  troops  in  the  new  command  received  the  old  name  of 
Army  of  the  Ohio. 

Opposite  Thomas,  at  Dalton,  Ga.,  lay  Joe  Johnston, 
now  devoting  himself  to  the  personal  command  of  Bragg's 
old  army.  For  this  and  the  army  of  Northern  Virginia 
were  then  the  sole  forces  on  which  the  South  could  rely  to 
eave  the  Cause  from  its  threatening  doom,  if  saved  it  might 
be.  Longstreet,  untU  ordered  back  to  the  Army  of  North- 
ern Virginia,  confronted  Schofield. 

Sherman,  who  had  rejoined  McPherson  and  Hurlbut  at 
Vicksburg,    was   commissioned   to    capture   Meridian,    in 
Eastern  Mississippi,  and  destroy  the  railroads  there  center- 
ing.    This  work  he  accomplished  in  so  thorough  a  manner 
that  the  State  of  Mississippi  was  rendered 

M  "^hT  1864  harmless  for  interference  in  the  campaign 
immediately  to  ensue.  He  was  severely 
held  to  task  by  the  Southern  press  for  what  were  termed  his 
ruthless  methods  of  warfare.  But  Sherman  was  a  soldier, 
and  when  he  had  work  to  do,  he  did  it  without  fear,  favor, 
or  affection.  An  instance  of  unnecessary  cruelty  or 
destruction  of  property  by  him  has  yet  to  be  substantiated. 
After  the  Meridian  campaign  the  bulk  of  Sherman's  force 
was  rendezvoused  at  Huntsville,  Ala.,  to  join  in  the  great 
onfiet  towards  Atlanta. 

Sherman  assumed  command  of  the  above  named  three 
armies  upon  Grant's  appointment  as  Lieutenant-General, 
and  to  McPherson  fell  the  command  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee.     Joe  Johnston  still  lay  at  Dalton. 


1864.]         SHERMAN  LOOKS  TOWARDS  ATLANTA.  225 

Grant  and  Sherman  had  agreed  to  act  in  concert. 
While  the  former  should  thrust  Lee  back  upon  Kichmond, 
his  late  lieutenant  was  to  push  Johnston  towards  Atlanta. 
And  Banks  was  to  transfer  his  forces  from  New  Orleans  to 
Mobile  and  thence  move  towards  and  join  hands  with  the 
Western  armies. 

Sherman  devoted  his  earliest  energies  to  the  question  of 
transportation  and  railroads.  Baggage  was  reduced  to  the 
lowest  limits,  the  higher  officers  setting  the  example. 
Actual  supplies  and  fighting-material  were  alone  to  be 
carried.  Luxuries  were  to  be  things  of  the  past ;  comforts 
to  be  forgotten.  "War's  stem  reality  was  to  be  each  one's 
lot.  Probably  no  officer  in  such  high  command  ever  lived 
80  entirely  from  hand  to  mouth  as  did  Sherman  and  his 
military  family  during  the  succeeding  campaigns.  The 
entire  equipment  of  his  army  head-quarters  would  have 
ehamed  the  shabbiest  regimental  outfit  of  1861. 

Spring  was  to  open  with  a  general  advance.  It  was 
agreed  to   put  and   keep  the  Confederates 

May. 

on  the  defensive    by  a    policy  of   constant 
hammering. 

Bragg  had  been  removed  to  satisfy  public  opinion  in  the 
South,  but  was  nominally  called  to  Richmond  to  act  as  Mr.  • 
Davis'  chief-of-staff.  Johnston,  as  commander  of  the 
Department,  had  personally  undertaken  to  hold  head 
against  Sherman.  But  the  fact  that  he  possessed  neither 
the  President's  good  will  nor  that  of  his  new  adviser, 
militated  much  against  a  happy  conduct  of  the  campaign* 

Sherman's    forces   held    a    front    twenty 
miles   long   in   advance   of  Ringgold,  just 


226  BIRD'8-ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.         [1864. 

fiouth  of  Chattanooga.  McPherson  and  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  was  on  the  right  with  twenty-five  thousand  men 
and  one  hundred  guns.  Thomas  and  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  held  the  centre  with  sixty  thousand  men  and 
one  hundred  and  thirty  guns.  Schofield  and  the  Army  of 
the  Ohic  formed  the  left  wing.  His  command  waa 
fifteen  thousand  men  and  thirty  guns.  This  grand  total  of 
one  hundred  thousand  men  and  two  hundred  and  sixty  guns 
formed  an  army  of  as  good  stuff  as  ever  bore  arms,  and 
the  confidence  of  the  leader  in  his  men  and  of  the  men  in 
their  leader  was  unbounded. 

Johnston  himself  foresaw  the  necessity  of  a  strictly 
defensive  campaign,  to  which  his  far  from  sanguine 
character  as  well  as  his  judgment  as  to  what  the  existing 
conditions  demanded,  made  him  peculiarly  suited. 
Counted  after  the  same  fashion  as  Sherman's  army, 
Johnston  had  some  sixty-five  thousand  men.  Recog- 
nizing the  difference  in  the  strength  of  each,  and  knowing 
that  Sherman  must  follow  the  railroad,  Johnston  was  wise 
in  adopting  this  Fabian  policy.  He  could  divine  what 
Sherman's  general  strategy  must  be.  The  tactics  of  each 
manoeuvre  he  could  meet  as  occasion  offered.  He  was 
able  to  calculate  his  task,  and  he  acted  accordingly.  He 
intrenched  every  step  he  took;  he  fought  only  when 
attacked ;  he  invited  battle  only  when  the  conditions  were 
largely  in  his  favor.  Subsequent  events  showed  how  wisa 
beyond  his  critics  he  could  be. 


XMIL 

SHERMAN  MOVES  ON  ATLANTA. 

SHERMAN  took  the  measure  of  the  intrenchments  at 
Dalton  with  care,  and  though  he  outnumbered  his 
antagonist,  preferred  not  to  hazard  an  engagement  at  such 
odda  when  he  might  force  one  on  better  ground.  Thia 
conduct  shows  in  strong  contrast  with  Grant's,  when  the 
latter  first  met  his  opponent  at  this  same  moment  in 
Virginia. 

Sherman  despatched  McPherson  towards  Resaca,  on  the 
raib-oad  in  Johnston's  rear,  with  instructions  to  capture  the 
town  if  possible.  Combined  with  this  flanking  movement,  a 
general  advance  was  made  upon  the  Con- 

n  ■,  1.  1      ^  .      ;  May  7  to  12. 

federate  Imes,  and  after  tactical  maneeuvrmg 

of  several  days  in  front  of  Rocky  Face  Ridge,  Johnston 

concluded  to  tetire  from  his  stronghold.     McPherson  had 

Btrangely  failed  to  seize  Resaca,  though  an  excellent  chance 

had  offered,  and  at  this  place  the  Confederate  army  took  up 

its  new  stand.     Had  McPherson  been  a  trifle  more  bold, 

Johnston  would  have  been  reduced  for  supplies  and  retreat 

to  the  poor  roads  to  the  east  of  Dalton ;  and  at  the  very 

outset  of  this  campaign  might,  perhaps,  have  been  seriously 

compromised. 

227 


228  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1864. 

This  was  Sherman's  first  earnest  bout  with  Johnston .  The 
former  was  by  nature  eager,  sanguine,  restless,  and  venture- 
some ;  the  latter  of  quiet,  steady  nerves,  unsuited  to  attack, 
unsurpassed  on  the  defense.  Yet  Sherman  was  to  beat 
him  at  his  own  game  of  patience.  Nothing  characterizes 
Sherman's  versatile  ability  more  than  this. 

Sherman  faced  his  antagonist  on  the  line  of  Camp  Creek 
in  front  of  Resaca,  with  his  right  flank  resting  on  the 
Oostanaula.  From  this  position  he  operated  by  uninter- 
mitted  tapping  upon  Johnston's  defences  at  constantly 
varying  points,  without,  however,  bringing  on  a  general 
engagement.  The  latter,  well  aware  that  Sherman  could 
make  his  position  untenable  by  crossing  the  Oostanaula 
below,  as  indeed  Sherman  was  preparing  to  do,  evacuated 
Resaca  and  crossed  the  river.  Sherman 
speedily  followed. 

Sherman's  uniform  tactics  during  this  campaign,  varied 
indefinitely  in  details,  consisted,  as  will  be  seen,  in  forcing 
the  centre  of  the  army  upon  Johnston's  lines,  while  with 
the  right  or  left  he  operated  upon  either  flank  as  chance 
or  ground  best  offered. 

Johnston  did  not  propose  to  hazard  an  engagement  unless 
all  conditions  were  in  his  favor.  He  attempted  a  stand  at 
Alairsville,  twenty  miles  south  of  Eesaca,  but  shortly 
withdrew  to  Kingston  and  Cassville.  Each  captain  manoeu- 
rred  for  a  chance  to  fight  the  other  at  a  disadvantage. 
Each  was  too  wary.  But  either  would  have  welcomed 
the  other's  attack  in  force,  if  only  on  his  own  chosen 
terms.  Johnston,  in  fact,  here  issued  an  order  looking 
to  a  general  engagement,  but   some   dissensions  between 


1864.]  SHERMAN  MOVES    ON  ATLANTA,  229 

himself  and  his  lieutenants,  Hardee,  Hood  and  Polk, 
operated  to  change  his  mind.  Both  Hood  and  Hardee 
bitterly  opposed  Johnston's  defensive  policy.  Its  expedi- 
ency appeared  later. 

Opportunities  were  not  infrequent  for  an  attack  on 
one  or  other  wing  of  the  Union  Army,  which,  from  the 
exigencies  of  the  manoeuvring  or  the  march,  might  become 
isolated  at  a  distance  from  the  rest  of  the 

May  18. 

army.  But  Sherman  had  abundant  faith  in 
his  lieutenants,  and  believed  that  under  almost  any  condi- 
tions either  of  them  could  hold  his  own  long  enough  to 
enable  him  to  bring  up  his  other  forces  to  their  assistance. 
And  Sherman  was  eager  for  a  general  action,  if  only  it 
could  be  brought  about  on  ground  not  all  too  favorable  to 
his  enemy.  For  he  desired  to  weaken  the  Confederates  by 
the  attrition  of  battle  before  he  forced  them  in  retreat  too 
far  from  his  own  base. 

From  Cassville,   Johnston  retired  across 

May  20. 
the  Etowah.     So  far  this  campaign  had  been 

one  of  manoeuvres.  Neither  combatant  had  suffered  ma- 
terial loss.  Like  two  wrestlers,  as  yet  ignorant  of  each 
other's  strength  or  quickness,  they  were  sparring  for  a  hold. 
NTeither  would  risk  giving  odds. 

Field  comforts  had  been  very  sparse,  but  the  men  had 
borne  their  privations  cheerily.  The  example  of  their 
Buperiors  and  especially  the  promise  of  the  campaign  had 
made  it  easy  to  bear  with  short  rations  and  the  discomforts 
of  the  rainy  season.  And  within  the  enemy's  lines,  the 
brave  men  were  accustomed  to  look  upon  privation  as  a 
daily  necessity .     Though  in  this  campaign,  the  Confederate 


230  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.        [18G4. 

army  had  in  the  fertile  fields  of  Georgia  an  immediate 
Bource  of  supply  usually  much  more  rare. 

The  Union  army  was  growing  skilful.  Local  difficulties, 
multiplied  many  fold  by  bad  maps  and  hostile  population, 
were  overcome  in  considerable  measure  by  an  able  corps  of 
topographical  engineers.  Their  peculiar  duty  was  to  accom- 
pany the  daily  reconnoitring  parties  and  furnish  detailed 
information  as  to  the  ground  on  which  approaching  manceu- 
vres  were  apt  to  be  conducted. 

The  division  of  eno^ineers  under  Colonel  Wriojht  became 
singularly  expert.  To  the  enemy  fell  the  duty  of  destroying 
as  they  fell  back ;  to  us  the  task  of  reconstructing.  Bridges 
were  uniformly  burned  and  railroads  wrecked  by  the  re- 
treating Confederates.  To  save  delays  in  rebuilding,  so  far 
as  possible,  trestles  were  fitted  in  the  rear  to  a  scale  with 
interchangeable  timbers,  so  that  bridges  could  be  constructed 
with  a  speed  never  before  dreamed  of.  No  sooner  had  the 
Confederates  put  torch  to  a  bridge,  than  a  new  one  arose 
as  by  magic,  and  the  whistle  of  the  locomotive  always  fol- 
lowed hard  upon  the  heels  of  the  army. 

Johnston  was  never  in  a  better  situation  for  attack  than 
about  these  days.  For  every  mile  that  Sherman  advanced, 
the  Federal  army  was  losing  in  numbers,  by  leaving  de- 
tachments to  protect  its  lengthening  line  of  operations. 
Johnston,  on  the  contrary,  was  gathering  in  his  own  and 
was  daily  gaining  in  effective  strength.  K  he  was  to  fight, 
the  occasion  was  good.  But  Sherman  would  give  him  no 
opening. 


XLIV. 

ON  TO  MARIETTA. 

MARIETTA  was  Sherman's  next  objective.  But  to 
advance  upon  it  along  the  railroad  was  impracticable. 
The  Etowah  river  as  well  as  Allatoona  Pass  lay  athwart  hia 
path.  He  had  in  ante  helium  days  become  familiar  with 
this  section,  and  had  no  miod  to  force  a  passage  of  the  river 
and  defile  beyond,  if  he  could  manoeuvre  Johnston  out  of 
this  strong  defensive  position.  He  knew  that  the  water-shed 
between  the  Etowah  and  Chattahoochee  offered  an  easier 
route. 

Leavmg  to  his  enemy  the  possession  of  the  railroad  east 
of  the  Etowah,  he  put  over  his  army  at  various  points 
south   of  Kingston,    and   moved   direct  towards    Dallas, 

intending  from  here  to  operate  on  Marietta. 

.  May  23. 

Thomas,  in  the  centre,  was  the  column  of 

direction. 

Johnston   accepted   the   change   of   route    and    shifted 

position  to   the   east   of   Dallas  on  the  line  of   Pumpkin 

Vine  Creek.     Here  the  rival  armies  closed  in  a  struggle 

of  more  or  less  severity,  almost  rising  to  the  dignity  of 

a  general  engagement.     While  Hooker  at-      Ma  05  27 

tacked   the   enemy's  lines    at    New    Hope 

281 


232 


BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR. 


[1864. 


Church,    Howard    essayed    to    break    them   at   Pickett's 

Mills. 

We  had  not  as  yet  been  weaned  from  the  old  ideas  of 

attack  in  columns  of  brigades.     The  Napoleonic  theory  of 

momentum,  well  suited 
to  the  short  range  mus- 
ket and  open  ground, 
will  not  work  against 
arms  of  precision  and 
intrenclied  field-works. 
Neither  Hooker's  nor 
Howard's  columns  were 
able  to  effect  a  breach 
in  the  enemy's  lines ; 
and  except  once  there- 

Piekett's  Mills  and  New  Hope  Church,  ^^^er,  at  Kenesaw,  this 
May  26-27,  1864.  '  ^  , 

formation    for    assault 

was    abandoned.     A    single    line,    followed   by    a   second 

one  at  a  suitable  distance,  and  yet  another,  proved  to  be 

more  effective,  and  saved  much  loss.     This  is  the  origin 

of  the  successive  slender  lines  of  infantry,  each  able  to  take 

advantage  of  the  accidents  of  the  ground  in  moving  to  the 

assault,   that  were  later  employed  against  the  still  more 

accurate  weapon  of  the  day. 

Our  Civil  War  was  full  of  suggestions  as  to  methods  of 

coping    with     the    rapidly     growing     destructiveness    of 

smaU  arms  and  artillery,  both   on  land    and  at   sea.     As 

arms  of  precision  and  heavy  guns  were  not  at   that  time 

perfected,  neither  did  we  leave  perfect  means  to  the  future 

Boldier.     But  nearly  all  the  changes  in  the  tactical  forma 


1864.]  ON  TO  MARIETTA.  233 

tions  of  later  European  armies  had  their  prototype  in 
methods  adapted  by  us  to  the  conditions  then  existing. 
American  ingenuity  is  by  no  means  confined  to  the 
machine-shop. 

It  has  been  said  that,  in  this  campaign,  one  man  behind 
field-works  proved  equal,  on  whichever  side,  to  three  in 
attack.  Two  would  be  nearer  the  truth.  And  every  mile 
of  ground  from  Dalton  to  Atlanta  was  covered  with  sub- 
stantial works,  erected  whenever  and  wherever  either  army 
halted  in  the  presence  of  the  other. 

During  this  three  days'  fight  along  Pumpkin  Vine  Creek, 
Sherman  proved  Johnston's  line  too  strong  to  carry  by 
direct  assault.  He  must  resort  to  his  old  tactics  and  turn 
Johnston's  right.  For  this  purpose  he  withdrew  his  own 
right  wing  piecemeal  towards  his  left.  Johnston  seized 
the  opportunity  himself  to  attack  during  this 

May  28. 

manoeuvre.     But  he  was  repulsed  in   good 
style  by  Schofield. 

For  a  month  the  troops  had  now  been  unceasingly  under 
fire.  Nothing  more  nearly  approaching  a  general  engage- 
ment than  New  Hope  Church  and  Pickett's  Mills  had  beei 
brought  on,  but  Sherman  had  suffered  a  loss  of  fifteen 
hundred  killed  and  seven  thousand  five  hundred  wounded, 
and  Johnston  a  similar  loss  of  five  thousand  five  hundred. 
Contact  with  the  enemy  had  never  ceased.  Skirmishing 
had  been  severe  and  incessant,  and  the  troops  were  kept 
on  the  alert  every  minute  of  the  time.  But  the  health  of 
the  army  remained  excellent. 

By  Sherman's  movement  towards  his  left,  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  and  the  Army  of  the    Ohio    had  forced 


234  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1864. 

themselves  into  a  position  in  which  they  enfiladed  a  salient 
in  Johnston's  line.  The  latter  once  more  deemed  it 
expedient  to  retire  to  a  new  position  nearer  Marietta, 
between  Lost,  Pine  and  Brush  Mountains  and  in  advance 
of  Kenesaw.  Sherman  followed  him  sharply  up  by  a 
movement  towards  his  left ;  Schofield  standing  fast,  while 
Thomas  and  McPherson  passed  in  his  rear.  The  new 
disposition  threw  Schofield  on  the  right,  Thomas  in  the 
centre,  and  McPherson  on  the  left.  Johnston  opposed  it 
with  Hardee  on  the  left,  Polk  in  the  centre,  and  Hood  on 
the  right. 

By  this  flank  operation  Sherman  reached  and  reestablished 
his  line  alonff  the  railroad  ;  the  supply-trains 

June  6-9.  .  *=  ^  i'i'  J 

quickly  appeared,  and  a  new  base  of 
supplies  was  set  up  at  Ackworth.  Thus  ended  the  first 
stage  of  this  campaign. 

If  Sherman  had  exhibited  great  vigor  and  patience  in 
pushing  Johnston  back,  so  had  Johnston  shown  wonderful 
dexterity  in  parrying  Sherman's  powerful  lunges,  and  in 
preventing  an  antagonist  of  such  superior  strength  from 
opening  a  weak  spot  in  his  harness. 

The  forces  had  been  about  as  three  to  two. 


XLV. 

MARIETTA. 

ALLATOONA  is  now  made  a  secondary  base  from 
which  operations  against  Johnston  may  be  con- 
ducted. 

During  this  entire  campaign  Sherman  sought  constantly 
to  compel  his  antagonist  to  an  open  field  engagement,  sure 
that  his  heavier  battalions  would  carry  the  day.  With 
praiseworthy  shrewdness  Johnston  as  constantly  declined. 
The  open  ground  to  the  east  of  Marietta  again  tempted 
Sherman  to  move  by  his  left  in  the  hope  of  bringing  John- 
ston to  battle.  But,  inasmuch  as  an  eastward  movement 
might  afford  Johnston  too  ready  an  opportunity  to  strike  at 
his  line  of  communications,  which  such  a  direction  would 
somewhat  uncover,  Sherman  determined  to  forego  his  pur- 
pose and  to  operate  by  his  right  instead. 

This  campaign  resembles  a  bout  with  the  foils.  Both 
fencers  are  in  guard.  Sherman  is  constantly  at  play  with 
Uis  weapon,  disengaging,  cutting  over,  beating,  lunging, 
using  every  art  to  draw  into  action  his  antagonist.  John- 
ston "warily  follows  every  disengagement,  skilfully  parries 
each  lunge  his  strong-armed  adversary  makes,  with  an 
occasional   cautious  riposte  y  which  in   turn  is  invariably 

286 


236  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1864. 

countered.  Johnston  constantly  retires,  Sherman  as  con- 
stantly advances.  At  every  retrograde  movement  you 
expect  Johnston  to  make  a  return  assault.  But  it  never 
comes.  Nor  can  all  Sherman's  skill  find  the  weak  side  of 
his  guard,  or  an  opening  through  which  he  can  manage  to 
plant  his  button  squarely  on  his  breast. 

The  rains  had  been  continuous  and  heavy.  Only  those 
acquainted  with  the  soil  and  streams  of  the  South  appreciate 
the  full  meaning  of  this  statement.  By  the  utmost  energy 
only  could  artillery  be  moved,  or  supplies  and  ammunition 
be  distributed  to  the  troops.  The  lines  had  been  laboriously 
advanced  close  to  the  enemy's  works  and  a  partial  demon- 
stration upon  his  front  was  begun.  The  situation  promised 
serious  pounding. 

Sherman  gives  the  word.     Thomas  throws  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland  upon  the  enemy's  position;  Hooker  gal- 
lantly assaults,  but  is  foiled  by  the  intrench- 
ments  at  Pine  Mountain,  while  Cox  makes  a 

partial   lodgment   in   the   line  near  Gilgal. 
June  16. 

The  fire  on  the  advanced  posts  is  irritating  in 

the  extreme.     Blair  effects  a  breach  in  a  part  of  Hood's 

works.     The  latter  retires  behind  Noonday 
June  17.         ^  ^ 

Creek.  Again  on  the  morrow  Hardee  with- 
draws his  left  to  a  new  set  of  previously  thrown  up  intrench- 
ments,  followed  smartly  by  Sherman's  right. 

Johnston's  line  is  weakened  by  several  salients  which  the 
successful  issue  of  the  partial  attacks  of  the  last  few  days 

have   left.     He  is  on  the  point  of  falling 

back,  when  Sherman  launches  Howard's 
corps  upon  him,  and  quickens  his  retreat.     The  new  Con- 


1864  J 


MARIETTA. 


237 


federate  works  are  nearer  Marietta,  with  Hardee  on  the  left, 
Hood  on  the  right,  and  Loring  (temporary  successor  of 
Polk)  holding  Kenesaw  in  the  centre. 

Since  the  first  of  the  month  there  has  been  an  uninter- 
rupted downpour  of  rain.  All  the  streams  are  swollen,  and 
the  artillery  and  wagon  trains  fairly  engulfed.     Movements 


Operations  about  Marietta.    June  14-28,  1864. 


are  correspondmgly  slow.  The  question  of  supplies  be- 
comes more  than  troublesome.  The  long  line  of  operations 
is  in  danjjer  of  beino^  cut.  Several  Confederate  raids  have 
already  interfered  with  the  communications,  though  skilful 
management  has  quickly  repaired  the  damage.  And  it  is 
not  feasible  to  cut  loose  from  the  rail,  owing  to  the  impossi- 
bility of  using  the  country  roads  for  heavy  amounts  of 
transportation. 


238  BIRD*S-ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.        [1864. 

The  left  is  advanced,  while  the  entire  army 

prepares  for  attack,  moving  by  the  right. 

This  manoeuvre  is  continued  to  such  a  point  as  to  seriously 

jeopardize  Johnston's  left.     Hood  is  conse- 

June  20-21.  ,  ,         ,  ,        .   , 

quently  transferred  from  the  right  to  the  ex- 
treme left.  No  sooner  on  the  line,  than,  fretted  with  inac- 
tivity, he  rushes  like  a  hound  unleashed  upon  Hooker  and 

Schofield,  in  an  effort  to  regain  lost  ground. 
June  22.  t»       ,       .     ,        ,  i  xx.      • 

But  he  IS  handsomely  met.  His  impetuous 
onslaught  is  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  a  thousand  men,  our 
OYHx  being  slight. 


XLVI. 

KENESAW. 

SHERMAN  had  left  no  stone  unturned  to  bring  on  a 
general  engagement  upon  favorable  ground.  But 
wily  Johnston  had  never  afforded  him  an  opportunity  to 
fight  unless  he  was  behind  field-works  too  solid  to  promise 
aught  but  fruitless  slaughter.  Johnston  would  not  be 
drawn  into  the  open.  Since  Hood  had  been  transferred 
from  the  right,  however,  the  defences  at  Kenesaw  were  not 
so  fully  manned. 

Inaction  would  not  do.  Sherman  must  choose  either  to 
move  about  Johnston's  left,  which  the  bad  state  of  the  roads 
scarcely  warranted,  or  else  to  break  through  his  lines. 
Failure  to  take  some  decisive  action  would  allow  Johnston 
time  to  operate  seriously  against  our  communications. 
Sherman  decided  to  try  once  more  the  fortunes  of  assault, 
and  selected  for  the  attempt  the  bluffs  of  Kenesaw,  as  the 
key  of  the  situation. 

Schofield  makes   a  heavy  demonstration 

June  26. 
on  the  right  to   draw   troops,    if   possible, 

away  from  Kenesaw.     In  so  doing  he  is  able  to  seize  some 

advanced  ground  which  compromises  the  security  of  Hood's 

239 


240  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1864. 

left.     This  he  defends  by  a  strong  redoubt.     At  the  same 

time  an  attack  in  force  is  ordered  to  be  made  on  Kenesaw. 

McPherson  entrusts  the  details  of  his  front  to  Logan,  who 

presses  in  with  M.  L.  Smith  and  Walcutt. 
June  27. 

Howard  pushes  Newton  forward  in  column 

from  his  front,  and  Palmer  sends  in  Davis  on  Newton's 

right  in  like  formation .     Hooker  is  in  reserve .     Meanwhile , 

on  the  right,  Schofield  supports  this  onset  by  pushing  his 

advantage  against  Hood  to  the  utmost,  with  the  railroad 

south  of  Marietta  as  a  goal. 

The  attack  on  Kenesaw  has  been  preceded  by  general 
artillery  fire ;  and  the  columns  advance  with  confidence. 
But,  as  was  demonstrated  a  month  ago,  heavy  masses  are 
found  useless  against  intrenched  lines  and  rapid  musketry. 
Newton  and  Davis  both  fail  to  effect  a  lodgment,  but  with 
obstinate  gallantry  each  holds  and  intrenches  a  line  within 
a  few  hundred  feet  of  the  works  from  which  they  have 
recoiled.  Smith  carries  and  holds  the  skirmish  pits,  but  is 
brought  up  standing  against  the  works  of  the  line. 

The  enemy  has  quickly  comprehended  that  the  real 
attack  is  against  the  key  of  their  position  at  Kenesaw,  and 
80  soon  as  the  first  rush  is  over,  and  the  works  still  remain 
theirs,  the  lines  are  at  once  reinforced  and  all  chance  of 
success   is   past. 

The  loss  has  not  been  as  great  as  might  have  been  ex- 
pected. Our  own  adds  up  about  three  thousand  men ; 
the  enemy's  barely  five  hundred.  Whether  the  works 
could  have  been  carried  by  a  sturdier  onset  is  uncertain. 
But  the  days  of  massed  columns  are  numbered.  Their 
weakness  has  now  been  doubly  proven.     The   only  gain 


1864.]  KENESAW.  241 

has  been  by  Schofield  on  the  right.     The  enemy  has  won 
the  battle  of  Kenesaw  Mountain. 

It  has  been  alleged  that  the  impossible  nature  of  the  task 
made  the  assault  on  Kenesaw  unjustifiable ;  and  the  loss 
of  life  has  been  characterized  as  mere  wilful  slaughter. 
It  is  difficult  to  answer  such  criticism.  But  if  it  has  any 
weight,  what  can  be  said  of  Fredericksburg  or  of  Cold 
Harbor?  Who  shall  decide  upon  what  is  justifiable  in 
war?  What,  indeed,  becomes  of  the  art  of  war  itself? 
Must  not  all  swords  be  forthwith  beaten  into  ploughshares 
and  all  spears  into  pruning-hooks  ?  The  same  criticism 
has  been  passed  on  other  soldiers  —  notably  on  Gustavus 
Adolphus  for  his  assault  on  the  Alte  Veste.  But  Gustavus 
was  in  the  right,  and  so  was  Sherman. 

The  rainy  period  now  came  to  an  end.  The  roads  agaui 
began  to  harden.  Sherman  saw  that  his  advantage  lay  in 
moving  around  Johnston's  left,  as  he  could  now  with  less 
danger  leave  the  vicinity  of  the  railroad.  Johnston  began 
to  fortify  Atlanta  and  make  new  lines  to  defend  the  Chatta- 
hoochee. For  this  purpose  he  employed  large  bodies  of 
negroes,  always  fortifying  positions  in  the  rear  to  which  he 
could  withdraw  at  will.  McPherson  was  moved  to  the 
right  of  the  army,  as  the  first  step  in  a  new  flank  march. 
But   Johnston   did   not  wait ;  he  evacuated       ^  ,    ,  „ 

'  July  1-2. 

Marietta.        Thomas     at     once     advanced 

through  the  town,  while  McPherson  moved  on  Turner's 

Ferry,  obliging  Johnston  to  defend  the  crossing. 

The  casualties  in  June  had  been  seventy-five  hundred 
Lien,  of  which  fifty-five  hundred  were  from  the  Army  of 
the  Cumberland.     This  meant  a  daily  loss  of  some  two 


242  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR.         [1864. 

hundred  men  in  the  constant  bickering  at  the  advanced 
posts.  Johnston's  may  have  been  five  thousand  men. 
The  habit  of  both  contestants  had  been  to  intrench  the 
skirmish  as  well  as  the  main  line.  Every  advance  on 
either  Bide  called  for  the  capture  of  field-works. 

The  only  great  physical  obstacle  now  in  Sherman^s  path 
ie  the  Chattahoochee.  Beyond  this  lies  Atlanta.,  But  his 
problem  is  a  grave  one.  To  cross  this  river  lq  face  of 
an  enemy  intrenched  and  well  equipped  is  no  simple 
matter. 

Johnston  had  spent  a  month  on  his  tete  de  pont  at  the 
main  Chattahoochee  crossing.  But  he  could  not  presume 
to  hold  it  beyond  a  few  days,  for  he  was  exposed  to  being 
turned  out  of  it  by  Sherman's  putting  over  a  part  of  his 
force  above  or  below  to  move  on  Atlanta,  while  observing 
Johnston  with  the  balance. 

Sherman,  after  some  days,  discovered  an 

July  7. 

unused  crossing  above  the  railroad  near  Soap 

Creek,  and   passing   over   a   few   regiments,  intrenched  a 

bridge-head   on  the  east   bank.     Other  fords  above  were 

utilized,  and  the  cavalry  kept  up  a  constant  demonstration 

below  to  distract  the  enemy's  attention  from  the  operations 

up  the  river.     Rousseau  was  despatched  on  a  cavalry  raid 

eouth  of  Atlanta.     Stores  were  accumulated  at  Marietta. 

Johnston  now  entirely  withdrew  from  the 
July  9.  .  "^ 

west  side  of  the  Chattahoochee.     Sherman, 

after  long  deliberation,  made  ready  to  cross  his  army  by  the 

left  around  the  north  of  Atlanta.     By  this  means  he  might, 

after   seizing  the  railroad,    intercept    any   reinforcements 

which  should  be  sent  from  Virginia.     In  this  movement, 


1864.]  KENESA  W.  243 

Thomas  was  to  cross  and  establish  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland  as  the  new  right,  and  press  towards  Atlanta ; 
while  McPherson  was  to  pass  in  his  >rear  and  manoeuvre 
towards  the  left,  breaking  the  railroad  at  Decatur. 
Schofield  was  to  follow  and  fall  into  line  in  the  centre. 

Some  Southern  historians  claim  this  entire  campaign 
from  Dalton  to  Atlanta  as  a  Confederate  success. 
Johnston  "  had  Ijrought  his  army  to  Atlanta  after  inflicting 
a  loss  upon  the  enemy  five  times  as  great  as  his  own ;  and 
he  hnd  [performed  the  almost  marvellous  feat  of  conducting 
a  retresit  through  a  difficult  and  mountainous  country  more 
than  a  hundred  miles  in  extent  without  the  loss  of  material 
or  of  a  single  gun.  Gen.  Johnston  held  Atlanta  more 
firmly  than  Lee  held  Richmond.  Sherman  was  tmable  to 
invest  the  city,  and  to  withdraw  he  would  have  to  pass  over 
a  single  road,  one  hundred  and  thirty-five  miles  long, 
traversing  a  wild  and  broken  country.  Johnston  held  him, 
as  it  were,  suspended  for  destruction.  The  situation  was 
brilliant  for  the  Confederates."  [Pollard.]  It  does  not 
appear  that  such  deductions  from  the  facts  do  Johnston  the 
justice  he  deserves  for  the  very  able  conduct  of  the 
campaign  now  soon  to  close.  To  allow  Sherman  the 
credit  due  him  for  exceptional  skill  and  vigor  certainly 
throws  Johnston's  defense  into  higher  relief. 

The  situation  of  the  Confederate  army  was  far  from 
briUiant.     The  advantage  was  with  the  Federals.  ;, 


XLVIL 

GRANT'S  CHANGE  OF  BASE. 

W"E  last  saw  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  when  it  wa« 
about  to  leave  the  fatal   ground  on  which  Cold 
Harbor  had  been  fought.     Let  us  return  to  it. 

Gradually  moving  successive  corps  from  the  right,  Grant 
extended  his  left  down  towards  the  crossings  of  the  Chicka- 
hominy.    Warren  seized  Long  Bridge,  crossed,  and  demon- 
strated along  all  the  roads  leading  towards 
Richmond,  in  order  to  mislead  Lee.     Han- 
cock pushed  his  corps  over  the  same  bridge  towards  the 
James.     Burnside  and  Wright  crossed   lower  down  and 
marched  to  Charles  City.     Smith  had  already 
moved  by  water  from  White  House  to  Ber- 
muda Hundred,  whence  he  was  sent  out  to  seize  Petersburg 
with  his  own  and  other  troops. 

The  Army  of  the  Potomac  reached  the 
James  in  two  marches,  and,  with  a  day's  delay,  was  put 
over  to  the  south  side.     Lee  had  not  been 
slow  to  discover  Grant's  purpose,  and,  pur- 
suing the  same  policy  as  heretofore,  he  followed  on  parallel 
roads  and  crossed  the  James,  near  Drury's  Bluff,  one  day 

later  than  Grant  put  over  his  troops  below. 
244 


1864.]  GRANT'S  CHANGE  OF  BASE.  245 

The  City  of  Petersburg  acts  as  an  advanced  fortress  to 
protect  the  communications  of  Richmond  with  the  interior. 
It  is  a  strategic  point  of  the  greatest  value.  No  operations 
on  the  James  can  be  secure  without  its  possession. 

But  neither  Hancock,  who  was  first  ordered  forward  from 
the  Army  of  the  Potomac  in  the  direction  of  the  place,  nor 
indeed  Meade,  appears  to  have  known  that  Grant  intended 
that  Petersburg  should  be  at  once  captured.  Specific  or- 
ders had  not  been  issued  to  this  effect.  Smith  had  taken 
the  outer  works,  but  had  not  followed  up  his 
success,  though  opposed  only  by  militia. 
Hancock  should  at  once  have  been  sent  to  finish  the  opera^ 
tion ;  but  the  orders  eventually  issued  did  not  reach  him  in 
season,  and  before  he  was  prepared  to  act,  Lee  had  already 
thrown  some  old  troops  into  the  city. 

Even  then  an  immediate  assault  gave  some  promise  of 
success.  But  Hancock's  dispositions  had  not  sufficient 
vigor  to  command  a  satisfactory  result. 

Burnside  now  comes  upon  the  ground.     He  and  Hancock 
twice  assault  the  enemy's  lines,  with  some  gain  of  ground, 
but  without  material  result.     Their  loss  is 
tour   thousand   men.      A  thu-d    attempt  is 
made,  but  stiU  fruitlessly.     Lee  retires  to  the  interior  lines. 
The    losses    in   these   four  days    aggregate 
eleven  thousand  four  hundred  men. 

The  Second  and  Sixth  corps  are  now  ordered  to  extend 
their  lines  to  the  left  so  as  to  gain  ground  well  south  of  the 
town,  and  towards  the  Weldon  Eailroad.  During  this  ma- 
noeuvre, the  Second  corps,  on  the  extreme  flank  and  in  the 
thickets,  moves  so  far  beyond  the  Sixth  that  it  opens  a  gap 


246  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1864 

between  the  two  corps.  Into  this  gap  EQll, 
wide  awake  for  a  chancfe  to  check  our  ad- 
vance, immediately  thrusts  a  force,  taking  both  exposed 
flanks  in  reverse,  and  captures  a  number  of  guns  and  some 
seventeen  hundred  prisoners.  The  extension  has  proven 
costly. 

Sheridan  was  out  on  his  expedition  in  aid  of  Hunters 
march  on  Lynchburg.  In  his  absence  Wilson  and 
Kautz,  with  their  cavalry  divisions,  were  ordered  to 
operate  against  the  Weldon  and  Southside  railroads. 
These  M.e  Lee's  two  important  lines  of  supply.  Moving 
in  ligl.t  order  these  officers  proceeded  on  their  task, 
reached  their  objective  and  destroyed  a  large  amount  of 

««  ^  ,    ^    roUino:   stock,    track,    and   other   property. 
June  22^uly  2.  °  r     r       ^ 

Wilson  on  the  return  trip  got  rather  roughly 
handled  by  the  enemy's  horse,  near  Reams'  Station,  and  suf- 
fered largely  in  casualties  and  prisoners.  The  damage  in- 
flicted to  the  railroad  was  not  of  a  permanent  nature. 

There  was  now  no  hope  of  carrying  Petersburg  by 
assault.  The  losses  had  reached  sixteen  thousand  men. 
Regular  siege  operations  must  be  resorted  to. 

The  army  was  not  in  good  condition  for  any  severe  work. 
[t  needed  recuperation,  if  any  army  ever  did.  In  a  little  over 
uix  weeks  sixty-two  thousand  men,  out  of  one  hundred  and 
twenty-two  thousand  with  which  it  left  the  Rappahannock, 
had  fallen  in  their  tracks.  The  drain  had  been  particularly 
severe  in  experienced  officers.  To  be  sure,  these  rents  had 
been  to  a  certain  extent  patched  by  reinforcements ;  but  they 
were  none  the  less  appalling.  It  was  no  longer  the  proud 
Army  of  the  Potomac. 


1864.]  GRANT'S  CHANGE  OF  BASE.  247 

Nor  do  these  figures  cover  all.  The  casualties  of  the 
Eighteeenth  corps  and  the  Army  of  the  James  had  been 
ten  thousand  men  besides.  The  forces  now  about  to  lay 
siege  to  Petersburg  had  lost  in  battle  over  one-half  of  their 
effective  strength  in  this  short  space  of  time. 

Success  might  have  justified  this  awful  sacrifice.  But 
there  had  been  no  success  for  the  Army  of  the  James. 
Still  less  had  there  been  for  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.  Its 
every  manoeuvre  had  been  checkmated ;  its  every  attack  re- 
pulsed.    No  wonder  that  its  confidence  had  begun  to  ebb. 

But  there  was  work  in  it  yet  if  called  out  in  the 
right  way.  All  that  it  needed  was  to  know  that  the  reason 
was  good,  and  it  was  ready  for  any  effort.  The  American 
volunteer  was  too  intelligent  not  to  recognize  when  blood- 
shedding  had  gone  too  far,  and  too  independent  not  to  show 
his  conviction.  But  his  courage  would  not  let  him  turn 
his  face  :&om  work  to  which  he  had  once  put  his  hand. 


XLVIII. 

PETERSBURG.  — THE  MINE  FIASCO. 

PETERSBURG  was  not  besieged.  It  was  only  ob- 
served. All  its  lines  of  communication  were  open. 
Its  defences  began  far  beyond  Grant's  extreme  left,  and  ex- 
tended round  to  the  Appomattox.  From  the  further  side 
of  this  river  the  works  continued  northward  so  as  to  keep 
the  Richmond  and  Petersburg  Railroad  safe  from  the  attacks 
of  Butler,  who  was  still  at  Bermuda  Hundred ;  and  from 
a  force  under  Foster  at  Deep  Bottom  on  the  north  bank 
of  the  James. 

Grant  could  operate  against  Richmond  at  pleasure,  while 

observing  Petersburg.     Or  he  could  organize  a  force  to 

act    as  a  flying  column  against  the  railroads  west  of  the 

latter  place.     The  second  plan  would  interfere  with  Lee's 

supplies,  and  was  the  most  dangerous  thing  both  for  the 

Army  of  Northern  Virginia  and  the  Confederate  capital. 

For  to  procure  supplies  was  already  Lee's  hardest  problem. 

By  a  variety  of  movements  Grant  could  keep  Lee  on  the 

qui  Vive,     But  meanwhile,  some  weeks  must 

be  spent  to   perfect  a  system  of  works   in 

which  the   army  could  defend  itself  from  sorties   by  the 

enemy. 

248 


1864.] 


PETERSBURG. 


249 


In  the  prosecution  of  this  work,  Burnside  had  run  a  mine 
under  one  of  the  Confederate  forts  in  his  front.  It  was  de- 
termined to  fire  this  mine  and  to  follow  the  explosion  by  an 


250  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1864 

assault,  in  the  hope  that  the  crest  beyond,  which  dominated 

the  city,  might  be  carried  by  the  troops.     Hancock,  with  his 

corps  and  two  divisions  of  cavalry,  had  been  across  the 

James  river  on  an  expedition  against  the  de- 
July  2&-29.  .  ^  ^ 

fences  of  Richmond,  which,  though  it  had 

failed,  had  drawn  a  large  force  from  Petersburg  to  check  it. 

The  time  was  opportune. 

But  the  dispositions  were  not  careful.  The  storming 
column,  which  should  have  been  chosen  from  the  best  stuff 
of  the  army,  was  actually  selected  by  lot  from  among  the 
divisions  in  the  immediate  front  of  the  mine.  These  were 
by  no  means  the  best,  and  the  actual  column  of  assault  con- 
tained poor  material  and  was  not  well  led.  No  special  iu' 
structions  were  issued.  There  was  no  place  d^armes  on 
which  the  men  could  speedily  deploy  for  the  attack  after 
filing  out  of  their  intrenchments.  No  community  of  action 
rv^as  apparent.  All  the  preparations  were  wanting  in  skill 
and  care. 

The  mine  was  exploded  early  in  the  morning.  Heavy 
artillery  fire  had  silenced  the  enemy's  guns  in 
the  surrounding  forts.  But  in  lieu  of  the 
storming  column  taking  advantage  of  the  surprise  by  a 
rapid  advance,  it  debouched  slowly  from  its  position,  and 
far  from  rushing  for  the  crest  to  be  captured,  sought  refuge 
in  the  crater  made  by  the  exploded  mine  I 

More  troops  were  pushed  in  only  to  make  the  slaughter- 
pen  more  bloody.  The  enemy  was  not  long  in  recovering 
from  his  astonishment  and  began  to  pour  a  heavy  artillery 
fire  into  the  crater.  A  few  partial  charges  were  headed  by 
some  of  the  more  courageous  oflficers  in  the  m^Ucy  but  no 


1864.]  PETERSBURG.  251 

Bemblance  of  efficient  work  was  done.  It  was  purely  a 
case  of  bad  management  and  worthless  leadership.  The 
mass  extricated  itself  as  best  it  might  with  a  loss  of  four 
thousand  men.  The  preparations  had  been  such  that  noth- 
ing short  of  failure  could  well  ensue. 


XLIX. 

WASHINGTON    IN  ALARM  FOR  THE  LAST  TIME. 

THE  opposing  forces  in  front  of  Petersburg  at  this 
time  had  dwindled  to  much  smaller  proportions. 
Thej  numbered  about  seventy-five  thousand  on  the  Union 
to  fifty  thousand  on  the  Confederate  side.  But  their 
purpose  vras  none  the  less  set. 

Hunter's  eccentric  retreat  had  offered  the  enemy  an  ex- 
cellent chance  to  resort  to  the  old  Washington  scare,  for 
the  Valley  was  defended  by  only  Sigel's  small  division. 

Early  is  accordingly  instructed  to  force 

his  way  into  Maryland.     Sigel  retires  from 

his  front  across  the  Potomac  at    Shepherdstown.     Early 

confines    him    to    Maryland    Heights,    and 

moves  around  his  flank  to  Frederick. 

Early  has  fifteen  thousand  veterans,  just 
fitted  for  the  work.  There  is  nothing  of  any  moment  to 
withstand  him,  but  General  Lew.  Wallace  assembles  a 
motley  force  of  hundred-days'  men  and  militia,  and  boldly 
plants  himself  athwart  Early's  path. 

Ricketts  arrives  opportunely  in  Baltimore,  for  Grant,  on 
receiving  the  news  of  the  invasion,  has  at 
once  hurried  the   Sixth  corps   by  water  t<f 
26$ 


1864.]  WASHINOTON  IN  ALARM.  253 

the  capital.     The  Nineteenth  corps,  from  Fortress  Monroe, 

has  taken  the  same  direction.     Wallace,  and  Ricketts  with 

two  brigades,  at  Monocacy  Junction  make  a 

gallant  stand  to  cover  Baltimore,  losing  seven 

hundred  men  killed  and  wounded,  and  then  retire  to  Elli- 

cott's  Mills,  to  oppose  Early's  advance  on  the  capital.      But 

the    Confederates  push   on  to  the  gates  of 

July  11. 

Washington  without  serious  loss. 

At  this  moment  Early's  vanguard  might  easily  enter  the 
city.  For  Washington  has  for  its  defense  not  much  else 
than  citizen-soldiery,  improvised  from  department  clerks  and 
non-combatants.  But  seeing  the  fortifications  of  the  capi- 
tal well-manned,  Early  imagines  that  troops  from  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  are  on  hand,  and  delays  his  attack  to  make 
proper  disposition  of  his  corps.  This  delay  is  fatal. 
When  he  actually  moves  to  the  assault,  the  Sixth  and  Nine- 
teenth corps  have  put  in  their  appearance, 
and  his  one  chance  of  making  the  most 
brilliant  stroke  of  the  war  has  vanished. 

Early  ruefully  retires  by  way  of  the  Valley.  Lee's  di- 
version has  not  budged  Grant  from  Petersburg,  and  has 
therefore  failed  of  its  main  purpose. 

Hunter  reappears  at  Harper's  Ferry  before  Early  gets 
well  back  to  the  Valley.  Wright  is  also  on  his  heels.  It 
seems  as  if  Early  might,  in  his  turn,  be  trapped.  But  he 
slips  from  between  these  corps,  suffering  only  from  a 
cavalry  attack  by  Averell,  whQe  he  repels 

1        r^i     ,  Julyl&-20. 

one  by  Thoburn. 

At  Strasburg,  Early's  retreat  ends.  Not  so  however  hia 
activity.      A  few   days  later   Crook  crosses  swords  with 


[1864 

his  forces  at  Kemstown,  on  the  same  ground 
where  Shields  had  defeated  Jackson.     But 
the  result  is  different.     Crook  loses  twelve  hundred  men 
and  is  driven  back  upon  the  Potomac. 

McCausland  again  crosses  the  river  with  a  body  of  Con- 
federate horse.     Couch  makes  a  show  of  de- 
July  29. 

fending    Chambersburg,    but     McCausland 

occupies  the  iDwn  and  levies  a  contribution  of  $500,000 
upon  it.  In  default  of  payment  of  this  sum,  which  cannot 
be  raised  upon  the  instant,  the  Confederate  leader  deliber- 
ately puts  torch  to  the  town. 

This  act  was  utterly  indefensible,  for  Chambersburg  had 
committed  no  overt  act  of  war. 

From  here  McCausland  escapes  to  West  Virginia,  while 

our  infantry  forces   are  marching  purposeless  hither  and 

yon.     At  Moorfield  he  encounters  Averell, 

August?. 

who  in  a  smart  combat  inflicts  heavy  losa 
U]:)on  him>  but  cannot  prevent  his  escape. 


ATLANTA. 

THE  Richmond  government  had  become  alarmed  at  the 
results  of  the  inaggressive  policy  of  Johnston.  Able 
as  had  been  his  retreat  in  the  face  of  Sherman's  heavier 
battalions,  retreat  was  the  last  thing  which  the  Confederacy 
and  its  foreign  policy  demanded.  A  bolder  front  and  more 
fighting  seemed  strategically  desirable,  —  politically  essien- 
tial.  So  judged  at  least  the  Southern  President  and  his 
Chief  of  Staff,  Bragg. 

Mr.  Davis  was  a  West  Pointer,  and  while  he  had  no  per- 
sonal experience  in  war,  he  believed  military  affairs  to  be 
his  strong  point.  He  certainly  interfered  constantly  in  the 
conduct  of  the  Confederate  campaigns,  and  often  with  dis- 
astrous results. 

Hood  had  all  along  been  critical  of  Johnston's  Fabian 
tactics  and  was  par  excellence  a  fighting  general.  He 
was  accordingly  put  in  command  in  Johnston's  stead, 
though,  it  is  claimed,  with  reluctance  on  his  part.  It  was 
expected  that  he  would  show  what  aggressiveness  could 
accomplish. 

Hood  was  certainly  a  stanch  soldier,  but  his  bravery  ex- 
ceeded his  discretion.     He  could  not  brook  delay.     He  was 

355 


256  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL    WAR.         [1864. 

impatient  in  method ;  and  his  whole  war  creed  was  summed 
up  in  the  belief  that  a  well-planned  attack  driven  home  can 
shatter  any  obstacle.  He  was  the  very  reverse  of  Johnston, 
—  every  inch  a  fighter,  but  lacking  Johnston's  cool  calcu- 
lation and  singular  absence  of  flurry.  The  one  quality 
necessary  to  oppose  Sherman's  restless  activity  was  the 
power  of  waiting.  This  Hood  had  not.  What  made  Lee 
60  great  was  that  he  had  both  this  quality  and  the  added 
power  of  striking  a  blow  often  marvelous  when  the  small 
weight  of  his  army  is  considered. 

Johnston  had  already  prepared  to  fall  upon  our  forces  as 
they  filed  into  line  along  Peach-Tree  Creek.  Hood,  on 
acceding  to  the  command,  decided  to  carry  through  the 
plan  of  his  late  chief.  Stewart's  (late  Polk's)  corps  was 
on  the  left ;  Hardee's  in  the  centre,  and  Cheatham's  (late 
Hood's)  on  the  right.  His  line  lay  in  a  semi-circle  about 
the  north  suburbs  of  Atlanta. 

So   soon   as   the   Army  of  the  Cumberland  has  passed 

the  Chattahoochee,  it  falls  into  position  as  a 
July  17-18.         .  . 

pivot  on  which  the  rest  of  the  army  shall 

wheel  into  line,  and  soon  gains  a  foothold  south  of  Peach- 
Tree  Creek,  —  a  very  formidable  obstacle, 

July  20.  . 

—  with  three  heads  of  column.  Meanwhile 
iSchofield  and  McPherson  are  executing  their  delicate  ma- 
noeuvre of  passing  Thomas'  rear  and  filing  into  line  on  his 
left.  Owing  to  the  broken  nature  of  the  ground  they  are 
cautiously  feeling  their  way  to  their  appointed  places. 

Hood,  whose  scouts  keep  him  well  informed  of  all  that  is 
going  on,  proposes  to  push  a  column  in  between  these  two 
and  Thomas,  and  to  fall  in  force  upon  the  latter  before  his 


1864.] 


ATLANTA. 


257 


associates  can  come  to  his  assistance.  The  character  of  the 
terrain  separates  the  several  detachments  of  the  Federals 
and  opens  a  gap  of  dangerous  proportions  in  the  centre  of 


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July  20. 


our  Ime.  Into  this  gap  Hood  thrusts  Hardee  with  a  heavy- 
force.  This  general  falls  upon  Newton  at 
Clear  Creek  and  on  Ward,  Geary  and 
Williams.  His  intention  is  to  force  a  general  engagement 
while  Sherman  is  getting  into  line.     This  is  a  moment  of 


258  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL   WAR.         [1864 

great  danger  at  all  times  for  an  army  in  the  immediate  pres- 
ence of  the  enemy. 

But  McPherson  has  marched  with  more  expedition  than 
Hood  expects.  The  sound  of  heavy  firing  between  him 
and  Thomas  quickens  his  stride  still  more.  He  drives  h\s 
vanguard  sharply  in  upon  Hood's  right  flank.  To  meet 
this  inopportune  diversion,  Hood  is  forced  to  call  for  Cle- 
burne's division  from  Hardee's  corps.  So  considerable  a 
drain  cripples  Hardee  in  his  onslaught  on  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland.  Hood  has  only  done  the  essential.  Had  he 
paused,  McPherson  might  have  moved  into  Atlanta  unop- 
posed.    But  Hardee,  thus  weakened,  cannot 

July  20. 

wrest  any  ground  from  sturdy  Thomas.  The 
first  aggressive  tactics  of  the  new  general  have  been  foiled, 
with  a  loss  of  perhaps  double  our  two  thousand. 

The  armies  of  the  Cumberland  and  Ohio  now  unite  upon 
a  new  line  nearer  Atlanta.  A  strong  hill  is  seized  and  forti- 
fied by  Leggett's  division,  from  which  the  city  can  be  plainly 
seen.  Hood  withdraws  into  his  main  Atlanta  works. 
The  siege  begins  by  another  advance  of  Thomas  and  Scho- 
field,  while  the  engineers  are  bridging  the  river,  and  heavy 
guns  are  coming  to  the  front. 

McPherson  has  extended  the  extreme  left  around  to  a 
point  southeast  of  the  city.  Hood,  still  determined  to  carry 
things  with  the  strong  hand,  assigns  the  task  of  dislodging 
him  to  Hardee.  This  general,  familiar  with  the  ground, 
makes  a  circuit  of  McPherson's  exposed  flank  before  the 
latter  has  fully  completed  his  field-works,  and  falls  upon  his 
rear.     In  the  confusion  McPherson  is  killed. 

July  22. 

Loga^    assumes    command.      The    troops. 


1864.]  ATLANTA,  259 

hardened  to  surprises,  face  steadily  about  and  receive  the 
enemy  from  the  other  side  of  their  breastworks.  Cheat- 
ham again  assails  them  upon  their  new  rear,  intending  to 
cooperate  with  Hardee.  Again  the  breastworks  are  re- 
versed and  a  cheerful  defense  offered,  for  the  stout-hearted 
troops  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  are  not  easily  discon- 
certed, even  by  surprises  such  as  these. 

Hardee  and  Cheatham  are  attacking  at  right  angles  to 
each  other  and  do  not  readily  work  together.  Their  as- 
saults, if  simultaneous,  would  have  been  fatal  to  the  Feder- 
als. But  McPherson's  old  soldiers,  though  hard  put  to  it, 
repulse  each  foe  in  turn.  Our  loss  has  been  three  thousand 
five  hundred ;  the  Confederate,  much  heavier,  was  never 
officially  reported. 

In  after  days  Hood  passed  serious  criticism  upon  Hardee'a 
conduct  of  this  battle  of  Atlanta,  but  without  justice. 
Hardee  had  behaved  with  unusual  discretion  and  skill.  He 
had  simply  met  his  match. 

Hooker  was  senior  to  both  Schofield  and  Thomas.  He 
was  in  a  measure  entitled  to  succeed  McPherson.  But  his 
peculiarities  made  Sherman  fear  that  he  would  not  find  in 
Hooker  a  cordial  support,  coupled  with  such  deference  to 
his  judgment  as  supreme  control  demands.  Howard  was 
appointed  to  command  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee.  Hooker 
sullenly  retired  and  Slocum  was  given  the  Twentieth  corps. 
Sherman  thus  retained  lieutenants  who  were  in  warm  sym- 
pathy with  his  plans,  and  able  to  second  him  in  their  eflPi- 
cient  conduct. 

The  railroad  had  been  finished  to  the  rear  of  the  Army  of 
the    Cumberland.     So   far   Sherman's   manceuvre   around 


260  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1864. 

the  north  of  Atlanta  did  not  promise  success. 

He  reconsidered  the  situation  and  proposed 
to  try  an  operation  on  the  west  and  south  of  the  city, 
instead  of  the  one  now  going  on  on  the  north  and  east. 
From  the  new  side  he  might  wrest  from  Hood  the 
Macon  Railroad,  a  manifest  advantage.  Stoneman  was 
sent  on  a  raid  towards  Macon,  and  Howard  was  with- 
drawn from  the  battle-field  of  Atlanta  to  the  extreme 
right. 

Hood  had  been  placed  in  command  to  fight.  He  had 
fought —  l)oldly  and  skilfully,  but  so  far  with  most  disastrous 
results,  liut  to  fight  was  the  condition  on  which  he  held 
command.     He  determined  to  attack  Howard  on  the  march 

over  towards   the  riffht,   and  to  repeat  the 

July  28.  .  . 

tactics,  topographically  reversed,  which  he 
had  employed  against  McPherson.  Advancing  along  the 
Lickskillet  road  he  fell  upon  Howard  at  Ezra  Church.  But 
again  he  was  repulsed,  with  a  loss  much  exceeding  our 
own,  which  was  about  a  thousand  men. 

Sherman's  troops  have  acquired  the  instinct  of  victory. 
They  are  almost  invincible.  Hood's  vast  waste  of  life, 
without  gain  of  any  kind,  goes  far  towards  vindicating 
Johnston's  defensive  policy. 

Schofield  moved  upon  the  heels  of  Howard  and  speedily 
got  into  line.  Sherman's  purpose  was  to  hold  the  bridge- 
head at  the  Chattahoochee,  and  swing  the  entire  army  upon 
that  pivot  into  position  west  and  south  of  Atlanta.  Hood 
began  to  see  that  his  tenure  of  Atlanta  depended  on  a 
slender  tie.  So  far  his  fighting  policy  was  barren.  Good 
speed  enabled  Sherman  to  anticipate  him  in  the  possession  of 


1864.]  ATLANTA.  261 

Jonesborough,  south  of  the  city  a  dozen  miles.  Attacking 
at  a  venture,  Hardee  was  here  repulsed  by  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee. 

Schofield  was  meanwhile  engaged  in  de- 
stroying the  railroad  between  Jonesborough 
and  Atlanta.  Hood  ordered  Hardee  out  to  drive  him 
back,  as  a  last  means  of  holding  the  city.  Sherman 
endeavored  to  surround  Hardee,  and  a  serious  combat 
resulted.  The  loss  on  each  side  was  about  two 
thousnnd,  but  we  captured  fully  that  number  of 
prisoners. 

Unwilling  to  be  cooped  up,  an  event  which  he  now  could 
not  but  foresee.  Hood  reluctantly  evacuated 

September  2. 

Atlanta  and  moved  towards  Macon.     The 
Army  of  the  Cumberland  at  once  occupied  the  city,  while 
the  Army  of  the  Tennessee  remained  at  East  Point,  and 
the  Army  of  the  Ohio  held  Decatur.      A  season  of  rest 
and  preparation  for  the  new  conflict  ensued. 

It  is  difficult  to  gauge  the  relative  losses  of  the  opposing 
armies  during  the  campaign  from  Chattanooga  to  Atlanta. 
The  Union  forces  outnumbered  the  Confederate  on  the 
average  probably  as  ten  to  seven,  if  the  muster  rolls  of  both 
are  estimated  in  the  same  manner.  Sherman  captured 
thirteen  thousand  prisoners  all  told. 

Hood  manifestly  understated  his  losses.  He  placed  them 
at  ^\Q  thousand  two  hundred  and  fifty  men,  while  Hardee 
claimed  himself  alone  to  have  lost  seven  thousand  during 
Hood's  command.  It  is  asserted  that  Sherman  buried  not 
far  from  four  thousand  Confederate  dead  during  this  cam- 
paign.    There  is  some  duplication   here  no  doubt.     But 


262  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL    WAR.         [1864. 

the  War  Records,  which  are  as  exact  as  careful  compari- 
son can  make  them,  give  the  Confederate  losses  in  killed 
and  wounded,  from  May  7  to  September  1,  as  twenty-two 
thousand  four  hundred,  to  which  number  the  prisoners  are 
to  be  added.  The  Union  losses  during  the  same  period 
were  nearly  thirty- two  thousand  men. 


LI. 

A  PROTRACTED   SIEGE. 

FOR  many  weary  months,  while  Sherman  was  batthng 
for  Atlanta,  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  was  detained 
by  Lee  at  the  portals  of  Petersburg.  The  uniform  success 
with  which  he  managed  to  check  every  attempt  of  Grant 
to  break  or  turn  his  lines  became  monotonous.  But 
these  failures  must  be  described  in  their  proper  sequence, 
though  they  had  no  immediate  effect  on  the  whole  result. 
It  was  the  gradually  growing  exhaustion  of  the  resources 
of  the  Confederates  which  was  our  strongest  aUy. 

Another  diversion  against  the  lines  of  Richmond,  north 
of  the  James,  was  attempted  by  Hancock. 

August  12-21. 

Crossing  as  before  to  where  Foster  held  his 
lodgment  at  Deep  Bottom,  he  advanced  out  beyond 
Malvern  Hill,  in  the  hope  of  finding  some  favorable  point 
of  attack.  But  Lee  reinforced  the  troops  on  the  east  of . 
Richmond  almost  as  soon  as  Hancock  arrived,  and  in  a 
combat  at  Bailey's  Creek,  followed  by  desultory  skirmishing 
for  several  days,  prevented  our  forces  from  gaining  any 
ground  which  could  be  held.  The  command  returned  to 
camp  with  a  loss  of  fifteen  hundred  men. 

About  the  same  time  Warren  conducts  another  operation 


264  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR.       [1864. 

against  the  Weldon  Railroad.     A  foothold  is  effected  on 
this  road    after  a  smart   action   at   Yellow 

August  18-21. 

Tavern,  in  which  we  lost  a  thousand  men. 
Lee,  unwilling  to  forego  the  use  of  any  part  of  this  line, 
makes  strenuous  efforts  to  recover  its  possession  by  a 
number  of  stout  attacks,  but  Warren  is  not  to  be  dislodged, 
and  intrenches  the  position.  What  he  has  gained,  how- 
ever, is  at  a  sacrifice  of  forty-three  hundred  men.  The 
scale  on  which  some  of  these  operations  are  conducted 
necessitates  heavy  work  and  serious  losses. 

On  his  return  from  his  expedition  north  of  the  James 
Hancock  pushes  rapidly  out  to  the  left  of  Warren  to  sup- 
plement the  latter's  efforts.     He  destroys  the 

August  25. 

railroad  to  Reams'  Station,  and  the  cavalry 

operates  beyond  his  left  towards  Dinwiddie  Court  House. 

Hancock   has   with   him    Miles'   and    Gibbon's  divisions, 

some  eight   thousand   men.       Lee    detaches    A.  P.  Hill 

against  him.       Hill  assaults  with  his  usual  vigor,  and  is 

favored  by  his  intimate  knowledge  of  the  ground.       The 

conduct  of  all  but  Miles'  force  and  the  cavalry  is  of  the 

weakest  character,  and  the  upshot  of  the  entire  movement 

is  a  retreat  by  us  with  a  loss  of  twenty-seven  hundred 

men.     The  whole    operation   has   been    disappointing   in 

the  extreme. 

A  few  weeks  of  rest  now  supervene.     But  Grant  is  not 

content  to  remain  long  quiet.     His  continuous  hammering 

has  its  valuable  side.      His  tendency  is  always  towards 

great  activity.       An  attack  in  force  on  the  right  is  this 

time  projected,  to  sustain  which  a  diversion 
Sept.  SO-Oct.  6.  ,      ,  «    .  ,        T         1       ixr  -1 

on  the  leit  is  undertaken    by  Warren  with 


1864.]  A  PROTRACTED  SIEGE.  265 

Parke   and    Gregg.       Ground    is   gained    and   intrenched 
beyond  Peeble's  Farm.     Loss  three  thousand. 

Butler  meanwhile  has  been  operating  against  the  de- 
fences of  Richmond,  and  has  actually  captured  and  held 
Fort  Harrison,  aorainst  a  number  of  strona: 

m  .  XT.      ,  ,  1  September  28-30. 

enorts   to   recover   it.     His   loss   has    been 

heavy.     Beyond  this  the  movements  on  the  right  appear  to 

be  attended  with  no  success  and  are  shortly  abandoned. 

But  before  settling  down  to  winter-quarters  Grant  was 
desirous  of  dealing  one  more  serious  blow  to  the  enemy, 
in  the  hope  that  some  permanent  gain  could  be  made  with 
which  to  close  the  year.  He  again  decided  for  a  move- 
ment by  the  left  in  sufficient  force  to  break  in  the  Confed- 
erate right,  and  to  seize  the  Southside  Railroad,  on  which 
Lee  depended  for  most  of  his  supplies.  The  force  con- 
sisted of  the  bulk  of  three  corps.  Warren  and  Parke 
(now  commanding  the  Ninth  corps)  were  to  attack  the 
extreme  right  of  Lee's  line  in  front,  while  Hancock  should 
by  a  circuit  seize  the  Boydton  Plank  Road 

•^  ,  "^  October  25-28. 

and  the  railroad. 

Warren  and  Parke  struck  Lee  at  Hatcher's  Run.  Parke 
assaulted  in  front  while  Warren  endeavored  to  turn  the 
Confederate  right.  Parke  fell  short  of  accomplishing  his 
aim,  upon  which  Meade  ordered  Hancock  and  Gregg  to 
halt  on  the  Boydton  road  so  that  Warren  and  he  might 
cooperate.  But  before  these  two  corps  could  reach  each 
other,  so  as  jointly  to  attack  Lee's  flank,  the  latter  thrust 
A.  P.  Hill  into  the  gap  between  them. 

Moving  through  the  wooded  country,  with  the  ease  bred 
of  perfect  familiarity  with  every  path,  while  our   troopai 


266  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.      [1864-tf. 

blunder  about  in  utter  ignorance  of  their  own  or  the  enemy's 
whereabouts,  Hill  suddenly  falls  upon  Hancock's  flank. 
The  attack  has  well-nigh  come  to  a  fatal  pass,  when  Egaii 
changes  front  and  pours  his  volleys  into  the  rear  of  Hill's 
column.    Unable  to  hold  his  own,  Hill  summarily  withdraws. 

Gregg  has,  meanwhile,  been  skirmishing  on  Hancock's 
front  and  left,  and  has  made  good  headway  against  the 
enemy's  horse.  But,  though  our  losses  are  seventeen  hun- 
dred men,  and  the  troops  have  all  done  creditable  work,  the 
result  has  been  renewed  failure  to  make  any  satisfactory 
gain  of  ground. 

For  several  months  to  come  nothing  in  particular  was  un- 
dertaken except  along  the  regular  lines.     But  before  winter 

set  in,  Warren  made  one  more  expedition 
December  7-11. 

down  the  Weldon  Railroad,  of  which  he  de- 

Btroyed  eighteen  or  twenty  miles,  much  to  the  annoyance 
of  Lee,  to  whose  already  serious  difficulty  in  obtaining  sup- 
plies this  break  greatly  added.  For  it  materially  increased 
the  length  of  his  wagon-haul  from  the  point  where  stores 
could  be  unloaded  south  of  the  break  to  the  Richmond  and 
Petersburg  lines. 

Still  another  of  the  ineffectual  manoeuvres  by  the  left 
was  made  during  the  winter  by  the  Fifth  corps  and  the 
Second,  — now  commanded  by  Humphreys,  — accompanied 
by  Gregg's  cavalry,  against  the  Southside  Railroad. 
The  Second  corps  moved  upon  the  right  of  the  enemy  at 
Hatcher's   Run   while    the    Fifth    marched 

February  6-7,  1865.  -,    ,     .     n      i         t».t  i         i 

around  their  nank.  JNext  day  the  two  corps 
joined  hands  on  either  side  of  Hatcher's  Run,  at  Dabney'B 
Mills,  and  Gregg  came  up  from  Dinwiddie. 


1865.]  A  PROTRACTED  8IEGK  267 

But  the  enemy  are  proof  at  all  points.  They  have  spent 
many  months  in  devising  means  to  resist  an  attack  from 
every  imaginable  quarter,  and  are  prepared  to  act  decisively 
on  the  spur  of  the  moment,  while  our  troops  must  grope 
blindfold  over  unknown  ground.  Lee  contrives  to  out- 
flank our  line.  Warren  loses  fifteen  hundred  men  ;  but 
we  gain  ground  as  far  as  Hatcher's  Run.  \ 

This  uniform  failure  of  movements  by  the  left  was  dis- 
heartening to  a  degree.  Lee's  defences  had  been  made 
impregnable  to  front  attack  and  extended  far  to  the  west  of 
Petersburg.  And  his  interior  communications  enabled  him 
at  any  moment  to  detach  heavily  from  his  centre  to  check 
any  operation  against  his  right. 

It  had  become  evident  that  Petersburg  could  not  be 
taken,  or  the  enemy's  hold  on  Richmond  compromised,  by 
a  continuance  of  the  policy  pursued  so  far.  It  is  not  im- 
probable that  Grant  might  have  made  more  headway  by 
leaving  a  sufficient  part  of  his  army  in  the  trenches  in  front 
of  Petersburg  and  by  moving  with  a  heavy  force  far  to 
the  west  upon  Lee's  communications  ;  or,  if  it  were  deter- 
mined to  capture  the  place  a  main  forte  ^  by  making  a 
massed  attack  upon  some  point  in  the  centre  after  suitable 
mining  operations  had  weakened  Lee's  defences  and  pre- 
pared for  such  an  operation. 

But  the  end  was  to  come  with  opening  spring.  To  the 
far-sighted,  this  was  no  longer  doubtful.  The  South  must 
Buccumb  to  the  greater  material  resources  of  the  North,  de- 
spite its  courage  and  its  sacrifices. 

Hancock  was  unable  to  resume  command  of  the  old 
Second  corps.     His   history  is   that   of  the   Army  of  the 


268  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1865. 

Potomac.  None  of  the  corps-commanders  in  Virginia 
whose  names  are  household  words  have  earned  their  laurels 
by  sounder,  better  work  than  he.  That  he  never  rose  to 
the  command  of  a  separate  army  was  due  solely  to  circum- 
stances. He  was  too  necessary  to  the  Army  of  the  Potomac 
to  be  allowed  to  leave  it. 

Hancock  was  one  of  the  most  cheerful  men  under  fire  we 
ever  had.  In  the  thickest  of  the  fight,  his  appearance  and 
manner  infused  a  singular  confidence  in  the  troops.  He 
was  an  uniform  favorite,  rarely  made  a  mistake,  and  always 
finished  his  work  in  good  style.  His  is  an  enviable  record 
among  the  great  names  of  the  war. 


ML 


SHERIDAN  IN  THE  VALLEY 

EARLY,  after  the  failure  of  his  raid  on  Washington, 
had  retired  into  the  Shenandoah  Valley.  His  pres- 
ence there  was  a  constant  threat,  and  it  was  evident  that 
Lee  had  no  intention  of  recalling  him.  The  Sixth  and 
Nineteenth  corps,  of  which  Grant  had  sore  need  at  Peters- 
burg, were  thus  kept  from  their  legitimate  duty  for  the 
protection  of  Washington.  Grant  therefore  determined  to 
make  a  clean  sweep  of  the  Valley  and  if  possible  prevent 
further  use  of  it  by  the  Confederates  for  campaigning  pur- 
poses. 

The  division  of  our  forces  in  Northern  Virginia  into 
petty  independent  commands  had  up  to  this  time  wrought 
only  mischief.  Grant  saw  that  at  least  one  vigorous  cam- 
paiscn  must  be   conducted  there    under    a 

August  7. 

single  head.  He  selected  Sheridan  for  the 
task,  and  promised  to  give  him  sufficient  force  to  do  his 
work  fiill  justice.  This  promise  in  due  time  took  the 
shape  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  and  consisted  of 
forty  thousand  infantry  and  a  superb  body  of  fifteen 
thousand  horse. 

Sheridan  had  never  yet  enjoyed  a  separate   command. 


270  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.        [1864. 

WTiatever  operations  had  been  his  to  conduct  had  shown 
him  to  possess  brilliant  powers.  He  was  now  en- 
trusted with  an  army  destined  for  a  service  of  equal  im- 
portance and  delicacy.  For  some  weeks  he  exhibited 
great  caution,  due  in  part  to  Grant's  unwillingness  that 
he  should  strike  out  beyond  his  depth,  and  in  part  to  his 
own  appreciation  of  the  fact  that  in  his  front  lay  an  old 
and  wily  tactician,  who,  though  commanding  a  much 
smaller  force,  had  both  audacity  and  skill,  and  the  keenest 
tools  to  handle. 

Sheridan  adopted  Hunter's  position  at  Halltown,  in  the 

angle  of  the  Potomac  and  Shenandoah.     Of  this   he   re- 

Bolved  to  retain  firm  hold,  whatever  his  manoeuvres.     He 

first  moved  towards  the  line  of  the  Opequon. 

August  10. 

Early  retired  to  cover  Winchester,  for  the 
reinforcements  promised  him  by  Lee  were  still  on  the  way, 
and  he  must  keep  a  clear  road  open  for  them.  On  his 
arrival  at  Fisher's  Hill  the  reinforcements  began  to  come 
in,  under  Kershaw,  with  Fitz-Lee's  horse.  These  forces 
were  commanded  by  Anderson,  who  was  senior  to  Early  by 
commission.  Some  slight  friction  thus  engendered  worked 
tardiness  in  the  Confederate  plans. 

Grant  imagined  that  Early's  force  might  have  been  in- 
creased to  forty  thousand  men,  and  advised  Sheridan,  who 
was  at  Cedar  Creek,  not  to  attack.  In  consequence  the 
Army  of  the  Shenandoah  was  retired  to 
Berry ville.  Early  followed,  but  could  not 
advance  further  north  without  u^icovering  his  rear.  Some 
manoeuvring,  however,  resulted  in  Sheridan  letting  go 
Berryville  and   retiring  again   to   Halltown,  while   Early 


1864.]  SHERIDAN  IN  THE  VALLEY,  271 

demonstrated  on  Shepherdstown  as  if  again  to  cross  the 
Potomac. 

But  Lee  must  have  men,  and  again  with-  ^        ,     ,  ^ 

°     ^  September  14. 

drew  Anderson.     Early  retired  behind  the 
Opequon.     Quiet  reigned  for  a  fortnight. 

In  all  this  manoeuvring,  during  which  each  general  was 
gauging  the  skill  of  his  opponent,  the  losses  had  been  but 
a  few  hundreds  on  each  side,  in  occasional  skirmishes  of 
the  outposts.  Now  that  Early  had  been  weakened  by  the 
loss  of  Anderson,  was  Sheridan's  time  to  "  go  in,"  as  Grant 
tersely  formulated  his  orders. 

Early's  position  along  the  Opequon  protects  Winchester 
and  at  the  same  time  threatens  an  incursion  into  Mary- 
land ;  while  Sheridan  lies  in  such  a  position 

Mid-September. 

back  of  the  stream  as  to   threaten   Early's 

communications  if  he  should  move  in  the  latter  direction. 

Early's  first  manoeuvre  is  to  operate  by  his  left  towards 

Martinsburg.    Nothing  loth,  Sheridan  crosses  the  Opequon 

and   advances   straight    on  Winchester,    to 

September  19. 
strike  Early's  right  while  his  left   is   at   a 

distance.  But  delays  often  incident  to  the  movement  of 
troops  in  battle  enable  Early  to  recall  his  left  and  save  him- 
self from  a  crushing  blow.  Sheridan  has  twice  Early's 
force.  It  is  noon  before  he  is  ready  to  attack.  When  his 
lines  advance  they  meet  with  a  warm  reception.  But 
numbers  tell.  Except  for  a  temporary  check  on  the  left, 
due  to  the  impetuosity  of  Early's  attack,  the  Army  of  the 
Shenandoah  carries  everything  before  it.  Sheridan  throws 
his  cavalry  upon  Early's  flanks.  By  nightfall,  despite  the 
utmost  gallantry.  Early  is  driven  from  the  field,  in  broken 


272 


BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR. 


[1864. 


ranks,  with  a  loss  of  thirty-six  hundred  men,  half  of  which 
are  in  prisoners.     Our  own  loss  is  five  thousand. 

This  battle  of  the  Opequon,  or  "Winchester,"  saved 
Maryland  and  Pennsylvania  from  future  invasion. 

Early  retired  to  Strasburg,  where  he  could  rest  his  flanks 
on  the  heights  and  the  north  fork  of  the  Shenandoah.     His 


Opequon,  or  Winehester,  Va.    September  19,  1864. 


position  at  Fisher's  Hill  appeared  stronger  than  it  actually 
was,  for  these  obstacles  could  be  turned  by  a  superior  force. 
Sheridan  soon  put  in  an  appearance  and  de- 
spatched Torbert's  cavalry  by  Luray  to 
to    seize   the    upper   end   of    the    Valley   in 


September  22. 


Newmarket 


Early's  rear.     But  before  awaiting  results  he  attacked  the 


1864.] 


SHERIDAN  IN  THE   VALLEY, 


273 


enemy  in  his  chosen  position,   throwing  Crook   in  force 
around  his  left. 

By  evening 
Crook  got  into 
place  and  moved 
in  upon  Early's 
flank  and  rear, 
while  the  Sixth 
and  Nineteenth 
corps  assaulted 
in  front.  Stout 
resistance  availed 
Early  naught. 
He  was  broken, 
and  retreated 
five  hundred 


Fisher's  Hill.    Septembep  22,  1864. 


m 


men 


September  24. 


much  disorder.  Our  loss  was  only 
Early's  one  thousand  two  hundred. 
Torbert  did  not  get  in  Early's  rear,  being  held  at  Milford 
by  an  insignificant  cavalry  force  of  the  enemy. 

Sheridan  pursued  Early  up  the  Valley.     The  latter  made 
a  stand  atMt.  Jackson,  but  was  driven  from 
the  place  and  retired  through  Newmarket. 

Lee  had  ordered  Kershaw  back  to  Early,  on  hearing  of 
the  disaster  at  the  Opequon,  and  Early  moved  towards  Port 
Republic  to  join  force  with  him.  Sheridan  marched  to  Har- 
risonburg. Torbert  made  for  Staunton,  where  he  began  to 
tear  up  the  railroad,  but  was  interrupted  with 
work  half  done  by  Early. 

Grant  believed  that  Sheridan  should  now  advance  toward 
Lynchburg  and  destroy  the  railroads  and  the  James  River 
canal.      Sheridan  objected  that  his  line  of  operations  would 


September  28. 


274  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1864. 

be  too  long,  and  would  take  a  full  corps  to  protect,  and  sug- 
gested, in  lieu  of  Grant's  plan,  the  devastation  of  the  Valley 
so  as  to  render  it  useless  to  the  enemy  as  a  campaigning 
ground  ;  after  doing  which  he  could  rejoin  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac  with  the  bulk  of  his  force. 

To  this  suffffestion  Grant  acceded.    Sheri- 

Octobere.  ,  \^.  ,  ,      ,M 

dan  commenced  his  return  march,  and  while 
retracing  his  steps  he  utterly  destroyed  grain,  forage,  barns, 
agricultural  tools  and  material  of  all  kinds  over  the  entire 
breadth  of  the  Valley,  collected  and  drove  off  the  stock, 
and  left  that  section  a  desolate  waste.  Some  two  thousand 
barns  and  seventy  mills  filled  with  grain  were  thus  destroyed, 
He  then  fell  back  and  took  up  position  along  Cedar  Creek. 

The  destruction  of  provisions,  forage,  or  any  supplies 
which  could  enable  the  enemy  to  protract  the  struggle  was 
no  doubt  justifiable.  It  is  very  questionable,  however, 
whether  the  burning  of  barns,  agriculturaJ  implements,  and 
means  of  future  thrift  not  applicable  to  the  conduct  of  an 
immediate  campaign  comes  under  the  same  head.  Such 
destruction  is  not  considered  defensible  by  the  best  author- 
ities. Nor  does  it  appear  to  have  been  essential,  for  a  nev^ 
crop  could  not  have  been  raised  for  many  months. 

Sheridan  did  not  expect  to  be  followed  up  by  Early ;  but 
the  latter  again  put  his  divisions  afoot  towards  the  old 
ground  as  soon  as  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  retired. 

On  the  home  march,  Torbert,  with  Merritt  and  Custer, 
crossed   swords   with  the  enemy  at   Tom's 

October  9.         _,        ,  .  , 

Brook,  capturmg  eleven  guns. 
Early  reached  Strasburg,  and  again  reestablished  him- 
self at  Fisher's  Hill.     From  here  he  pushed  out  a  sharp 


1864.]  SHERIDAN  IN  THE  VALLEY.  275 

reconuoissance  of  our  position,  at  a  loss  of 

.1  r       J     J  October  13. 

three  nundrea  men. 

The  Sixth  corps  had  been  recalled,  and  was  actually  on 
its  way  out  of  the  Valley.  Upon  the  return  of  Early  it 
.was  again  brought  back.  Sheridan  started  for  Washing- 
ton to  consult  with  the  authorities  as  to  the  best  course  to 
pursue,  leaving  Wright  in  command. 

Early  was  soon  out  of  supplies.  The  Valley  was  no 
longer  a  granary  for  the  Confederates.  He  must  fight  for 
his  rations  or  fall  back.  He  planned  a  surprise  of  the 
Union  Army  at  Cedar  Creek.  Crook,  with  the  Eighth 
corps,  lay  on  the  left;  Emory's  Nineteenth  corps  held 
the  centre;  the  Sixth  corps  under  Ricketts,  with  the  cav- 
alry of  Custer  and  Merritt,  formed  the  right.  Crook  was 
covered  by  Averell's  horse,  but  insufficiently. 

Gordon  cautiously  moves  about  the  Union  left,  under 
cover  of  the  night  and  foggy  dawn.  Kershaw  is  to  make 
a  heavy  demonstration  on  the  Union  centre  along  and  south 
of  the  turnpike  as  a  feint  to  cover  Gordon's  march. 

Advancing:  with  the  utmost  silence,  even 

^  ^  .  October  19. 

leaving  canteens  behind,  lest  their  clatter 
should  disturb  the  Federal  camps,  Gordon  passes  Cedar 
Creek,  moves  well  around  Crook's  flank,  and  falls  with 
Soi/them  vehemence  upon  his  left  and  rear.  The  onset 
is  ciitirely  unexpected.  Crook's  corps  is  at  once  demoral- 
ized and  soon  utterly  broken  up  in  confused  retreat.  Gor- 
don cheerily  foUows  up  his  gain  and  soon  draws  into  the 
vcitex  of  defeat  the  centre  under  Emory.  The  only 
ijojnd  member  of  the  Union  Army  is  the  Sixth  corps, 
iucketts  succeeds  in  making  a  rapid  change  of  front  and 


276 


BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR. 


[1864. 


falls  upon  Early,  checking  his   onset  till  the  Eighth  and 
Nineteenth  corps  can  reach  some  place  to  rally. 

An  attempt  to  re-form  is  made  at  Middletown,  but  it  is 
futile.     A  second  stand,  a  mile  and  a  half  farther  back,  is 

more  successful. 
Wright  patches 
up  the  line  upon 
a  nucleus  of 
Getty's  division, 
which  this  gal- 
lant officer  has 
rallied  on  the 
pike.  The  troops 
have  recovered 
their  bearings. 
The  stampede 
has  not  quite  de- 
moralized them. 
Early  makes  no 
impression  by 
a  smart  attack. 

Sheridan  op- 
portunely arrives 
upon  the  field.  His  magnetic  presence  caps  the  structure 
already  built.  Wright  is  placed  on  the  left ;  Emory  on  the 
right ;  Crook  in  reserve.  Merritt  and  Custer  with  their 
horse  fall  in  upon  the  right  and  left  flanks.     It  is  4  P.M. 

A  general  advance  is  ordered  upon  the  Confederates, 
who  now  approach  flushed  with  victory,  but  disorgan- 
ized withal.     The  first  onset  bears  Early  back.     He  has 


TMRCC  TOP    MT 

Cedar  Creek.    October  19,  1864. 


1864.]  SHERIDAN  IN  THE  VALLEY.  211 

nothing  to  oppose  to  the  heavy  numbers  of  the  Federals. 
Sheridan  sweeps  the  field.  The  enemy  is  broken,  routed, 
driven  in  as  wild  confusion  up  the  Valley  as  we  had  just 
fled  down. 

Early's  loss  was  twenty-nine  hundred  ;  ours  fifty-six  hun- 
dred, including  seventeen  hundred  prisoners,  which  the  Con- 
federates got  quickly  to  the  rear  after  the  morning's  surprise. 

Early  next    turned    up   at   Newmarket, 

.  October20. 

where  he  remamed  three  weeks. 

Sheridan  withdrew  for  readier  supplies  to  Kemstown. 
Early  again  followed,  loth   to  acknowledge 

,  .      ;  P  -.  .     -.    1       -.    .  11  November  13. 

his  defeat,  and  indulged  m  a  needless  com- 
bat with  our  outposts.     This  was  the  end  of  the  drama. 
The  bulk  of  both  the  Confederate  and  Union  forces  was 
ordered  to  Petersburg. 

The  Battle  of  Cedar  Creek  finished  forever  the  Valley 
campaigns.  Sheridan  had  forces  vastly  outnumbering  his 
opponent.  But  his  handling  of  his  troops,  especially  the 
cavalry,  was  handsome,  and  the  work  done  was  crisp  and 
clean.  The  forces  on  either  side  were  nearly  forty  thou- 
sand men  under  Sheridan  to  less  than  half  the  number 
under  Early. 

The  Confederate  general  never  recovered  the  prestige  lost 
In  this  Valley  campaign.  And  yet  he  had  fought  bravely, 
skilfully.  But  he  was  overmatched  in  numbers  and  found 
himself  opposed  by  equal  skill.  Success  could  not  well  be 
expected. 

Except  some  operations  in  Loudon  County  against  the 
guerilla  Mosby,  no  further  hostilities  were  attempted  in 
Northern  Virginia. 


278  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR.       [1864. 

Sheridan  was  a  typical  soldier.  Men  who  love  fighting 
are  rarely  the  best  generals.  A  distinguished  example 
of  this  was  Charles  XII.  The  keen  enjoyment  of  the 
fray  does  not  often  coexist  with  the  power  of  cool  calcula- 
tion and  of  intense  mental  effort  essential  to  the  commander 
of  an  army.  But  it  did  in  Sheridan.  It  is  hard  to  say 
whether  he  was  best  fitted  to  command  a  cavalry  corps  or 
an  army.  In  either  capacity  he  excelled.  Wherever 
Sheridan  appears  in  the  annals  of  the  war  it  is  in  stemming 
an  adverse  tide  with  a  vigor  almost  unequalled,  or  in 
leading  victorious  troops  to  certain  triumph. 

We  cannot  try  him  in  the  same  balance  as  we  try 
Stonewall  Jackson,  though  he  has  some  of  the  latter's 
traits  ;  for  Jackson  won  his  important  successes  with  scant 
material,  and  almost  invariably  against  odds,  while  Sheri- 
dan's means  were  always  ample.  But  his  methods  were 
sharp,  clear,  exact;  and  his  power  over  men  equalled  his 
capacity  as  a  soldier.     His  is  a  case  of  nascitur^  non  fiU 


MIL 

HOOD  TAKES  THE  OFFENSIVE. 

LITTLE  rest  was  to  be  allowed  to  Sherman  after  hia 
arduous  labors  in  the  capture  of  Atlanta.  His  line 
of  operations  was  now  one  hundred  and  forty  miles  longer 
than  it  was  at  Chattanooga,  and  liable  to  interruption  at 
any  moment.  Cooperation  by  Canby  from  Mobile  had 
been  part  of  the  summer's  programme.  But  Canby's 
forces  had  been  depleted  by  details,  and  he  had  not  yet 
been  able  to  capture  Mobile. 

Sherman  made  his  dispositions  to  remain  in  Atlanta. 
He  contracted  his  lines  for  easier  defense,  and  deemed  it 
essential  to  remove  the  non-military  residents.  This 
course  gave  rise  to  a  terrible  outcry  at  the  South,  and 
some  adverse  criticism  at  the  North.  But  the  act  was 
entirely  justifiable  as  a  military  measure  ;  and  the  necessity 
for  the  removal  must  be  held  to  have  depended  upon  his 
own  sole  discretion.  Sherman  extended  all  possible  help 
to  the  departing  inhabitants  in  the  matter  of  rations  and 
transportation. 

After  consultation  with  President  Davis,  Hood  now 
planned  to  operate  seriously  against  Sherman's  communi- 
cations.    Our  army  had  largely  lost  in  numbers  by  fur- 


280  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.  [1864. 

loughs,  sick   and  wounded,  and  the  time  was  opportune. 

Wheeler  and  Forrest  were  sent  out  to  open  the  affair  by  a 

raid  upon  the   railroad  in    Sherman's  rear. 

Aug  .-Sept.  ^ 

But  their  efforts  had  no  serious  results. 
Sherman  cannot  mistake  Hood's  purpose.  But  he  does 
not  propose  to  be  ousted  from  Atlanta.  Thomas  is  sent 
back  to  Nashville,  and  about  the  same  time  Hood 
moves  northward.  Sherman  is  not  to  be  called  off  his 
quarry  by  any  ordinary  threat.  He  cautions  Thomas  to 
keep  a  keen  lookout  for  any  attempt  to  cross  the  Tennessee, 
and  leaves  Slocum  to  hold  Atlanta.  Howard  still  com- 
mands the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  and  Cox,  during  the 
absence  on  political  affairs  of  Logan,  commands  the  Army 
of  the  Ohio. 

Hood  marches  on  Marietta.  He  has  no  doubt  that  he 
will  draw  Sherman  away  from  Atlanta  and  transfer  the 
seat  of  war  to  the  Valley  of  the  Tennessee. 

The  Army   of  the  Cumberland   repasses 

the  Chattahoochee  and  reaches  Smyrna.  It 
is  difficult  for  Sherman  to  divine  Hood's  immediate  pur- 
pose, but  he  has  no  idea  of  letting  go  what  has  cost  so 
much. 

A  detachment  of  Hood's   army  attacks 
October  6. 

Allatoona,  but  is  repulsed  with  heavy  loss. 

Sherman's    forces    are    concentrated    about 
October  12. 

Rome.     Hood  pauses  at  Eesaca,  but  shortly 

moves  to  Dalton.     But  for   the  continued  possession   of 

Atlanta  it  would  almost  seem  that  nothing  had  been  gained 

by  the  galling  summer's  work. 

Hood's  campaign  does  not,  however,  promise  immediate 


1864.]  HOOD    TAKES   THE  OFFENSIVE.  281 

great  results.  Sherman  proposes  to  keep  all  he  has  won, 
and  no  serious  break  has  as  yet  been  made  in  his  commu- 
nications. He  has  absolute  confidence  in  the  solidity  of 
his  position.  He  asserted  later  that,  if  Hood  had  entered 
Tennessee,  he  could  have  surrounded  him  and  compelled 
the  surrender  of  his  entire  force. 

The  bulk  of  the  Union  army  in  pursuit 

October  19. 

of  Hood  reaches  Gaylesville,   Ala.     There 

are  absent  only  the  Atlanta  and  other  garrisons  along  the 

line  of  the  railroad. 


LIV. 

HOOD  MAKES  FOR  TENNESSEE 

"ij^OR  some  months  Sherman  had  contemplated  and  had 
-■-  been  urging  upon  Grant  a  march  from  Atlanta  to  the 
ee&board,  during  which  he  should  destroy  all  munitions  of 
war,  cotton,  crops,  factories  and  machine-shops,  tear  up 
railroads,  and  render  the  country  useless  to  the  Confederacy 
as  a  means  of  continuing  the  struggle.  It  seems  to  be  well 
settled  that  the  plan  was  of  his  own  conception.  And  he 
urged  it  many  months  before  it  secured  a  willing  ear. 

His  objective  would  be  Columbia,  S.C.,  at  which  point 
he  would  be  in  rear  of  Lee  at  Richmond,  and  could  throw 
his  forces  into  cooperation  with  Grant's.  But  before  he 
could  march  on  Columbia,  he  must  establish  a  new  base 
upon  the  seaboard.  If  his  manoeuvre  should  prove  suc- 
cessful he  would,  by  isolating  Virginia  from  all  the 
Southern  States  except  North  Carolina,  deal  the  virtual 
death-blow  to  the  Confederacy. 

Two  general  postulates  only  were  a  part  of  the  problem. 
If  Lee  should  turn  upon  Sherman,  Grant  must  so  follow 
him  up  as  that  between  them  they  could  destroy  him.  And 
Thomas  on  his  part  must  use  up  or  neutralize  Hood. 

It  was  a  bold  game,  this  marching  away   from   Hood 

282 


1864.]  HOOD  MAKES  FOR   TENNESSEE.  283 

while  the  latter  was  trying  to  lure  Sherman  back  to  the 
line  of  the  Tennessee  by  threatening  his  communications. 
If  Hood  had  crossed  the  river  near  Sherman's  army,  the 
latter  might  have  been  seriously  compromised  by  failing 
immediately  to  follow  him,  for  he  was  not  yet  ready  to  cut 
loose  from  his  base.  But  when  he  saw  that  Hood  kept 
south  of  the  Tennessee  until  he  reached  Decatur,  Sherman's 
mind  was  made  up. 

Schofield,  Stanley,  and  half  the  horse  were  sent  back  to 
Thomas,  and  A.  J.  Smith,  then  in  Missouri,  was  ordered 
to  Nashville  as  a  further  reinforcement.  These,  with  some 
recruits,  swelled  Thomas'  ranks  to  a  point  enabling  him 
successfully  to  cope  with  Hood.  And  Thomas  was  the 
man  for  the  task.  Somewhat  too  deliberate,  almost  indeed 
lacking  the  power  of  assuming  the  initiative,  when  he  did 
move,  it  was  with  the  stride  of  a  giant ;  when  he  struck,  it 
was  the  blow  of  a  battering  ram.  And  on  the  defense  he 
had  never  yet  met  his  equal. 

After  the  capture  of  Atlanta,  Governor  Brown  had  fur- 
loughed  the  Georgia  militia,  which  had  been  called  out  to 
make  temporary  headway  against  the  ruthless  invader.  He 
had  alleged,  as  a  reason  for  thus  disbanding  them,  the  pre- 
eminent necessity  of  gathering  the  crops.  There  had  been 
much  friction  between  Hood  and  Hardee  and  the  latter  had 
been  ordered  to  the  coast.  There  was  no  force  to  oppose 
Sherman's  march  to  the  eastward. 

Beauregard  had  been  placed  in  command  of  the  entire 
military  division,  including  Hood's  territory,  but  with  a 
caution  not  to  interfere  with  the  latter's  field  operations. 
Wheeler's   cavalry   alone    was   to   stay   behind   to   watch 


284  BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL    WAR.  [1864. 

Sherman,  while  Hood  retained  both  Forrest  and  Jackson 
as  a  part  of  his  column. 

Hood's   effective   was   about   fifty-four   thousand    men. 
He   expected,    by   crossing   the   river   at    Tuscumbia    or 
Decatur,  to  draw  Sherman  back  to  Nashville.      His  at- 
tempt to  pass  at  Decatur  was  successfully  resisted.     He 
then  moved  on  to  Tuscumbia  and  effected  a 

Oct.  29-Nov.  13. 

passage.  But  once  on  the  north  side  he 
found  himself  compelled  to  sit  down  three  weeks  at 
Florence  to  accumulate  the  supplies  of  which  he  stood  in 
urgent  need.  This  delay,  though  doubtless  essential,  was 
fatal  to  Hood's  success  in  this  campaign. 

The  Confederate  armies,  both  in  the  East  and  West, 
were  always  ready  to  move  with  less  transportation  than 
our  own,  partly  because  they  possessed  less  material  and 
issued  rations  and  equipage  more  irregularly  to  the  men. 
Certain  it  is  that  the  Southern  soldier  did  his  wonderfully 
efficient  work  on  a  basis  of  victuals,  clothing,  and  ammu- 
nition which  would  generally  have  kept  a  Federal  force  in 
camp,  as  unfit  to  move.  But  even  they  had  sometimes  to 
delay  their  march  for  rations. 

Meanwhile    Forrest   raids    on    Jackson,     Tenn.,    and 

on    Fort  Henry,  hoping  to    draw   Thomas 
Nov  ^10*^       away  from  Nashville.     But  in  vain.     And 

Hood  is  equally  disappointed  at  not  having 
decoyed  Sherman  from  hard-won  Atlanta.  Beauregard 
spurs  on  Hood  to  a  bold  initiative.  Hood  surely  needs  no 
spur. 

-,       ,     .  Stanley's  Fourth  corps  is  concentrated  at 

November  4.  "^  *^ 

Pulaski.     Schofield  joins  and  assumes  com- 


1864.]  HOOD  MAKES  FOR   TENNESSEE.  285 

mand  at  that  place.     His  force  consists  of 
the  Fourth  corps  and  Cox*s  division  of  the 
Twenty-third  corps.     Altogether  Thomas  numbers  fifty- 
five   to   sixty  thousand  men,    including   Schofield's   com- 


LV. 

SHERMAN  ASTONISHES   HOOD. 

IN  due  time    Sherman  cut  loose  from  his  communica- 
tions.    He  destroyed  the  railroad  in  his  rear,  after 
first  sending  back  such  portions  of  his  com- 

Novemberl2.  ,  n  n      i      ' 

mand  as  would  hamper  m  lieu  of  furthermg 
his  movements.  None  but  the  stoutest  of  heart  and  limb 
must  follow  him  on  the  coming  march. 

He  was  now  fairly  launched  on  a  great  strategic  ma- 
noeuvre. The  hardihood  of  this  undertaking  has  been  often 
overrated ;  its  conception  and  its  valuable  results  cannot 
be.  Sherman  himself  "  regarded  the  march  as  a  shift  of 
base,  as  the  transfer  of  a  strong  army  which  had  no  oppo- 
nent and  had  finished  its  then  work,  from  the  interior  to  a 
point  on  the  sea-coast,  from  which  it  could  achieve  other 
important  results."  He  "  considered  this  march  as  a  means 
to  an  end,  and  not  as  an  essential  act  of  war."  As  com- 
pared with  his  progress  through  the  Carolinas,  Sherman 
gauges  this  march  as  of  but  slight  importance.  It  was  the 
result  of  the  entire  achievement  which  made  it  what  it  was. 
The  boldness  lay  in  conceiving  its  far-reaching  advantages ; 
not  in  carrying  through  the  mere  details  of  the  progress. 

Sherman  was  by  no  means  certain  what  point  on  the 
966 


1864.]  SHERMAN  ASTONISHES  HOOD.  287 

seaboard  he  should  reach ;  but  he  made  his  calculations  to 
meet  the  Union  fleet  which  was  to  be  sent  towards  him,  in 
the  neighborhood  of  Ossabaw  Sound.  He  had  with  him 
two  corps  of  the  Army  of  the  Tennessee,  under  command 
of  Howard,  as  his  right  wing,  and  two  of  the  Army  of  the 
Cumberland,  under  Slocum,  as  the  left.  These  troops 
numbered  over  sixty  thousand  rugged  veterans,  unham- 
pered by  sick  or  off-duty  men,  with  twenty  days'  rations, 
plenty  of  beef  on  the  hoof,  about  one  field-gun  per  thou- 
sand effective,  and  an  excellent  canvas  pontoon  train. 

Atlanta  Sherman  thoroughly  destroyed,  so  far  as  future 
utility  to  the  enemy  for  the  creation  of  war  material  was 
concerned.     In  other  respects  it  was  left  intact. 

His  first  objective  was  Milledgeville,  threatening  both 
Macon  and  Augusta  on  the  way.  His  route  lay  between 
the  Ocmulgee  and  Oconee,  both  of  which  rivers  take 
their  source  not  far  from  Atlanta,  and  flow  south-eastwardly 
towards  the  coast,  joining  to  form  the  Altamaha. 

Kilpatrick  commanded  Sherman's  horse.  His  first  dem- 
onstration was  towards  Macon,  during  which  he  encoun- 
tered some  opposition  from  Wheeler's  cavalry,  which  was 
constautly  hovering  on  Sherman's  right  front. 

While  Howard's  column  crossed  the  Oc- 
mulgee, Slocum,  whose  wing  Sherman  per- 
sonally accompanied,  was  engaged  in  destroying  the  rail- 
road from  Atlanta  to  Augusta  as  far  as  the  Oconee. 

Beauregard  did  not  long  remain  silent.  The  ebullition 
of  his  zeal  took  the  form  of  volleys  of  telegrams,  promises, 
appeals,  threats,  addressed  alternately  to  Sherman  and  to 
the   entire  population  of  Georgia.     Anything  to  destroy 


288  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1864. 

or  impede  the  invader.  Sherman's  sole  response  was  an 
order  that  all  law-abiding  citizens  should  be  protected, 
but  that  any  person  caught  damaging  roads  or  engaged  in 
any  overt  act  of  war  should  have  his  houses  burned  and 
his  property  destroyed  as  a  penalty. 

No  engagement  of  serious  moment  occurred.     Walcutt's 

Brigade  had  a  sharp  skirmish  with  the  enemy  near  Macon, 

sufFerinff  the  loss  of  about  one  hundred  men, 

Nov.  22-28. 

and  Kilpatrick  defeated  Wheeler  in  a  smart 

combat  at  Waynesborough.     But  Kilpatrick's  attempt  to 

release  our  prisoners  at  Millen  was  foiled  by  their  removal. 

Leaving  Milledgeville  Sherman  marched  on  Millen,  and 

here  broke  up  the  railroad  between  Savannah 
Decembers. 

and  Augusta.  His  route  now  lay  between 
the  Ogeechee  and  Savannah  rivers,  excepting  the  Fifteenth 
corps,  which  marched  south  of  the  former  stream.  Prog- 
ress was  easy,  and  no  further  attack  from  the  enemy  was 
anticipated. 

As  a  permanent  interruption  of  the  railroads  between 
Richmond  and  the  Southern  States  was  one  of  the  great 
objects  of  Sherman's  raid,  the  work  of  destruction  was 
accompHshed  in  such  a  manner  as  to  make  it  difficult  to 
repair  the  damage.  The  rails,  after  being  taken  up,  were 
heated  in  the  middle  upon  bonfires  made  of  the  ties,  and 
then  twisted  around  trees  or  posts  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  render  them  useless.  And  as  all  rolling-mills  were 
wrecked,  no  means  of  re-rolling  the  rails  was  at  hand. 
A  corps,  strung  along  the  track,  could  in  this  way  utterly 
ruin  about  fifteen  miles  a  day. 

All  supplies  of  food  and  forage,  over  a  belt  of  country 


1864.}  SHERMAN  ASTONISHES  HOOD.  289 

sixty  miles  wide,  from  Atlanta  to  Savannah,  in  like  man- 
ner fell  a  prey  to  this  march.  Either  the  Confederates  de- 
stroyed them  to  prevent  their  boing  of  benefit  to  us,  or  else 
we  in  turn  used  or  wasted  them,  leaving  the  people  only 
the  barft  necessaries  of  life.  Nothing  remained  which  could 
6ul)sist  an  army. 

The  negroes  who  endeavored  to  follow  "  Massa  Sherman  ** 
proved  a  great  embarrassment.  If  allowed  to  join  the  col- 
umn they  would  have  srHously  jeopardized  its  safety.  A 
few  able-bodied  men  were  carried  along.  Families  and 
the  extreme  young  and  old  could  not  be. 

Much  criticism  was  passed  upon  this  method  in  the 
North,  by  those  who  looked  upon  the  war  from  a  merely 
political  stand-point,  or  indeed  as  a  war  waged  against 
slavery,  and  who  forgot  that  its  conduct,  to  secure  good 
political  results,  must  strictly  conform  to  military  usage. 
As  an  instance,  General  Davis  of  the  Fourteenth  corps,  from 
pure  necessity,  to  carry  out  his  order  of  march,  withdrew  his 
pontoon  bridge  at  Ebenezer  Creek  before  a  horde  of  col- 
ored people  could  cross,  who  had  been  fully  warned  not  to 
follow  his  command  and  yet  persisted  in  their  infatuation. 
Quite  a  number  were  drowned  in  frantic  endeavors  to  swim 
the  stream.  A  cry  of  horror  arose  at  this  "  act  of  barba- 
rism "  and  Davis  was  held  up  to  the  bitterest  censure, 
though  absolutely  in  the  right.  He  was  a  soldier  under 
military  orders  ;  not  a  humanitarian  peacefully  guiding  the 
movements  of  an  exodus. 

Probably  no  body  of  men  ever  so  fully  embodied  the  two- 
fold purpose  of  fighting  and  foraging  as  Sherman's  "  bum 
mers."     The  work  exactly  suited  the  genius  of  the  people 


290  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1864. 

composing  the  army,  and  the  natural  law-abiding  quality 
of  the  American  checked  extravagance  and  cruelty.  It 
would  be  absurd  to  deny  that  there  was  some  looting,  and 
an  occasional  but  very  rare  act  committed  in  hot  blood. 
Mayhap  Kilpatrick  and  his  men  earned  a  somewhat  bad 
reputation  on  just  grounds.  But  no  army  ever  enjoyed 
such  freedom  and  kept  within  such  bounds.  Indeed  the 
Southern  press  complained  at  the  time  more  bitterly  of 
Wheeler's  cavalry  for  their  reckless  vandalism  than  of  our 
troops.  And  with  rare  exceptions  the  collection  of  sup- 
plies was  systematically  conducted,  and  the  men  who  were 
detailed  on  this  duty  fought  and  foraged  with  equal 
alacrity,  good-temper  and  even-handedness. 

It  may  be  confidently  asserted  that  no  army  ever  moved 
through  an  enemy's  territory  with  like  purpose,  which  so 
scrupulously  observed  the  humanities  if  not  the  amenities 
of  life.  The  rare  exceptions  which  occurred  are  quoted, 
multiplied ;  the  thousand  instances  of  moderation  are  for- 
gotten. And  war  is  not  a  gentle  art.  Its  methods 
necessarily  partake  of  the  horrible.  But  during  our  Civil 
Conflict  we  may  truthfully  claim  that  its  terrors  were  almost 
uniformly  confined  to  the  actual  field  of  battle. 

The  weather  was  bright,  and  everything  tended  to  give 
the  whole  aflPair  the  aspect  of  a  frolic.  Certainly  it  was 
the  one  thoroughly  enjoyable  operation  of  the  war. 
Without  the  stern  duties  of  the  field,  all  the  pleasures  of 
the  soldier's  free  and  hardy  life  were  ever  present ;  and  the 
men  and  animals  reached  their  goal  in  far  finer  condition 
than  that  in  which  they  started. 


LVI. 

SHERMAN'S   GOAL. 

THE  city  of  Savannah  had  strong  defewies  on  both 
its  sea  and  land  fronts.  Under  Hardee's  command 
were  some  eighteen  thousand  men.  He  prepared  to  hold 
the  place,  trusting  to  keep  open  his  commu- 

.  ,  ,        .  1    J^i      1  December  10, 1864. 

mcations  on  the  north  with  Charleston. 

Arrived  before  the  city,  Sherman  stretched  out  his 
left  in  the  endeavor  to  cut  Hardee  off  from  this  source 
of  supply  and  means  of  retreat,  but  to  no  purpose.  Gen- 
eral Foster,  from  his  foothold  on  the  coast  at  Port  Koyal, 
sent  Hatch's  division  to  cut  the  Charleston  Railroad,  but 
for  once  Governor  Brown's  militia  proved  to  be  of  use, 
and  Hatch's  attack  was  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  seven 
hundred  men. 

Sherman  closed  in  on  Savannah  and  com- 

.  Ill  December  li 

pleted  the  mvestment,  save  only  the  above 

outlet. 

To   open   communication  with  Dahlgren's   fleet   in   the 

offing  it  became  necessary  to  capture  Fort  McAllister  on 

the  south  side  of  the  town.     The  detail  for  the  assault  feU 

tD  Hazen's  division  and  the  work  was  sturdily     ^       ,     ,» 

•^       December  13. 

done.     The  fort  was  taken  at  the  first  rush. 

291 


292  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL   WAR.        [1864. 

Hardee  continued  to  operate  the  Charleston  Kailroad  to 
Hardeeville,  not  far  from  Savannah,  Foster's  renewed 
efforts  to  cut  it  having  proved  unsuccessful.  Sherman 
was  forced  to  prepare  for  regular  siege  operations  against 
Savannah.  He  drained  the  rice-fields  surrounding  the 
city  and  began  to  mount  some  heavy  guns.  The  men's 
rations  at  this  time  consisted  largely  of  rice,  and  the 
animals  were  fed  almost  exclusively  on  rice  straw. 

During  these  preparations  Sherman  received  Grant's 
orders  to  send  the  bulk  of  his  forces  to  Virginia  by  water. 
For  the  army  in  front  of  Petersburg  had  been  greatly  de- 
pleted by  the  summer's  campaign.  While  preparing  to  com- 
ply, though  strongly  urging  the  advantages  of  his  own  plau 
for  a  march  overland,  he  partly  lost  his  grip  on  Hardee. 
The     latter,    smelling     disaster     afar     off, 

Deoember  20. 

deemed  it  wise  to  evacuate  the  place  before 
his  sole  outlet  was  cut.  Although  he  lost  the  chance  of 
capturing  Hardee's  forces,  Sherman  was  thus  enabled  to 
make  the  President  a  Christmas  present  of  the  city  of 
Sayannah. 


LVII. 

HOOD  SEEKS  TO  CRUSH  SCHOFIELD,  —  FRANKLIN, 

WHEN  Sherman  unexpectedly  eluded  Hood,  thia 
general  became  doubly  anxious  to  get  at  Thomas, 
and  retrieve  the  standing  of  the  Confederacy  by  some 
brilliant  feat  of  arms.  But  the  November  storms  inter- 
fered so  materially  with  his    movements,  that  it  was  not 

until  late  in  the  month  that  he  pushed  from 

November  21. 
Florence   on    towards    Duck    iCiver.     This 

stream  was  the  first  serious  natural  obstacle  in  his  path, 
and  here  also  lay  Schofield. 

Thomas  occupied  Nashville,  shaping  the  somewhat  dis- 
cordant elements  now  under  his  command  into  an  army 
which  he  could  handle  with  confidence  against  an  activo 
enemy.  This  was  a  task  of  no  small  magnitude.  His 
force  embraced  the  Fourth  corps  under  Wood,  the  Twenty- 
third  under  Schofield,  three  divisions  of  the  Army  of  the 
Tennessee  under  A.  J.  Smith,  and  Wilson's  cavalry, 
beside  a  Liotley  collection  of  clerks,  recruits,  and  quarter- 
master's employes,  of  questionable  utility  in  a  fight. 
Hood's  command  consisted  of  Lee's,  Stewart's,  and  Cheat- 
ham's army  corps,  and  he  was  ably  supported  by  Forrest'i 
horsemen. 


294  BIRD'8-ETE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1864. 

Schofield's  orders  were  to  retreat  when  he  must  from 
before  Hood,  but  to  hold  him  as  long  as  possible  so  that 
Thomas  might  finish  his  preparations.  Schofield  was  anx- 
ious to  keep  south  of  the  line  of  Duck  Kiver  and  to  pre- 
serve the  important  bridge  at  Columbia.  But  Hood  flanked 
him  bv  crossing  the  river  above,  and  he  was  obliged  to 
retire   to   the  north  side.     Wilson,  though 

November  29.  .     „  i  -r^  , 

weaker  numerically  than  Forrest,  began 
to  show  himself  amply  able  to  cope  with  this  clever 
trooper,  and  protected  Schofield's  movements  against  his 
sudden  < lushes. 

Hoods  next  move  was  to  despatch  Forrest  around  Scho- 
field's left  to  his  rear  at  Spring  Hill,  whither  he  himself 
soon  followed,  obliging  Schofield  to  let  go  his  hold  on 
Columbia  and  retire  by  his  left  so  as  readily  to  form  line 
to  the  east. 

A  slight  interchange  of  hostilities  took  place  at  Spring 
Hill,  but  Hood  seemed  here  to  lack  his  usual  strong  initia- 
tive, and  the  advantage  of  his  manoeuvre  was  lost  by  failure 
to  push  the  fighting  while  Schofield  was  on  the  retreat. 

Schofield  wisely  retired  to  Franklin,  intending  to  put  the 
Harpeth  river  between  himself  and  the  enemy.  Lack  of 
pontoons,  however,  prevented  his  crossing  at  once,  and  he 
was  obliged  to  form  line  south  of  the  town,  and  to  intrench 
in  the  usual  manner.  He  at  once  set  to 
work,  however,  to  improve  the  fords,  and 
reestablish  the  bridges,  by  which  means  he  managed  to 
get  his  artillery  across  and  out  of  danger,  while  it  could 
still  be  used  to  advantage  from  the  north  side.  He  planted 
the  guns  on  some  high  ground,  and  in  a  fort  formerly  con- 


1864.] 


HOOD   SEEKS   TO    CRUSH  SCHOFIELD. 


295 


structed  on  that  spot.     With  considerable  exertion  he  also 
placed  his  trains  beyond  danger. 

Hood  had  rather  unnecessarily  complained  of  his  subordi- 
nates for  what  he  termed  their  lack  of  enterprise  at  Spring 
Hill,  and  all  were  in  high  tension  at  the  approaching 
opportunity  to  prove  his  strictures  false.  And  Hood  felt 
justly  confident  that  he  could  crush  Schofield,  separated  as 
he  was  from  the  main  Federal  army. 

Schofield  had  ordered  the  troops  to  begin  the  crossing  of 
the  Harpeth  River,  unless  attacked,  at  6  P.M.  Himself 
was  on  the  north  of  the  river,  where  he  could  best  watch 
operations  on  the  other  side,  as  well  as  pay  heed  to  Wilson, 
who  was  holding  head  against  Forrest  on  our  left. 

Wagner's  two  brigades  formed  the  Union  rear-guard, 
with  clear  instructions  to  retire,  slowly  and  without 
bringing  on  a  serious  combat,  within  the  main  line. 
This  was  protected  by  excellent  parapets,  and  able  to 
give  a  good  account  of  itself.  The  ground  was 
open.  The  advance  of  the  Confederates  could  be  pUiinly 
watched. 

Our  main  line 
was  bracing  itself 
for  the  approaching 
conflict,  expecting 
Wagner's  men  to 
retire  in  good  order 
from  their  front,  so 
as  to  afford  a  clear 
sweep  for  their  fire. 
But,  to  every  one's         Franklin.    Novembep  30,  1864, 


296  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1864. 

surprise,  Wagner  opened  upon  the   approaching  Confed 
erates,  and  almost  instantly  provoked  a  desperate  charge 
upon  his  isolated  brigades. 

With  a  yell,  Wagner  was  brushed  away,  his  men  rush- 
ing frantically  through  our  lines,  followed  by  the  victorious 
enemy,  who,  absolutely  on  the  heels  of  Wagner's  broken 
legiments,  overran  our  parapets  in  the  centre,  and  drove 
our  troops  back  in  much  confusion.  A  countercharge  by 
the  reserves  managed  to  recapture  a  portion  of  the  breast- 
works, while  the  enemy  was  not  to  be  driven  from  the  rest. 
But  our  troops  established  a  new  line  of  intrenchments 
within  twenty-five  yards  of  the  one  they  had  just  lost. 

This  preliminary  attack  was  made  about  5  P.M.,  and 
heavy  fighting  ensued  all  along  the  lines  until  nearly  four 
hours  after  dark.  The  combats  were  isolated,  but  desper- 
ate and  sanguinary,  without  advantage  to  either  party. 

Tactically  Franklin  was  a  drawn  battle,  but  as  his  posi- 
tion could  be  easily  turned,  Schofield,  at  11  P.M.,  ordered 
a  withdrawal  to  the  north  side  of  the  river.  This  was 
accomplished  without  loss. 

Nothing  better  proves  the  enemy's  determined  purpose 
to  crush  Schofield's  forces  in  this  battle,  than  their  heavy 
loss,  especially  in  officers.  Hood  confesses  to  six  thousand 
three  hundred  men.  Our  own  was  twenty-three  hundred. 
This  disproportion  savors  of  inaccuracy.  The  forces  on 
the  field  were  twenty-seven  thousand  Federals  to  a  slightly 
less  number  of  Confederates. 

Thomas  now  ordered  Schofield  to  retire  on  Nashville. 


LVIII. 

HOOD  BROKEN  BY  THOMAS. —  NASHVILLE. 

ACCORDING  to  his  wont,  Thomas  took  such  time  aa 
he  deemed  essential  to  complete  his  preparations,  de- 
ep ite  constant,  almost  angry,  demands  for  an  advance  from 
the  War  Office,  the  President  and  General  Grant.  With 
all  just  confidence  in  Thomas'  ability,  the  entire  North  in- 
Bisted  on  instant  action,  and  Grant  finally  ordered  Thomas 
either  to  move  upon  Hood  at  once  or  else  turn  over  the 
command  to  Schofield. 

Thomas  quietly  replied  that  he  would  cheerfully  do  the 
latter,  if  directed,  but  would  not  attack  Hood  until  he  was 
satisfied  that  the  time  was  ripe. .  He  desired  both  favorable 
weather  and  to  increase  his  force  of  mounted  men. 

But  the  enemy  was  devastating  a  considerable  part  of 
Tennessee  and  was  forcing  all  the  young  men  into  their 
ranks  ;  and  eyery  one  was  fearful  of  a  repetition  of  Bragg's 
march  to  the  Ohio  in  1862.  Logan  was  finally  ordered  to 
Nashville  to  supplant  Thomas.  But  before  he  could  reaci: 
the  ground,  Thomas  had  struck  his  blow. 

His  preparations  had  been  two  weeks  before  substantially 

completed.       Small  detachments  were  at  Murfreesborough, 

Chattanooga,  and    along   the   railroad.       This    latter    had 

297 


298 


BIRD'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR. 


[1864. 


been,  however,  interrupted  by  Hood  for  a  number  of  days. 
A  heavy  storm  of  sleet  and  ice  had  made  the  country 
almost  impassable  and  would  render  the  operations  of  the 
attacking  party  uncertain.     Thomas  had  made  up  his  mind 


December   15. 


to  wait  for  clearing  weather.     Finally  came 
sunshine,  and  with  it  Thomas'  advance. 
Hood  lay  in  his  front,  witli  Stewart  on  his  left,  Lee  in 

the  centre  and 
Cheatham  on  the 
right,  while  a 
portion  of  For- 
rest's cavalry 
was  operating 
out  upon  his 
right.  He  had 
some  forty-four 
thousand  men, 
but  his  check 
and  heavy  losses 
at  Franklin  had 
seriously  impair- 
ed the  morale 
^ ^  of  his  army  as 
well  as  thinned 
his  ranks.  Hood 
could,  however, 
not  retreat.  He 
was  committed 
to  a  death- 
It  was  his  last  chance  as  a  soldier. 


Nashville.    December  15-16,  1864, 


Btrugorle  with  Thomas. 


1864.]  HOOD  BROKEN  BY  THOMAS.  299 

Thomas  had  placed  A.  J.  Smith  on  his  right,  Woods 
in  the  centre,  and  Schofield  and  Steedman  on  the 
left.  He  advanced  on  Hood,  bearing  heavily  with  his 
right,  while  sharply  demonstrating  with  his  left.  The 
position  of  the  Confederate  Army  had  placed  A.  J. 
Smith's  corps  obliquely  to  their  general  line  of  battle,  an 
advantage  not  to  be  neglected.  Smith  pushed  in,  later 
supported  by  Schofield,  and  successively  capturing  the 
field  works  erected  by  the  enemy's  main  line  and  reserves, 
disastrously  crushed  and  turned  Hood's  left  flank. 

Meanwhile  Wood  was  making  all  but  equal  headway 
against  Hood's  centre,  and  the  first  day  closed  with  remark- 
able success  for  the  amount  of  loss  sustained.  Still  this 
was  not  victory.  The  morrow  might  bring  reverse. 
Hood's  fight  promised  to  be  with  clenched  teeth. 

Hood  seriously  missed  Forrest,  whom  he  had  detached 
on  a  raiding  excursion  and  without  whose  cavalry  his  flanks 
were  naked.  Cheatham  he  moved  during  the  night  over 
from  the  right  to  sustain  his  left,  which  had  proved  the 
weaker  wing.  On  the  morning  of  the  next  day  he  lay 
intrenched  upon  the  hills  back  of  his  former 

•  1       •  1         n      1  c        ^  December  16. 

line,  with  either  flank  somewhat  refused. 

Thomas  sent  Wilson  with  his  cavalry  to  work  his  way 
unobserved  around  the  extreme  left  flank  thus  thrown  back. 

At  3  P.M.  a  general  assault  was  made  all  along  the  line. 
Upon  our  left,  Wood  and  Steedman  met  with  no  success. 
On  the  right,  however,  A.  J.  Smith's  onset,  concentrated 
at  the  salient  of  Hood's  left  centre,  proved  heavy  enough 
to  break  down  the  Confederate  defense.  Sharply  follow- 
ing up    his  successes,  allowing  no  breathing  time  to  the 


300  BIRD  'S-EYE   VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL    WAR,        [1864. 

exultant  troops,  Smith  pushed  well  home,  and  overcoming 
all  resistance,  drove  the  enemy  in  wild  confusion  from  the 
field.  Meanwhile  Wilson's  troopers,  dismounted,  fell  upon 
the  Confederate  flank  and  rear  and  increased  the  wreck  ten- 
fold. Reaching  Granny  White  Pike,  they  cut  the  enemy 
from  this  outlet.  Wood  and  Steedman  charged  again, 
broke  through,  and  with  renewed  joint  effort  the  rout  of  the 
enemy  became  overwhelming.  Almost  all  organization 
was  lost  in  Hood's  army  as  it  fled  across  the  country  tow- 
ards Franklin. 

Pursuit  was  promptly  undertaken,  but  though  seriously 

harassed, Hood  saved  himself  beyond  the  Ten- 
December  27. 

nessee  Kiver  with  the  remnants  of  his  army. 

Thomas'  losses  were  three  thousand  men.  Hood's  were 
never  officially  given,  but  our  tropliies  included  forty-five 
hundred  prisoners  and  fifty-three  guns. 

Thomas  had  settled  all  adverse  speculation  upon  his  slow- 
ness in  attacking  Hood  by  the  next  to  annihilation  he 
wrought  when  he  actually  moved  upon  him.  No  army 
was  so  completely  overthrown  during  our  war.  Nothing 
succeeds  like  success,  and  we  may  be  content,  perhaps,  to 
leave  the  grand  old  soldier  his  full  triumph.  Criticism 
may  be  well   laid   aside. 

liut  as  a  pure  matter  of  curious  study,  it  might  with  some 
justice  be  claimed  that  Thomas  was  at  any  time  strong 
enough  to  meet  Hood  on  the  line  of  Duck  River ;  and  that 
with  Schofield's  force,  reinforced  by  what  he  himself  had, 
he  might  then  and  there  have  overwhelmed  him  as  he  did 
later  before  Nashville. 

Thomas  was  a  Virginian.     In  1861  he  had  been  seek- 


1864.]  HOOD  BROKEN  BY  THOMAS.  301 

ing  a  college  position  in  his  native  State,  and  some  un- 
necessarily feared  his  loyalty.  Man  was  never  born  more 
true.  He  was  essentially  cast  in  a  large  mould,  in  mind 
and  body;  so  modest  that  he  shrank  from  command,  to 
which  he  was  peculiarly  fitted;  with  courage  of  the  stamp 
that  ignores  self ;  possessing  steadfastness  in  greater 
measure  than  audacity,  he  yet  lacked  none  of  that  ability 
which  can  deal  heavy  blows ;  while  no  antagonist  was  ever 
able  to  shake  his  foothold.  Honesty  in  thought,  word, 
and  deed  was  constitutional  with  him.  A  thorough  mili- 
tary training,  added  to  a  passionate  love  of  his  profession, 
and  great  natural  powers,  made  him  peer  of  any  soldier. 
Sedate  in  mind,  and  physically  slow  in  movement,  he  yet 
aroused  great  enthusiasm  among  his  men,  as  well  as  earned 
their  warm  affection.  Uniformly  successful  in  all  he  un- 
dertook, from  Mill  Springs  to  Nashville,  he  has  left  a 
memorable  name  and  an  untarnished  reputation.  He  per- 
haps falls  as  little  short  of  the  model  goldier  ae  any  man 
produced  bj  this  counti^. 


LIX. 

SHERMAN  MOVES  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS. 

/^  RANT'S  general  plan  for  a  final  campaign  had  in- 
VJ^  eluded  a  march  by  Thomas,  after  he  should  have 
used  up  Hood,  on  a  similar  scale  to  Sherman's,  to  a  new 
base  which  Canby  at  Mobile  should  open  for  him,  destroy- 
ing in  his  path  all  the  munitions  of  war,  factories  and  mills. 
But  Thomas  considered  it  unsafe  to  leave  Tennessee,  and 
preferred  to  operate  only  with  his  cavalry.  A.  J.  Smith 
was  consequently  sent  to  Canby,  while  Schofield  was 
ordered  to  the  Atlantic  seaboard. 

Schofield  moved  by  way  of  the  Ohio  and  Washington, 
with  the  Twenty-third  corps  under  Cox,  to  join  forces  with 
the  Tenth  corps  under  Terry,  then  on  the  coast  of  North 
Carolina.  Here  he  would  be  ready  to  cooperate  with  Sher- 
man as  the  latter  moved  northward. 

Fort  Fisher  protected  the  harbor  of  Wilmington,  N.C., 
the  last  of  the  ports  open  to  blockade  runners,  Savannah, 
Charleston,  and  Mobile  having  been  closed  by  our  naval  and 
land  forces.  It  was  of  importance  to  neutralize  this  asylum 
also.  Admiral  Porter  had  prepared  a  fleet  of  seventy 
vessels  for  the  expedition,  and  Grant  had  selected  Weitzel 


1864-5.]  THROUGH  THE  CAROL INA8.  303 

as  the  officer  to  accompany  him,  with  some  sixty- five 
hundred  men. 

As  ill  luck  would  have  it,  Butler  had  become  greatly 
exercised  over  a  scheme  for  blowing  up  the  magazine  of 
Fort  Fisher  by  exploding  a  powder-boat  near  by,  and  not 
only  did  he  accompany  the  expedition,  but  he  undertook, 
without  orders,  claiming  this  right  as  senior  officer  present, 
to  control  its  operations. 

On  arrival  of  the  forces  three  thousand  men  were  landed, 
the  2Tins  of  the  fort  havinar  been   silenced 

°  ^  Dec.  24-25, '64. 

by  a  bombardment  of  the  fleet.  The  ex- 
plosion of  the  powder-boat  was  a  complete  ^asco,  exciting 
only  curiosity  among  the  enemy  at  the  moment,  and 
laughter  afterwards.  The  land  forces  advanced,  and 
might  well  have  captured  the  place,  but  Butler  saw  fit  to 
recall  them,  alleging  that  Fort  Fisher  was  so  strong  that 
it  could  not  be  taken,  and  that  he  was  unwilling  to  sacri- 
fice the  lives  of  the  men. 

The  foUy  of  this  course  was  shown  within  a  month. 
Terry  joined   Porter  in  Butler's  stead,  and 

January  15,  '65. 

With  about  the  same  force,  after  a  gallant  as- 
sault, captured  the  fort  at  a  loss  of  seven  hundred  men. 
The  navy  lost  some  three  hundred  more. 

The  Twenty-third  corps  having  reached  Fort  Fisher, 
Schofield    assumed    command  of    the  joint 

February  22. 

forces  and  soon  after  captured  "Wilmington. 
From   here  Cox  was    ordered   to  New  Berne    to  make  a 
new  base    for  future    movements  and   later 
the  bulk  of  Scho field's  forces  entered  Golds- 
borough. 


304  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL   WAR.        [1805. 

No    socner   fairly    in    Savannah    than    Sherman,    glad 

enough  to  leave  political  and  commercial  questions  to  be 

settled  by  the  civil  authorities,  put  his  army 

Janiary,  '65  i  j 

afoot  for  Columbia,  which  had  been  his  ulti- 
mate objective  when  he  left  Atlanta.  He  purposed  to  feint 
on  Charleston  and  Augusta,  and  to  march  through 
Columbia  to  Golds  borough,  while  Grant,  by  extending  hia 
left  west  of  Petersburg,  would  prevent  Lee  from  turning 
against  him.  The  projected  route  followed  the  water-shed 
between  the  Combahee  and  the  Savannah  rivers,  as  it  was 
necessary  to  cross  the  intervening  streams  near  their 
sources,  where  they  were  not  wide.  At  this  time  of  year, 
even  small  rivers  in  this  section  become  swollen  and  im- 
passable. 

Charleston,  dear  to  the  Confederate  heart,  was  held  too 
long  —  Sherman's  advance  from  Savannah  not  being  ex- 
pected in  the  month  of  January  —  to  enable  the  enemy  to 
concentrate  in  Sherman's  front.  Beauregard  and  Hardee 
had  calculated  to  oppose  the  further  advance  of  the  Federal 
Army  in  February  with  some  thirty-three  thousand  men, 
but  Sherman  was  well  ahead  of  them  before  they  awoke 
to  the  reality. 

The  rains  had  been  persistent  and  heavy.  There  waa 
greater  difficulty  than  usual  in  bridging  streams.  The  soil 
was  so  treacherous  that  in  order  to  pull  through  the  artillery 
and  trains,  nearly  the  entire  distance  marched  had  to  be 
ijorduroyed.  It  required  exceptional  energy  and  vast  labor 
to  push  an  army  through  such  a  country.  Joe  Johnston 
has  comj.limented  Sherman's  veterans  as  being  the  toughest 
and  most  ready  men  since   Julius  Cajsar  commanded  hia 


1865.]  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS.  305 

Gallic  legions.  And  indeed,  as  Romans  m  courage  and 
endurance,  and  as  Yankees  in  inventiveness  and  adaptability, 
Cajsar's  legionaries  were  a  fair  prototype  of  Sherman's  bum- 
mers. 

TJie   army     reached    Columbia   after   an 

February  17 

arduous  march.  Before  entering  the  town 
Sherman  ordered  all  public  property  and  factories  capable 
of  making  munitions  of  war  to  be  destroyed ;  all  private 
and  educational  property  to  be  left  unmolested.  Not  the 
slightest  desire  to  injure  the  town  was  manifest,  for  no  such 
intention  existed.  But  a  fire  was  accidentally  started,  and 
before  it  could  be  got  under  control  had  made  such  head- 
way that  the  greater  part  of  the  city  was  consumed. 

The  crimination  and  recrimination  which  has  been  in- 
dulged in  about  the  burning  of  Columbia  probably  resolves 
itself  into  the  simple  fact  that  a  fire  of  cotton  bales, 
started  by  the  retiring  Confederates,  extended  beyond  con- 
trol. There  is  abundant  proof  that  everything  possible  was 
done  to  extinguish  the  flames,  but  to  no  avail.  And  after 
the  calamity  Sherman  did  all  that  man  could  do  to  help  the 
citizens  to  food  and  shelter.  There  may  have  been  some 
drunkenness  and  rioting  among  the  men.  Under  such 
circumstances,  when  are  they  absent?  But  the  testimony 
before  and  the  decision  of  the  Mixed  Commission  on  Amer- 
ican and  British  Claims,  in  the  matter  of  cotton  then  de- 
stroyed, settles  the  responsibility  beyond  further  argument. 
That  body,  as  able  as  disinterested,  attached  no  blame  to 
the  Federal  army. 

Sherman   almost     immediately     continued     his   march. 
Skirmishing  was  now  incessant  with  the  enemy  in  his  front, 


306  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.        [1865. 

but  the  loss  of  life  was  small.  Hardee,  finding  Charleston 
of  no  further  strategic  value  and  hoping  still  to  effect  some- 
thing against  Sherman  in  the  field,  evacuated  the  city,  upon 
which  Dahlgren  and  Foster  occupied  it. 

The  Confederates  concentrated  at  Cheraw 

March  2. 

to  oppose  our  advance,  but  by  pushing  for** 

ward  Slocum's  left  wing,  they  were  manoeuvred  out  of  theii' 
position.  Hampton's  cavalry  was  very  active  in  Sher- 
man's front.  On  one  occasion  he  surprised  Kilpatrick, 
who  had  become  somewhat  carelefcs  about  his  outpost  ser- 
vice, and  came  near  to  putting  a  term  to  the  latter's  useful- 
ness ;  but  this  slight  success  eventuated  in  no  gain  to  the 
Confederates. 

When  Lee  found  that  Hardee  was  making  no  headway 

against  Sherman's  progress,  he  assumed  the 

prerogative     of    commander-in-chief,     and 

assigned  Joe    Johnston    to    command   the   forces,    some 

twenty-six  thousand  men,  in  front  of  his  late  antagonist. 

Johnston   at   once  took  the  reins  in  hand, 

March  16. 

and  began  to  harass  Sherman's  van.  In 
the  small  affair  at  Averasborough,  Sherman  gained  an 
unimportant  success,  but  at  BentonviUe  came  near  a 
grievous   check. 

The  army,  partly  owing  to  the  bad  roads  and  partly 
to  the  necessity  of  foraging  on  the  country,  has  got 
much  strung  out.  Johnston,  well  aware  of  this,  and 
hid  behind  a  curtain  of  Hampton's  cavalry,  concen- 
trates at  Bentonville,  hoping  to  strike  a  heavy  blow 
at  Sherman  before  he  can  effect  a  junction  with 
Schofield. 


1865.]  THROUGH  THE  CAROLINAS,  307 

Sherman  himself  is  with  the  right  wing,  so  as  all  the 
sooner  to  open  communication  with  his  lieutenant.  Davis' 
division,  leading  the  left  wing,  stumbles  upon  Hampton  in 
a  manner  indicating  the  proximity  of  other  troops.  Sher- 
man  is   duly  notified,  but    makes    up   his     ,,    ,  ,« ^ 

•^  '  ^  March  1&-20. 

mind  —  rather  hastily  it  appears  —  that  it 
is  only  a  cavalry  force,  little  suspecting  thait   Johnston, 
with  twenty-two   thousand    men,    lies   massed    behind  it, 
ready  to  fall  upon  Slocum,  whose  entire  force  within  a 
day's  march  is  dangerously  small. 

The  blow  falls.  At  first  it  staggers  Davis,  whose  men 
fall  back  in  confusion,  but  without  panic  rally  and  reform. 
Slocum  speeds  back  messengers  to  bring  up  Williams' 
army  corps,  next  in  rear.  Morgan  and  Carlin  handle 
their  divisions  to  great  advantage,  and  yield  no  ground  to 
the  attacks  of  double  their  number  of  the  enemy.  Sher- 
man's bummers  are  unfamiliar  with  defeat.  In  this  pict- 
uresque combat,  which  wavers  fiercely  to  and  fro  from 
morn  till  dark,  our  troops  are  called  on  several  times  to 
fight  on  opposite  sides  of  the  same  breastworks,  so  com- 
pletely are  they  surrounded  by  the  Confederates.  But 
they  hold  their  ground  without  loss  of  courage. 

During  the  night,  reinforcements  arrive  from  the  right 
wing,  and  the  rear  of  the  left  wing  comes  up.  Johnston 
retires  foiled.  But  he  has  been  nearer  success  than  he  has 
guessed.  His  loss  somewhat  exceeded  two  thousand  three 
hundred  men ;  ours  was  over  sixteen  hundred.  This 
was  his  last  chance  in  the  Carolinas.  And  he  had 
lost  it. 

Stoneman,  accompanied  by  the  Fourth  Corps,  had  been 


308  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1866. 

ordered  into  the  Valley  from  Nashville  to 
pn .  ^gg|.j.Qy.  ^Q  railroad  from  Virginia  to  Ten- 
nessee. This  was  designed  to  cut  off  from  Lee  this 
means  of  retreat  from  Virginia,  and  source  of  supply  from 
such  part  of  Tennessee  as  was  still  in  the  enemy's  hands. 
The  raid  was  successfully  accomplished  and  had  nu  small 
effect  upon  the  morale  of  the  Virginia  forces.  Stoneman 
made  his  way  as  far  as  Salisbury,  N.C.,  where  he  de- 
stroyed a  vast  depot  of  reserve  stores. 

Wilson  led  a  cavalry  expedition  into  Alabama.  His 
prugreiss  was  opposed  by  Forrest.  Wilson  drove  this 
noted  paiiisan  into  Selma,  stormed  and  carried  the  town.. 

Forrest  escaped,  but  only  to  fall  somewhat 

Apnl2.  ^  "^ 

later  into  the  hands  of  a  detachment  of  our 
horsemen.  Wilson  won  great  credit  by  thus  ending  tbe 
career  of  this  doughty  champion  of  the  Confederacy. 

Sherman  was  duly  joined  at  Goldsborough  by  Schofield 
and  Terry.  This  ran  his  force  up  to  ninety  thousand  men. 
He  occupied  Raleigh  without  opposition.  The  end  of  the 
Confederacy  had  come  within  sight. 

Sherman's  active  field-work  ends  here.  What  has  been 
said  about  his  Atlanta  campaign  sufficiently  stamps  the 
man  and  the  soldier.  No  praise  can  add  to,  no  blame  de- 
tract from,  Sherman's  splendid  reputation  and  services. 
He,  if  any  one,  showed  during  our  Civil  War  the  divine 
military  spark. 

In  his  1864  campaign  he  was  pitted  against  the  strongest 
of  the  Confederates,  always  excepting  Lee ;  and  he  wrote 
his  own  strength  upon  every  page  of  its  history.  It  would 
have  furnished  an  interesting  study  to  have  seen  him  at  the 


Itt65.]  THROUGH  THE  GAROLINAS.  309 

head  of  the  splendid  force  wliich  started  from  the  Rappa- 
hannock when  he  himself  started  from  Chattanooga.  For 
Sherman's  work  never  taxed  him  beyond  his  powers.  It 
is  difficult  to  say  what  he  still  held  in  reserve. 


LX. 

THE  FINAL    CAMPAIGN. 

THE  marvellous  gallantry  of  the  South  had  availed  it 
nothing.  The  toils  of  its  stronger  opponent  were 
drawing  closer  and  tighter.  Never  had  nation  fought 
more  nobly  for  what  it  believed  to  be  right.  No  race  can 
harbor  a  more  just  pride  in  its  achievements  than  the 
American  Anglo-Saxon  may  do  in  the  splendid  resistance 
of  the  South.  Happy  our  Northern  homes  that  we  weMi 
not  called  on  to  endure  to  such  a  bitter  end ! 

Sherman,  in  his  march  through  the  Carolinas,  has  drawn 
a  line  of  steel  from  the  Appalachians  to  the  Atlantic.  Grant 
holds  Lee  fast  in  his  stronghold.  The  end  must  speedily 
come. 

Sheridan's  Valley  command  has  been  broken  up,  and  the 
Sixth  and  Nineteenth  corps  have  returned  to  the  army 
before  Petersburg. 

Sheridan  himself,  with  ten  thousand  sabres,  is  ordered  to 
operate  against  Lee's  communications  at  Danville.     This 
is  the  plan  Grant  has  been  urging  on  him  for  six  months. 
He  moves  to  Staunton  and  from  there  to  Charlottesville, 
crossing  swords  with  the  enemy  at  Waynes- 
boro.    But  he  is  unable  to  cross  the  James 
810 


1866.]  THE  FINAL   CAMPAIGN.  311 

on  accouut  of  high  water.     Foregoing  his  purpose  of  de- 
stroying the  Danville  Railroad  he  breaks  up  the  James  River 

Canal  and  the  Lynchburo:  Railroad  and  strikes 

March  19 

across  country  for  White  House  on  the  York 

river,  from  which  place  he  joins  the  Army  of  the  Potomac. 

Lee  could  not  expect  further  reinforcements.  There 
were  still  men  to  be  had;  but  the  population  of  the 
South  was  growing  tired  of  the  manner  in  which  the 
politicians  were  conducting  the  war.  And  there  was  not 
a  house  in  which  there  was  not  one  dead.  The  people 
saw  the  end  if  the  politicians  would  not.  The  starv- 
ing wife  and  children  called  from  his  duty  under  the 
colors  many  a  brave  man  who  had  for  four  years  risked  his 
life  for  the  cause  which  he  now  saw  was  beyond  saving. 
These  deserters  were  all  but  impossible  to  capture.  They 
were  shielded  wholesale  from  the  provost-marshals.  The 
commissariat,  too,  was  in  a  condition  of  collapse.  Only 
the  despairing  courage  of  the  leaders  remained,  and  their 
dwindling  retinue.  The  means  of  carrying  on  the  struggle 
had  been  exhausted.     The  last  ditch  had  been  reached. 

Lee  had  little  over  sixty  thousand  effectives.  Grant 
surrounded  him  with  more  than  twice  the  number.  The 
return  of  the  Valley  troops  and  reinforcements  had  again 
placed  Grant  in  overwhelming  strength.  He  had  one 
hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  men.  No  doubt  as  the 
time  approached  for  the  opening  of  what  all  saw  must  be 
the  last  campaign,  Lee  had  fully  determined  to  forsake  Rich- 
mond, and,  joining  to  his  own  the  forces  of  Johnston,  to 
retreat  to  the  mountains,  where,  if  he  could  not  prolong 
the  war,  he   might,  at   least,  command   better  terms  of 


312  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL  WAR.        [1865. 

peace  for  the  Confederacy.  He  accumulated  a  supply  oi 
rations  at  Amelia  Court  House,  west  of  Richmond,  ready 
to  take  with  him  when  he  should  retire  alonj'  the  Danville 
RaUroad. 

In  order  to  be  able  to  retire,  as  he  desires,  by  the  south 
side  of  the  Appomattox  river,  Lee  must  drive  Grant  from 
liis  hold  on  the  Boydton  road.  And  to  make  the  operation 
of  disengaging  himself  from  Richmond  and  Petersburg 
safe,  he  plans  to  attack  Grant  as  a  diversion.  Selecting 
Fort  Stedman,   on    Grant's    centre,   as   the 

March  25.  -i    ,  i  .  i  •  i  i 

most  available  pomt,  he  vigorously  assaults 
the  place  in  three  columns  of  selected  troops. 

Negligently  guarded,  Fort  Stedman  is  captured  by  a 
coup  de  main,  causing  the  abandonment  of  some  adjacent 
batteries.  But  the  assaulting  force  is  not  promptly 
supported,  and  Lee  is  forced  to  retire  under  the  concentric 
fire  of  other  batteries  commanding  Fort  Stedman,  — 
(Confederate,  "Hare's  Hill").  His  casualties  amount  to 
twenty-five  hundred  men  and  two  thousand  prisoners,  — 
a  loss  he  can  ill  afford. 

Grant  can  not  well  mistake  Lee's  purpose.  He  knows 
that  the  attack  on  Fort  Stedman  is  but  a  cover  for  some 
other  operation,  presumably  retreat,  for  the  prisoners  re- 
cently captured  have  told  a  sorry  tale  of  the  condition  of 
the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia.  Grant  therefore  once 
more  adopts  his  ancient  tactics  of  a  move  by  the  left.  But 
this  time  he  leaves  a  small  body  only  in  front  of  Peters- 
burg, and  makes  his  turning  force  sohd  and  strong. 

Sheridan  is  on  the  extreme  left,  moving  towards  Din- 
uriddie.     Warren,  with  Humphreys  on  his  right,  first  finds 


1866.]  THE  FINAL    CAMPAIGN.  313 

the  enemy  as  he  pushes  for  the  White  Oak  road.     A  com- 
bat, with  loss  of  four  hundred  men,  results 

.  March  29. 

m  W  arren's  favor. 

The  Union  line  stretches  out  from  the  Appomattox 
River  to  Dinwiddle  Court  House,  in  order  Parke,  Wright, 
Ord,  Humphreys,  Warren,  Sheridan.  With  not  much 
over  fifty  thousand  muskets,  Lee  has  thirty-five  miles 
of  intrenchments  to  hold.  Longstreet  is  in  the  Richmond 
defences ;  Mahone  at  Bermuda  Hundred.  In  Peters- 
burg are  Wilcox,  Pickett,  Bushrod  Johnson,  Heth,  and 
Gordon. 

Starved  as  ^e  is  for  men,  Lee  still  clings  to  his  old  and 
daring  tactics.  Stripping  the  lipes  to  the  barest,  he  col- 
lects fifteen  thousand  men,  and  once  again  essays  his  so 
often  successful  assault  upon  our  right.  A  heavy  storm 
supervenes.     Grant   arrests   the   movement 

^  March  30. 

of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac.     Lee   com- 
pletes his  preparations. 

Warren  has  formed  his  divisions  in  echelon.  The  habit 
of  moving  forward  in  line  enables  an  opponent  who  can 
efifect  a  breach  in  one  place  to  bear  back  the  whole  body, 
'file  disposition  in  echelon  allows  easy  support  of  one  por- 
tion of  the  line  by  another,  while  not  subje^t^^  ^-^  the  weak- 
ness mentioned.     Ayres  is  sent  forward  to 

,       TTTi  ^1  1  March  31. 

seize  the  White  Oak  road. 

Lee  once  more  makes  a  sudden  swoop  upon  Warren's 
left.  Ayres  and  Crawford  are  driven  in  ;  but  Griflftn  holds 
on,  and  Humphreys  thrusts  Miles  forward  upon  Warren's 
right.     Lee  fails,  but  we  lose  two  thousand  men. 

Sheridan  with  his  horse  moves  forward  to  Five  Forks. 


314  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR   CIVIL   WAR.         [1865. 

Lee,  whose  safety  demands  that  he  shall  hold  this  point, 
advances  an  equal  number  of  foot  upon  him,  and  drives 
him  back  towards  Dinwiddle. 

Grant  and  Meade  become  solicitous  for  Sheridan's 
safety,  and  send  Warren  to  his  succor.  Warren  throws 
Ayres  forward  towards  Dinwiddle.  Ayres  is  stopped  for 
a  few  hours  by  a  broken  bridge.  But  in  reality  Sheridan 
is  in  no  degree  compromised.  Lee  cannot  afford  to  leave 
BO  many  men  at  Dinwiddle,  and  withdraws  them  to  Five 
Forks. 

Sheridan  affain   follows  up  Lee  to   that 

April  1.  x-r     .     .  . 

place.  He  is  in  command  of  the  joint  cav- 
alry and  infantry  forces.  Masking  the  Fifth  corps  with 
his  cavalry,  and  attacking  smartly  on  the  right  of  Lee's 
line  to  divert  his  attention,  he  sends  a  body  of  horse  up  the 
White  Oak  road  towards  Richmond  to  arrest  any  rein- 
forcements which  may  chance  to  come  from  that  direction. 
Warren  forms  his  corps  with  Ayres  on  the  left,  Crawford 
on  the  right,  and  Griffin  in  rear  of  Crawford  as  reserve. 

Ayres  and  Crawford  have  each  two  brigades  in  front, 
each  brigade  in  two  lines  of  battle,  and  a  third  brigade  in 
similar  formation  in  rear  of  the  two  advance  brigades. 
Griffin  is  in  columns  by  battalion. 

The  march  is  directed  by  the  sun,  which  is  to  be  kept 

tver  the  left  shoulder.     The  line  of  advance  is  to  be  upon 

and  around  the  left  flank  of  the  enemy,  thus  taking  him  in 

reverse.     As  in  all  such  cases,  in  wooded  country,  there  ie 

some  delay  in  the  advance,  due  to  no  particular  neglect. 

,    .,  ,  The  cavalry  attack  in  front,  the  foot  falls 

Apnl  1  "^ 

upon   the   enemy   in   flank  and  rear.     The 


1865.]  THE  FINAL    CAMPAIGN.  315 

enemy  struggles  with  all  his  old  nerve,  changes  front 
in  good  style,  and  fights  manfully ;  but  outnumbered 
and  outmanoeuvred,  he  can  make  no  headway.  His  line  is 
broken.  Part  fly  westward,  five  thousand  are  captured. 
Our  loss  is  less  than  one  thousand  men. 

After  the  battle  of  Five  Forks  was  over,  Warren  was 
relieved  by  Sheridan  from  command  of  his  corps,  and 
Griffin  was  placed  in  his  stead.  It  can  not  be  denied  that 
Sheridan  had  the  right  to  do  this.  But  it  was  a  hard 
blow  to  one  of  the  most  gallant  men  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  who  had  ever  made  a  brilliant  record  in  all  that 
he  had  done.  To  say  that  a  Court  of  Inquiry  found  no 
want  of  activity  or  of  intelligent  effort  in  Warren's  conduct 
affords  little  consolation.  But  Warren's  history  is  written. 
Few  can  boast  so  clear  and  bright  a  fame. 

After  this  battle  Grant  opens  on  Peters- 
burg a  heavy  artillery  fire,  and  Parke  with 
the  Ninth  corps  goes  in  on  the  right  of  the  line.  He 
carries  the  outer  defences,  but  the  inner  works  are  stub- 
bornly held  by  a  mere  handful  of  the  enemy.  Wright 
with  the  Sixth  corps  carries  everything  in  his  front  and 
marches  down  the  Boydton  Plank  Road  towards  Peters- 
burg.    Humphreys  does  the  same. 

Opposite  Ord  is  Fort  Gregg.  Here  some  two  hundred 
and  fifty  Confederate  marksmen  place  five  hundred  of  our 
men  hors  de  combat.  Longstreet  brings  what  reinforce- 
ments he  can  from  Richmond  to  Lee  at  Petersburg:. 

Lee  nobly  meets  our  vigorous  attack. 
None  of  the  fire  which  in  days  of  high 
emprise  and  brilliant  hopes  blazed  in  his  assault,  was  now 


316  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF   OUR   CIVIL     WAR.         [1866. 

found  wanting.  But  gallantry  can  no  more  avail.  And 
brave  A.  P.  Hill,  whose  name  is  written  upon  every  page 
of  the  history  of  the  Army  of  Northern  Virginia,  falls  in 
this  last  attack.     Our  loss  is  thirty-four  hundred  men. 

During   the  night,  silently,  unperceived, 

April  2-3. 

Lee    retreats    from     both    Richmond    and 

Petersburg.  With  twenty-five  thousand  men,  he  marches 
sixteen  miles  west  from  Petersburg  along  the  north  side  of 
the  Appomattox.  In  the  morning  the  Union  forces 
enter  both  the  cities  which  they  have  so  long  and  so  ardu- 
ously labored  to  capture. 

Little  caring  for  these  empty  prizes,  Grant  pursues  by 
the  south  side  of  the  river.  Lee  hurries  along  towards 
the  Danville  Railroad,  still  hopmg  to  push  beyond  his 
enemy  to  a  point  where  he  can  join  to  himself  the  forces  of 
Johnston.  Either  Lynchburg  or  DanvUle  may  compass 
this  end. 

A  train  of  supplies  has  been  ordered  to  remain  at 
Amelia  Court  House.  Lee  proposes  to  ration  his  men, 
cut  loose  from  any  base,  and  push  boldly  for  the  foot-hills 
of  the  Alleghanies.  His  is  the  courage  which  does  not 
forsake  him.     There  is  yet  work  to  be  done. 

It  is  difficult  to  picture  Lee's  utter  consternation, — 
despair,  when  on  reaching  Amelia,  he  discovers  that, 
under  mistaken  orders  from  the  capital,  this  train  of 
victuals,  which  is  all  that  stands  between  him  and  sheer 
starvation,  has  been  run  on  to  Richmond.  The  authori- 
ties had  wanted  the  cars  on  Avhich  to  lo^d  the  archives 
and  valuables  of  the  Confederate  Government,  intending 
that  the  rations  should  be  left  for  Lee.     The  rations  had 


1865.]  THE  FINAL    CAMPAIGN.  317 

not  been  unloaded,  and  the  cars  had  been  forwarded  to 
the  capital.  Lee's  twenty  thousand  men  have  not  ,a 
mouthful  to  eat  save  what  they  can  gather  in  little  driblets 
along  the  road. 

A_T)i*il  4 

Sheridan  with  the  Second,  Fifth  and  Sixth 
Corps  pushes  remorselessly  onward.     Both  he  and  Lee  aim 
for   Burke ville,    but   Sheridan   is  the  fleeter  of   foot  and 
reaches  that  place  first. 

Lee  dares  not  halt.  He  now  has  Union  columns  press- 
ing hard  upon  his  left,  upon  his  rear.  Sheridan's  cavalry 
hurries  far  ahead  to  cut  him  off  in  the  advance. 

A  running  fight  is  kept  up  between  the  armies  all  the 
way.  Despite  gallant  defense,  the  day  generally  goes 
against    the    enemy.      At    Sailor's    Creek 


Ewell's  eiffht  thousand  men  are  cut  off  and 


A^-il  6. 


'& 


captured.     Our  loss  is  twelve  hundred. 

The  Confederates  are  literally  starving.  For  four  days 
they  have  had  nothing  to  eat  save  the  crumbs  of  their  last 
issue  of  rations.  Even  the  buds  of  the  trees  are  put  to  use 
for  food.  Those  who  are  best  off  have  but  a  few  handfuls 
of  com.  And  yet  they  cling  fondly  to  their  chief  and 
trust  that  all  may  yet  be  well. 

Lee  crosses  the  Appomattox  at  Farmville  and  fires  the 
bridges.      Humphreys  comes   up  barely  in 
time   to   save   one   of  them.     On   this    he 
crosses  and  attacks  the  Confederate  rear.     But  the  gallant 
fellows  have  lost  none  of  their  soldier's  pride,  and  repulse 
the  onset  handsomely,  with  a  loss  to  us  of  six  hundred  men. 

Lee  must  escape,  if  at  all,  over  the  narrow  neck  of  land 
between  the  James  and  Appomattox  rivers  to  the   west 


318  BIRD'S-EYE  VIEW  OF  OUR  CIVIL   WAR.         [1865. 

of  his  present  position.  But  Sheridan's  horse  is  nimbler- 
footed.  He  reaches  the  ground  first  and  closes  this  last 
outlet  also. 

Lee  is  trapped.  Like  his  old  self,  he  promptly  decides 
to  cut  his  way  through.  But  Sheridan 
anticipates  him  in  his  attack.  The  brave 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  comes  to  the  end  of  its  glori- 
ous career,  and  its  faithful  commander  can  do  no  more. 
After  a  short  correspondence,  the  chieftains  meet,  terms 
are  agreed  upon,  arms  are  stacked  by  the 
troops,  and,  at  Appomattox  Court  House, 
Lee  surrenders  to  Grant's  armies  some  twenty-nine  thousand 
men,  bearing,  it  has  been  said,  but  ten  thousand  muskets. 

The  first  act,  upon  capitulation  having  been  made,  is  to 
ration  tne  starving  Confederates.  Lee  takes  leave  of  the 
tearful  veterans  v^^ho  have  seconded  his  purpose  so  nobly, 
and  whose  very  rags  are  a  shining  honor,  in  a  few  heart- 
felt words  :  — 

"Men,  we  have  fought  through  the  war  together.  1 
have  done  the  best  I  could  for  you." 

The  Union  loss  in  these  closing  operations  was  about 
ten  thousand  men. 

General  Meade  had  remained  in  command  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  till  the  close.  Grant  had  directed  the 
larger  operations,  but  had  left  Meade  the  immediate 
control.  Meade  was  a  ripe,  sound  soldier.  He  fell  short 
of  greatness,  perhaps,  but  few  equalled  him  in  pre- 
cision and  steady-going  capacity.  Under  him  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac  saw  its  greatest  triumph,  and  its 
greatest  humiliation.     Gettysburg   was   Meade's   victory; 


1866.]  THE  FINAL   CAMPAIGN.  319 

Cold  Harbor  was  not  Meade's  defeat.  While  he  was  in 
command  the  army  was  always  in  safe  hands  ;  its  discipline 
was  excellent ;  its  esprit  de  corps  high.  All  his  subordi- 
nates held  him  in  great  esteem. 

In  minor  stations  Meade  obeyed  with  alacrity;  in 
supreme  control  he  commanded  with  discretion.  His 
qualities  are  not  salient ;  but  he  was  well  rounded  both  as 
a  soldier  and  as  a  man. 

Johnston  surrendered  to  Sherman  towards  the  close  of 
the  month.      There  was  some  friction  be- 

April  26. 

tween  Sherman  and  the  Secretary  of  War  as 
to  the  terms  granted  to  Johnston,  but  the  capitulation  was 
eventually  completed.  And  gradually,  so  soon  as  the  news 
had  spread,  the  smaller  armies  of  the  Confederacy  sur- 
rendered upon  similar  conditions.  These  were  substantially 
the  giving  up  of  all  material  of  war,  and  the  signing  by  aU 
Confederate  soldiers  of  a  parole  not  to  take  up  arms  again 
against  the  United  States,  and  to  return  at  once  to  their 
homes.  Transportation  and  rations  were  furnished  them  so 
far  as  could  be. 

Anger,  on  the  one  side,  was  swallowed  up  in  gladness 
for  the  happy  outcome  of  the  war ;  regrets  on  the  other 
disappeared  in  the  cessation  of  the  unavailing  strife. 

The  men  composing  the  vast  armies  on  either  side  soon 
peacefully  dispersed  to  their  homes  and  were  speedily 
engrossed  in  their  ancient  occupations  or  in  new  pursuits* 
No  act  of  lawlessness  is  on  record  to  stain  their  proud 
repute  as  soldiers  and  Americans.  This  remarkable  fact  is 
the  most  splendid  of  tributes  to  the  value  of  the  liberties 
of  the  New  World.     It  would  be  impossible  elsewhere. 


LXL 

A  FEW    STRAY    ITEMS. 


rriHE  theory  of  the  North  that  no  State  could  leave  thfl 
JL  Union  by  its  own  sole  act  had  been  maintained.  The 
seceding  States  were  stiU  part  and  parcel  of  the  nation. 
But  the  inhabitants  of  this  section  had  waged  war  upon  the 
United  States,  and  had  thereby  forfeited  their  civil  and 
property  rights.  Something  must  be  done  to  restore  the 
status  quo  a>nto  heihtm,.  ^,        v  ^    ^  *  v  /iT^ 

"Within  a  month  after  the  close  of  hostili- 

May29,1865.        .         ,       ^       .,  .  ,  i  .  i? 

ties  the  ^resident  issued  a  proclamation  of 
amnesty  to  all  who  had  participated  in  rebellion,  ex- 
cepting only  certain  prominent  classes,  on  condition  that 
each  person  taking  the  benefit  of  the  proclamation  should 
subscribe  an  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  United  States  and 
accept  the  results  of  the  war.  This  would  restore  to  such 
affiant  his  rights  as  a  citizen  and  his  rights  of  property ; 
but  the  oath  itself,  as  well  as  the  proclamation,  expressly 
sustained  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves. 

The  great  bulk  of  the  Southern  population  accepted  the 
amnesty  thus  offered,  and  gradually  thereafter  those  per- 
sons who  were  excepted  in  the  first  proclamation  were  re- 
admitted to  their  citizenship  upon  promise  of  future  loyalty 
890 


A  FEW  STRAY  ITEMS.  321 

to  the  laws  and  constitution  of  the  United  States.  Legally 
speaking,  the  Union  was  once  more  what  it  had  been,  pro- 
foundly at  peace,  and  without  any  stain  of  discord  upon  its 
garments. 

To  trace  the  history  of  Reconstruction  in  the  South ;  of 
the  bestowal  of  Civil  Rights  upon  the  former  slaves ;  of 
the  vast  frauds  committed  by  the  "  carpet-bag  "  administra- 
tions of  the  several  Southern  States,  and  the  unnecessary 
hardships  arising  from  this  vicious  system ;  of  the  turbulence 
thereby  excited,  and  the  cruel  and  sometimes  bloody 
attempts  to  cow  the  negro  population  into  its  ancient  ser- 
vility ;  and  of  the  gradual  renewal  of  good  feeling  and  con- 
cord, is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  little  work.  The  actual 
war  for  the  Union  had  ended ;  the  Union  and  the  Con- 
stitution had  been  maintained  ;  and,  as  a  result  not  antici- 
pated at  the  outset,  freedom  had  been  given  to  the  slave. 
The  price  paid  in  blood  and  treasure  had  been  vast.  But 
the  gain  for  future  generations  had  been  equally  vast. 
North  and  South  now  recognized  each  other's  strength,  and 
each  other's  readiness  to  battle  for  the  right.  Slavery  was 
.  buried.  And  the  Southerner  had  learned  that  honest  labor 
\  is  not  only  the  duty,  but  the  privilege,  of  every  man  who 
\jralues  the  heritage  of  our  common  country.  /  ^  lAi^A 
A  few  stray  statistics  must  close.  These  come  mainly 
from  the  War  Department  records  and  the  tables  of  the 
Treasury  Department  and  Pension  Office.  Any  inaccuracy 
in  approximation  is  traceable  to  paucity  of  Southern  records. 
The  average  population  of  the  North  and  South  from 
1861  to  1864  was  thirty-five  millions,  including  four 
million  slaves. 


322  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF  OUR    CIVIL    WAR. 

In  the  North  and  South  alike  the  first  troops  were  raised 
by  volunteering.  But  within  a  year,  in  the  South,  con- 
scription acts  were  passed  and  thereafter  kept  in  force. 
In  the  North,  volunteering  obtained  until  late  in  the  third 
year  of  the  war,  when  the  draft  also  went  into  effect  in 
most  of  the  States. 

Northern  troops  were  furnished  for  various  terms  of 
service,  from  three  months  to  "three  years  or  the  war." 
The  actual  enlistments  were  two  million  seven  hundred  and 
eighty  thousand  men  for  the  armies  and  navies,  or, 
reduced  to  a  three  years'  term,  ^.e.,  counting  three  one- 
year  men  as  one  three-years'  man,  and,  estimating  as  a  full 
man  only  one  who  enlisted  for  a  term  which  could  have 
lasted  three  full  years  (men  who  enlisted  in  January,  1865, 
for  three  years  could  actually  serve  only  four  months,  and 
would  count  as  one-ninth  of  one  man  each),  there  were 
furnished  in  the  North  about  one  million  seven  hundred 
thousand  men.  In  the  South,  counting  in  the  same  man- 
ner (a  man  who  enlisted  for  four  years  was  a  man  and  a 
third) ,  there  were  furnished  about  nine  hundred  thousand 
men.  These  forces  came  from  a  military  population, 
according  to  the  census  of  1861,  of  four  million  six  hun- 
dred thousand  in  the  North  and  one  million  and  sixty-five 
thousand  in  the  South.  Of  these,  about  one-fifth  were,  as 
usual  in  every  country,  exempts.  Thus,  in  the  North, 
about  four  men  in  every  nine  served  three  years ;  in  the 
South,  exemption  being  much  rarer,  nine  out  often  did  so. 

The  regular  army  of  the  United  States  was  never  large. 
Only  some  sixty-seven  thousand  regulars  served  through 
the  war.     The   bulk  of  the  forces  were  called   volunteer 


A  FBW  STRAY  ITEMS.  323 

troops,  though  few  regulars  in  any  country  were  ever 
better  soldiers.  But  the  prominent  general  officers,  and 
many  of  the  minor  ones,  were  men  whom  the  government 
had  educated  at  West  Point.  This  applied  equally  to  the 
South. 

In  the  North  over  two-thirds  of  all  the  men  who  served 
were  American-born.  In  the  South  all  but  a  small  per- 
centage were  so.  Among  the  foreign-born  soldiers  the 
greater  part  were  naturalized  citizens. 

Much  to  the  credit  of  our  colored  fellow-citizens,  there 
were  one  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  negro  soldiers. 

In  the  North  the  troops  served  in  twenty-five  Army 
Corps,  consecutively  numbered,  and  one  Cavalry  Corps. 
In  the  South  the  corps  bore  the  names  of  their  com- 
manders. 

The  following  was  the  strength  of  the  United  States'  and 
the  Confederate  States'  forces  at  various  dates,  present  and 
absent.  The  Southern  figures  are  from  accurate  data.  If 
anything  they  are  understated  :  — 

U.S.  c.s. 

About 

Jan.  1,  1861 16,367 

July  1,  1861 186,751  98,000 

Jan.  1,  1862 575,917  350,000 

March  31,  1862 637,126  353,000 

Jan.  1,  1863 918,191  441,000 

Jan.  1,  1864 860,737  471,000 

Jan.  1,  1865      .     ^     .     .     .     .  959,460  418,000 

March  31,  1865 980,086  175,000 

May  1,  1865 1,000,516 


324  BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF   OUR    CIVIL    WAR. 

This  gave  the  North,  on  the  average,  about  double  the 
force  of  the  South  (17  to  9)  ;  but  owing  to  the  larger  amount 
of  garrison  duty  done  by  the  invading  force,  in  the  field  the 
numbers  stood,  up  to  1865,  as  not  far  from  three  to  two. 

Of  every  thousand  men  there  were,  in  the  North,  on  the 
average,  seventy-three  men  sick,  and  two  hundred  and 
thirty-four  men  absent  for  various  reasons,  leaving  six 
hundred  and  ninety-three  under  the  colors. 

In  the  South,  except  towards  the  close  of  the  war,  when 
desertions  became  frequent,  the  average  with  the  colors  was 
somewhat  higher,  as  furloughs  were  much  more  rare. 

The  deaths  during  the  war,  in  the  North,  were  as 
follows  :  — 


Killed  or  died  of  wounds     .      .    j^,..-*-— "^ — /    \ — 110>070 
Died  of  disease  (two-thirds  due  to  service  ex- 
posure)               199,720 

In  Confederate  prisons  , 24,866 

Accidents 9,371 

Murders  and  suicides 1,015 

Military  executions 331 

Other  causes 14,155 

359,528 

In  the  South,  the  losses  in  killed  or  died  of  their  wounds 
were  94,000  men  ;  those  dying  of  disease  are  unknown. 
The  sacrifices  of  the  Confederates  were  appalling.  South 
Carolina  {e.g.)  lost  in  killed  or  mortally  wounded  one- 
quarter  of  her  military  population  —  a  record  probably 
unequalled  in  any  war. 

The  above  table  of  Northern  losses  does  not  include  the 


A   FEW  STRAY  ITEMS.  .325 

great  number  who  were  discharged  for  disability  during  the 
war,  and  who  died  at  home  from  the  results  of  exposure, 
wounds,  or  disease  contracted  in  the  line  of  duty,  and  other 
causes.  Counting  all  losses  directly  due  to  the  war,  it 
would  be  safe  to  say  that  half  a  million  men  were  lost  in 
the  North,  and  close  upon  the  same  number  in  tlie  South. 

There  are  buried  in  the  national  cemeteries  three  hun- 
dred and  twenty-five  thousand  Union  soldiers. 

At  least  seven  hundred  men  a  day  were  victims  of  the 
four  years'  war ;  and  there  was,  in  battle,  during  this 
period,  a  daily  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  of  over  four 
hundred  men. 

These  casualties  occurred  in  some  two  thousand  four 
hundred  actions  of  sufficient  importance  to  be  identified 
by  name ;  in  eighteen  hundred  and  eighty-two  of  which  a 
regiment  or  more  was  engaged.  This  is  nearly  two  for 
each  day.  There  were  one  hundred  and  twelve  of  these 
actions  in  which  the  loss  exceeded  five  hundred  men.  All 
this  tale  makes  no  count  of  the  innumerable  small  affairs 
on  the  picket-line  and  outpost  service,  and  in  scouting  and 
reconnoitring  duty. 

At  the  outset  of  the  war  no  prisoners  were  exchanged 
between  North  and  South.  But,  later  on,  better  counsels 
prevailed  and  a  system  of  exchange  was  inaugurated.  The 
exchanges  covered  several  hundred  thousand  men,  and 
were  made  on  equal  terms.  Retaliatory  measures  on 
prisoners  were,  except  in  isolated  cases,  not  resorted  to. 

The  medical  service  and  the  ambulance  system  of  the 
Northern  armies  were  more  efl^icient  than  had  ever  before 
existed.    The  Sanitary  and  Christian  Commissions  rendered 


326-         BIRD'S-EYE    VIEW  OF   OUR    CIVIL    WAR. 

services  never  to  be  forgotten.  Scores  of  thousands  of 
men  to-day  owe  their  lives  to  the  fidelity  and  skill  of  these 
ministers  of  mercy.  Numberless  surgeons  and  their  attend- 
ants lost  their  lives  on  the  field  of  battle  in  pursuit  of  their 
humane  duties.  In  the  South  scant  means  prevented  the 
same  lavish  outlay  for  this  purpose. 

At  the  close  of  the  war  one  hundred  and  seventy-five 
thousand  Confederates  surrendered. 

The  South  raised  its  means  for  carrying  on  the  war  by 
internal  revenue  and  by  loans  of  various  kinds  at  home  and 
abroad.  Some  of  these  had  the  cotton-crops  pledged  to 
secure  the  bonds  issued.  None  of  the  debt  created  by  the 
South  has  been  or  ever  can  be  paid. 

The  North  raised  its  moneys  from  loans  similarly  placed. 
The  United  States  debt  was,  substantially, 

June  30,  1861 $65,000,000 

June  30,  1865 2,682,000,000 

Increase  of  debt .     ......       $2,617,000,000 

There  was  raised  by  customs,  etc.,  in 
addition  to  the  above,  and  spent  on 
the  war,  some 783,000,000 

making  the  whole  cost  of  the  war    .     .       $3,400,000,000 

or  nearly  two  and  a  half  millions  a  day,  as  a  rough  calcu- 
lation, during  the  entire  struggle. 

Republics  are  said  to  be  ungrateful.  But  the  United 
States  has  paid  to  its  soldiers,  in  addition  to  larger  emolu- 
ments than  any  nation  ever  gave  its  troops,  three  hundred 


A   FFW  STRAY  ITEMS.  327 

millions  in  bounties,  and  has  already  paid  two  thousand 
millions  in  pensions.  Add  to  this  the  pensions  which  will 
continue  to  be  paid  until  the  pensioners  gradually  drop  off 
the  rolls,  and  we  reach  a  total  of  probably  four  thousand 
million  dollars.  This  is  about  eight  thousand  dollars  for 
each  man  who  died  in  service,  or  who  was  discharged  for 
disability  and  died  at  home,  in  addition  to  his  pay,  rations, 
and  clothing  while  in  the  service.  This  does  not  look  like 
ingratitude.     The  like  of  it  has  never  been  known. 


GLOSSARY. 


Ahatis,  —  Trees  cut  down  and  having  the  branches  stripped  and  theif 
ends  sharpened  and  pointed  towards  the  enemy  in  front  of  intrench* 
ments.  Abatis  delays  the  attacking  party  and  keeps  it  longer 
under  fire. 

A(t  of  War.  — Any  act  which  is  incompatible  with  the  friendly  relations 
which  exist  among  nations  at  peace  with  each  other  is  an  act  of  war, 
unless  immediate  reparation  is  made.  War  usually  follows  such  an 
act  among  nations  of  equal  strength. 

Ambulance.  —  A  vehicle  specially  adapted  to  carrying  wounded  men. 
Sometimes  used,  in  a  broader  sense,  as  the  hospital  system  of  an 
army. 

Affair.  —  A  small  engagement  or  action  between  forces  which  are  not 
very  numerous.     A  skirmish. 

A  main  forte.  —  "  With  a  strong  hand."     By  a  sudden  or  overwhelm- 
ing attack  or  movement  to  capture  a  plaae  or  do  any  work  is  to  do  it 
a  main  forte. 

Arms  of  Precision.  —  The  breach-loading  small-arms  of  to-day,  which 
are  very  precise  in  their  fire. 

Au  fond.  '■''To  the  bottom."  A  force  is  said  to  fight  or  to  charge  au 
fond,  when  it  does  its  work  thoroughly,  with  a  will,  or  to  the  bitter 
end. 

Base  (of  operations).  —  The  country,  city,  depot  or  locality  from  which 
an  army  starts  on  its  campaign,  and  on  which  it  relies  for  victuals, 
men  and  material.  The  line  of  operations  starts  from  the  base  of 
operations,  and  reaches  out  to  the  army.  Along  this  line  supplies 
are  carried.  The  line  may  be  a  railroad,  a  river,  or  a  road;  or  sev- 
eral sucti. 

Battle.  —  A  serious  engagement  between  rival  armies  which  is  apt  to  lead 
to  decisive  results.     An  action  of  large  proportions. 

Belligerents. — Legally,  only  those  nations  which  are  recognijied  by 
other  nations  as  independent,  and  which  are  deemed  to  have  the  rights 
of  independent  powers,  such  as  the  right  of  carrying  oi  war 
ToUoquially,  any  fighting  forces. 

329 


330  GLOSSARY,. 

Bivouac.  —  A  temporary  encampment.  Sometimes  used  when  no  tenta 
are  on  hand,  and  the  men  shelter  themselves  as  best  they  may. 

Blockade.  —  The  closing  of  a  port  by  an  enemy's  fleet  or  by  other  means, 
to  prevent  ingress  or  egress.  The  object  is  to  keep  the  nation 
whose  ports  are  blockaded  from  receiving  contraband  of  war  or  from 
exporting  its  own  commodities.  To  be  respected  by  other  nations, 
a  blockade  must  be  strictly  kept  up. 

Campaign.  —  A  series  of  operations  covering  some  period  of  time,  or 
beginning  with  a  definite  plan  and  ending  with  its  accomplishment 
or  with  failure. 

Cantonments.  —  Quarters  occupied  by  troops  for  a  considerable  time,  in 
villages  or  in  more  or  less  permanent  barracks,  huts  or  shelters. 
Winter  quarters  are  often  cantonments. 

Cashier.  —  An  officer  is  cashiered  when  he  is  (by  sentence  of  a  Court- 
martial)  dismissed  from  the  service,  and  forever  incapacitated  from 
holding  any  office  of  trust  or  emolument  under  the  United  States. 

Casus  Belli.  —  That  act  which  is  the  immediate  cause  of  war,  or  which 
is  alleged  to  be  the  reason  for  a  declaration  of  war. 

Charge.  —  An  advance  to  the  assault. 

Close  Order.  —  Massed  in  column. 

Column.  — Troops  in  close,  compact  order,  many  files  deep.  A  mass  of 
troops.     There  are  many  kinds  of  tactical  means  of  forming  column. 

Column  by  Battalion.  — A  brigade  will  be  in  column  by  battalion,  when 
the  battalions  composing  it  are  each  in  line  and  in  rear  of  each  other. 

Combat.  —  An  engagement  of  no  great  length  or  dimensions.  But  it 
may  be  sharp  and  bloody. 

Commissariat. —  The  force  employed  to  accumulate  and  distribute  rations 
to  armies.     Colloquially  applied  to  the  supply  of  food  on  hand. 

Commission.  —  A  permission  granted  by  a  government  to  a  ship  to  gc 
on  a  cruise  or  to  do  some  definite  act  of  war.  The  letter  appointing 
an  officer  to  his  rank. 

Communications.  —  The  line  of  operations.  {See  Base.)  The  route 
by  which  an  army  communicates  with  its  depot  of  supplies.  An 
army  must  keep  its  communications  open,  or  else  live  off  the  coun- 
try ;  this  latter  is  always  difficult  for  a  large  force. 

C7owcen){ric.  —  Towards  a  common  centre;  towards  the  same  objective 
from  different  places.  The  movements  of  the  Army  of  the 
Potomac,  the  Army  of  the  James,  and  the  Valley  Armies  on  Rich- 
mond, in  18G4,  were  concentric  operations. 

Conscription.  —  A  forcible  method  of  raising  troops.  Every  citizen 
capable  of  bearing  arras  is  enrolled  {i.e.,  put  on  a  list)  in  his  omu 
district,  and  drawings  by  lot  are  made  from  the  list  for  the  number 
of  men  apportioned  to  that  district  when  a  call  for  troops  is  made. 

Contraband  of  War.  —  Any  stores  or  arms  or  goods  of  any  kind  whatso- 


GLOSSARY.  331 

ever  which  will  enable  a  military  power  or  force  to  carrj  on  of 
prolong  a  war;  such  as  powder,  medicines,  rations,  ship-timber. 
Almost  any  article  may  be  contraband  of  war,  according  to  the 
circumstances,  and  the  use  for  which  it  is  destined,  or  the  amount 
of  it  on  hand,  etc. ,  etc.  Such  articles  may  legally  be  seized  by  either 
belligerent  wherever  found. 

Corduroy.  —  To  mend  a  road  which  is  deep  in  mud,  by  laying  across  it 
small  trunks  of  trees,  or  rails,  and  filling  the  same  in  with  dirt  or 
brush.  This  is  sometimes  done  very  carefully  and  a  substantial 
road  produced. 

Corral.  —  A  large  enclosure  into  which  wild  horses  or  cattle  are  driven 
and  captured.     A  stock-yard.     A  trap.     To  entrap. 

Counter.  —  To  meet  a  blow  by  a  blow,  or  an  attack  by  an  attack. 

Court  of  Inquiry.  —  Military  tribunals  may  be  Courts-raartial  or  Court* 
of  Inquiry.  The  former  try  officers  or  soldiers  for  crimes  or  of- 
fences against  military  law.  Courts  of  Inquiry  inquire  into  any 
matter,  the  facts  of  which  are  in  dispute.  They  may  find  the  factg 
such  as  to  warrant  the  calling  of  a  Court-martial. 

Counter-charge.  — A  charge  made  by  the  army  or  body  of  troops  which 
is  on  the  defensive  upon  another  which  is  advancing  upon  it,  in 
order  to  break  up  the  onset  of  the  latter.  A  charge  from  intrench- 
ments  upon  a  body  of  troops,  which  has  attacked  and  recoiled  from 
them,  in  order  to  disperse  the  assailants  more  effectually. 

Counter-march.  —  When  marching  in  one  direction,  to  face  to,  and  march 
in  substantially  the  opposite.  To  retrace  one's  steps.  There  are 
tactical  manoeuvres  specifically  called  counter-marches. 

Coup  de  grace.  —  The  death  stroke.  So  called  because  it  may  put  a  suf- 
fering creature  out  of  its  agony.    The  finishing  stroke. 

Coup  de  main.  —  A  quick,  sudden  attack  by  which  any  place  is  seized  or 
any  object  accomplished.     A  surprise. 

Jul  de  sac.  —  ''  The  bottom  of  a  bag."  A  blind  alley.  Any  place  hav- 
ing but  one  means  of  entrance  or  exit.     A  trap. 

Cut.  —  To  interrupt  or  sever,  as  a  road  or  other  means  of  retreat  or  ad- 
vance. 

Debouch.  —  Any  place  from  which  you  can  unobserved  fall  upon  the 
enemy,  or  so  move  as  to  compromise  him.  To  debouch  is  to  fall 
upon  the  enemy  or  to  move  from  such  a  place.  Troops  may 
debouch  from  a  bridge,  a  town,  a  pass  in  the  mountains. 

i^rclaration  of  War.  — A  formal  notice  by  one  nation  to  another  that  it 
considers  its  friendly  relations  with  the  latter  at  an  end.  It  is  usual 
to  give  it  before  opening  a  war. 

De  farfn.  —  Absolutely  done  or  accomplished,  whether  rightfully  or 
wrorgfully.  A  de  facto  government  is  the  one  actually  in  power, 
wh*>Mier  legally  or  not 


332  GLOSSARY. 

Defile.  —  A  long  narrow  pass  which  obliges  troops  to  march  through  it 
in  very  extended  order,  as  a  bridge,  or  a  gap  in  the  mountains.  To 
pass  a  defile  is  a  delicate  operation,  because  the  troops  are  not  in 
such  order,  at  the  moment  of  passing,  as  to  be  ready  to  meet  an 
attack.  To  force  a  defile  is  difficult  because  only  a  few  men  can 
move  through  it  abreast,  and  the  enemy  can  do  great  damage 
to  the  long  line  of  troops  by  firing  on  them  as  they  march  through. 

Ve  jure. — A  de  jure  right  is  a  legal  right  to  do  or  to  be  anything 
whether  you  assert  it  or  not.  One  man  might  be  de  jure  (^i.e,, 
rightful)  governor  of  a  place  while  another  might,  by  usurpation, 
be  de  facto  governor. 

Deploy.  —  If  troops  are  in  column  or  close  order  they  deploy  Into  line 
or  open  order.  If  in  line  or  open  order,  they  ploy  into  column  or 
close  order.  Troops  fight  in  line,  as  a  rule.  They  used  to  charge 
in  column.  They  camp  generally  in  more  or  less  close  order,  but 
taking  up  more  space  than  if  drawn  up  for  manoeuvres. 

Demonstrate.  —  To  operate  against  or  to  attack  in  order  to  ascertain  the 
condition  or  position  of  the  enemy,  or  to  blind  him  as  to  what  you 
intend  to  do.     To  demonstrate  is  to  make  a  diversion,  q.  v. 

Detail.  —  A  selection  of  men  for  any  purpose  from  a  larger  body.  Such 
as  a  detail  for  picket  duty  from  each  company  of  a  regiment.  The 
detail  may  be  regular,  i.e.,  from  all  the  men  by  rote,  or  it  may  be  a 
special  detail  of  reliable  men  for  a  work  requiring  intelligence  or 
courage. 

Develop.  — To  adopt  means,  as  by  a  reconnoissance  or  by  a  slight  attack, 
to  ascertain  all  about  the  force  opposing  you.  To  do  any  act  which 
makes  the  enemy  develop  his  strength  or  position. 

Direction,  Column  of.  —  That  body  by  whose  movements  the  rest  of  an 
army  has  to  govern  its  line  of  march. 

Diversion.  —  Any  attack,  large  or  small,  which  will  divert  the  enemy's 
attention  from  the  main  object  you  have  in  view  and  enable  you  to 
carry  out  your  plans.  A  diversion  often  draws  the  enemy's 
troops  away  from  the  main  point  where  you  intend  to  attack. 

Draft.  —  Conscription.  The  actual  drawing  by  lot  of  a  required  num- 
ber from  the  enrolled  men  of  a  district. 

Eccentnic.  —  Out  of  the  central  line  on  which  military  movements  should 
be  conducted,  in  order  to  protect  the  base  of  operations.  If  an 
army  retreats  along  any  except  its  line  of  operations,  it  makes  an 
eccentric  retreat,  which  niay  be  disastrous  to  it  unless  it  has  an- 
other base  to  fall  back  upon.  Even  then,  it  leaves  its  old  base  open 
10  the  attack  of  the  enemy. 

Echelon.  —  A  line  of  columns  or  bodies  of  troops  in  which  each  succes- 
sive column  or  body  is  placed  a  trifle  in  rear  of  the  line  of  the  on? 
next  on  its  right  or  left,  — like  a  ladder  {echelle),  or  more  like  tli** 


GLOSSARY,  333 

tread  of  a  pair  of  stairs.  The  bodies  do  not  lap,  or  stand  behind 
each  other,  but  only  stand  in  line,  each  one  further  to  the  rear. 

Effective.  — That  portion  of  a  body  of  troops  which  is  "  for  duty,"  i.e.y 
ready  to  do  effective  duty ;  which  will  be  able  to  fight.  Every  army 
has  many  non-combatants,  often  not  reckoned  as  a  part  of  the  effective. 

Elan.  —  Dash.  That  vigor  or  spirit  which  carries  troops  forward  with 
a  rush. 

Enfilade.  — To  fire,  with  artillery  or  musketry,  along  a  line  of  troops, 
i.e.,  from  a  position  on  their  flanks.  Such  a  fire  is  very  destruc- 
tive and  demoralizing. 

Engagement.  —  A  smaller  battle. 

Entrenchment.  —  {See  Intrenchment.) 

Esprit  dfi  corps. — When  companies,  regiments,  and  brigades  have 
served  beside  each  other  for  so  long  a  time  that  they  have  learned 
to  know  and  to  have  confidence  in  the  courage  and  energy  of  each 
other,  a  spirit  of  pride  and  reliance  animates  the  whole  body, 
which  is  of  the  greatest  value  in  a  military  sense. 

Fall  in.  —  To  take  one's  place  in  line,  or  column. 

Field-works.  Intrenchments  thrown  up  on  the  field  out  of  the  most 
available  means  on  hand.  Fortifications  not  of  a  permanent 
nature. 

File.  —  A  file  is  the  depth  of  a  body  of  troops  from  front  to  rear,  with 
one  man  front.  Rank  is  the  length  from  right  to  left.  Thus,  in 
a  company  of  eighty  men  in  two  ranks,  the  file  will  be  two  deep,  — 
the  rank  will  consist  of  forty  men.  To  file  out  of  a  place  generally 
means  to  march  out  of  it  by  the  flank,  for  when  a  line  faces  to  either 
flank,  its  then  front  has  the  width  only  of  the  depth  of  a  file,  and  it 
marches  by  file.  Tactical  formations,  however,  for  ease  of 
marching,  generally  double  these  files,  so  that  a  body  in  two  ranks 
marching  by  the  flank,  has  four  men  abreast. 

Flank.  —  Troops  in  line  of  battle  have  a  front,  a  rear,  and  two  flanks. 
The  flanks  are  the  ends  of  a  line  of  troops.  Troops  can  only  fight 
towards  their  direct,  or  slightly  oblique,  front.  If  attacked  in  the 
flank  they  must  change  front  in  whole  or  in  part  towards  the  attack- 
ing party.  This  is  more  or  less  difficult.  If  attacked  in  rear  they 
can  face  about ;  but  troops  cannot  fight  with  equal  confidence  faced 
to  the  rear. 

Flankers.  —  Small  bodies  of  troops  marching  in  the  same  direction  as 
the  main  column,  but  at  a  distance  ou  either  side  of  it,  to  protect 
its  flanks  from  sudden  attack.  The  distance  varies  according  to 
the  size  of  the  colunms  and  the  nature  of  the  ground. 

Hank  March.  —  Troops  march  in  action  by  the  front  j  for  short  dis- 
tances by  the  rear ;  when  not  in  presence  of  the  enemy  by  the  right 
oi  left  Aank.     A  flank  march  sometimes  means  a  march  with  cithei 


334  GLOSSARY. 

flank  leading ;  but  as  generally  used,  it  means  a  march  around  the 
flank  of  an  enemy;  a  circuitous  march  to  reach  and  attack  the 
enemy  in  flank  or  rear. 

flying  Wing.  —  A  body  of  troops  out  on  the  right  or  left  of  an  army, 
and  at  some  distance,  but  under  independent  control  and  command 
as  to  all  but  its  general  operations.  It  acts  in  a  larger  way  aa 
flankers  do. 

Flying  Column.  —  A  body  of  troops  cut  loose  from  its  base  to  do  some 
special  work,  and  meanwhile  to  live  on  the  country  or  on  the  rations 
it  starts  with. 

Forage.  —  Food  for  the  beasts  which  form  part  of  an  army.  To 
forage  is  to  go  out  for,  capture,  and  bring  in  any  kind  of  food  or  feed 
for  man  or  beast.  Foraging  parties  detailed  for  the  purpose  gen- 
erally do  this  work. 

Forced  Marches.  —  Twelve  to  twenty  miles  a  day  is  good  marching  for 
a  column.  If  the  troops  are  forced  they  can  do  much  more  than 
this  amount  for  awhile,  but  not  keep  it  up.  Forced  marches  are 
made  to  reach  a  place  where  the  troops  are  much  needed,  with  the 
utmost  despatch. 

Forlorn  Hope.  —  A  body  selected  to  capture  by  assault  a  very  dangerous 
position.  So  called  because  the  hope  which  each  man  has  of  sur- 
viving the  attempt  is  a  forlorn  one.  A  forlorn  hope,  if  it  makes 
a  breach  in  the  enemy's  defences,  is  followed  up  by  reserves,  so  as 
to  hold  what  the  forlorn  hope  has  seized. 

Furlough.  —  A  permission  to  a  soldier  to  be  absent  for  a  definite 
period. 

Garrison.  —  A  body  of  men  holding  or  defending  a  town  or  fort  or 
other  place. 

General  Engagement.  —  A  battle. 

Grand-tactics.  —  The  art  of  moving  large  bodies  of  men  on  the  field  of 
battle.  '*  Tactics  "  is  also  used  to  express  the  art  of  handling  arms 
and  performing  manoBuvres  by  soldiers  or  small  bodies  of  troops, 
as  companies  and  regiments. —  See  Strategy  and  Tactics. 

Guerillas.  —  Irregular  troops  which  conduct  irregular  warfare.  Land 
pirates.  Unorganized  forces.  **  Peaceful  farmers"  when  they  are 
not  making  raids  or  shooting  from  behind  trees  and  hedges. 
Troops  which  are  raised  for  a  sudden  incursion,  and  then  disappear 
into  the  population.  ^The  word  means  petty  war  in  Spanish. 
Guerilla  warfare  is  not  considered  legitimate.  War  is  supposed  to 
be  conducted  only  by  organized  bodies  of  troops  under  recognized 
leaders.  For  organization  alone  can  control  the  actions  of  the  indi- 
vidual soldiers. 

Sonors  of  War.  —  When  your  enemy  has  made  a  gallant  defense  of  a 
citadel,  and  you  find  you  cannot  easily  reduce  it,  he  may  still  per- 


GLOSSARY.  335 

hsps  agree  to  surrender  it  to  you,  if  its  importance  has  ceased,  or  if  he 
thinks  he  cannot  hold  it  much  longer,  on  condition  that  you  will  allow 
him  to  march  out  with  colors  flying,  drums  beating,  and  such  parade 
as  to  show  that  he  has  not  been  vanquished.  Such  a  body  so  marching 
out  is  entitled  to  be  saluted  by  you.  These  courtesies  and  parade 
are  called  the  "  honors  o{  war."  Surrender  of  the  place  alone  is 
usually  made,  and  not  of  the  troops  as  prisoners  of  war.  In  an  or- 
dinary surrender  thQ  troops  give  up  their  arms  and  become  prisoners. 

Hbj»  de  {or  du)  Combat.  —  "Out  of  the  fight ";  killed,  wounded  or 
missing  men  are  said  to  he  placed  hers  de  combat. 

Incursions.  — Attacks  across  the  border,  and  into  the  enemy's  territory; 
or  into  territory  occupied  by  him. 

Inirenchments.  —  Defensive  works  thrown  up  to  help  trocj^s  to  hold  a 
position.  The  simplest  form  is  a  ditch  the  dirt  from  vhich  is  piled 
up  in  an  embankment  behind  which  the  defenders  stand.  Abatis, 
and  various  kinds  of  entanglements,  are  erected  in  front,  when 
time  allows,  to  keep  the  enemy  long  under  fire  from  the  in- 
trenchraents. 

Itinerary.  —  Order  of  march.  Instructions  or  minutes  showing  when 
and  on  what  roads  each  portion  of  an  array  is  to  march. 

Key  of  a  Position.  —  That  point  of  a  battle-field  which  stands  in  such 
relation  to  the  enemy's  position  that  if  captured  it  will  oblige  him 
to  retreat  or  will  compromise  him  in  some  way.  A  hill  overlooking 
or  enfilading  his  line  may  be  the  key  to  a  battle-field. 

Left  {by  the).  — A  body  of  troops  moves  by  its  left  when  it  moves  with 
its  left  flank  in  advance.  An  army  must  be  so  marched  as  most 
readily  to  f  a(ie  towards  the  enemy,  and  may  be  marched  by  its  right 
or  left  for  this  purpose. 

Letters  of  Marque.  —  Permission  given  Jt>y  a  government  to  private  indi- 
viduals to  equip  vessels  and  prey  upon  the  commerce  of  the  enemy. 

Line.  —  The  length  of  a  body  of  troops  from  right  to  left.  Troops  used 
in  ancient  days  to  be  fought  in  masses,  with  files  many  men  deep. 
This  depth  has  been  gradually  decreasing.  In  the  last  century  tho 
file  was  of  eight,  six  and  four  men.  In  this  it  has  come  down  to  three 
and  two.  A  line  of  battle  of  a  regiment  now  consists  of  two  ranks. 
But  a  number  of  regiments  may  each  be  in  column  and  the  whole 
army  or  part  of  it  may  be  in  line  of  such  columns. 

Linv  of  Columns  by  Battalion.  —  A  common  form  in  action  for  making 
a  heavy  line.     Each  battalion  or  regiment  is  ployed  into  column. 

Line  of  Defense.  — A  line  along  which  troops  are  posted  across  the  path 
of  the  enemy  to  resist  his  further  advance.  Such  a  line  may  be  near 
our  base,  or  out  beyond  it  and  connected  with  it  by  our  line  of 
operations.  A  river,  or  a  chain  of  hills,  or  other  natural  ob- 
stacle is  desirable  as  a  line  of  defense.  Such  a  line  is  generally 
intrenched,  often  with  permanent  fortifications. 


336  GLOSSARY. 

Line  of  Operations. —  {See  Base.)     The  line  along  which  an  amry  la 
advancing  or  retiring  and  by  which  it  is  victualled, 
and  such  columns  stand  in  line,  with  suitable  intervals. 

Lodgment.  —  A  foothold  in  the  enemy's  territory,  or  position,  or  works. 

Logistics.  — Originally  the  art  of  lodging  troops.  {Logis.)  Now  the 
art  of  supplying  troops  with  rations,  material  of  war,  tianspoita- 
tion,  camp  and  garrison  equipage,  and  of  marcliing  it  from  place  to 
place.  In  short,  the  art  of  doing  everythipg  for  an  army  tixccpt 
manoeuvring  or  fighting  it. 

Lunge.  —  The  fencer's  thrust,  to  which  he  gives  strength  by  a  quick 
forward  step  so  as  to  add  to  the  thrust  the  weight  of  his  moving 
body. 

Mancewvre.  —  Any  movement  of  a  body  of  troops  intended  to  accomplish 
a  tactical  or  a  strategic  result. 

Material  of  War  — Anything  in  the  nature  of  arms,  ammunition  or  sup* 
plies  wliich  pertains  to  the  conduct  of  war  or  the  support  of  an 
army.  The  word  materiel  is  often  used  to  convey  a  larger  meaning 
than  the  English  word. 

MeUe.  —  A  mixed  fight,  in  which  the  troops  on  either  side  are  huddled 
together  in  a  mass,  neither  party  yielding. 

Morale.  —  That  cheerful  confidence  in  itself,  or  its  situation,  or  its 
leaders,  which  makes  an  army  full  of  courage  and  readiness  to 
encounter  danger.     The  converse  of  demoralization. 

Munitions  of  War.  —  Generally  applied  to  ammunition,  ordnance  and 
fighting-material  of  any  kind.  It  may  be  used  in  a  larger  mean- 
ing. 

Muster.  —  To  bring  together  a  number  of  men.  To  enrol  men.  Spe- 
cifically, to  swear  into  the  U.  S.  service.  A  volunteer  or  drafted  man 
only  became  entitled  to  pay  and  allowances  when  he  was  sworn 
into  the  U.  S.  service,  or  mustered.  It  might  be  weeks  or  months" 
after  enlistment  before  he  was  mustered.  In  raising  a  regiment, 
the  men  were  enlisted  singly,  and  the  regiment,  or  its  companies, 
when  full,  were  mustered. 

Won-combaiants.  Any  one  in  the  military  service  whose  duties  do  not 
oblige  him  to  bear  arms  or  to  take  an  active  part  in  battle.  Such 
are  surgeons,  quarter-masters,  their  assistants  and  camp-followers. 

Objective.  —  That  place  or  goal  to  reach  or  capture  which  is  the 
object  of  the  movement  going  on. 

Observe. — To  keep  watch  of  a  place  with  a  body  of  troops,  so  as  to 
hold  an  enemy  in  it,  or  to  prevent  his  attacking  you  from  it. 

Offensive-  Defensive.  —  In  offensive  warfare  we  attack  the  enemy  to 
destroy  him.  In  defensive  warfare  we  repel  his  attack.  In  offen- 
sive-defensive warfare  we  are  on  the  defense  but  we  a:tack  the 
enemy  to  keep  him  busy  so  that  he  shall  not  invade  our  territory, 
or  attack  us  at  a  disadvantage. 


GLOSSARY.  337 

Open  Order.  —  Extended  in  line. 

Outpost.  — A  small  body  posted  out  beyond  an  army  iu  camp  to  give 
timely  notice  of  danger,  and  to  hold  the  enemy  in  check  until  the 
main  body  can  form  to  resist  his  attack.  An  army  in  camp  is  sur- 
rounded by  a  circle  of  such  outposts. 

Ovtrslaugh.  — When  a  senior  oflScer  has  a  junior  promoted  over  his 
head  he  is  said  to  be  overslaughed. 

Overt  Act  of  War.  — Communities  on  whose  territory  the  operations  of 
war  are  being  conducted  are  by  the  law  of  nations  entitled  to  pro- 
tection from  harm  if  they  remain  peaceful,  unless  grave  public 
necessity  requires  the  destruction  of  what  may  be  contraband  of 
war  within  their  limits,  or  the  taking  of  provisions  and  supplies 
for  the  armies.  But  any  community  whose  inhabitants  interfere 
with  these  operations  (as  by  burning  bridges,  obstructing 
roads  or  taking  any  part  in  the  strife)  is  liable  to  be  treated  as  part 
of  the  enemy's  forces  and  to  be  visited  with  punishment  by  fire  and 
sword. 

Parade  Order,  —  With  the  steadiness  of  troops  on  parade.  In  action 
troops  rarely  preserve  anything  like  such  order. 

Parapet.  —  A  breastwork.     Part  of  an  intrenchment. 

Parley.  —  A  communication  between  enemies  for  which  a  temporary 
cessation  of  hostilities  is  made,  in  order  to  arrange  terms  for  sur- 
render, or  attend  to  the  burial  of  the  dead,  care  of  the  wounded, 
etc.,  etc.  During  a  parley  it  is  understood  that  neither  party  shall 
alter  its  position,  or  take  advantage  of  the  situation. 

Parole.  — The  promise  on  honor  given  by  a  prisoner  that  he  will  not 
take  up  arms  again  to  serve  against  his  captors.  Prisoners  of 
war  are  often  paroled  when  they  cannot  well  be  kept  and  are  then 
set  at  liberty.  They  are  thereafter  exchanged  as  if  still  prisoners 
of  war. 

Patrol.  —  A  force  which  moves  to  and  fro  to  keep  watch  of  a  certain 
point,  or  which  moves  around  from  place  to  place  inspecting  the 
condition  of  affairs.  The  force  which  moves  among  the  outposts  of 
a  camp  to  see  that  everything  is  in  order. 

Picket.  —  Substantially  the  same  as  outposts.  The  picket-line  is  gener- 
ally understood  to  mean  the  line  of  individual  sentinels  furthest 
out;  the  outposts  are  small  bodies  acting  as  reserves  to  the  picket- 
line. 

i'iace  d'armes.  — '  An  open  spot  on  which  troops  can  form  in  proj  er  order 
as  the  successive  bodies  arrive.  A  parade-ground.  It  is  difficult 
to  deploy  troops  and  start  them  on  their  work  quickly  and  in  good 
order,  without  suitable  ground  to  do  it  on.  Such  ground  is  an 
tssential  point  in  the  calculations  of  any  general  planning  a 
manoeuvre. 

Ploy. — To  form  close-order  from  open.     (iS^tf*  Deploy.") 


338  GLOSSARY. 

PiMvtoon.  —  A  portable  boat  used  to  bridge  rirers.  Several  pontoons 
anchored  in  line  at  suitable  distances  with  their  length  up  and  down 
stream,  and  joined  by  timbers,  form  a  pontoon  bridge.  Pontoons 
and  their  timbers  are  transported  in  wagons.  The  whole  is  a 
pontoon-train. 

Prestige.  —  The  credit  attached  to  having  accomplished  sucsess,  or  to 
having  acted  with  conspicuous  gallantry. 

Provost-marshal.  —  An  oflficer  whose  duty  it  is  to  arrest  and  hold  desert- 
ers, spies,  etc.,  and  substantially  to  do  the  police  work  of  an  army 
or  military  post. 

^aid. — A  sudden  operation;  generally  upon  the  communications  of 
the  enemy,  or  into  the  enemy's  territory.  Cavalry,  because  it  moves 
more  swiftly,  is  used,  as  a  rule.  A  raid  which  cuts  an  enemy's 
communications  with  his  base  seriously  compromises  his  safety, 
unless  he  can  at  once  repair  damages. 

Raise  a  Siege.  —  To  withdraw  from  besieging  a  fortress. 

Rank.  —  A  line  of  men  standing  shoulder  to  shoulder ;  a  file  is  a  line 
of  men  standing  one  behind  another.  '*  Rank  and  file  "  form  any 
body  of  troops,  and  is  applied  to  include  all  but  officers. 

Rear-guard.  —  A  portion  of  an  army  following  at  a  suitable  distance 
to  protect  it  from  attack.  On  the  retreat  the  rear  guard  is  large 
and  important. 

Reconnaissance.  —  The  operation  of  a  body  sent  out  to  reconnoitre,  or 
discover  the  whereabouts  and  force  and  probable  intentions  of  the 
enemy.  Reconnoissances  often  end  in  heavy  combats,  and  some- 
times rise  to  the  dignity  of  battles.  A  reconnoissance  in  force  is  one 
on  a  large  scale,  ready  to  do  heavy  fighting  if  it  becomes  essential. 

Reduce.  —  To  capture  a  place. 

Refused.  —  When  one  flank  of  a  line  is  bent  back  in  crochet-form  it  is 
said  to  be  refused.  This  is  often  done  to  protect  the  line  from  a 
probable  flank  attack. 

Retire  vpon.  —  To  move  towards,  so  as  to  derive  support  from  a  depot 
or  citadel  or  friendly  force. 

Right  (by  the).  — A  body  of  troops  moves  by  its  right  when  it  moves  with 
its  right  flank  in  advance. 

Riposte.  —  A  return  lunge  in  fencing,  after  a  parry. 

Salient.  —  A  salient  is  an  outward  angle  thrown  out  from  a  line  of  troops 
or  fortifications.  Its  weakness  consists  in  the  fact  that  there  is  a 
point  in  its  front  from  which  the  enemy  can  enfilade  its  sides.  Still, 
a  salient  is  sometimes  useful,  for  if  strongly  held  and  protected 
it  can  flank  an  enemy  attacking  the  line  on  its  left  or  right. 

Sally-port.  —  A  gate  by  which  a  force  can  make  a  dash  from  a  fortress 
upon  the  besiegers. 

Scout.  —  A  man  or  a  party  sent  out  to  discover  the  enemy  and  his  coo* 
dition.    Also  used  as  a  verb. 


glossary:  339 

Sieye  batteries. — Batteries  of  heavy  guns  which  cannot  be  readily 
moved  with  an  army,  as  batteries  of  field-guns  are.  Siege  guns  are 
kept  at  the  rear  until  wanted.  Th  ey  are  generally  mounted  ou 
specially  prepared  foundations. 

Sit  down  before.  —  A  besieging  or  observing  force  8it»  dovfn  before  s 
fortress  or  strong  place. 

Skirmish.  —  A  scattering  engagement  of  no  great  moment.  It  often 
precedes  more  serious  work. 

Sortie.  —  A  sudden  attack  from  a  strong  place  upon  its  besiegers,  in  order 
to  interrupt  their  plans  or  break  up  their  lines  of  approach. 

Strategy.  —  The  art  of  making  war  on  the  map.  The  movement  of 
armies  out  of  sight  of  each  other,  after  the  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign. The  manoeuvres  or  marches  by  which  a  general  seeks  to 
place  the  enemy  in  such  a  position  that  he  can  fight  him  at  a 
disadvantage.  Strategy  is  the  art  of  so  moving  your  army  that 
you  may  in  some  manner  compromise  or  weaken  the  enemy's 
army  before  you  fight  it.     (See  Tactics  and  Grand-tactics.) 

Tactics.  —  In  its  lesser  meaning,  the  instruction  of  the  soldier  or  squad 
or  company  or  regiment  in  bearing  arms  and  moving  as  one  body. 
In  its  larger  meaning,  the  art  of  moving  bodies  of  troops  on  the 
field  of  battle  or  in  the  immediate  presence  of  the  enemy.  (See 
Strategy.)  Having  been  brought  upon  the  field  of  battle  by  such 
strategic  movements  that  your  enemy  is  less  well  placed  than  you 
are  (with  regard  to  retreat  if  he  is  beaten,  or  in  respect  to  the 
ground  he  actually  occupies,  or  numbers,  or  in  any  other 
way),  it  still  behooves  you  so  to  manoeuvre  tactically  that 
vou  shall  defeat  him  by  actual  fighting.  B.g.,  a  move- 
ment of  an  army  or  part  of  an  army  so  as  to  threaten 
its  enemy's  line  of  operations,  if  at  a  distance,  would  be 
be  a  strategic  movement.  Such  was  Jackson's  march  through 
I'horoughfare  Gap,  in  Pope's  campaign.  The  same  movement  on 
the  field  of  battle  would  be  a  tactical  manoeuvre.  Such  was 
J.ickson's  march  about  Hooker's  left  flank  at  Chancellorsville. 
Again,  Lee  threw  Longstreet  upon  Meade's  left  and  Early  upon  his 
right  at  Gettysburg  on  July  2d,  and  Pickett  next  day  upon  Meade's 
centre,  as  tactical  manoeuvres;  but  the  operations  by  which  the 
Army  of  Northern  Virginia  and  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  moved 
away  from  and  towards  each  other,  starting  at  Fredericksburg 
and  moving  until  they  reached  Gettysburg,  were  strategic.  Tactics 
often  trench  on  the  domain  of  strategy,  and  vice  versa.  Many 
soldiers  would  call  Jackson's  manoeuvre  at  Chancellorsville  a 
strategic  one;  but  it  was  constantly  in  the  presence  of  the 
enemy. 

Take  in  reverse.  —  To  attack  an  enemy  in  his  rear  or  well  back  of  hit 
flank. 


340  GLOSSARY. 

Terrain.  —  The  actual  ground  on  which  manoeuvres  or  marches  are 
conducted.  Generally  used  in  a  topographical  sense;  i.e.,  with 
reference  to  the  surface  of  the  land,  whether  flat,  rolling,  sandy, 
much  cut  up  by  ravines  or  streams,  or  covered  with  forests, 
etc.,  etc. 

Threaten.  —  So  to  place  your  army  as  to  be  able,  unless  your  «uemy 
alters  his  position,  to  attack  some  weak  spot  in  his  defense. 

Transports.  —  Vessels  used  for  transporting  troops. 

Turn  an  enemy  out  of  a  place. — To  oblige  an  enemy  to  evacuate  a 
position  by  moving  around  his  flank  and  threatening  him  from  this 
quarter. 

Turn  the  right  or  left.  —  To  march  around  the  right  or  left  flank  of  an 
enemy  so  as  to  oblige  him  to  change  front  or  move  in  retreat. 

Uncover.  —  An  army  uncovers  its  line  or  base  or  communications  when 
it  so  moves  that  the  enemy  is  nearer  to  them  than  itself  is.  Though 
not  directly  in  front  of  its  base  an  army  may  still  cover  it. 

Vanguard.  —  A  smaller  force  preceding  an  army  by  a  distance  varying 
according  to  the  numbers  and  ground,  to  protect  it  from  sudden 
attack. 

Wing.  —  An  army  has  a  centre  and  a  right  and  left  wing.  These 
three  parts  may  be  substantially  equal,  or  either  may  be  larger,  ac- 
cording to  the  lay  of  the  land,  the  position  of  the  enemy,  the  work 
to  be  accomplished,  etc.,  etc. 

Wfk*.  —  Fortiflcationt  or  intrenchmento  of  anj  kiid. 


INDEX 


Ackworfh,  S84 
Aoquia  Creek,  70. 
AdairsTille,  228. 
Alabama,  195. 
Albemarle  Sound,  37. 
Alexandria,  73,  79,  163,  193. 
Allatoona,  280. 
AUatoona  Pass,  231. 
Allen's  Farm,  66. 
Alpine,  176. 
Altamaha,  287. 
Amelia  C.  H.,  312,  316. 
'Anderson,  Bobt.,  7. 
Anderson,  R.  H.,  270. 
Antietam,  105. 

Appomattox,  210,248,  312,  317,  318. 
Arkansas,  94. 
Arkansas  Post,  101. 
Atchafalaya,  144,  163, 164. 
Atlanta,  The,  85. 
Atlanta,  119,  223  et  seq.,  227  et 

seq.,  279,287. 
Angnsta,  287,  804. 
Austrians,  121. 
Ayerasborough,  806. 
Averell,  263,  276. 
Ayres,  313,  814. 

Bailey,  194. 
Bailey's  Creek,  268. 
Baker,  60. 
Baker's  Creek,  158. 
Ball's  Bluff.  50. 


Baltimore,  8,  102,  fSt. 

Banks,  70,  162  et  teq.,  198, 195. 

Baton  Houge,  93,  94,  148,  163. 

Battle  above  the  Clouds,  187. 

Bayou  Pierre,  149. 

Bayou  Teche,  163. 

Beaufort,  37. 

Beauregard,  17,  43,  46,  88,  209, 

283,  287,  304. 
Belmont,  24. 
Bentonville,  306. 
Bermuda  Hundred,  209,  244,  248, 

313. 
Berryville,  270. 
Beverly  Ford,  132. 
Big  Bethel,  14. 
Big  Black  River,  147,  151. 
Bisland,  Fort,  164. 
Black  River,  144. 
Blair,  10, 168. 
Blunt,  191,  192. 
Bolivar,  89. 
Bolton,  163. 
Boone ville,  21. 
Boston  Mts.,  31. 
Bottom's  Bridge,  62. 
Bowling  Green,  213. 
Boynton  Road,  312,  816. 
Bragg,   46,  84,  123,  126,  17J  •! 

scq.,  179. 
Brashear  City,  163,  164. 
Breckenridge,  94,  124. 
Bridgeport,  43,  164, 176. 
341 


342 


INDEX. 


Bristoe  Station,  73,  168. 

Brock  Road,  202. 

Brown's  Ferry,  183. 

Brownsville,  192. 

Bruinsburg,  148. 

Brush  Mt.,  234. 

Buell,  25,  43,  45,  83  et  seq.,  88. 

Bull  Run,  16  et  seq.,  72,  74,  169. 

Burkesville,  317. 

Burnside,  37,  106,  111,  127,  174, 

185,  245,  249. 
Butler,  14,  36,  38,  199,  209,  303. 

Cabell,  192. 

Caesar's  legionaries,  306. 

Cairo,  10. 

Camp  Creek,  228. 

Canby,  41,  195,  279. 

Canton,  159. 

Carlisle,  134. 

Carlin,  307. 

Carnifex  Ferry,  19. 

Carolinas,  The,  302  et  seq. 

Carthage,  21. 

Casey,  60. 

Cassville,  228. 

Catlett's  Station,  72. 

Cedar  Creek,  211,  270,  274,  275. 

Cedar  Mountain,  70. 

Cemetery  Hill,  137. 

Centreville,  79,  169. 

Chambersburg,  108,  254. 

Champion's  Hill,  153. 

Chancellors ville,  127  et  seq. 

Charles  City,  244. 

Charleston,  190,  304. 

Charlottesville,  310. 

Chattahoochee,  231,  242,  256. 

Chattanooga,   84,    174,    182,   184 

et  seq. 
Chattanooga  Valley,  185. 
Cheatham,  256,  259,  298. 
Chickamauga,  129, 179  et  seq.,  182. 


Chickamauga  Creek,  178. 

Chickasaw  Bayou,  99. 

Chickahominy,  215. 

Churchill,  101. 

Cincinnati,  86. 

City  of  Vicksburg,  143. 

City  Point,  209. 

Clear  Creek,  257. 

Cobb,  Howell,  104. 

Cold  Harbor,  215,  217  et  seq. 

Columbia,  282,  294,  304. 

Combahee,  304. 

Corinth,  47,  82,  89,  90. 

Cox,  280,  302. 

Crampton's  Gap,  104. 

Crawford,  314. 

Crittenden,  122,  124,  176. 

Crook,  199,  210,  253,  273,  275. 

Cross  Keys,  57. 

Crump's  Landing,  44. 

Culpeper,  109,  198. 

Culp's  Hill,  137,  139. 

Cumberland  Gap,  86. 

Curtis,  22,  31,  32,  82,  95,  195. 

Custer,  276. 


Dabney's  Mills,  266. 

Dahlgren,  Adm.,  191,  291,  306. 

Dahlgren,  Col.,  192. 

Dallas,  231. 

Dalton,  119,  224,  227,  280. 

Danville,  310,  316. 

Danville  R.R.,  311,  312,  316. 

Davis,  Adm.,  37,  47,  255. 

Davis,  Gen.,  289,  307. 

Decatur,  43,  243,  261,  284. 

Decherd,  173. 

Deep  Bottom,  248,  263. 

De  Russey,  Fort,  193. 

Dinwiddle  C.H.,  264,  312,  314. 

Dix,  134. 

Donelson,  Fort,  27,  28,  172. 

Dranesville,  50. 


INDEX. 


343 


Drury's  Bluff,  210,  244. 
Duck  River,  86,  293. 
Dug  Gap,  177. 
Dunker  Church,  106. 
Dupont,  36,  37,  190. 

Early,  114,  211,  252,  269  et  seq. 

East  Point,  261. 

Ebenezer  Creek,  289. 

Edward's  Depot,  152. 

Elizabeth  City,  37. 

Ellet,  143. 

Ellicott's  Mills,  253. 

Ely's  Ford,  200. 

Emmetsburg,  139. 

Emory,  164,  275. 

English,  121. 

Etowah,  229,  231. 

Ewell,  132,  199,  317. 

Ezra  Church,  260. 

Fairfax,  79. 

Fair  Oaks,  58  et  seq. 

Falmouth,  111,  128. 

Farmville,  317. 

Farragut,  39,  93,  164. 

Fisher,  Fort,  302. 

Fisher's  Hill,  270,  274. 

Five  Forks,  313,  314. 

Florence,  284. 

Florida,  The,  195. 

Foote,  30. 

Forrest,  172,  188,  284,  308. 

Fort  Hill,  155. 

Foster,  37,  191,  248,  291,  306. 

Frankfort,  86. 

Franklin,  54,  60,   62,    111,   127, 

193,  293  et  seq. 
Frazier's  Farm,  67. 
Frederick,  103, 120, 133, 134,  252. 
Fredericksburg,  110  et  seq.,  128. 
Fremont,  10,  21,  22,  23,  62,  57. 
French,  114,  170. 


French,  The,  121. 
Front  Royal,  56. 

Gaines,  Fort,  194. 

Gaines'  Mill,  62,  64,  216. 

Gainesville,  75. 

Gallic  Legions,  305. 

Galveston,  192. 

Gardner,  165. 

Garfield,  25,  181. 

Gauley  River,  20,  212. 

Gaylesville,  281. 

Georgia,  The,  195. 

Germanna  Ford,  200. 

Germans,  121. 

Getty,  276. 

Gettysburg,  135  et  seq. 

Gilgal,  236. 

Gilmore,  37,  190,  209. 

Glendale,  67. 

Goldsborough,  N.  C,  191. 

Goldsborough,  Adm.,  37,  303. 

Gordon,  275. 

Gordon's  Mills,  177. 

Gordonsville,  70. 

Grand  Ecore,  194. 

Grand  Gulf,  145,  147. 

Granger,  Gordon,  181,  188. 

Granny  White  Pike,  300. 

Grant,  26,  42,  84,  89,94,  142,  151, 
160,  184  et  seq.,  244  et  seq., 
248  et  seq.,  263  et  seq.,  310. 

Grapevine  Bridge,  64. 

Greenbrier  River,  20. 

Gregg,  Fort,  315. 

Grenada,  95,  97,  145. 

Grierson,  148. 

Griffin,  314. 

Groveton,  76,  78. 

Haines'  Bluff,  99. 

Halleck,  23,  24,   68,  80,    82,    84, 

103,  133. 
Halltown,  270. 
Hampton,  306,  307. 


344 


INDEX. 


Hancock,  63,  114,  140,  i99,  206, 

245,  2G3,  267. 
Hanover  C.H.,  68. 
Hanover  Town,  215. 
Hardee,  45,   124,  256,    258,   269, 

283,  291c^5cg.,804. 
Hardeeville,  292. 
Hare's  Hill,  312. 
Harper's    Ferry,  8,    14,   67,   103 

etseq.,  133,  253. 
Harpeth  River,  294. 
Harrisburg,  134. 
Harrisonburg,  64',  273. 
Hatcher's  Run,  265,  267. 
Hatchie  River,  92. 
Hatteras  Inlet,  36. 
Hawkinson's  Ferry,  161. 
Haymarket,  76. 
Hazen,  291. 
Heintzelman,  58,  62. 
Helena,  32. 

Henry,  Fort,  26,  27,  284. 
Henry  House  Hill,  79. 
Herron,  191. 
Hill,  A.  P.,  60,  62,  113,  134,  169, 

199,  246,  264,  316. 
Hill,  D.  H.,  62. 
Hilton  Head,  36. 
Hindman,  Fort,  101. 
Hindman,  Gen.,  191. 
Holly  Springs,  96,  97. 
Holmes,  166. 
Hood,  255    et   seq.,  282   et  seq., 

286  et    seq.,  293    tt   seq.,  297 

et  seq. 
Hooker,   63,   78,    105,    114,    127, 

134,  167,  183,  259. 
Hoover's  Gap,  173. 
Horseshoe  Ridge,  181. 
Howard,  131,  260,  280,  287. 
Huger,  62. 
Hurlbut,  142. 
Humphreys,  ^66,  812,  818. 


Hunter,  37, 190,  211,  353. 
Huntsville,  82,  84,  224. 

Imboden,  211. 
Imperial,  166. 
luka,  89. 

Jackson,  Stonewall,   18,  51,  5ft, 

63,  70,  73,  75,  129,  131. 
Jackson,  Miss.,  96,  145,  159,  160, 

284. 
Jackson,  Fort,  39. 
Jacksonville,  192. 
James  River,  65,  244. 
James  River  Canal,  273,  811. 
Jericho  Ford,  213. 
Johnston,  A.  S.,  25,  42,  46,  61,  86. 
Johnston,  J.  E. ,  50,  59,  97,  103, 

145,  152, 158,  159, 160,  224,  266 

etseq.,  306,  319. 
Jonesborough,  261. 

Kanawha,  199,  212. 

Eautz,  246. 

Kearney,  53,  67,  78,  79. 

Kearsarge,  196. 

Kenesaw,  239  et  seq, 

Kentucky  River,  86. 

Kernstown,  51,  254. 

Keyes,  58,  62. 

Kilpatrick,  192,  287,  290,  806. 

Kingston,  228. 

Knoxville,  83,  174,  188. 

LaFayette,  177. 

Lagrange,  148. 

Lander,  51. 

Lawrence,  192. 

Lee,  R.  E.,  19,  63,  102,  116,  128, 

137,  141,  252,  256,  263  et  seq., 

310. 
Lee,  298. 
Leesburg,  60. 


INDEX 


345 


Leuthen,  118. 

Lexington,  22. 

Libby,  62,  192. 

Lickskillet,  260. 

Little  Rock,  192,  194. 

Little  Round  Top,  137. 

Logan,  258,  297. 

Logan's  Cross-Roads,  26. 

Long  Bridge,  244. 

Longstreet,  63,  62,   75,  134,  137, 

139, 167, 179,  188,  199,  206, 313. 
Lookout  Mt.,  176,  185. 
Lookout  Valley,  176. 
Loring,  154. 
Lost  Mt.,  234. 
Loudon  County,  277. 
Luray,  272. 

Lynchburg,  211,  273,  816. 
Lyon,  10,  21,  22. 
Macon,  261,  287,  288. 
Macon,  Fort,  37. 
Macon  R.R.,  260. 
Magruder,  53,  62, 192. 
Mahone,  313. 
Malvern  Hill  67,  263. 
Manassas,  50. 
Manassas  Gap,  167. 
Manassas  Station,  73. 
Manchester,  173. 
Mansfield,  106,  193. 
Marietta,  231  et  seq.,  236  et  seq., 

280. 
Marmaduke,  191. 
Marshall,  26. 
Martinsburg,  271. 
Marye's  Heights,  112,  130. 
Maryland  Heights,  252. 
McAllister,  Fort,  291. 
McClellan,  13,  19,  49,  62  et  seq. 
McClernand,  45,  95,  97,  101,  102, 

109,  142,  lp7,  159. 
McCook,  122,  124,  176. 
McDowell,  17,  52,  70,  76,  78. 


McDowell,  Va.,  66. 
McLemore's  Cove,  176. 
McPherson,  142,  224,  226,   256, 

258. 
Meade,  106,  113,  134,  137,  140, 

169,  318. 
Meadow  Bridge,  64,  212. 
Mechanics ville,  64. 
Memphis,  47,  89. 
Meridian,  162,  224. 
Merrimac,  38. 
Merritt,  276. 
Middletown,  276. 
Miles,  104. 

Milledgeville,  287,  288. 
Millen,  288. 

Milliken's  Bend,  147,  169. 
Mill  Spring,  26. 
Milroy,  56,  133. 
Mine,  Petersburg,  248  ct  seq 
Mine  Run,  167  et  seq. 
Missionary  Ridge,  185,  187. 
Mississippi,  184. 
Mitchell,  42,  82,  84,  190. 
Mobile,  162,  194.  225,  279. 
Monocacy,  103. 
Monocacy  Junction,  263. 
Monitor,  38. 
Monroe,  Fort,  134. 
Montgomery,  162. 
Moon  Lake,  144. 
Moorfield,  254. 
Morgan,  307. 
Morgan,  FortH»194. 
Morgan,  John,  122,  17 J. 
Morris  Island,  191. 
Mosby,  277. 
Mud  March,  127. 
Mulligan,  22. 
Mumfordsville,  86. 
Murfreegboro',  86,  122,  17* 
Nachitoches,  193. 
NashviUe,  85,  283, 293,  297  e«»^ 


346 


INDEX. 


Natchez,  93. 

Nelson,  86. 

New  Berne,  37,  303. 

New  Bridge,  218. 

New  River,  20. 

New  Carthage,  147. 

New  Hope  Church,  232. 

New  Madrid,  29  et  seq.,  211. 

Newmarket,  272,  277. 

New  Orleans,  38,  92,  162,  225. 

Noonday  Creek,  236. 

Norfolk  Navy  Yard,  8,  190. 

North  Anna,  213. 


Ocmulgee  River,  287. 

Oconee  River,  287. 

Ogeechee  River,  288. 

Old  Wilderness  Tavern,  200. 

Olustee,  192. 

Oostanaula,  228. 

Opelousas,  1G4. 

Opequon,  271. 

Orange,  198. 

Orange  &  Alexandria  R.R.,  168. 

Orange  Turnpike,  200. 

Ord,  50,  90. 

Ossabaw  Sound,  287. 

Oxford,  97. 


Paducah,  10,  188. 

Pamlico  Sound,  37. 

Pamunkey,  215. 

Parke,  37. 

Patterson,  18. 

Peach  Tree  Creek,  266. 

Pea  Ridge,  31. 

Peeble's  Farm,  265. 

Pemberton,  92,  145,  151,  160. 

Perry ville,  87. 

Petersburg,   70,  210,  245,  248   et 

seq.,  263  et  seq..,  316. 
Phillipi,  13. 


Pickens,  Fort,  36. 

Pickett,  140. 

Pickett's  Mills,  232. 

Piedmont,  211. 

Pigeon  Mt.,  176. 

Pillow,  10. 

Pillow,  Fort,  47,  188. 

PineMt,,  234,  236. 

Pipe  Creek.  135. 

Pittsburg  Landing,  43. 

Pleasant  Hill,  194. 

Pleasonton,  109. 

Po,  206. 

Polk,  10,  179. 

Pope,  23,  29  et  seq.,  84. 

Pope's  Campaign,  69  et  seq. 

Porter,  A  dm.,  93,   97,    100,  143, 

148,  302. 
Porter,  Fitz  John,  39,  58,  60.,  62, 

64,  78,  80,  99,  101,  156,  193. 
Port  Gibson,  149. 
Port  Hudson,  144,  162  et  seq. 
Port  Republic,  57. 
Port  Royal,  36,  215,  291. 
Powell,  194. 
Prairie  Grove,  191. 
Prentiss,  45,  166. 
Prestonburg,  26. 
Price,  22,  31,''89,  195. 
Providence,  Lake,  144. 
Prussians,  121. 
Pulaski,  37,  284. 
Pumpkin  Vine  Creek,  231. 

Quaker  Road,  67. 

Quantrell,  192. 

Queen  of  the  West,  143. 

Raccoon  Mts.,  176. 
Raleigh,  30P,. 
Rapidan,  168. 
Rappahannock,  167. 
Raymond,  152. 


INDEX. 


347 


Beam's  Station,  246,  264. 

Red  River,  144,  163,  164,  192. 

Reno,  37. 

Resaca,  227,  280. 

Reynolds,  113,  136. 

Richmond,  86,  313. 

Rich  Mountain,  13. 

Ricketts,  76,  262,  275. 

Ringgold,  225. 

Rio  Grande,  41. 

Roanoke  Island,  37. 

Rocky  Face  Ridge,  227. 

Rome,  280. 

Rosecrans,  19,  88,  89,  121  et  seq., 

172  ei  seq. 
Rossville,  182,  187. 
Rossville  Gap,  178. 
Round  Top,  137,  139. 

Sabine  Cross  Roads,  193. 

Sabine  Pass,  192. 

Sailor's  Creek,  317. 

Salisbury,  308. 

Sandtown,  260. 

Savage  Station,  60,  66. 

Savannah,  37,  291  et  seq. 

Savannah  River,  288,  304. 

Schenck,  56. 

Schofield,  32,  188,  226,  256,  283, 

293  etseq.,  299,  302. 
Sedgwick,  128,  130,  199. 
Selma,  308. 

Seminary  Ridge,  137,  140. 
Semmes,  195. 

Sequatchie  Valley,  85, 176. 
Seven  Days'  Battle,  62  et  seq. 
Seven  Pines,  59. 
Sharpsburg,  104. 
Shelbyville,  173. 
Shenandoah  Valley,  55,  269. 
Shepherdstown,  252,  271. 
Sheridan,  125,  203,  209,  217,  246, 

269,  278,  310,  312,  317. 


Sherman,  T.  W.,  36. 

Sherman,  W.  T.,  24,  25,  95,  97, 

101,    142,    156,    159,    160,    185, 

188,  223  et  seq.,  227  et  seq.,  255 

et  seq. 
Shields,  51,  57. 
Shiloh,  42. 
Ship  Island,  38. 
Shreveport,  193. 
Sibley,  41. 
Sickles,  139. 

Siege  of  Vicksburg,  156  et  seq. 
Sigel,  22,  70,  199,  210. 
Slocum,  259,  287. 
Smith,  A.  J.,  193,  246,  283,  299, 

302. 
Smith,  Kirby,  86. 
Smyrna,  280. 
Snake  Creek,  46. 
Soap  Creek,  242. 
South  Mt.,  104. 
Southside,  246. 
Spotsylvania,  204. 
Spring  Hill,  294,  295. 
Stanley,  172. 
Staunton,  310. 
Stedman,  Fort,  312. 
Steedman,  299. 
Steele,  192,  194. 
Stewart,  256,  298. 
Stone,  50. 

Stoneman,  260,  307. 
Stone's  River,  119,  122. 
St.  Philip,  Fort,  39. 
Strasburg,  272. 
Stringham,  36. 
Stuart,  61,  72,  108,  132,  203. 
Sturgis,  22. 
Sudley  Springs,  76. 
Sulphur  Springs,  73. 
Sumner,  60,  62,  106,  111,  127. 
Sumter,  Fort,  7,  191. 
Susquehaunah,  134. 


348 


INDEX, 


Tallahatchie,  96,  144. 

Taylor,  164,  193. 

Tennessee  River,  300. 

Tensas,  144. 

Terry,  302,  -303. 

Thomas,  26,  85,, 86,  122.  173, 176, 
179,  181,  187,  226,  280,  '283  ei 
seq.y  293,  297  et-seq.^  300  etseq. 

Thoroughfare  Gap,  72. 

Tipton ville,  29  et  seq. 

Todd's  Tavern,  202. 

Tolopotomoy  Creek,  216. 

Tom's  Brook,  274. 

Torbert,  272. 

Trenton,  176. 

TuUahoma,  174. 

Tunnel  ffill,  185. 

Turkey  Bend,  67. 

Turner's  Ferry,  241. 

Turner's  Gap,  104. 

Tuscumbia,  284. 

Tybee  Island,  37. 

United  States  Ford,  129. 

Valley  Head,  176. 
Van  Dorn,  31,  89,  92. 
Vicksburg,  93,  94. 
Vienna,  16. 

Wagner,  Fort,  191. 
Wagner,  Gen.,  295. 
Waynesboro*,  288,  310. 
Walker,  Fort,  36. 
Walkce,  252. 


Walnut  Hill,  166. 

Warren,  168,  199,  263,  312,  813 

316. 
Warrenton,  72,  109. 
Washington,  250. 
Waterloo,  73. 
Wauhatchie,  184. 
Weehawken,  35. 
Weitzel,  163,  302. 
Weldon  R.  R.,  245,  264,  266. 
West  Va.,  13,  19,  20. 
Wheeler,  172,  290. 
White  House,  54,  65,  212,  215. 
White  Oak  Bridge,  67. 
White  Oak  Rd.,  313. 
Wilderness,  128,  197  et  seq, 
Williams,  93,  94,  307. 
Williamsburg,  63. 
Wilmington,  302,  303. 
Wilson,  246,  294,  299,  308. 
Wilson's  Creek,  22. 
Winchester,  133,  270. 
Winslow,  195. 
Wood,  180,  299. 
Wright,  Col.,  230. 
Wright,  Gen.,  253,  276,  27«. 

Yazoo,  99,  143,  144. 
Yazoo  City,  156. 
Yellow  Tavern,  264. 
York,  52, 134. 
Yorktown,  53. 
Young's  Point,  142. 

Zolliooffer,  26. 


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